Criminal Law - UAPA – Grounds of Arrest – Mandatory Written Communication – Appellants arrested under UAPA without being furnished written grounds of arrest at the time of apprehension – State argued that grounds were explained by remand court and later supplied to counsel – Held: Explanation by court or post-facto supply to counsel does not satisfy requirement under Section 43B UAPA and Article 22(1) – Arrest and remand proceedings quashed

Constitution of India – Article 22(1) – Protection Against Arbitrary Arrest – Supreme Court reiterates that furnishing written grounds of arrest to the accused at the time of arrest is mandatory – Reading out or explaining by the court is inadequate – Compliance must be contemporaneous and in writing to ensure right to legal remedy – Violation renders arrest illegal

Distinction Between “Reasons for Arrest” and “Grounds of Arrest” – Court draws distinction between general reasons (standard proforma) and personal grounds necessitating arrest – Arrest memo without specific grounds is insufficient under constitutional and statutory mandates

Precedents – Binding Nature – Supreme Court affirms that decisions in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576, and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 are binding under Article 141 – Followed and reiterated by Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana – Recent decisions in Kasireddy Upender Reddy and Sri Darshan also affirm compliance requirement

Decision: Appeal allowed – Arrest and remand proceedings set aside solely on ground of non-compliance with statutory requirement of furnishing written grounds of arrest – Liberty granted to State to take appropriate action in accordance with law, if warranted

Criminal Law – Voice Sample – Magistrate’s Power – High Court order setting aside Magistrate’s direction to obtain voice sample of a witness reversed – Supreme Court held Magistrate is empowered to order voice sample despite absence of explicit provision in Cr.P.C. – Held: Judgment in Ritesh Sinha (2019) 8 SCC 1 applies – Use of term “person” includes both accused and witness – Rule against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) not violated by furnishing voice sample – Appeal allowed, Magistrate’s order restored [Paras 1, 3-10]

Self-Incrimination – Article 20(3) – Voice Sample Not Testimonial – Court reiterated principle from Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808] – Specimen signature, handwriting, fingerprints or voice sample do not amount to testimonial compulsion – Sample by itself is innocuous unless compared with incriminating material discovered during investigation – Furnishing such samples not protected under Article 20(3) [Paras 7-9]

Criminal Procedure – BNSS vs CrPC – Supreme Court held that it is immaterial whether Cr.P.C. or BNSS applies – Even under Cr.P.C., Magistrate is empowered by virtue of Ritesh Sinha judgment – Under BNSS, Section 349 now provides explicit statutory backing – Both paths support legality of Magistrate’s direction [Paras 8-9]

Judicial Discipline – Binding Precedent – High Court erred in disregarding binding precedent on the ground of pending reference – Supreme Court noted that the reference to Larger Bench in Ritesh Sinha had been closed – High Courts must follow binding decisions unless expressly overruled [Para 2, 4]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Order of Magistrate restored – Respondent directed to comply with voice sample order. [Para 11]

Criminal Law – Crowd Crush Incident – CBI Investigation Ordered – 41 people died and over 100 injured in stampede during political rally held by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) on 27.09.2025 – FIR No. 855/2025 registered under BNS and TNPP Act – Conflicting High Court orders on formation of SIT and refusal of CBI probe led to multiplicity of proceedings – Supreme Court held that public confidence in fairness of investigation is paramount – Interim direction issued to transfer probe to CBI for impartiality [Paras 1, 7-9, 17, 21-22, 31-32]

High Court Practice – Jurisdictional Conflict – Madurai Bench (Division Bench) refused CBI probe, while Main Seat (Single Judge) ordered formation of SIT without pleadings or parties present – Supreme Court criticised lack of judicial propriety – Held: Matters affecting public at large like SOP for rallies and disaster protocols should be treated as PIL and heard by Division Bench, not single judge [Paras 13-20, 22, 24]

Public Safety – SOP for Political Rallies – Supreme Court directed that pending writ on framing of safety guidelines (W.P. Crl. No. 884/2025) be transferred to Division Bench of High Court – All other related writs dismissed or harmonised to avoid forum shopping and duplication [Paras 14, 22, 39]

