Facts:

A commercial plot was allotted on a free-hold basis to the respondent's husband.

The allotment required completion of the building according to sanctioned plans.

The husband constructed a building with the ground floor for commercial use and first and second floors for residential purposes.

The respondent applied for a residential plot, declaring no ownership of residential property in the Union Territory.

An allotment was made, but it was later canceled when authorities realized the husband owned a residential flat.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of Regulation 6(1) concerning the eligibility of the respondent for a residential plot, given her husband's ownership of a residential flat on a commercial plot.

Held:

The eligibility hinges on whether the husband owned a residential plot or house in the specified region.

The Court held that the residential flat above the ground floor commercial plot qualified as a residential house under Regulation 6(1).

The respondent's declaration was deemed incorrect, justifying the cancellation of the allotment.

The Court set aside previous orders and upheld the cancellation of allotment.

Despite the bona fide nature of the respondent's statement, the deposit was permitted to be refunded without interest, deviating from the usual regulation on forfeiting the deposit.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Tirupati Mills, incorporated in 1972, faced financial distress and was declared a sick industrial company in 1988.

On 5-7-1997, an agreement was made between Tirupati Woollen Mills Shramik Sangharsha Samity ("Samity") and appellant-Divya for the purchase of assets and re-employment of workers.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to a series of court orders and appeals.

Offers for the sale of assets were made, with the appellant initially offering Rs. 37 lakhs, later increased to Rs. 85 lakhs, and finally, Rs. 1.3 crores.

Issues:

Include the adequacy of the sale price, the conduct of the auction, and the subsequent offers made by other parties.

Held:

The Court, considering the chequered history of the sale proceedings, held that the appellant initially underbid for the property, indicating an attempt to take advantage of a court sale. The subsequent increase in the bid to Rs. 1.3 crores did not negate this initial undervaluation. Respondents 7 and 8 expressed willingness to purchase the property for Rs. 2 crores after the sale was confirmed but before possession was handed over. The Court, relying on Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of sale, set aside the confirmed sale in favor of the appellant for the benefit of creditors and public interest. Respondents 7 and 8 were directed to compensate the appellant with Rs. 70,000 each. The Court emphasized its duty to ensure an adequate price for the property.

Facts:

The dispute centered around land measuring 2 Kanals 12 Marias, classified as "gair mumkin toba" or pond land, in village Khokhar, Punjab. Respondent No. 2 claimed ownership through an auction in 1959. Appellant, inducted as a tenant in 1978, contended the land was evacuee property. The appellant was growing sugarcane on the land.

Issues:

Discrepancy in the auctioned land's classification (gair mumkin bhatta) and the appellant's possession (gair mumkin toba).

Validity of the corrigendum issued in 1985, including the land in the possession of the appellant.

Adequacy of the appellant's locus standi in light of canceled auction proceedings.

Held:

The auctioned land's classification discrepancy and possession were crucial. The appellant was in possession since 1978, and respondent No. 2's objections emerged only in 1982, after a lapse of 23 years. The authorities erred in applying Rule 90, which addresses clerical or arithmetic errors, not disputes of possession.

The corrigendum issued in 1985 lacked a factual basis and was deemed arbitrary. The Chief Settlement Commissioner's oversight of the appellant's possession rights was noted.

The cancellation of the auction without notifying the appellant and denying a fair hearing was deemed unjust. The appellant had locus standi, and his rights were adversely affected.

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Munsif in 1981, confirmed in 1985, and later promoted to a Civil Judge in 1993.

A review in 1998 allowed the petitioner to remain in service until the age of 58.

A subsequent decision, invoking Rule 71(A1), mandated the petitioner's retirement at the age of 58.

Issues:

Whether Rule 71(A1) is valid and in compliance with previous judgments, specifically addressing the extension of the retirement age for judicial officers.

Held:

The court upholds the validity of Rule 71(A1) as it aligns with the intention of raising the tone and morale of judicial services.

The judgment emphasizes the need for periodic evaluation to retain officers with potential for continued useful service.

The court clarifies that the extension to the age of 60 is not automatic but subject to the High Court's positive recommendation based on a comprehensive assessment.

The decision dismisses the petition, asserting that without a specific rule, judicial officers have no inherent right to continue beyond the age of 58.

Facts:

The petitioners, engaged in providing credit to the public, challenged the constitutionality of Section 45-S, alleging that it prohibited them from accepting public deposits for their business. They argued that this restriction adversely affected various sectors with seasonal financial needs.

Issues:

Constitutionality of Section 45-S concerning the acceptance of public deposits by non-banking institutions.

Violation of Articles 19(1)(g), 19(6), and 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that Section 45-S does not restrict unincorporated bodies from conducting their financial business but specifically prohibits utilizing public deposits. There is no unrestricted fundamental right to accept deposits from the public. The court emphasized the need for prudence in managing public funds, especially considering the risks posed by unincorporated bodies.

