Service Law – Termination – Probationer – Whether termination of a judicial officer during probation can be retrospectively reinstated – Held, once the termination order is set aside, the employee is deemed to be in service and is entitled to reinstatement and back wages – Supreme Court directs the High Court and the State to reinstate the appellant into service and award full salary from April 20, 2022, to the date of fresh termination on April 2, 2024, along with 50% back wages for the period from December 17, 2009, to April 19, 2022 – [Paras 1-45].

Judicial Process – Delay in Compliance with Court Orders – The Supreme Court expressed concern over the delayed action taken by the High Court and the State in not reinstating the appellant after its earlier judgment, despite setting aside his termination – Court notes that no decision was taken to reinstate the appellant or pay arrears during this period, warranting relief – [Paras 12-22].

Administrative Action – Reconsideration by the Full Court – The Full Court of the High Court, when reconsidering a termination, must offer detailed reasoning rather than reiterating prior conclusions – The lack of a speaking order and failure to give proper consideration are noted as serious lapses – [Paras 23-30].

Back Wages – Entitlement of Employee after Set-Aside of Termination – The Supreme Court clarifies that while reinstatement entitles an employee to salary from the date of the Court’s judgment, partial back wages (50%) are appropriate for the period preceding the judgment, reflecting fairness and balancing of interests – [Paras 33-44].

Service Law – Termination of Employment – Non-compliance with Procedural Requirements – Termination of respondent's services by Kerala Agricultural University for unauthorized absence after expiry of Leave Without Allowance (LWA) challenged – High Court Division Bench set aside the termination, holding that the university failed to follow the prescribed procedure under the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, 1960 – Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the necessity of recording prima facie satisfaction before initiating a disciplinary inquiry as per Rule 15 – Failure to adhere to statutory procedures deemed fatal to the university’s case [Paras 8-14].

Natural Justice – Mandatory Procedural Compliance – Supreme Court reiterated that statutory procedures must be strictly followed – The principle that if a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be followed in that manner and not otherwise – University’s failure to record satisfaction before disciplinary inquiry found to violate principles of natural justice – Respondent's inability to rejoin duties due to illness and COVID-19 travel restrictions considered bona fide [Paras 12-15].

Decision – Dismissal of Special Leave Petition – Held – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's quashing of the termination order – Court found no merit in the university's plea, concluding that the Division Bench's judgment was sound and required no interference – Termination set aside due to procedural lapses by the university [Paras 16-17].

Criminal Law – Conviction under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC upheld – Challenge in Supreme Court against the Allahabad High Court's decision maintaining trial court’s conviction of the appellant for murder and rioting – Court examined the evidence presented by the prosecution, including eyewitness accounts and medical evidence – The prosecution’s case was supported by the testimony of eyewitnesses, corroborated by medical evidence of the deceased’s injuries – The appellant’s involvement in the unlawful assembly with a common object of eliminating the deceased was established, leading to the upholding of the conviction [Paras 1-34].

Unlawful Assembly and Vicarious Liability – Supreme Court reaffirmed that under Section 149 IPC, each member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the acts committed in prosecution of the common object, regardless of whether each member physically participated in the crime – Even if the appellant did not directly cause fatal injuries, his participation in the unlawful assembly with the knowledge of the common object was sufficient for conviction under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC [Paras 27-31].

Evidence Evaluation – Supreme Court found that despite certain omissions in the prosecution's case, such as the non-recovery of the weapon and the failure to examine key witnesses, the evidence of the eyewitnesses was credible and consistent – The Court concluded that these omissions did not undermine the overall prosecution case, which was sufficiently supported by direct and medical evidence [Paras 32-33].

Decision – Dismissal of Appeal – Held – The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction of the appellant under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC is affirmed – The Court held that the appellant’s involvement in the unlawful assembly with the common object of committing murder was clearly established, justifying his conviction under the applicable sections of the IPC [Paras 33-34].

Civil Law – Motor Vehicle Accident – Liability of Dealer and Manufacturer – Supreme Court examined liability in a motor vehicle accident case where the vehicle involved was owned by the manufacturer, but in possession of the dealer – Tribunal held the manufacturer and dealer jointly and severally liable – High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision – Supreme Court reversed the finding regarding the dealer’s liability, holding that the manufacturer, not the dealer, was liable as the vehicle was under the control of the manufacturer’s employees at the time of the accident [Paras 13-24].

Interpretation of 'Owner' under Motor Vehicles Act – The Court examined the definition of 'owner' under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, concluding that ownership is not limited to the registered owner but includes the person in control or command of the vehicle – Liability determined based on control and command at the time of the accident [Paras 13, 19].

Contractual Liability – Clauses in Dealership Agreement – Supreme Court considered whether clauses in the dealership agreement between the manufacturer and dealer shifted liability to the dealer – Held that clauses limiting the manufacturer’s liability to defects under the warranty did not transfer tortious liability to the dealer, thus absolving the dealer from compensation liability in this case [Paras 25-28].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Held – The appeal is allowed to the extent that the dealer is not liable for compensation – However, the manufacturer remains liable – If the dealer has paid any part of the compensation, it is entitled to recover the same from the manufacturer with interest [Paras 33-35].

