Prescription Of Minimum Sentence Under Section 25 Arms Act No Bar To Extending Benefit Of Probation Under Section 360 CrPC: Punjab & Haryana High Court

16 November 2026 3:20 PM

By: sayum


CHANDIGARH — The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the prescription of a statutory minimum sentence does not preclude a court from granting the benefit of probation under Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to an offender convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act.

Justice Surya Partap Singh, while deciding the appeal on November 5, 2026, held that correctional and reformative jurisprudence permits courts to release first-time offenders on probation of good conduct, even where mandatory penal terms are statutorily prescribed.

The case originated from an FIR registered in December 2002 at Police Station Mohana, where police authorities intercepted five individuals allegedly planning a dacoity, leading to the recovery of weapons including a spring-actuated knife and an illicit firearm. Following trial, the Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, acquitted the co-accused but convicted the appellants under Section 25 of the Arms Act, sentencing them to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹500. Aggrieved by the conviction and order of sentence, the appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court, ultimately confining their relief during arguments solely to the extension of probation on the quantum of sentence.

Whether an individual convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act, which prescribes a statutory minimum sentence, is legally eligible to receive the benefit of probation under Section 360 CrPC and the Probation of Offenders Act.

Whether the lapse of more than twenty-three years of protracted criminal trial, coupled with the absence of antecedent criminal history, warrants replacing substantive imprisonment with release on probation of good conduct.

The High Court commenced its examination by scrutinizing the trial court record to ascertain the sustainability of the conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act. The bench recorded that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was consistent and fully established the commission of the offence, thereby leaving no ground to disturb the finding of guilt. However, turning to the sentencing aspect, the bench noted that the appellants had unequivocally confined their challenge to the quantum of punishment and prayed for release on probation.

Statutory minimum sentence does not restrict judicial power to grant probation to first offenders

Addressing the State's submission that probation could not be accorded due to the mandatory statutory minimum sentence attached to Section 25 of the Arms Act, the bench expressly rejected the contention as contrary to established criminal jurisprudence. Justice Singh observed that modern penology prioritizes individual reformation and correction over retribution, particularly for individuals who are not habitual offenders.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court ruling in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, underscoring that the underlying purpose of probation legislation is to prevent youthful and non-hardened offenders from turning into obdurate criminals through exposure to jail environments. The bench reiterated that modern criminal jurisprudence recognizes that many crimes stem from socio-economic factors and that reformative opportunities must be prioritized where statutory bars like death or life imprisonment are not attracted.

Subsequent Supreme Court precedents affirm probation despite statutory minimum terms

The Court placed robust reliance on the apex court's pronouncement in Chellammal v. State, highlighting the expansive scope of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vis-à-vis Section 360 CrPC. The Court recalled that Section 4 contains a non-obstante clause overriding other penal statutes, casting an obligation upon courts to examine the suitability of probation whenever statutory pre-conditions are satisfied.

The bench further fortified its reasoning by drawing upon Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, where the Supreme Court extended the benefit of probation to an offender convicted under Section 397 IPC despite the statutory minimum punishment prescribed therein. The bench also noted Amit Singh v. State of Rajasthan, where probation granted to an accused convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act was upheld by the top court.

Protracted trial of over two decades and clean antecedents justify reformative reprieve

Evaluating the mitigating factors on record, the Court took note of the Probation Officer's report alongside four core circumstances: the incident occurred over 23½ years ago, the appellants suffered a protracted trial throughout this duration, they were first-time offenders at the time of the incident, and they maintained an unblemished record with zero subsequent prosecutions.

The Court concluded that under such circumstances, subjecting the appellants to substantive imprisonment after nearly a quarter-century would run counter to the ends of justice. It held that the mandate under Section 360 CrPC was squarely attracted to substitute custodial incarceration with probation of good behaviour.

The High Court affirmed the judgment of conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act but partly allowed the appeal by modifying the substantive sentence. Directing that the appellants be released on probation of good conduct for a period of one year, the Court ordered them to furnish requisite bonds before the trial court undertaking to maintain peace and good behavior, subject to the condition that any default would render them liable to serve the original sentence.

Date of Decision: November 5, 2026

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