Criminal Law – Child Pornography – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Appeal – High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused under Section 67B of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, and Section 15(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, citing that mere possession or viewing of child pornography without publication or transmission does not constitute an offense under these provisions – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the law, especially under Section 15(1) of the POCSO, which penalizes possession of child pornographic material with an intent to transmit or share, even if no actual transmission occurs – Held: The criminal proceedings against the accused are restored and must proceed to trial [Paras 9-13, 261].

Interpretation of Section 15 POCSO Act – Nature of Offense – Supreme Court emphasized that Section 15 of the POCSO Act penalizes storage or possession of child pornography with specific intent, even without actual transmission – The Court distinguished between three distinct offenses under subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 15, holding that intent can be inferred from the manner of possession and failure to delete or report such material – Held: The High Court wrongly ignored the scope of Section 15, which criminalizes possession of child pornographic material under certain circumstances [Paras 222-231].

Information Technology Act – Section 67B – Transmission or Publication of Child Pornography – High Court ruled that downloading or watching child pornography in private does not constitute an offense under Section 67B of the IT Act – Supreme Court clarified that Section 67B covers a wide range of activities related to child exploitation online, including possession, consumption, and propagation – Held: The act of viewing or possessing child pornography with intent to transmit is punishable, even if transmission does not occur [Paras 11-12, 259].

Public Interest – Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material (CSEAM) – Supreme Court acknowledged the broader public interest in combating child pornography and ordered that the term "child pornography" be replaced with "child sexual exploitation and abuse material" (CSEAM) in legal discourse – The Court called for amendments to the POCSO Act and comprehensive sex education to prevent child exploitation – Directed Union of India to consider these suggestions and take appropriate legislative and administrative action [Paras 223-246, 260].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings against the accused restored for further trial – Suggestions to amend the POCSO Act and measures to address child exploitation recommended to the Union of India [Paras 261-263].

Juvenility Claim – Application Filed After Final Conviction – Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Claim Accepted - The applicant, convicted for offences under Sections 302, 307, and 34 IPC, filed an application seeking release on the ground of juvenility at the time of the offence. The Supreme Court held that a claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after conviction. The applicant's date of birth, verified through school records and other documents, established that he was 17 years, 3 months, and 13 days old on the date of the offence, entitling him to the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the applicant was acquitted [Paras 3-6, 14-16].

Discrepancy in Identity – Slight Variance in Name – No Bar to Juvenility Claim - The Court dismissed objections raised regarding discrepancies in the applicant’s name across various records, emphasizing that such minor inconsistencies could not negate the substantial evidence proving the applicant’s juvenility. The Court observed that the applicant’s parentage was not in dispute, and the variance in name was immaterial to the adjudication of juvenility [Paras 7-9].

Belated Plea of Juvenility – No Time Limit on Juvenility Claims – Application Not Barred - The Court rejected the State’s objection regarding the delayed claim of juvenility, reaffirming that such claims can be made at any stage, even post-conviction, as per the ruling in Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489. The delay in raising the plea was not a ground for dismissal [Paras 10-12].

Final Decision – Conviction Set Aside – Applicant Acquitted Due to Juvenility - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the applicant based on his established juvenility and acquitted him of all charges. The interim bail granted earlier was confirmed, and the bail bonds were cancelled [Paras 17-19].

Judicial Misconduct – Inquiry and Suspension of Judicial Officer – Appeal Allowed – The appellant, a Sub-Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, was suspended by the High Court of Kerala for allegedly failing to examine the Investigating Officer and allowing no opportunity for cross-examination in a criminal case (CC No.24/2016) – The Supreme Court found that the High Court had issued the suspension order without receiving the case records and without providing the appellant's counsel an opportunity to present his case – Held: The High Court’s order dated 23/12/2022, suspending the appellant and ordering an inquiry, was set aside as legally invalid – The disciplinary proceedings initiated based on this order were also quashed [Paras 5-12].

