“No Second Bite At The Cherry”: Supreme Court Bars Successive SLP After Unconditional Withdrawal, Dismisses Borrower’s Appeal Against Federal Bank

“It is not a permissible practice to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing the special leave petition without obtaining permission of the Court” — Supreme Court

On September 23, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a significant ruling in Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL NOS.11752-11753/2025, shutting the door on a second Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the same High Court order when the first SLP was withdrawn without liberty. The Court dismissed the borrower’s civil appeals as not maintainable, reiterating that Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC bars an appeal from an order refusing review and that “public policy” principles against repetitive challenges apply equally to SLPs. The ruling reinforces finality in litigation and curbs tactical withdrawals designed to relitigate identical orders.

“It is for the public good that there be an end to litigation” — maxim applied to successive SLP attempts

The case arose from enforcement proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, where the appellant-borrower had mortgaged properties in Kozhikode and defaulted on repayment. The Kerala High Court (October 1, 2024) disposed of his writ petition by fixing a repayment schedule — ₹2 crore by October 30, 2024 and the balance in 12 monthly installments — with liberty to seek a one-time settlement after paying the initial sum. The borrower’s first SLP was dismissed as withdrawn on November 28, 2024, without any liberty to re-approach the Supreme Court. He then sought a review in the High Court, which was dismissed on December 5, 2024, and ultimately filed two civil appeals in the Supreme Court on December 12, 2024. Recording the “alacrity” with which the borrower shuttled between courts “without showing semblance of an inclination to repay the dues,” the Bench of Dipankar Datta and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ., noted it would weigh these factors while deciding maintainability. The Court concluded that entertaining a fresh challenge would be “contrary to public policy” and amount to sitting in appeal over its own earlier order that had attained finality.

The Court’s principal observation is categorical: a second SLP challenging the same High Court order is not maintainable when the earlier SLP was withdrawn unconditionally and without liberty to file afresh. Combined with the express bar under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC against appeals from orders refusing review, the decision consolidates the jurisprudence discouraging strategic withdrawals and repetitive filings under Article 136. The outcome: both civil appeals dismissed; connected applications closed; and the appellant left to pursue “appropriate” remedies, if any, before the proper forum in accordance with law.

The appellant, a “borrower” under Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, had obtained financial assistance from Federal Bank by creating an equitable mortgage over properties in Kozhikode. After default, the account was classified as NPA and measures under Section 13(4) SARFAESI were initiated. The Kerala High Court’s October 1, 2024 order required payment of ₹2,00,00,000 by October 30, 2024 and the balance, with future interest, in twelve equal monthly installments starting November 15, 2024. It warned that any default would allow the Bank to proceed under SARFAESI. The borrower’s first SLP was dismissed as withdrawn on November 28, 2024; the High Court later dismissed his review on December 5, 2024; the present civil appeals were then filed on December 12, 2024. The Supreme Court took note that the appellant “moved from court to court… to buy time by resorting to technicalities.”

Legal Issues at Hand And Court Observation On That: The central questions were whether a second SLP (in “series”) would lie after the first was withdrawn without any liberty; and whether, in view of Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC, an appeal would lie against an order refusing review. The Court emphasized that the maintainability issue was decisive; only if the appellant overcame that hurdle would merits — including the MSME notification arguments under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 — be examined. On precedents, the Court navigated three tracks: first, the long-standing bar crystallized in Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P., applying Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC’s public policy logic to SLPs; second, the doctrine-of-merger line in Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries clarifying that a non-speaking dismissal of SLP does not attract merger but allows review in the High Court; and third, the reference in S. Narahari to a larger Bench on a slightly different factual setting (withdrawal with liberty to seek review but without liberty to re-approach the Supreme Court). Distinguishing Narahari on facts, the Court found Upadhyay directly controlling: withdrawal of an SLP without liberty bars a fresh SLP against the same order. It also reaffirmed that no appeal lies against refusal of review under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) — the original decree/order remains intact when review is refused, and there is no merger.

The Bench held the civil appeals non-maintainable, resting its ratio on two planks. First, “the principle flowing from Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC is also applicable to special leave petitions,” meaning that one who withdraws an SLP without leave “to move for special leave again subsequently” cannot file a fresh SLP against the same order; allowing otherwise would encourage “bench-hunting tactics” and defeat finality. In words the Court approvingly set out, “It is not a permissible practice to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing the special leave petition without obtaining permission of the court…” This was tied to the broader public interest maxim: “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.” Second, the Court read Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC as an express bar: no appeal lies from an order refusing review, since refusal effects no change and there is no merger. The Court distinguished Kunhayammed and Khoday as addressing the maintainability of review in the High Court after non-speaking SLP dismissal, not the permissibility of filing a second SLP after an unconditional withdrawal. It also noted recent orders (including Vasantalata and the N.F. Railway Vending & Catering matters) but found no assistance for the appellant. Having ruled the appeals non-maintainable, the Bench declined to examine the borrower’s MSME-notification merits, observing those would arise only if the maintainability objection were overcome. The civil appeals were dismissed; connected applications stood closed; and the appellant was left free, “if so advised,” to pursue any lawful remedy before the appropriate forum.

The judgment crystallizes a clean rule of finality: after an SLP is withdrawn without liberty, litigants cannot circle back with a second SLP against the same order; and they cannot appeal an order refusing review. By anchoring its result in public policy, the CPC’s architecture, and settled Supreme Court authority, the Court fortifies the endgame of litigation and limits tactical relitigation under Article 136. In doing so, it also signals that merits-based pleas — however substantial — cannot be a passport to evade maintainability bars rooted in finality and judicial discipline.

Date of Decision: September 23, 2025