Mere Discovery Of Accused's Presence At A Location Not A 'Fact Discovered' Under Section 27 Evidence Act: Delhi High Court Acquits Official In 1989 Bribe Case

"What should be discovered is a material fact and the information that is admissible is that which has caused that discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with each other as the cause and effect," Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that the mere discovery of an accused person’s presence at a specific location based on a disclosure statement does not constitute a "fact discovered" under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

A bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha observed that "a witness cannot be said to be discovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act though the statement of the accused may be taken into consideration as conduct relevant under Section 8." The ruling came while setting aside the conviction of a Desk Officer in a corruption case originating from 1989.

The case involved Ravinder Kumar Chopra (A1), a Desk Officer in the Ministry of Industries, who was accused of demanding a bribe from the Director of M/s. Aries Granites for an export license. The prosecution alleged that Chopra acted through a retired officer (A2) who was caught in a CBI trap accepting ₹10,000. Both were convicted by a Special Judge in 2002 and sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment, leading the appellant to challenge the verdict before the High Court.

The primary question before the court was whether the evidence of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court was also called upon to determine if a disclosure statement leading to the "discovery" of an accused person’s presence at a residence is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Additionally, the court examined the legality of wholesale marking of Section 161 CrPC statements as exhibits.

Court Clarifies Scope Of 'Fact Discovered' Under Section 27

The court found the trial court’s reliance on the disclosure statement of A2 to be "perverse." It was alleged that A2 told the police that the bribe money would be collected by A1 at the former's residence, and A1 was subsequently found there. The High Court clarified that Section 27 permits only that portion of information which relates to a "fact discovered," typically involving the place from which a physical object is produced and the accused's knowledge thereof.

The bench emphasized that the discovery of a person's presence does not meet the legal threshold of a "fact discovered." Citing the landmark Privy Council decision in Pulikuri Kottaya v. Emperor, the court noted that information that merely explains the material being discovered or does not lead to a physical object is inadmissible. Consequently, the disclosure statement of A2 could not be used as incriminating evidence against the appellant.

"The fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact."

Inaudible Audio Recordings And Lack Of Voice Forensic Analysis

Regarding the audio evidence, the court noted that the first cassette was rejected due to poor quality and that the same infirmities applied to the second cassette. The bench observed that several portions were inaudible and that the CBI had failed to obtain a court order before breaking the seals to prepare transcripts. Furthermore, the transcripts were prepared 20 days after the raid, raising concerns about the chain of custody.

The court further criticized the prosecution for failing to conduct forensic voice comparison. No sample voices of the accused were obtained, and the identification was made solely by an interested witness. The bench held that in the absence of expert opinion and proper procedural safeguards, the audio recordings could not form a reliable basis for a criminal conviction under the PC Act.

Adverse Inference From Non-Examination Of Key Shadow Witness

A critical blow to the prosecution case was the non-examination of the shadow witness, Amarnath. Although he was present for several hearing dates, the trial court did not take coercive steps to secure his presence after he reportedly settled abroad. The High Court noted that his testimony was vital for proving the recovery and the trap proceedings.

While acknowledging that evidence is weighed and not counted, the court held that the non-examination of such a central witness, coupled with other infirmities, adversely affected the prosecution's case. The bench noted that the remaining witness (PW4) had been declared hostile on material aspects, further weakening the narrative of a successful trap operation.

Irregularity In Wholesale Marking Of Section 161 CrPC Statements

The High Court expressed strong disapproval of the trial court's practice of marking statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC as exhibits wholesale. The bench reminded the lower court that such statements are strictly governed by Section 162 CrPC and can only be used to contradict a witness in the manner contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

Citing Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., the court reiterated that these statements cannot be used for seeking corroboration or as substantive evidence. The bench held that the wholesale marking of these documents was in "complete ignorance" of the procedural law and the established precedents of the Supreme Court.

"The statements made under Section 161 are statements made to the police during the course of investigation and the same cannot be used except for the purpose of contradicting a prosecution witness."

Suspicion Cannot Substitute Proof

The court also took note of the complainant's admission that the money might have been discussed in the context of "consultancy charges" for preparing a fresh representation. The complainant (PW2) admitted that A2 had mentioned fees ranging from ₹30,000 to ₹50,000 for his services as a consultant. This raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the ₹10,000 paid was a bribe or a professional fee.

Concluding the judgment, the bench held that while there might be grave suspicion against the appellant, the prosecution failed to bridge the gap between "may be true" and "must be true." The court emphasized that the evidence regarding the initial demand was inconsistent and the timing of the FIR registration was at odds with the complainant's testimony.

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of Ravinder Kumar Chopra. The court held that the materials on record were insufficient to establish the charges under the IPC and the PC Act beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant was acquitted under Section 248(1) CrPC, and his bail bonds were ordered to be cancelled.

Date of Decision: 28 April 2026