Procedural Irregularity – Early Listing Without Case Records – The Court noted that the records requisitioned by the High Court from the CJM were not received before the order of suspension was passed – The Supreme Court held that passing an order without complete records and without allowing proper representation renders the High Court’s decision flawed [Paras 8-10].

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the impugned orders of the Kerala High Court dated 23/12/2022 and 21/06/2023 were set aside. The disciplinary proceedings were quashed, and the original petitions were restored for hearing before the Kerala High Court.

Land Acquisition – Payment of Compensation – The appellant (M/s Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd.) challenged the High Court’s direction to pay compensation under the Supplementary Award dated 02.05.2022 – High Court had ruled that the appellant should pay the compensation first and recover the amount from Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) later – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on Clause 7.1 of the Scheme of Arrangement between the appellant and JAL was erroneous – The acquisition proceedings commenced before the Scheme's "Effective Date," and liabilities associated with the land remained with JAL – Held: JAL is liable for the compensation determined under the Supplementary Award [Paras 16, 20, 27, 32, 56].

Land Ownership – Liability of Payment – The subject land was acquired for a safety zone under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for JAL's cement project – The land was not transferred to Ultra-Tech Cement under the Scheme of Arrangement – Supreme Court clarified that ownership of the land and liabilities relating to the land acquisition, including compensation, remained with JAL – Hence, the appellant could not be directed to pay the compensation amount for land not transferred to it – Held: Compensation liability remains with JAL, not Ultra-Tech Cement [Paras 27, 29, 32].

Return of Acquired Land – Unutilized Land under Section 101 of the 2013 Act – JAL contended that the subject land had remained unutilized and should be returned to the original landowners – The Court rejected this contention, holding that the land was acquired as a safety zone and was being utilized for that purpose – The argument that the land was unutilized did not hold since the purpose of acquisition was being fulfilled – Held: The return of land under Section 101 is not applicable in this case [Paras 33, 36-38].

State's Role – Article 300-A of the Constitution – The Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the State to ensure fair compensation for landowners – The Himachal Pradesh government failed in ensuring timely payment of compensation, contrary to the welfare State principles under Article 300-A – The Court held that the State should have facilitated payment to the landowners rather than leaving them to seek compensation from corporate entities – Held: The State must compensate landowners and recover the amount from JAL [Paras 43-52].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Respondent Nos. 7 (State of Himachal Pradesh) and 10 (Land Acquisition Collector) directed to pay compensation to the landowners and recover it from JAL – Compensation to be paid within 15 days with interest at 9% from the date of the Supplementary Award [Paras 56-58].

Criminal Law – Filing of False Proceedings – Misuse of Judicial Process – Appellants filed appeals in the name of Bhagwan Singh challenging orders of the Allahabad High Court – During proceedings, it was revealed that Bhagwan Singh had not authorized any such filings and had no knowledge of the SLPs in his name – Multiple advocates were involved in submitting forged documents, including a falsified 'Vakalatnama' purportedly signed by Bhagwan Singh – Court found that the entire proceedings were a fraud, orchestrated by respondents Sukhpal Singh and Rinki with the assistance of advocates【Paras 5-17, 20-25】.

Professional Misconduct – Role of Advocates in Fraudulent Proceedings – Advocates involved in the case were found to have knowingly filed false documents and misled the Court – Advocate-on-Record (AOR) attested signatures on the ‘Vakalatnama’ without Bhagwan Singh’s presence or consent – Advocates were directed to adhere to high standards of professionalism, as their actions directly impacted the integrity of the judicial process【Paras 9-10, 25-32】.

Judicial Process – Fraud on Court – Misuse of Legal System – The Court held that filing false proceedings using forged documents, with the involvement of advocates, constituted a fraud on the judiciary – The case reflected systemic abuse of the justice delivery process, where unscrupulous litigants and their counsel exploited procedural loopholes to file false claims【Paras 4, 20, 30-32】.

