Family Law – Right of Natural Guardian – Mother, as the only natural guardian after the father's death, has the right to decide the surname of her child and give the child in adoption – High Court's direction to restore the child's original surname was overturned – Mother's decision to change the surname to that of her new husband is valid and aligns with the child's best interests and social identity [Paras 6-11, 19].

Adoption and Surname – Legal Implications – Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, stipulates that an adopted child assumes the surname of the adoptive family – Adoption legally severs ties with the biological family, making the adoptive family the child's new family for all purposes – Judicial intervention in changing the surname without a specific prayer is improper [Paras 12-14].

Judicial Propriety – Relief Beyond Pleadings – Relief not sought in the pleadings should not be granted – High Court's direction to change the child's surname without a specific plea from the respondents is contrary to established legal principles and constitutes a miscarriage of justice [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeals allowed in part – High Court's directions to change the surname of the child set aside – Mother recognized as the sole natural guardian with the right to decide the surname and adoption of the child – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 20-21].

Corruption and Falsification of Accounts – Insufficient Evidence – Appellant, a public servant, was convicted for offences under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 15 of the PC Act and Section 477A of IPC – Alleged manipulation of records and wrongful gain not supported by material evidence – Investigation revealed no criminal charges against the appellant – Conviction based on ignoring vital admissions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses [Paras 6-19].

Appreciation of Evidence – Perversity in Findings – Both Trial Court and High Court failed to appreciate relevant and vital admissions in the evidence – Findings recorded without considering material evidence amount to perversity – Scope of interference in concurrent findings of fact is limited but warranted in cases of manifest error or perverse findings [Paras 10-25].

Judicial Review – Concurrent Findings – Supreme Court’s authority to interfere in concurrent findings of fact when found to be perverse, based on no evidence, or leading to miscarriage of justice – Reappraisal of evidence justified when lower courts ignore material admissions affecting the outcome [Paras 20-24].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's judgment and conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted of all charges – Bail bonds discharged [Paras 26-27].

Criminal Law – Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Appellants Sanjay Puran Bagde and Rajratna @ Nandu Bagde were convicted for holding the deceased while co-accused Manoj Puran Bagde and Puran Sakharam Bagde assaulted the deceased with axes – High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal, finding common intention based on their participation and presence at the crime scene with the intention to assist in the murder [Paras 1-6, 12-13].

Evidence – Eyewitness Testimony – Reliability – The testimony of PW-6, the wife of the deceased and an eyewitness, was found reliable by both the trial court and the High Court – Statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC were consistent – The appellants’ presence and participation in holding the deceased facilitated the fatal assault, indicating shared common intention [Paras 2-4, 9-11].

Judicial Review – Concurrent Findings – The Supreme Court emphasized the limited scope of interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless shown to be perverse or erroneous – The appellants' role in the crime supported the conclusion of shared common intention, justifying the High Court’s reversal of the acquittal [Paras 10-13].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court's judgment convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC upheld – Appellants' role in facilitating the murder established shared common intention [Paras 13-14].

Land Acquisition – Initiation of Proceedings – Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act – Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be deemed to have been initiated with the issuance and publication of the Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette – The Court emphasized that this interpretation aligns with the legislative intention of providing fair compensation while ensuring the continuation of public purpose projects [Paras 1-25].

Effect of Repeal – Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – The Court reiterated that the repeal of the L.A. Act by the 2013 Act does not affect the initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the former Act as long as they are consistent with Section 24 of the 2013 Act – The combined effect of Section 24(1) and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensures that ongoing acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act continue under its provisions but with compensation determined according to the 2013 Act [Paras 3-6, 8].

Public Purpose and Compensation – Legislative Intention – The Court underscored the legislative intent behind the 2013 Act to ensure humane, participative, informed, and transparent land acquisition processes that provide just and fair compensation to affected families – The Court highlighted that the interpretation of 'initiation' under Section 24(1) should subserve these objectives [Paras 22-25].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The interpretation of 'initiated' for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act clarified as beginning with the issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification under the L.A. Act – The Court set aside contrary views and aligned the interpretation with the legislative intent to balance public purpose with fair compensation to affected landowners [Paras 27-31].

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Section 14 – Possession of Secured Asset – Supreme Court held that the District Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as mentioned in Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act include Additional District Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate – This interpretation ensures the timely disposal of applications under Section 14, fulfilling the Act's objective of expeditious recovery of secured assets [Paras 1-14].

Persona Designata – Section 14 of SARFAESI Act – The Court clarified that the District Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are not persona designata under Section 14 – The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate can exercise powers under this Section [Paras 3-6, 8].

Ministerial Functions – Nature of Powers – The powers exercised by the Magistrates under Section 14 are ministerial and do not involve any quasi-judicial functions – These powers can thus be exercised by the Additional Magistrates to facilitate the SARFAESI Act’s purpose [Paras 8-10].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court's interpretation upheld that the terms "District Magistrate" and "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate" under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act include their respective Additional Magistrates – Ensures the objectives of the SARFAESI Act for expeditious possession and disposal of secured assets [Paras 12-14].

