Quashing of FIR  - Public Servant – Definition under PC Act vs. IPC – Section 2(c) PC Act – Not Section 21 IPC – High Court quashed FIR relying on Section 21 IPC and Laljit Rajshi Shah (decided under the 1947 Act) – Held – The 1988 Act contains a self-contained and wider definition in Section 2(c); coverage includes persons in service or pay of a government-aided/controlled authority or corporation [Section 2(c)(iii)] and office-bearers of registered co-operative societies receiving government aid [Section 2(c)(ix)] – High Court’s approach erroneous – Quash order set aside [Paras 2-3, 5, 8].

PC Act – Public Servant – Co-operative Societies – Section 2(c)(iii) & (ix) – Determination is fact-dependent – Whether the society is owned/controlled/aided by Government, and whether the accused is an office-bearer, requires inquiry into management, control and funding – Such issues cannot be assumed at the threshold [Paras 3-4].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC (implied) – When foundational facts on “public servant” status require evidence, quashing is impermissible – Proper course is to remit for trial court’s determination on maintainability under the PC Act on available material [Paras 4, 7-8].

Precedent Distinguished – State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah – Decision turned on Section 21 IPC as adopted in the PC Act, 1947 – Not applicable post-1988 due to expanded, specific definition in Section 2(c) PC Act, 1988 [Para 2].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing FIR set aside – Parties at liberty to raise maintainability before the trial court – Trial court to decide, on material and in accordance with law [Paras 7-8].

Electricity Act - Tariff Determination – Section 26 A.P. Electricity Reforms Act – Brief of Judgment – Annual tariff for 01.04.2000–31.03.2001 upheld by High Court – Before the Supreme Court, appellants urged that Section 26(9) procedure must be followed for tariff fixation and that Section 26(7) forbids classification/undue preference – Held: Annual tariff is determined under Section 26(5); Section 26(9) applies to mid-year tariff amendments only – Differentiation among consumer categories and cross-subsidy are expressly permitted by Section 26(7) – Judicial review under Article 226 is limited to examining legality, procedure and arbitrariness – Appeals dismissed [Paras 4–5, 7–11].

Section 26(5) vs Section 26(9) – Distinct Fields – Annual exercise under Section 26(5) requiring filing of expected revenue from charges at least three months before ensuing financial year – Section 26(9) triggered only for intra-year introduction/amendment of tariff, with filing at least three months before “proposed date of implementation” – Overlap resolved by contextual reading – Notification and effective date governed by Section 26(6) [Paras 7–9].

Consumer Classification and Cross-Subsidy – Permissible Differentiation – Section 26(7)(a) allows differentiation by load/power factor, consumption, time-of-use, paying capacity and need for cross-subsidization – Tariff must be just, reasonable and efficiency-promoting [Section 26(7)(b)] and consistent with Act/licence [Section 26(7)(c)] – Categorisation among industrial, agricultural, domestic consumers valid on statutory parameters – No “undue” preference shown merely because industrial tariff is higher despite lower supply cost if cross-subsidy criteria are met [Paras 5, 10].

Sixth Schedule Link – Departure With Reasons – Financial principles in Sixth Schedule to the 1948 Act bind the Commission unless it records reasons for departure under Section 26(3) – Methodologies/procedures must further the Act’s objectives [Sections 26(2)–(4)] [Paras 7, 10].

Judicial Review – Limited under Article 226 – Court is not an appellate tariff body – Interference only if procedure illegal, decision arbitrary/ex facie contrary to statute – Policy choices in tariff and cross-subsidy ordinarily not to be disturbed [Para 11].

Decision – Appeals dismissed with costs – High Court judgment affirming Commission’s tariff sustained – Clarified that Section 26(9) governs mid-year amendments while annual tariff follows Section 26(5) – Consumer classification and cross-subsidy upheld within Section 26(7) framework [Paras 4, 9–12].

Criminal Law - Murder  – Sections 300 Exception 4, 304 Part I, 149 IPC – Article 136 – The High Court set aside the co-accuseds’ convictions under Sections 302/149 etc., finding no common object, and maintained the appellant Sukhbir Singh’s conviction under Section 302 – Held by Supreme Court: No common object under Section 149 was proved – Occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel without premeditation – Appellant entitled to Exception 4 to Section 300 – Conviction altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I with sentence of 10 years RI and fine – State’s appeal against acquittal of co-accused dismissed – Sections 300 Exception 4, 304 Part I, 149 IPC, Section 313 CrPC, Article 136 applied [Paras 7-16, 17-22, 23].

Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Section 149 IPC – Not Established – Trial court returned no specific finding on common object and convicted with the aid of Section 149 – High Court, on appraisal of evidence, found no prior enmity, trivial trigger, and individual reactions by others – Mere presence/arms not enough – No proof that members knew murder was likely in prosecution of a common object – Held: Section 149 liability not attracted [Paras 7, 14-16].

Exception 4 to Section 300 – Sudden Fight – Heat of Passion – No Premeditation – Appellant inflicted two spear blows after a brief altercation following splashes of mud and slaps by deceased – Short time gap – No further assault after victim fell – Conduct not “cruel or unusual” – Held: Case falls under Exception 4 – Offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I [Paras 17-22].

Article 136 – Scope of Interference – Concurrent/Reasonable View Rule – Supreme Court does not reappreciate evidence unless perversity or grave miscarriage is shown – High Court’s view on absence of common object was a plausible view based on evidence – No interference warranted [Paras 8-12].

