-
by sayum
07 October 2026 4:35 AM
"If it is the case of the complainant that a particular amount is due and payable to him then he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the amount. He could not have gone to the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of cheating and criminal breach of trust." Supreme Court has reiterated that criminal proceedings cannot be weaponized as a tool for recovery of money in disputes that are essentially civil in nature.
A bench comprising Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar held that the registration of an FIR for offences under Section 420 (cheating) and Section 406 (criminal breach of trust) of the IPC, where the underlying cause of action is a commercial transaction, constitutes an abuse of the process of law.
The appellants, directors of a company engaged in the steel business, were accused of cheating and criminal breach of trust after they withheld payments to the complainant’s firm. The appellants contended that the payment was withheld as a set-off against prior dues owed by the complainant’s company to them, dating back to 2006. Despite the initiation of a criminal case in 2012, no civil suit for recovery was ever filed by the complainant, leading the appellants to challenge the criminal proceedings on the ground that the dispute was entirely civil.
The primary question before the court was whether a commercial dispute involving non-payment of dues can be prosecuted as cheating under Section 420 IPC or criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC. The court was further called upon to determine whether the continuation of criminal proceedings in the absence of a civil remedy sought by the complainant amounted to an abuse of the process of law.
The Supreme Court emphasized that for the invocation of Section 420 IPC, the ingredients of Section 415 IPC must be strictly established, specifically the presence of fraudulent or dishonest inducement at the inception of the transaction. The bench noted that the mere non-payment of money or a breach of contractual terms does not automatically translate into a criminal offence.
Distinction Between Civil Wrong and Criminal Offence
The court underscored that the sine qua non for attracting Section 415 IPC is the element of fraudulence or dishonest inducement. In the absence of such elements, the dispute remains a civil wrong. The court noted that the complainant had not instituted any civil proceedings for recovery, instead opting to invoke the criminal machinery to settle a business account, which the bench found impermissible.
"The police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money."
Police Training and Distinction of Offences
Reflecting on the distinction between cheating and criminal breach of trust, the court observed that these are independent and distinct offences that cannot coexist in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other. The court expressed concern regarding the lack of understanding of these fine legal distinctions by investigating agencies, stating that it is time for officers to be imparted proper training to avoid the misuse of criminal statutes for private commercial disputes.
Abuse of Process of Law
The court relied on the precedent set in Delhi Race Club v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reinforcing that where a complainant fails to seek civil remedies for recovery, the initiation of criminal proceedings solely for the purpose of coercing payment is an abuse of judicial process. The court concluded that allowing such proceedings to continue against the appellants would be a grave injustice and a misuse of the court's time and resources.
"The two provisions of IPC are not twins that they cannot survive without each other."
Finding that the entire dispute was pre-eminently civil, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order that had directed the framing of charges against the appellants. Consequently, the court quashed the entire criminal case pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar, thereby providing relief to the appellants.
Date of Decision: 23 September 2026