Contempt of Court – Interim Orders – Effect of “Release” of Reserved Matter – Termination of Service during Subistence of Interim Protection – Appellant’s services were terminated on 10-06-2020 while an interim order dated 20-12-2018 restraining final orders in disciplinary proceedings was in operation and being extended – Mere “release” of the writ petition on 06-02-2019 did not extinguish the interim order – Held: Dismissal of contempt petition by High Court set aside; matter remitted for fresh consideration [Paras 2.8, 2.14–2.18, 5–6].

University Discipline – KGMU CPMS Audit and Enquiry – Procedural History – Multiple writ petitions (2018–2021) challenging preliminary enquiry, questionnaire, chargesheet, suspension, and termination – Interim stay of suspension on 05-12-2019 continued – Despite pendency, final termination order passed on 10-06-2020 forming the gravamen of contempt claim [Paras 2.3–2.6, 2.10–2.15].

Practice & Procedure – Remand – High Court requested to consider contempt afresh and, for effective adjudication, to take up connected matters together; pending applications disposed of [Paras 6–8].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 23-09-2024 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) quashed and set aside – Contempt petition remitted for fresh consideration; connected matters may be heard together – Pending applications disposed of. [Paras 6–8].

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – S.12A – Urgent interim relief – IP infringement – Delay per se does not negate urgency where infringement is continuing – High Court orders rejecting plaint set aside – Suit restored to be decided on merits [Paras 20-26, 27-28]

Commercial Law – Pre-Institution Mediation – Section 12A – Meaning of “contemplates any urgent interim relief” – Test reiterated that courts examine plaint, pleadings and annexed documents to see if urgent interim relief is genuinely required from the standpoint of the plaintiff – Court is not to decide merits at this stage – Pro forma/anticipatory prayers to bypass mediation to be ignored [Paras 18-20]

Intellectual Property – Continuing Infringement – Urgency – Each act of manufacture/sale/offer for sale is a fresh wrong creating a recurring cause of action – Mere delay in filing suit does not legalise infringement nor defeat the right to injunction against a dishonest user – Urgency may be inherent where ongoing acts cause immediate and irreparable harm to goodwill, reputation and proprietary rights [Paras 22-23]

Public Interest – IP disputes implicate consumer confusion and market integrity – Preventing deception and confusion furnishes an additional element of immediacy for interim protection – Section 12A not intended to render a plaintiff remediless during ongoing infringement [Paras 16, 24]

Procedure – Section 12A v. Ongoing IP Infringement – Courts below erred by treating lapse of time as negating urgency and by evaluating entitlement to interim relief on merits rather than the plaintiff’s stand-point and material on record – Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non-compliance with Section 12A set aside [Paras 25, 27-28]

Principles Culled Out – (i) Section 12A is mandatory; violation ordinarily renders institution defective – (ii) Exemption lies only where plaint and documents disclose a real need for urgent interim intervention – (iii) Look for immediacy of peril/irreparable harm/risk to rights/perishable subject-matter/time sensitivity – (iv) Sham/anticipatory prayers to skip mediation to be ignored – (v) Court is concerned with plausibility of urgency, not its eventual success [Para 20]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders dated 28.08.2024 (Single Judge) and 13.11.2024 (Division Bench, HP High Court) set aside – Commercial Suit No. 13 of 2024 restored for decision on merits in accordance with law [Paras 27-28]

Trademark Law – Interim Injunction – Intra-group Licensing – Scope of Restraint – Suit filed by respondent sought to restrain petitioner from creating third-party interest including license or assignment of ‘Kirloskar’ trademarks – Trial Court granted injunction on 09.01.2025 – High Court stayed the injunction on 25.07.2025 permitting limited licensing to group companies – Later, by order dated 10.10.2025, High Court modified earlier order to prohibit even such licensing – Held: Prima facie, modified order expanded restraint without proper consideration of earlier licensing practices and despite pendency of appeal – Operation of 10.10.2025 order stayed [Paras 2–10].

Trademark Ownership – Difference between Assignment and Licensing – Petitioner argued that licensing does not amount to transfer of ownership and is distinguishable from assignment – Court noted there was no dispute over ownership of the mark and no prior adjudication on internal licensing history – Modified restraint seen as excessive at interlocutory stage [Paras 5–8].

Judicial Discretion – Modification of Interim Orders – Supreme Court observed that expanding the scope of an interim injunction during pendency of appeal and without full factual analysis was not warranted – Ordered interim stay on modified order [Paras 8–10].