Judicial Oversight – Supervisory Committee Appointed – In addition to transferring investigation to CBI, Supreme Court constituted a three-member Supervisory Committee headed by Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.) – Committee to monitor CBI probe, suggest directions, and review progress – State to provide logistics and comply with recommendations [Paras 33-34]

Fair Investigation – Allegations of Bias – Senior police officials made press statements exonerating their subordinates before probe concluded – Court held this could erode public faith – Directed that only a neutral, independent investigation could restore justice for victims and their families [Paras 27-30, 32]

Decision: Investigation of FIR 855/2025 transferred to CBI – SIT and Enquiry Commission suspended – Supervisory Committee constituted – CBI to file monthly reports – Related SOP writ to be placed before Division Bench – Interim directions subject to final hearing [Paras 31-40]

Land Acquisition – Restitution of Acquired Land – Industrial Entity Not Entitled – Respondent, a private ceramic manufacturer, sought restoration of land and factory premises acquired in 2006 as part of Tata Motors’ Singur Project – Supreme Court held that its earlier decision in Kedar Nath Yadav quashing the acquisition and ordering restoration applied only to poor cultivators and vulnerable farmers – Relief intended to protect disadvantaged communities from dispossession, not commercial entities – Appeal allowed – High Court’s direction to restore land and structures to respondent set aside [Paras 12-18, 25-27]

Judicial Remedy – Scope of PIL Relief – Kedar Nath Yadav relief granted in PIL proceedings on behalf of poor agricultural workers – Court held that Respondent, a financially capable corporate house, was not similarly situated – Restoration under PIL judgment cannot be extended to parties who did not challenge acquisition or litigate – Strategic inaction cannot entitle post-facto benefit [Paras 15-18, 22-23, 26]

Acquiescence – Delay – Respondent accepted full compensation of Rs. 14.54 crores including for land and structures – Raised no challenge from 2006 till 2016 – Court held that such delay, coupled with voluntary acceptance of compensation, bars restitution claim – Respondent estopped from seeking reversal based on parity with cultivators [Paras 6-7, 21-22]

Procedural Relief – In Personam vs In Rem – Quashing of acquisition in Kedar Nath Yadav was based on procedural lapses in Section 5-A inquiries – Supreme Court held relief applied only to objectors who pursued litigation – Does not extend to commercial parties like Respondent who did not challenge proceedings at the time [Paras 19-21]

Practicality and Passage of Time – Nearly 20 years passed since acquisition – Land demarcated and restructured to restore to farmers post-Kedar Nath Yadav – Court held physical restoration to Respondent not feasible due to irreversible changes – Ordered removal of plant/machinery or public auction as alternative relief [Paras 24-25, 27]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court orders set aside – Respondent not entitled to restoration – Directed removal or auction of existing structures – No further compensation or recovery [Paras 27-28]

Motor Accident Claim – Insurance – Liability of Insurer – Gratuitous Passenger – Policy Conditions Breached – Five-seater vehicle carrying nine passengers – Tribunal held insurer and owner jointly and severally liable – High Court absolved insurer based on breach of policy terms – Supreme Court held that insurer having collected additional premium for driver, conductor, and cleaner, may not be liable to cover gratuitous passengers – However, applying ‘pay and recover’ principle, insurer directed to pay compensation to claimant and recover from owner – Held: Even in case of breach of policy, insurer not to be completely absolved – Remedy lies in recovery from insured [Paras 4–12]

Pay and Recover Principle – Judicial Precedents – Even where insurance policy does not cover risk of a particular class of persons, and breach of conditions is established, courts have consistently applied the doctrine of ‘pay and recover’ to safeguard rights of third-party claimants – Reference made to Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, Shamanna (2018) 9 SCC 650, and Rama Bai (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2067) – Held: Claimant should not be left remediless where insurance contract exists – Insurer to satisfy award and recover from owner [Paras 12–13]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Insurer (Respondent No.1) directed to satisfy the compensation award passed by the Tribunal – Insurer granted liberty to recover the amount from the vehicle owner (Respondent No.2).

