Defendant's Own Family Attested the Sale Agreement – Yet She Called It Nominal: Andhra Pradesh High Court Upholds Specific Performance

“Execution of Sale Agreement Not Denied, Attestors Are Defendant’s Son, Daughter and Mother – Adverse Inference Justified When Defendant Fails to Prove ‘Nominal’ Defence”, In a significant verdict on the scope of second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati dismissed Second Appeal, upholding concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts that granted a decree for specific performance of a sale agreement executed in 1998.

Justice Venuthurumalli Gopala Krishna Rao, while reaffirming settled law, held that once the execution of the agreement is admitted and the plaintiff proves readiness and willingness, the court is not bound to interfere under Section 100 CPC unless findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to settled legal principles.

The High Court found that the defendant had herself admitted executing the agreement, which was attested by her son, daughter, and mother, but failed to lead any evidence to support her claim that it was merely a nominal document executed for securing a loan of ₹10,000.

Rise in Property Prices No Ground to Deny Specific Performance – Plaintiff Ready and Willing Throughout

Rejecting the appellant’s plea of comparative hardship under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court observed: “The jurisdiction to grant a decree of specific performance is discretionary and the said discretion of the Court is not arbitrary, but it is sound and reasonable to be guided by judicial principles.”

The Court noted that the plaintiff had paid ₹20,000 as advance on 17.09.1998, issued a legal notice within the contractual period, and filed the suit in 2001 after the defendant failed to execute the sale deed. The defendant meanwhile enjoyed the advance amount for over 27 years.

The Court dismissed the plea that a substantial rise in property prices warranted refusal of specific performance, reaffirming that: “Mere rise in market value cannot disentitle a party to specific performance when readiness and willingness are proved, and there is no inequitable conduct.”

Agreement Executed in 1998, Suit Filed in 2001, Defendant Pleads Nominal Transaction

The case revolved around an agreement of sale dated 17.09.1998 for a consideration of ₹50,000, where the plaintiff paid ₹20,000 as advance, with the remaining amount to be paid within three years. After the defendant failed to perform, the plaintiff sent a legal notice dated 21.07.2001, calling upon her to execute the sale deed at the Sub-Registrar’s office on 30.07.2001.

The defendant, however, denied any sale transaction and claimed she borrowed only ₹10,000 for medical needs, and the agreement was nominal, insisted upon by the plaintiff (her sister-in-law) to secure the loan. She further alleged that the plaintiff failed to appear on the appointed day at the Sub-Registrar’s office.

Despite these contentions, the Trial Court in O.S. No. 161 of 2001 decreed the suit on 08.05.2007, which was confirmed in appeal by the Senior Civil Judge, Piler on 26.07.2011 in A.S. No. 18 of 2007. The present second appeal, filed in 2011, came to be decided only in 2025, marking 24 years of litigation.

Admission of Execution Coupled With Failure to Examine Own Family as Witnesses Weakens Defendant’s Case

A key factor that weighed with the Court was the defendant’s admission in cross-examination that the attesting witnesses to the sale agreement were her son, daughter and mother, but none of them were examined to support her case that the document was nominal.

The Court observed: “To prove the defence… the defendant did not venture to examine her own family members… Adverse inference is justified.”

Moreover, the scribe of the agreement (PW-2), a document writer at Piler since 1997, testified that the parties had negotiated and executed the agreement in his presence, and ₹20,000 was paid at the time of execution.

Compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC Satisfied Despite Framing Only One Point in Appeal

The appellant sought to assail the First Appellate Court’s judgment on the ground that it framed only one point for determination, contrary to Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. However, relying on multiple Supreme Court precedents including Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari and G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, the Court held: “Mere absence of multiple points for determination does not vitiate the appellate judgment when the evidence has been discussed and reasons assigned.”

The Court found that the appellate court had independently assessed evidence, agreed with the Trial Court’s reasoning, and hence, there was substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31.

No Substantial Question of Law Involved – Concurrent Findings Stand

Framing four substantial questions of law, including whether the discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act was exercised properly, and whether the First Appellate Court failed to consider evidence, the High Court answered all against the appellant.

Justice V.G.K. Rao clarified: “The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below… unless material evidence is ignored or findings are perverse.”

The judgment noted that none of the well-recognized exceptions applied in this case—no perversity, no misapplication of law, no shifting of burden of proof, and therefore, no interference was warranted.

Equitable Conduct Favoured Plaintiff – Defendant’s Hardship Plea Rejected

Dealing with the plea of comparative hardship, the Court referred to Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act and several precedents including Jayakantham v. Abaykumar and K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments, and held:

“The plaintiff was always ready and willing… The defendant received ₹20,000 and held on to it for 27 years without refund or performance.”

It further noted that increase in market value, by itself, was not sufficient to deny relief, particularly when the defendant never offered to return the money or perform the agreement.

Equity and Law Converge – Specific Performance Granted After 27 Years of Delay

After exhaustive analysis of facts, evidence, and legal provisions, the High Court upheld the judgments of both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, granting specific performance. The Court concluded that the case involved no substantial question of law, and the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the agreement even after the long passage of time.

“The plaintiff paid ₹20,000 in 1998, issued notice in time, and filed suit promptly. The defendant admitted execution, did not dispute attestors were her close relatives, and enjoyed the money for nearly three decades. There is no equity in her favour.”

The Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the decree and directing both parties to bear their own costs.

Date of Decision: 10 December 2025