Decision: Notice issued returnable on 04.11.2025 – Effect and operation of High Court order dated 10.10.2025 stayed – Parties allowed to exchange affidavits/written submissions in the meantime

Transfer of Suits – Patent Infringement vs. Groundless Threats – Section 25 CPC – Earlier suit under Section 106 Patents Act has independent cause of action – Delhi jurisdiction invoked via online purchase and delivery – Substantial overlap of parties, facts and issues – To avoid duplication and conflicting findings, infringement suit in Delhi transferred to Bombay – Cross transfer petition dismissed [Paras 9-14]

Transfer – Competing Petitions – Chronology and Overlap – Petitioner first filed Bombay suit (01.07.2025) for groundless threats; Respondent later filed Delhi infringement suit (07.07.2025) – Court notes substantial overlap in facts, law, and issues – Held appropriate to have both tried by the same forum to conserve judicial time and ensure consistency [Paras 10 & 12]

Patents – Groundless Threats (S.106) – Independence from Infringement Action – 1911 Act proviso negating groundless-threat action upon diligent prosecution of infringement suit was deleted in the 1970 Act – Hence, S.106 suit is an independent cause of action and can proceed irrespective of an infringement action [Para 9]

Jurisdiction – Patent Infringement – Online purchase and delivery at Delhi – Court records that Delhi jurisdiction was invoked by respondent through online purchase and delivery in Delhi, but transfers the Delhi suit to Bombay in the interests of justice given overlap and earlier Bombay filing [Para 10(ii), Para 12]

Precedents – Transfer to Avoid Conflicting Judgments – Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85 – Applied – Where two suits between substantially the same parties arise out of the same transactions and evidence, separate trials may risk inconsistent findings; transfer allowed [Para 11]

Decision: Transfer Petition (C) No. 1983 of 2025 allowed – CS (COMM) No. 663 of 2025 (Delhi) transferred to Bombay High Court to be tried with Commercial IP (L) No. 19837 of 2025 – Injunction applications to be taken up and disposed of expeditiously – Transfer Petition (C) No. 2174 of 2025 dismissed [Paras 12-15]

Criminal Law – Culpable Homicide – Sentence – Appellant convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC for causing death of intervenor S by axe blow to the neck – Trial court sentenced him to 10 years’ RI – High Court reduced sentence to 8 years – Appellant sought further reduction on ground of young age (20 years) and absence of intention – Supreme Court held that deceased S was an innocent peacekeeper who suffered fatal injury without provocation – Act of appellant found not to be covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC – Sentence of 8 years not excessive in the circumstances – Held: Sentence imposed by High Court appropriate and does not warrant interference [Paras 8–10, 22–23, 27–28].

Sentencing – Proportionality – Deterrence – Supreme Court emphasized balancing judicial discretion with societal interests and victim’s rights – Reiterated principles from Raj Bala v. State of Haryana and Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat – Undue sympathy and disproportionate leniency undermine faith in justice system – Sentence must reflect gravity of offence and protect social order – Held: No compelling reason to further reduce sentence in absence of mitigating circumstances [Paras 24–25, 27–28].

Premature Release – Remission – Appellant permitted to seek premature release under applicable State remission policy – Court noted that such statutory remedies remain open and independent of judicial sentence review [Paras 17, 30].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Sentence of 8 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part-II IPC upheld – Appellant entitled to seek premature release as per remission policy of State of Karnataka.

Taxation – Business expenditure – Non-resident – Lull in business vs cessation – Assessee, a French drilling company with ONGC contract till 1993, maintained continuous correspondences and bid activity with ONGC during 1993–1998, ultimately securing a fresh contract in October 1998 (formalised January 1999) – Held: Such sustained efforts show intention to carry on business – Mere failure to procure a contract or maintain a permanent establishment in India does not imply cessation – Business expenditure (admin/legal etc.) undertaken wholly and exclusively for business is deductible and eligible for set-off under Section 71 [Paras 2, 4, 9, 11-17, 19-20].

Unabsorbed Depreciation – Section 32(2) – For the pre-2002 law, continuation of the business is relevant – On facts, business had not ceased; therefore, unabsorbed depreciation could be carried forward and set off in terms of Section 32(2) – Note: first proviso to Section 32(2) stood omitted w.e.f. 01/04/2002 by Finance Act, 2001 [Paras 10-12, 17].

Permanent Establishment (PE) – Not a statutory precondition under the Act for being “in business” in India – PE is relevant to DTAA benefits, not to charging or computation provisions under Sections 4, 5(2), 9(1)(i), and 28 – High Court erred in equating lack of PE/office or foreign-based correspondence with absence of business in India [Paras 11-12, 18-19].

Income Characterisation – Interest on income-tax refunds taxable under “Income from Other Sources” – Yet, business expenditure incurred for carrying on business can be set off against such income under Section 71, given the finding that business continued [Paras 5, 9, 11, 15-17].

Principles – The term “business” has a wide import, denoting real, substantial, systematic activity with a set purpose – “For the purpose of business” is broader than “for earning profits” and includes acts incidental to carrying on business, measures for preservation/protection, and statutory payments – “Lull in business” is distinct from “going out of business” [Paras 4, 14-16].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment set aside – ITAT orders revived – Assessing Officer to pass fresh assessment orders for AYs 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1999-2000 in terms of ITAT orders [Paras 21].

