No Professional Misconduct If Advocate Merely Identifies Signatures in Consent Terms or Affidavits: Supreme Court Quashes Frivolous Disciplinary Proceedings by Bar Council

"The existence of a jural relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned is a precondition for the invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act" — Supreme Court On September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court of India decisively clarifying the limits of disciplinary jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court quashed the proceedings initiated by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa (BCMG) against an advocate merely for identifying a party in consent terms filed before the High Court. The Court held that such identification does not amount to professional misconduct and reiterated that a disciplinary complaint must be preceded by a reasoned reference order showing application of mind, which was absent in this case.

Advocate's Identification of Party in Consent Terms Not Misconduct Without Advocate-Client Relationship

"Entertaining complaints filed by adversaries in litigation against advocates is impermissible and amounts to gross abuse of disciplinary jurisdiction" – Supreme Court

In a scathing critique of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, the Court underscored that disciplinary jurisdiction cannot be exercised based on complaints filed by an advocate’s adversaries in a legal proceeding, especially in the absence of any advocate-client relationship.

The respondent-advocate Rajiv Narula was not representing the complainant or his predecessor. He had merely identified the plaintiff in Consent Terms filed in an old suit (Suit No. 2541 of 1985) before the Bombay High Court, which continue to remain valid. The Court held that this act of identification does not bring the advocate within the scope of “professional misconduct” under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

"By mere identification of the plaintiff, the respondent-advocate cannot be held liable to face proceedings under Section 35 of the 1961 Act" — Para 29

The complainant, Khimji Devji Parmar, who claimed to be the heir of a former partner in a firm involved in the dispute, had alleged fraud in the Consent Terms. However, as the Consent Terms had not been challenged or rescinded, the Court ruled that such allegations were misdirected and could not form the basis of a disciplinary complaint against a third-party advocate.

Recording of Prima Facie Satisfaction Mandatory Before Referring Complaint to Disciplinary Committee

"A cryptic reference order without even a bare minimum discussion of allegations is ex facie invalid and in teeth of Section 35" – Supreme Court

The Supreme Court emphasized the mandatory nature of recording reasons in referral orders under Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The order dated 6th July 2023 passed by the Judge-Advocate of BCMG referred the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee without any discussion of facts or prima facie findings. The referral order merely stated:

“After hearing the Complainant and Respondent and after going through the document available on record, according to me, Complainant has made out a case by invoking Jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act... Complaint is referred to D.C. for further inquiry…”

The Court held this to be insufficient and invalid, observing: “The order... is absolutely cryptic and laconic for it does not record any satisfaction... and hence, the same suffers from total non-application of mind.” — Para 38

The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, (1980 Supp SCC 318), where it was held that State Bar Councils must act on a “reasoned belief” before referring a matter to the disciplinary committee.

"The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct... the function... is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct..." — Para 36 quoting Nandlal Khodidas

Advocate Not Liable for Truth of Affidavit Contents When Merely Identifying Deponent

In the connected matter involving Advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, the Court further clarified that:

“An advocate, by mere attestation of the affidavit, does not become a privy to the contents of the affidavit.” — Para 53

In that case, the complainant had alleged that the advocate was liable for false contents in an affidavit simply because she had identified the deponent. The Court found this complaint to be “absurd, malicious, and untenable,” and held that mere identification does not impose any responsibility on the advocate for the truth or falsity of the affidavit.

Accordingly, the Court quashed Complaint No. 264 of 2017 against Advocate Ms. Shastri, and imposed costs on both the complainant and the Bar Council.

Malicious Complaints Against Advocates by Opposing Parties Deprecated

The Court issued a strong warning against misuse of disciplinary proceedings by adversaries in litigation. It held that permitting such complaints would "fundamentally jeopardize the independence of the Bar and the fairness of litigation."

“His prosecution, as being the lawyer of the opposite party... was highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.” — Para 33

In both cases, the Court found that the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa had entertained frivolous and legally unsustainable complaints, resulting in malicious prosecution and reputational harm to the advocates involved.

The Supreme Court issued the following conclusive orders:

• Complaint No. 27 of 2023 against Rajiv Narula and Complaint No. 264 of 2017 against Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri were quashed in their entirety

• The pending writ petitions before the Bombay High Court were closed

• Costs of ₹50,000 each were imposed on:

  • The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, for both cases

  • The complainants in the respective proceedings

• The costs were directed to be paid to the respondent-advocates via the Registry of the Bombay High Court

The Supreme Court's judgment marks a critical reaffirmation of the safeguards built into Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and sets a clear precedent that disciplinary jurisdiction must not be misused to settle scores in adversarial litigation. The ruling fortifies the independence of the legal profession by ensuring that advocates are not hauled into disciplinary proceedings without cogent grounds or due process.

This decision is expected to curb the growing trend of vindictive complaints by litigants, and acts as a stern reminder to Bar Councils to exercise statutory powers with responsibility, transparency, and respect for due process.

Date of Decision: 24 September 2025