Army Law – Possession of Ammunition – Substitution of Conviction – Scope of Tribunal’s Power under Section 15(6) of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Appellant, a Colonel, was convicted by General Court Martial under Section 69 of the Army Act for unauthorised possession of ammunition and dismissed from service – Tribunal found no evidence to prove demand or acceptance of bribe and upheld acquittal for unexplained possession of cash – However, it held that possession of aged but live ammunition indicated neglect and failure to adhere to procedural norms – Held: Tribunal rightly substituted conviction to Section 63 of the Army Act (act prejudicial to good order and military discipline) under Section 15(6)(a) of the 2007 Act, as the same evidence lawfully sustained such finding – Punishment of compulsory retirement with full pensionary benefits held just and proportionate [Paras 19–26].

Armed Forces Tribunal – Jurisdiction – Power to Substitute Findings and Sentence – Tribunal under Section 15(6)(a) & (b) of the 2007 Act empowered to substitute a finding of guilty for any offence for which the accused could lawfully have been convicted by Court Martial and to pass a modified sentence – Provision analogous to Section 162 of the Army Act and Section 222 CrPC – Legislative intent clear that appellate forum can convict for a cognate or lesser offence based on same evidence – Tribunal acted within jurisdiction [Paras 20–22].

Appellate Interference – Limited Scope – Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 2007 Act confined to examining whether Tribunal’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious – Tribunal’s order based on concurrent factual findings and proper exercise of discretion – Held: Tribunal acted within statutory powers and fairly balanced service discipline with individual fairness – No interference warranted [Paras 23, 27].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Tribunal’s substitution of conviction under Section 63 of the Army Act and modification of punishment to compulsory retirement affirmed – No costs [Para 28].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Retrospective Application – Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000 – Petitioner convicted for murder committed in 1981 when he was aged 12 years and 5 months – Sessions Court had extended benefit under the Children’s Act, 1960 and sent him to a children’s home – His conviction restored by Supreme Court in 2009 after High Court acquittal – Petitioner re-arrested in 2022 and in custody for more than 3 years and 10 months – Held: By virtue of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal – Petitioner entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act as per Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan – Detention beyond 3 years is contrary to Section 15(1)(g) and violative of Article 21 [Paras 3, 9–13].

Children’s Act, 1960 – Section 24 – Joint Trial of Child and Adult Accused – No justification shown by the State for breach of Section 24 which prohibits joint trial of a child with non-children – Court notes that legislative safeguards under the Children’s Act were ignored by the trial court [Para 8].

Juvenile Justice – Period of Detention – Illegal Custody – Once the petitioner is found to have been a juvenile on the date of offence, continued incarceration beyond three years amounts to deprivation of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law – Detention beyond permissible period illegal [Paras 8, 13].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Protection of Personal Liberty – Continued custody of a person entitled to juvenile justice protection is unconstitutional – Breach of fundamental right to life and liberty warrants immediate release [Para 13].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioner directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case – Jail authorities to act on downloaded copy of judgment without insisting on certified copy [Paras 14–16].

Constitution of India – Article 233 – Appointment of District Judges – Eligibility – In-service Judicial Officers – Direct Recruitment – Interpretation of Clause (1) and (2) – Held: Both clauses form a complete code – Article 233(1) covers appointments, postings and promotions – Article 233(2) lays down qualification only for advocates/pleaders not in service – Judicial officers already in service are governed by Article 233(1) – No constitutional bar against their participation in direct recruitment – Textual and contextual reading must give effect to both clauses without rendering any part redundant [Paras 118–126].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Appointments – Article 233 – Eligibility of In-service Judicial Officers – Held: No constitutional bar against judicial officers competing in direct recruitment process for District Judges – Judicial officers having combined experience of seven years as advocate and judicial officer entitled to apply – Level playing field to be maintained between advocates and in-service candidates – Minimum age 35 years for both categories – Appointment to be based on merit through written examination and viva voce – No weightage to in-service candidates – Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service to continue in 50:25:25 ratio as per All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170 [Paras 155–161, 157–159, 172(i)–(v)].

Constitutional Law – Article 233(2) – Bar Quota – Reservation – Interpretation – The 25% direct recruitment under Article 233(2) is not an exclusive quota for advocates – Clause (2) only prescribes qualification for advocates/pleaders not in service – Reading it as a reservation for advocates would violate Article 14 and constitutional equality – Both advocates and judicial officers with requisite experience entitled to compete [Paras 164, 19–23 per Sundresh, J.].

