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by kapil
19 November 2026 7:59 AM
"Although the Court possesses limited discretionary power under Section 151 CPC to permit additional evidence in exceptional circumstances, such power cannot be exercised routinely to enable a party to overcome the consequences of its own prolonged inaction," Punjab & Haryana High Court
CHANDIGARH: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled that inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot be exercised routinely to permit additional evidence at the stage of final arguments merely to allow a litigant to overcome prolonged inaction and fill omissions, Justice Deepak Gupta held on November 16, 2026.
The petitioner-plaintiff had instituted a suit in 2019 seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell dated March 8, 2017, which the defendants specifically contested as forged and fabricated. After the petitioner availed more than 24 opportunities spread over approximately four years, his evidence was closed by the trial court vide order dated July 19, 2023, which attained finality without any challenge. Following the examination of a handwriting expert by the defendants and extensive cross-examination, the petitioner moved an application to examine a handwriting expert by way of additional evidence, which was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jind on October 30, 2026.
Whether a plaintiff who bore the initial burden of proving the execution of an agreement can invoke Section 151 CPC to lead additional evidence by examining a handwriting expert after the closure of affirmative evidence merely because the defendant examined an expert?
Whether supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to substitute the discretionary findings of the trial court refusing to reopen evidence at the stage of final arguments?
Burden of proving execution lies on plaintiff from inception
Dismissing the revision petition, the High Court observed that the defendants had explicitly disputed the execution and genuineness of the agreement to sell in their written statement from the very beginning. The court held that the petitioner was fully conscious from the inception of the proceedings that the burden of proving the agreement rested squarely upon him.
Despite having ample opportunities during the four-year trial window, the plaintiff chose not to examine any handwriting expert during his affirmative evidence. The court noted that the order closing his evidence had never been challenged and had consequently attained finality.
Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be used to fill lacunae
Addressing the scope of inherent powers, the bench underlined that while courts possess limited discretionary power under Section 151 CPC to permit additional evidence in exceptional circumstances, such provisions cannot be invoked routinely to bail out indolent litigants.
The court placed strong reliance on Supreme Court precedents, citing K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy and Bagai Construction v. Gupta Building Material Store, where the apex court categorically deprecated attempts by litigants to reopen evidence at the stage of final arguments merely to fill up lacunae and prolong proceedings.
Relevance of evidence alone does not warrant reopening of proceedings
Justice Gupta rejected the petitioner's argument that the proposed expert evidence was essential for a just adjudication, holding that relevance alone cannot supersede procedural discipline when a party fails to demonstrate due diligence.
The bench stressed that relevance of evidence, by itself, is not sufficient to justify reopening of a party's case after closure of evidence by a judicial order. The court must balance diligence, the stage of the proceedings, and the prejudice caused to the adverse party, especially in a suit instituted in 2019 that has already reached final arguments.
Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 does not allow substitution of trial court discretion
The High Court held that the trial court had carefully evaluated the previous proceedings, the 24 opportunities availed, the nature of the proposed evidence, and the delay that reopening the case would cause. The order could not be termed arbitrary or perverse.
Relying on the apex court's ruling in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, the bench reiterated that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not intended to substitute the High Court's discretion for that of the subordinate court merely because another view may be plausible.
Finding no patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity in the order passed by the trial court, the High Court dismissed the civil revision petition, while clarifying that its observations would have no bearing on the final merits of the suit.
Date of Decision: November 16, 2026