The court highlighted that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had considered various committee reports before amending Section 45-S in 1997. The question of restricting financial activities by unincorporated bodies is a matter of economic policy, and the court should defer to the expertise of expert bodies in such cases.

Even if the restrictions amounted to a total prohibition, the court justified it in the public interest, citing the uncontrolled growth of unincorporated bodies accepting deposits. The prohibition on partnership firms engaging in such business is considered a reasonable restriction.

The court emphasized the importance of not interfering with economic legislation unless it is manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional. It stated that the presumption is in favor of the constitutional validity of legislation, and judicial discretion should consider overwhelming public interest.

Facts:

The Government of Bihar granted a license for the supply of electric energy to M/s. Octavices Steel & Co. Ltd. in 1924, later transferred to the 1st Respondent.

The license had a term of 50 years, ending on February 5, 1974.

Appellant served notice under Section 6(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, calling for the sale of the undertaking on the license expiration.

Ordinances and an Amendment Act were passed in 1974, amending Sections 6 and 7A of the Indian Electricity Act.

Issues:

Validity of the amended Sections 6 and 7A concerning the purchase of electric undertakings.

Constitutional validity of the amendments challenged on the grounds of violating Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2).

Whether the amendments had a reasonable and direct nexus to the principles under Article 39(b) of the Constitution.

Nature of the acquisition: whether it was for material resources or a chose-in-action.

Held:

The acquisition was part of the policy of nationalization of electric companies by the Union of India.

Constitutional Bench upheld the validity of the Act/Ordinance, stating it had nexus with the principles in Article 39(b) and was protected by Article 31(c).

The Act was not a piece of colorable legislation; it aimed at nationalization of the undertaking and was eligible for protection under Article 31(c).

The financial costs of the nationalization scheme were integral and inseparable, and economic considerations for nationalization were not justiciable.

The rights to compensation did not crystallize upon giving the notice; licensee's rights were affected only when the undertaking was actually taken over.

Facts:

The assessee claimed depreciation at 15% on a theater building, asserting it as 'plant.' The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation at 5%. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) approved the claim, later confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether a theater building can be considered 'plant' for depreciation purposes under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The court held that a building used for hotel or cinema business cannot be categorized as 'plant.' Section 32 of the Income Tax Act provides distinct rates for depreciation on buildings and machinery/plant. The legislative intent is clear in treating buildings separately. The word 'plant' under Section 43(3) does not include buildings.

Referring to dictionary meanings is unnecessary, and considering a building designed for specific business purposes as 'plant' contradicts legislative intent. The Income Tax Rules prescribe depreciation rates for buildings separately, reinforcing the distinction.

Buildings for hotel businesses are shelters, not tools or apparatus for conducting business. Even applying functional tests, buildings do not meet the criteria for being considered 'plant.'

Rejecting the argument that 'plant' and 'building' are not mutually exclusive, the court emphasized that granting depreciation on buildings intended for hotel or cinema business is inconsistent with the legislative framework.

It is challenging to differentiate between specially designed and converted buildings for the same business. Depreciation aims to represent the true picture of business income, and the legislature didn't intend to grant such benefits to typically more durable buildings.

Considering all industries require buildings, design and construction tailored to specific needs don't qualify a building as 'plant.' Accepting the argument would blur the legislative distinction between 'building' and 'machinery' or 'plant.'

Facts:

Ghaziabad Development Authority announced schemes for allotment of developed plots. Claimants alleged unreasonable delays and failures in scheme implementation. Various forums found the Authority at fault and directed refund of amounts paid by claimants.

Issues:

Compensation for mental agony.

Awarding interest in the absence of a contractual obligation.

Determination of the appropriate interest rate.

Held:

Compensation for mental agony was held improper in ordinary commercial contracts.

Interest on equitable grounds can be awarded; in this case, 12% per annum was deemed just and proper.

The brochure's provision on non-liability for interest applies only when claimants are responsible for circumstances leading to a refund.

All the appeals and contempt petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Appellant (landlady) owns property at Masjid Moth, New Delhi, including an open plot of land (suit plot).

Respondent (tenant) constructed an unauthorized latrine on the suit plot.

Parties settled the dispute earlier with a compromise where respondent became the tenant of the suit plot.

Landlady terminated the tenancy and filed a suit for possession, contested by the tenant on the ground that the suit plot is "premises" under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Issues:

Whether the suit plot is "premises" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Held:

The term "premises" implies the subject matter of tenancy where there is a landlord-tenant relationship and an agreed-upon rent.

If an open plot with a structure was let out, it falls within the meaning of "premises."

In this case, the latrine on the suit plot was constructed by the tenant without authorization.

The compromise clearly mentions the letting out of the open plot of land measuring 9' x 7', and the agreed rent was for the plot, not the structure.

The structure (latrine) belongs to the tenant, and the landlady has no right or interest in it.

The suit plot does not fall within the definition of "premises" under the Delhi Act.

Section 50 of the Delhi Act, ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, is not applicable in this case.

The suit for possession is maintainable, and the appellant's claim is upheld.