Judicial Service – Independence of Judiciary – Article 50 – Separation of Powers – Held: Judicial officers are not “employees” of the State – They discharge sovereign judicial functions – To debar them from open competition would offend the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers – Recruitment and control over the judiciary is insulated from legislative and executive interference – Reliance placed on State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640, and Registrar (Admn.), Orissa High Court v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, (1999) 7 SCC 725 [Paras 8–13, 33–35 per Sundresh, J.].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation – Constitutional Silence – Doctrine Explained – Absence of express qualification for in-service candidates under Article 233(2) is a deliberate constitutional silence – Framers left it to the discretion of High Courts and Governors under Articles 233–235 – Such silence is not a gap but an intentional flexibility to preserve the independence and adaptability of the judiciary – Principle discussed in Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 [Paras 14–16 per Sundresh, J.].

Interpretation of Constitution – Textual and Contextual Reading – Harmonious construction required – Interpretation must give meaning to every word – Article 233(2) must be read so as not to render the words “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” redundant – Applying Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, and RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 [Paras 114–125].

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Article 14 – Exclusion of Judicial Officers from Direct Recruitment – Held: Such exclusion would amount to unconstitutional classification and deny equal opportunity – Would also amount to reservation in favour of advocates – Broader competition enhances merit and efficiency in judiciary [Paras 19–23, 153–155].

Judiciary – Efficiency and Merit – Object of Recruitment – Purpose of direct recruitment is to secure best talent for judicial service – Open competition between advocates and in-service judges fosters excellence and efficiency – Observations in Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2013) 4 SCC 540, relied upon [Paras 149–151].

Administrative Law – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Accepted – Commission found that allowing in-service judges to compete would promote efficiency, improve discipline and remove frustration – Recommended amendment to Article 233 to formalise such eligibility – Recommendations relied upon to interpret Article 233 in a progressive manner [Paras 128–134].

Professional Ethics – Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules – Enrollment and Suspension – An advocate who joins judicial service only suspends right to practice; remains on Bar Roll – May resume practice after retirement – Such suspended status does not erase prior practice experience – Thus, judicial officers with pre-service Bar practice fulfil eligibility under Article 233(2) [Paras 140–145].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 29, 30, 33 read with BCI Rules – Continuous Experience – Candidate must have continuous seven years’ experience either as advocate or judicial officer, or combined, as on date of application – Discontinuous or interrupted practice not sufficient – Break in practice cannot be condoned [Paras 162–163].

Constitutional Law – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Reconsideration of Long-standing View – Held: Doctrine not inflexible – Earlier rulings in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985) 1 SCC 225, and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 misapplied Constitution Bench decisions in Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 123, and Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 35 – Earlier interpretation perpetuated injustice to judicial officers – Correct view restored – Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor expressly overruled [Paras 165–169, 172(vi)].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Prospective Application – New interpretation to operate prospectively – Past appointments and completed selections not disturbed, except where protected by interim orders [Para 170].

Appointment Rules – Directions – All existing State rules inconsistent with present interpretation quashed – States directed to frame or amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months – Uniform criteria to include combined seven-year experience, minimum age 35, and common competitive examination for advocates and judicial officers [Paras 174–175].

Separate Opinion – Per M.M. Sundresh, J. – Concurred with CJI – Emphasised that Article 233(1) itself covers both promotion and direct recruitment – Clause (2) provides qualification only for advocates – Constitutional silence permits High Court to fix eligibility for in-service candidates – Judicial independence and Article 14 mandate equal opportunity – Interpreting Article 233 to exclude in-service judges would violate basic structure and reduce judicial quality – Advocated open competition to secure excellence in judiciary [Paras 1–23].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Questions answered – In-service judicial officers with combined experience of seven years eligible to compete in direct recruitment for District Judges – Satya Narain Singh (1985) and Dheeraj Mor (2020) overruled – Directions issued to States and High Courts for rule amendment – Prospective application – No retrospective disturbance of existing appointments [Paras 172–175].