Facts:

A young bride named Selvi committed suicide.

The police filed a challan against the husband and his mother for offenses under IPC Sections 304B and 498A.

Selvi's father was dissatisfied with the challan, moved the High Court u/s 482 of CrPC, seeking directions.

Issues:

Whether the investigating officer can be directed by the High Court to consult the Public Prosecutor and submit a fresh charge-sheet?

Legality of the order directing the investigating officer to seek the opinion of the Public Prosecutor.

Held:

The investigating officer is not legally obliged to take the opinion of a Public Prosecutor or any authority, except the superior police officer in rank, during the investigation (Para 11).

The Public Prosecutor is appointed for conducting proceedings in the court and is not involved in the investigation. Involving the Public Prosecutor in the investigation is deemed unjudicious (Para 13).

The court emphasizes that the final step in the investigation, i.e., forming an opinion on whether there is a case to place the accused on trial, is the responsibility of the officer in charge of the police station (Para 15).

The High Court committed an illegality by directing the investigating officer to take back the final report and file a fresh report based on the opinion of the Public Prosecutor. This order is set aside (Para 20).

Facts:

Appellant applied for voluntary retirement on 18.10.1995.

Management accepted the voluntary retirement offer on 30.7.1997.

The management, in their letter, mentioned a provision for retention of quarter under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme.

The appellant continued in service until 26.9.1997.

Appellant submitted a letter on 7.8.1997, followed by another on 24.9.1997, withdrawing the voluntary retirement letter.

The withdrawal was not acknowledged by the respondent-management.

Issues:

Whether a person can withdraw the option for voluntary retirement after its acceptance but before it becomes effective?

Held:

The withdrawal of the option for voluntary retirement is allowed before the "effective date," as established by precedents (Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India, J.N. Srivastava Vs. Union of India, Power Finance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Pramod Kumar Bhatia).

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, directing the appellant to continue in service with all consequential benefits. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellants, Ajaib Singh and Sapinder Singh, were separately convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of poppy husks. The question at hand was whether poppy husks fell within the definition of "poppy straw" as per the NDPS Act.

Issues:

Whether poppy husk constitutes "poppy straw" under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

Interpretation of relevant sections and definitions in the NDPS Act.

Held:

The term "poppy straw" as defined in Section 2(18) of the NDPS Act includes all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy, even if no juice has been extracted.

The argument that "poppy husk" is non-narcotic and not covered by the NDPS Act was rejected.

The court emphasized that for an offense under Section 15, it is not necessary for poppy straw to have been used or made into opium.

The definition of "husk" in Webster's Dictionary and the commentaries on the NDPS Act supported the conclusion that poppy husk is part of the plant Papaver and falls within the definition of "poppy straw."

The Appeals were dismissed, affirming the convictions under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

************************************

Facts:

By Notification No. 210/82 dated September 10, 1982, the Government of India granted customs duty exemption on raw materials and components imported for the manufacture of goods to be supplied to various organizations, including O.N.G.C. The exemption was to be in force until September 10, 1987. Subsequent notifications modified the exemption, leading to the appellant becoming liable to pay duty to the extent of 25% for the period between December 30, 1986, and September 10, 1987. The appellant contested this modification, arguing that the exemption was part of a project-based scheme to encourage indigenous manufacturing for essential Indian enterprises.

Issues:

The appellant was that the modification of the exemption, granted under Notification No. 210/82, was not justified as public interest did not demand the variation during the period the exemption was in force.

Held:

The Court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply if the change in the government's stand was made on account of public policy. The Court referred to previous decisions, stating that exemptions granted in public interest can be modified or withdrawn if the change is made for valid reasons. In this case, the Court found that the factors considered by the government, such as the possibility of misuse, were irrelevant and did not serve public interest. The Court quashed the amended notifications that reduced the extent of exemption and held that the original notifications issued in 1982 and modified in 1983 would be effective until September 10, 1987.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the order made by the High Court in allowing the writ petition was set aside.

FACTS:

Edward Keventer Pvt. Ltd., a company manufacturing fruit drinks under the brand names 'Frooti' and 'Appy,' challenged the Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board's demand for market fees on these products.

The Market Committee, under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, had classified 'Frooti' and 'Appy' as mango and apple products, respectively, subject to market fees.

ISSUES:

Whether the products 'Frooti' and 'Appy' fall under the definition of agricultural produce as specified in the Act.

Interpretation of Section 2(1)(a) and its application to processed agricultural products.

HELD:

The court interprets Section 2(1)(a) of the Act, emphasizing that agricultural produce must be specified in the Schedule. Drawing parallels, it notes that similar Acts distinguish between raw products and their processed forms, treating them as separate items. The court concludes that 'Frooti' and 'Appy,' being beverages processed from mango pulp and apple concentrate, do not retain the identity of mango and apple fruits specified in the Schedule. Therefore, they are not covered by the definition of agricultural produce.( Para 5)

The court dismisses the argument referring to a decision in another case, asserting that the definition of 'agricultural produce' in the Bihar Act is different from the Uttar Pradesh Act discussed in the precedent. It distinguishes between the two Acts, emphasizing that the Bihar Act requires specified items in the Schedule to qualify as agricultural produce.( Para 6)

The court, based on its interpretation of the Act, holds that 'Frooti' and 'Appy' are not specified in the Schedule, and therefore, the respondent had no authority to demand market fees from the appellant. The High Court's order is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.( Para 8)