Civil Law – Jurisdiction of Execution Court – Specific Performance – Rescission of Contract – The Supreme Court considered whether the Execution Court had jurisdiction to entertain applications for rescission of a contract and for the extension of time to deposit balance sale consideration under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, when the decree was passed by an appellate court. The Court held that the Execution Court, being the court of first instance, retained jurisdiction to entertain such applications, emphasizing that the decree passed by an appellate court is considered as being passed in the same suit. The Court further clarified that the applications should be treated as interlocutory applications in the original suit rather than in execution proceedings. [Paras 15-19]

Equitable Relief – Extension of Time to Deposit – Substantial Justice – The Supreme Court upheld the Execution Court’s decision to allow the decree-holder to deposit the balance sale consideration despite a delay. The Court noted that the decree-holder had consistently shown an intention to comply with the decree, and the delay was not due to any fault on their part. The decision emphasized the discretionary nature of the relief under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, aimed at ensuring substantial justice rather than penalizing procedural delays. The Court also refused to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution, stating that technicalities should not override the interests of justice. [Paras 23-30]

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Execution Court's jurisdiction and its decision to extend the time for deposit, thereby allowing the decree-holder to obtain specific performance of the contract. [Paras 31-32]

Criminal Law – Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304(A) of IPC – Conviction and Sentence – Modified – The appellant was convicted of causing death by rash and negligent driving under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304(A) of the IPC, related to a road accident resulting in the death of a pillion rider – The trial court sentenced him to simple imprisonment and fines for each offence – On appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction and imposed additional compensation – The Supreme Court, considering the appellant's age (69 years), health issues, and the fact that he had already been incarcerated for 117 days, modified the sentence to the period already undergone – Compensation reduced from Rs. 2.5 lakhs to Rs. 50,000, to be paid within 60 days [Paras 13-15].

Section 162 of Cr.P.C. – Testimony Contradictions – The appellant contended that the identification of the accused based on PW-6's testimony involved contradictions with the Section 161 statement, as the witness initially described the driver as an elderly person – The Court held that this inconsistency did not amount to a significant contradiction under Section 162(2) Cr.P.C., and the identification remained valid [Paras 8-9].

Sentence Reduction – Long Period of Incarceration and Mitigating Factors – The Court noted that the appellant had already been in custody for 117 days, and the accident occurred in 2007, almost 17 years ago – Citing a previous judgment in Surendran v. Sub-Inspector of Police, 2021, which substituted a sentence of imprisonment with a fine in a similar case of negligent driving, the Court reduced the appellant's sentence to the time already served [Paras 12-13].

Bail – Parity with Co-Accused – Prolonged Custody – The appellant, Sunil, sought bail on the grounds of parity with ten co-accused who had already been granted bail and the fact that he had been in custody for over a year – Held: The fact that ten other co-accused are already out on bail and that the trial is likely to be long due to the number of accused and witnesses justifies the appellant's request for bail – Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 5-6, 15].

Absconding Accused – Delayed Apprehension – The respondent argued against granting bail on the grounds that the appellant had absconded for seven months after the alleged crime – Held: While the appellant’s absconding is a factor to be considered, it is not sufficient by itself to deny bail, especially when the charges have already been framed and several other co-accused have been granted bail [Para 6].

Conditions for Bail – Trial Court Discretion – The Court directed that the appellant be released on bail subject to conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court – The appellant is required to cooperate fully in the trial, and any violation of bail conditions will lead to cancellation [Para 16].

Decision:

Bail granted. The appellant is to be produced before the concerned trial court and released on bail subject to conditions imposed by the trial court. The appellant must cooperate fully with the trial, and any misuse of liberty will result in cancellation of bail.

Stamp Act – Applicability of Sections 33, 34, 37, and 39 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Agreement of sale with possession considered as conveyance – Insufficiently stamped instrument – Jurisdiction of trial court under Section 34 to impose ten times penalty questioned – High Court upheld penalty but Supreme Court found it premature – Direction for instrument to be sent to District Registrar under Section 39 for determination of duty and penalty [Paras 14-23].

Discretionary Jurisdiction – Distinction between powers of trial court under Section 34 and District Registrar under Section 39 – Supreme Court clarified that the trial court lacks discretion to reduce penalty under Section 34, while the District Registrar under Section 39 has the discretion to impose an appropriate penalty – Trial court’s imposition of ten times penalty deemed illegal at the premature stage – Matter directed to be handled by District Registrar [Paras 14.1-14.2, 17-22].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Held – The appeal is allowed in part; the Supreme Court set aside the trial court's imposition of ten times penalty and directed the matter to the District Registrar for determination of the proper duty and penalty. The instrument is to be admitted in evidence upon compliance, with all other objections reserved for consideration [Paras 23-24].

Stamp Duty – Imposition of Penalty – The appellant challenged the trial court’s order directing payment of ten times the deficit stamp duty penalty under Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act. The appellant contended that the penalty should not have been imposed at the interlocutory stage and instead argued for the application of Section 37(2), allowing for a determination of penalty by the District Registrar. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, affirming the applicability of Section 34 based on the appellant’s prior consent to the court’s decision, and upheld the penalty imposition [Paras 1-12].

Specific Performance – Suit Agreement – The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of sale dated November 04, 1996, and the cancellation of a subsequent sale deed. The trial court imposed a significant penalty on the deficit stamp duty due to the agreement’s inadequate stamping. The Supreme Court confirmed that the trial court was correct in invoking Section 34 of the Act and that the appellant could not retroactively opt for a different procedure under Section 37(2) [Paras 2-9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to impose a ten times penalty on the deficit stamp duty, affirming that the appellant’s request to reconsider under a different section was not permissible. No order as to costs [Paras 11-12].