Witness Protection – Harassment of Key Witness in Nitish Katara Case – Respondent No. 2, Ajay Katara, a key witness in the Nitish Katara murder case, had been implicated in multiple false cases, including this one, as part of a larger effort to intimidate him for his testimony against high-profile convicts – The Court acknowledged the continuous threats and harassment faced by Katara, underscoring the vital role of witness protection in the justice system【Paras 16-18, 25-26, 28】.

Investigation Ordered – Involvement of CBI – The Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation into the fraudulent activities surrounding the filing of false proceedings – The CBI was tasked with identifying all individuals responsible for the fraud and submitting a report to the Court within two months【Paras 32, 43】.

Corrective Measures – Regulation of Professional Ethics and Procedures – The Court emphasized the need for strict adherence to professional ethics by advocates – It directed the Bar Council of India and the Government of India to take necessary actions based on this judgment – The Court also laid down guidelines for the proper marking of advocates' appearances in court records to prevent misuse【Paras 33-42】.

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Directions issued for CBI investigation and corrective measures for professional conduct – Matter listed for submission of CBI report on November 25, 2024【Paras 43】.

Dowry Death – Conviction Reversed – Appellants, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased, were convicted under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC by the Trial Court and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment – The High Court, while reducing the sentence to 7 years, upheld the conviction – The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that there was no direct evidence of dowry demand from the appellants – Alleged dowry demand appeared to be unrelated to the marriage, instead linked to the naming ceremony of the deceased's child – Prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with dowry – Held: Conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC set aside [Paras 16-18].

Presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act – Not Applicable – Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises only when all essential ingredients of dowry death are proved – In this case, the evidence of cruelty or harassment soon before death in connection with dowry was found lacking – Consequently, the presumption under Section 113-B could not be invoked against the appellants – Held: Prosecution failed to prove dowry harassment beyond reasonable doubt, negating the application of presumption under Section 113-B [Paras 13, 18].

Contradictions in Prosecution Case – Lack of Independent Witnesses – Testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, parents of the deceased, were inconsistent with the allegations in the FIR regarding dowry demand – No independent witnesses from the locality were examined to support the prosecution’s case – The Court found these contradictions to be crucial in doubting the truthfulness of the prosecution’s case – Held: Testimonies of key witnesses lacked credibility, and failure to produce independent witnesses further weakened the prosecution’s case [Paras 17-18].

Suicide due to Personal Reasons – No Proof of Murder – The defense argued that the deceased committed suicide due to personal issues, including her inability to live with her husband and the discovery of a photograph with a male stranger – The Court noted that no other injuries were found on the deceased besides burn injuries, and the presence of the accused at the time of the incident was not established – Held: The death was likely a suicide, but the prosecution failed to prove dowry harassment, so the conviction was not sustainable [Paras 18, 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC set aside – Appellants acquitted – Their bail bonds stand discharged [Paras 19-20].

Criminal Conspiracy – Discharge of Accused – Section 120B of IPC – Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act – Alleged Corruption – Discharge Upheld – The prosecution alleged that the Respondent No. 1, as Managing Director of the company, conspired with co-accused to pay illegal gratification to customs officials for clearing refunds – The High Court discharged the respondent based on lack of prima facie evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy – Held: There was insufficient material to link the respondent to the alleged payments or conspiracy, and the reference to "DM" in key entries was admitted to be referring to a different individual (Dushyant Mulani) – The High Court's decision to discharge the respondent was upheld [Paras 9-15].

Material Evidence – Diary Entries and Witness Statements – Inadequate to Implicate Respondent – The prosecution relied on diary entries made by co-accused, mentioning “DM” in connection with illegal payments – The prosecution admitted that "DM" referred to another co-accused (Dushyant Mulani) and not the respondent – No direct telephonic conversations or statements implicated the respondent – Held: The material on record, including diary entries, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the respondent [Paras 11-14].