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction Reversed – Appellant convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC along with three others – FIR stated incident occurred when accused tried to destroy hut of one Jagya, and deceased Ramesh intervened – Alleged eyewitnesses Madho Singh (PW-5) and Puniya (PW-12) gave materially contradictory accounts regarding place and sequence of incident – Court found contradictions regarding location (hut, Gopya’s field, Bholiya’s field) and number of assailants with sharp weapons – Doubt raised on presence of eyewitnesses due to improbabilities, contradictions, and omissions – Medical evidence confirmed homicidal death but lacked independent corroboration of witness accounts [Paras 26-40, 41-52].

Witness Testimony – Credibility – Madho Singh (PW-5) and Puniya (PW-12) contradicted each other on key aspects – Each denied other’s presence – Madho Singh admitted political rivalry with accused and stated no one came to rescue despite hue and cry – Puniya claimed to have witnessed the assault but made no attempt to assist the deceased – Their testimonies found unreliable and lacking corroboration – Court classified Puniya as “wholly unreliable” and Madho Singh as “partially reliable” – No corroborative evidence to support their testimonies [Paras 40, 55].

FIR and Investigation – Omission of key eyewitness name in FIR – FIR failed to mention presence of Puniya despite being relative and allegedly witnessing incident – Site inspection plan contradicted witness statements – No source of light recorded at scene – Seized weapons not proven to be linked with specific injuries – FIR filed next morning – Held: Prosecution suppressed genesis of incident and shifted scene of crime – Entire narrative doubtful [Paras 29, 36, 49, 56-57].

Benefit of Doubt – Other co-accused not before Court – However, in exercise of powers under Article 142, Court extended benefit of doubt to similarly situated co-convicts Govardhan, Raja Ram, and Bhima – All four accused acquitted – Conviction and sentence set aside [Paras 61-64].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC set aside – Appellant and co-accused acquitted – To be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.

Service Law – Medical Practitioners – Retirement Age – Parity Between Allopathy and AYUSH Doctors – Issue arose whether doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine (AYUSH) are entitled to the same retirement age as allopathic doctors – Division Bench decisions in NDMC v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (2021) 17 SCC 642, State of Gujarat v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 503, and Dr. Solamon A. v. State of Kerala distinguished – Court observed that Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma turned on a policy decision of Union Cabinet extending parity in retirement age, while Dr. P.A. Bhatt upheld classification based on educational qualifications – Ambiguity persists in judicial approach [Paras 2–6].

Equality Before Law – Articles 14 and 16 – Classification Between Allopathy and AYUSH Practitioners – Court held that difference in qualifications, nature of work, duties, and responsibilities justifies separate treatment – Allopathic doctors perform critical care, trauma management, surgeries, and emergency procedures, unlike AYUSH practitioners – Distinction has rational nexus with public interest and sufficiency of qualified allopathy doctors – Classification constitutionally valid [Paras 7–9].

Judicial Discipline – Reference to Larger Bench – Divergent Judicial Views – Considering conflicting precedents and continuing ambiguity regarding parity of service conditions between allopathic and AYUSH doctors, matter referred to a Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement [Para 9].

Interim Directions – Continuance of AYUSH Doctors – Pending reference, States permitted to continue AYUSH doctors beyond their prescribed retirement age up to the age applicable to MBBS doctors, on half pay and allowances – Such continuance optional; benefits subject to final outcome before Larger Bench [Paras 10–11].

Decision: Matter referred to Larger Bench – Interim arrangement for continuation of AYUSH doctors till Larger Bench decides issue – Directions regarding pay, allowances, and pension adjustments issued [Paras 9–12].

Service Law – Class IV Appointment – Validity of Appointments Beyond Advertised Vacancies – Rule 12, U.P. Rules – “Reasonable Dimension” of Waiting List – Appellants appointed against Class IV posts were terminated in 2008 on the ground that appointments exceeded notified vacancies – Advertisement of 2000 mentioned 12 vacancies “subject to increase or decrease” – Court held that Rule 12 permits maintenance of a waiting list of reasonable dimension to fill vacancies arising within the same or succeeding recruitment year – Reliance placed on Naseem Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2011) 2 SCC 734 – Held, appointments made from such waiting list were valid when vacancies arose subsequently – Termination unjustified [Paras 6–10].

Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Relief – Equitable Directions – Appellants were out of employment for 17 years – Two appellants had crossed superannuation age – Court directed reappointment of those still within age limit to existing or supernumerary posts in Ambedkar Nagar Judgeship – Those who crossed superannuation to be granted minimum pension – Intervening period not to count for seniority or pension computation – Directions confined to peculiar facts and not to be treated as precedent [Paras 11–12].

Interpretation of Rules – Rule 12, U.P. Rules – “Reasonable Dimension” – Expression construed to mean a waiting list adequate to cover vacancies likely to arise within the year of recruitment or the next year, in reasonable proportion to advertised vacancies – Ensures fairness and prevents arbitrariness in recruitment [Para 7].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Termination orders set aside – Reappointment or pension benefits granted as per directions – Relief restricted to appellants – Not to be treated as precedent [Paras 11–12].