Criminal Law – Reversal of Acquittal – Evidence Assessment – High Court reversed the acquittal of the appellants, convicting them under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC based on the testimony of an eyewitness (P.W.2) and the recovery of incriminating items – Supreme Court emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence and the credibility of witnesses, especially in cases with procedural lapses and conflicting testimonies [Paras 1-20].

Eyewitness Testimony – Reliability and Contradictions – The reliability of the sole eyewitness (P.W.2-Mahesh) was questioned due to material contradictions and discrepancies in his statements – The Court underscored the necessity for the testimony to be of sterling quality, especially when it forms the basis of conviction [Paras 21-24, 35-38].

Investigative Lapses – Impact on Prosecution Case – Serious lapses in the investigation, including the failure to produce critical documents and inconsistent statements recorded by different officers, were highlighted – The Court noted that such lapses undermine the prosecution's case and the credibility of the evidence presented [Paras 25-34, 39-40].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's judgment and conviction set aside – The appellants acquitted of all charges due to unreliable witness testimony and significant procedural lapses in the investigation – The well-reasoned order of acquittal by the Sessions Judge restored [Paras 41].

Thika Tenancy – Definition and Scope – Interpretation of ‘thika tenant’ under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, and subsequent statutes – Supreme Court held that the term 'any structure' includes both kutcha and pucca structures – The Court examined legislative amendments and their retrospective effect, and the implications on tenancy and landlord's interest in the property [Paras 1-25].

Vesting of Property – Impact of Legislation – Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, and its Amendment in 1993 and 2010 – The Court clarified the vesting of landlord’s interest in thika tenancy lands and other lands – The legislative intention to protect tenants and ensure equitable utilization of lands for public good [Paras 3-8, 22-25].

Judicial Precedents – Reliance on Previous Judgments – The Court referred to several precedents including Jatadhari Daw & Grandsons v. Smt Radha Debi & Anr., and Lakshmimoni Das and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., analyzing the interpretation of ‘any structure’ and its application in the context of thika tenancy laws [Paras 15-20].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's judgment reversed – The appellants declared as thika tenants under the relevant statutes – The property in question deemed to have vested in the State free from all encumbrances as per the applicable legislation – The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind protecting thika tenants and ensuring equitable utilization of land [Paras 27-31].

Constitutional Law – Legislative Competence and Repugnancy – Challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 4(7) and 4(8) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976, and Section 8A of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 – Appellant contended that the amendments were repugnant to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Central legislation, and thus invalid – Supreme Court held that there was no repugnancy as the 1988 Act did not cover the field of manner of levy and collection of vehicle tax, which fell under the State’s domain – No direct conflict between the State and Central legislations – Amendments upheld [Paras 1-88].

Taxation Law – Levy and Collection – Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976 – Amendments requiring proof of welfare fund contribution payment before vehicle tax payment – Challenge on grounds of arbitrariness and violation of fundamental rights – Supreme Court upheld amendments as constitutionally valid – Emphasized the purpose of ensuring timely payment of both welfare fund contributions and vehicle tax – Noted statutory safeguards for review and appeal in case of disputes [Paras 9-27, 31-33].

Welfare Legislation – Workers’ Welfare Fund – Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 – Section 8A – Requirement to produce receipt of welfare fund contribution before vehicle tax payment – Upheld by Supreme Court – Considered necessary to prevent evasion and ensure welfare of transport workers – Legislative competence of State Legislature affirmed [Paras 27-30, 33-34].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Amendments in Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976, and Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985, upheld as constitutionally valid.

Taxation Law – Service Tax – Exemption Notification – Mega Exemption Notification:Service tax exemption under the Mega Exemption Notification applies to services provided by way of conduct of any religious ceremony. The Supreme Court held that this exemption is specific to services directly involving the conduct of religious ceremonies and does not extend to auxiliary services facilitating the ceremony such as those provided by HGOs/PTOs. Therefore, services by HGOs/PTOs to Haj pilgrims do not qualify for exemption​​.

Service Tax – Religious Ceremonies – Applicability of Exemption:

The Court emphasized that the Mega Exemption Notification’s clause concerning religious ceremonies applies strictly to the person performing the ceremony, not to intermediaries or facilitators. Services like travel, accommodation, and other arrangements made by HGOs/PTOs for Haj pilgrims are not exempt as they do not constitute the conduct of the ceremony itself​​.

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Equality before Law:The distinction between services provided by the Haj Committees and HGOs/PTOs does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification of services and the corresponding exemptions provided to the Haj Committees under the bilateral arrangement between India and Saudi Arabia have a rational basis and meet the test of intelligible differentia​​.

Indirect Taxation – Scope of Service Tax: Service tax is an indirect tax levied on the service provider but ultimately borne by the service recipient. The Court highlighted that service tax is a consumption tax on services provided within the taxable territory, i.e., India, and thus services rendered by HGOs/PTOs to Indian pilgrims are taxable despite the religious context of the services provided​​.

 Decision: The petitions challenging the levy of service tax on services provided by HGOs/PTOs to Haj pilgrims were dismissed. The Court upheld the applicability of service tax on such services, affirming that the exemption under the Mega Exemption Notification does not extend to the services provided by HGOs/PTOs for the Haj pilgrimage.