Prima Facie Case – High Court's Role in Assessing Evidence at Discharge Stage – Legal Threshold – At the stage of framing charges, the court should only ascertain whether a prima facie case exists based on the charge sheet – The High Court carefully assessed the charge sheet, witness statements, and documentary evidence, concluding that there was no prima facie case against the respondent – Held: No error in the High Court's finding of discharge – Appeal dismissed [Paras 7, 13, 15].

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order discharging the respondent, finding that the material presented in the charge sheet did not establish a prima facie case of involvement in the alleged conspiracy or bribery – Appeal dismissed [Para 16].

Arbitration Agreement – Non-Signatory to Arbitration Agreement – Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Referral of Non-Signatory to Arbitration Upheld – The petitioners sought appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to resolve disputes arising under a Family Arrangement Agreement (FAA), including the involvement of the SRG Group which was not a signatory to the FAA – Held: Even though the SRG Group was not a signatory to the FAA, their conduct and involvement in the performance of the FAA raised a prima facie case for them being bound by the arbitration clause – The referral court is required to conduct only a prima facie inquiry into the existence of an arbitration agreement, with the arbitral tribunal left to determine whether the non-signatory (SRG Group) is bound by the arbitration agreement – The involvement of the SRG Group in implementing the FAA provisions, such as share transfers in Millenium and Deegee companies, prima facie indicates their role in the FAA, warranting referral to arbitration [Paras 52-80].

Prima Facie Determination – Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Scope of Referral Court’s Jurisdiction Limited – Under Section 11(6A), the referral court's inquiry is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement – Held: The referral court must avoid conducting a detailed inquiry into the facts and instead limit its examination to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement – Any further detailed examination, including whether a non-signatory can be bound by the arbitration agreement, must be left to the arbitral tribunal – Referral of SRG Group to arbitration was prima facie justified based on their involvement in the execution of the FAA [Paras 60-63, 80].

Non-Signatory Bound by Arbitration Agreement – Consent and Conduct – Factors for Determining Non-Signatory’s Intent – A non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement if there is evidence of consent, conduct, or involvement in the underlying contract – Held: In this case, email exchanges, involvement in performance, and negotiations involving the SRG Group raised questions about their intent to be bound by the FAA – The issue of whether the SRG Group is a veritable party to the arbitration agreement should be decided by the arbitral tribunal after evaluating the evidence [Paras 68-79].

Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the petition, appointing Justice Akil Kureshi (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes under the FAA – The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide the involvement of the SRG Group as a veritable party to the arbitration agreement based on the evidence – All contentions of the parties were left open for adjudication by the tribunal [Paras 81-84].

Eviction Suit – Judgment on Admission – Order XII Rule 6 of CPC – Admission Must be Clear and Unambiguous – Judgment Set Aside - The appellants challenged the eviction decree based on the alleged admission in a different case regarding the succession of tenancy rights. The Court emphasized that a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 requires an unequivocal and unconditional admission. The alleged admission in this case did not meet that standard, as it was mixed with questions of law and fact. The decree passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside [Paras 2-4, 8-9, 14].

Tenancy Succession – Interpretation of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – Retrospective Application Not Intended - The Court held that the 1997 Act did not retrospectively extinguish tenancy rights accrued under the 1956 Act. The phrase "whichever is later" in Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act was deemed superfluous, and the appellants’ tenancy rights, inherited under the 1956 Act, could not be nullified by the 1997 Act [Paras 19-21, 48-50].

Retrospective Legislation – Presumption Against Retrospective Operation of Statutes - The Court reiterated that unless expressly stated, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively. The rights vested in the appellants under the 1956 Act were protected, and the 1997 Act could not retrospectively divest those rights [Paras 25, 28-30].

Decision – Appellants’ Tenancy Rights Affirmed – Eviction Order Set Aside - The Court concluded that the appellants’ tenancy rights did not expire with the introduction of the 1997 Act. The eviction order passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside, and the appeals were allowed [Paras 48-50].