REFERRED CASES:

The Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar and Others Etc., AIR 1999 SC 3125 : (1999) 4 ARBLR 502 : (1999) 5 JT 422 : (1999) 4 SCALE 516 : (1999) 9 SCC 620 : (1999) 1 SCR 146 Supp

Smt. Kusum Chandrakant Khaushe Vs. L. Hmlinglianan and others, AIR 1993 SC 401 : AIR 1992 SC 401 : (1993) CriLJ 185 : (1993) 1 JT 601 : (1993) 1 SCALE 719 : (1993) 1 SCALE 615 : (1993) 2 SCC 515 Supp : (1993) 2 SCC 515 : (1993) 1 SCR 1037

**********************************

Facts:

The Indian Overseas Bank provided canteen facilities to its staff and departments. Initially run by a contractor, a cooperative canteen was established in 1973. The bank provided infrastructural support and subsidies. The canteen closed in 1990, leading to a claim by workers that they should be considered bank employees.

Issues:

The employer-employee relationship between the bank and the canteen workers, considering the financial and infrastructural support provided by the bank.

Held:

The Single Judge of the High Court, in exercising writ jurisdiction, inappropriately re-evaluated evidence. The Division Bench rightfully criticized the order and restored the Tribunal's award. The Industrial Tribunal had ample material for its findings.

The nature of tests for master and servant relationships can't be universally fixed. Piercing the veil to reveal realities may be necessary to safeguard workers. The canteen was run with consistent bank support, establishing an obligation, despite no statutory requirement.

The bank's historical involvement and support for the canteen, along with workers' enrollment in welfare schemes, demonstrated an unmistakable obligation. Canteen services became an implicit part of the employees' service conditions.

The Single Judge overlooked relevant material. The bank, even if not directly in control, cannot absolve itself of liabilities when using the canteen as its instrumentality. The Division Bench's restoration of the Tribunal's Award was justified.

Facts:

The Jaya Gokul Educational Trust sought permission from the University and AICTE to establish a self-financing Engineering College. AICTE granted conditional approval, and the University forwarded the request for affiliation to the State Government. The State Government refused

permission, leading to a legal challenge by the Trust.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's approval is required for establishing a technical institution, considering the AICTE Act.

The role of the University and State Government in the approval process and affiliation of technical institutions.

Held:

The court held that Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act occupies the field related to the grant of approvals for establishing technical institutions. Provisions of the University Act or statutes require obtaining the 'views' of the State Government, not 'approval.' Any requirement for 'approval' would be repugnant to the AICTE Act.

Regulation 8(4) of AICTE only mandates calling for "comments/recommendations" from the State Government and the University. The State Government's objection should be addressed within the AICTE framework, and reliance on contrary opinions without proper procedure is not valid.

The so-called policy of the State cannot be a ground for refusing approval, and the State must communicate any policy to AICTE before granting permission. Once the AICTE Act and regulations are followed, and the Central Task Force approves, the State has no scope for further objection.

Obtaining the 'views' of the State Government as per the statute 9(7) does not equate to obtaining its 'approval.' University procedures and conditions for affiliation cannot be inconsistent with the Central Act.

The approval of the AICTE is sufficient, and there is no need for the State Government to reconsider its decision. The University should base its decisions on AICTE approval and other relevant factors not inconsistent with AICTE Act or regulations.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of three family members, with the accused charged based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution asserted that the accused, Babu Ram, killed his parents and brother due to a property dispute. The High Court acquitted the accused, citing a lack of a strong motive.

Issues:

The relevance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Evaluation of circumstantial evidence, including the disinterment of bodies and recovery of items at the instance of the accused.

Interpretation of post-mortem reports and their impact on the time of occurrence.

Validity of the disclosure statement and the delay in the interrogation of the accused.

Held:

The court rejected the High Court's assertion that motive is less material in cases based on direct evidence, emphasizing its importance in all criminal cases. Motive, though difficult to prove, plays a significant role in understanding an offender's mindset.( Para 11)

The Division Bench's reservations about the disinterment circumstance were deemed flimsy. The court criticized the High Court for sidelining a crucial circumstance based on insignificant grounds.( Para 14)

The court dismissed concerns about the delay in interrogating the accused after the disclosure statement, highlighting that Investigating Officers may have legitimate reasons for their actions.( Para 17)

The absence of food material in the victims' stomachs was deemed irrelevant, given the uncertainty of the actual time of murder and the potential variation in meal times.( Para 20)

Judicial scrutiny was emphasized for both prosecution and defense witnesses, rejecting the notion of different standards based on their category.( Para 23)

The court restored the conviction but opted for a life sentence instead of the extreme penalty imposed by the trial court.( Para 26)

Facts:

The incident occurred on the night of 4/5-5-1993 during the Arlem Festival, where a group of boys from Khareband assaulted three brothers from Calconda, including the appellant, resulting in the death of Simon Fernandez.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the intention to cause death or inflicted injuries with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death.

Held:

The appellant and his group did not come with the intention to kill but to thrash the victims. The act of hitting Simon on the head was done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, falling under Section 304 Part II, IPC.( Para 10)

Section 304, Part II, IPC is applicable when the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without the intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.( Para 13)

The appellant is found guilty of an offence u/s 304, Part II, IPC, and the conviction u/s 302, IPC is set aside. The appellant is sentenced to seven years of Rigorous Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000/.( Para 15)

************************