Section 313 CrPC – Use of Accused’s Explanation – Accused’s version of sudden quarrel and purpose of removing water obstruction, elicited through Section 313 statements and cross-suggestions, could be considered in assessing “sudden fight” and absence of common object – Supports Exception 4 application [Paras 7, 15-19].

Decision – Appeals Partly Allowed – Appellant Sukhbir Singh’s conviction under Section 302 set aside – He is convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced to 10 years RI and fine of Rs. 5,000 – In default, RI for one year – State’s appeal against co-accused dismissed – Bail bonds of Sukhbir cancelled; to be taken into custody to serve remaining sentence – Other acquittals/modified convictions of co-accused by High Court left undisturbed [Para 23].

Murder – Sudden Quarrel – Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC – Applicability – The incident arose out of a sudden quarrel without prior enmity – Both the trial court and High Court found that the occurrence was without premeditation and fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 – Conviction altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC – Sentence reduced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment [Paras 2-3].

Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Requirement not Proved – The prosecution failed to establish that appellant shared common intention with co-accused Ram Parshad in inflicting fatal injury to the deceased – Evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 showed that appellant caused separate injuries on other victims with iron rod – Held: Conviction under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC unsustainable – Liability confined to individual acts punishable under Sections 325 and 323 IPC [Paras 4-5].

Conviction and Sentence – Modified – Conviction under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC set aside – Conviction under Sections 325 and 323 IPC maintained – Appellant having already undergone sentence for said offences, no further custody required – Bail bonds discharged [Para 6].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC set aside – Conviction under Sections 325 and 323 IPC affirmed – Appellant released as sentence already undergone [Paras 5-6].

Essential Commodities – Delegated Legislation – Validity of Gujarat State Order of 1981 – Appellants challenged the State Order of 1981 and subsequent notification restricting stock limits for edible oilseeds and edible oils, contending repugnancy with Central Order of 1977 which had deleted those items in 1997. Held: State Order of 1981 was validly issued under Section 3 read with Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act with prior concurrence of Central Government – Deletion of commodities from Central Order did not impliedly repeal or affect the State Order – Notifications fixing stock limits were within authority under Clause 24. Appeals dismissed. [Paras 16–23, 25–29]

Repugnancy – Article 254 – Not Applicable – Repugnancy arises only if both Central and State legislations occupy the same field simultaneously. After deletion of edible oilseeds and oils from Central Order of 1977, the field remained exclusively covered by the Gujarat State Order of 1981 – No conflict arose – State order continues to operate. [Paras 18–22]

State’s Power under Delegation – Sections 3 & 5, Essential Commodities Act – Delegation notification dated 09.06.1978 authorised States to frame orders with prior concurrence of Centre – Gujarat Order of 1981 issued with such concurrence – Clause 24 empowered directions on stock limits – Later amendments of 1998 and 2000 were within power and not ultra vires. [Paras 16, 20, 25]

Constitutional Law – Article 256 – Central Circular – Letter dated 13.11.1997 from Union Government merely required compliance with amendment to Central Order and did not mandate deletion of items from the State Order – Hence State was not bound to amend its order. [Para 22]

Precedent – Doctrine of Merger – Dismissal of SLP – Dismissal of SLP against Andhra Pradesh High Court ruling on similar issue without a speaking order does not constitute declaration of law or binding precedent – Gujarat High Court’s decision independently sustainable. [Para 14]

Case Distinguished – District Collector, Chittoor v. Chittoor Groundnut Traders Assn., AIR 1989 SC 989 – In Chittoor case, restrictions imposed were outside parent Order and lacked legal sanction – In contrast, Gujarat Order of 1981 expressly empowered State to regulate stock limits – Hence directions valid. [Paras 26–28]

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing, Control and Stock Declaration) Order, 1981 and notification dated 26.07.2000 imposing stock limits on edible oilseeds and oils held valid – No repugnancy with Central Order – No order as to costs. [Para 29]

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR - Prevention of Corruption – Repeal and Re-enactment – Saving of Notifications – Sections 30(2) PC Act, 1988 and Sections 6, 24 General Clauses Act – FIRs registered after 9.9.1988 were investigated by Inspectors of Police authorised under notifications issued under Section 5A(1) of the 1947 Act – High Court quashed proceedings holding that such Inspectors lacked authorisation under Section 17 of the 1988 Act – Held: Notifications issued under the repealed 1947 Act continue by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act and are deemed to have been issued under the corresponding provisions of the 1988 Act unless superseded – Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act preserves the application of Section 6 GCA and incorporates a legal fiction deeming acts done under the 1947 Act to have been done under the 1988 Act – No inconsistency between Section 5A of 1947 Act and Section 17 of 1988 Act – Investigations by authorised Inspectors are valid [Paras 2-3, 10-17, 20, 24-27].

General Clauses Act – Section 24 – Continuation of Subordinate Legislation – When a statute is repealed and re-enacted, appointments, notifications, orders, schemes, rules, and by-laws under the repealed statute continue so far as not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions – Exclusion of Section 24 must be express – Mere mention of Section 6 in Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act does not impliedly exclude Section 24 – Accepting implied exclusion would render the re-enacted law unworkable pending fresh notifications [Paras 14-17, 23-25].

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 CrPC – Quashing of Proceedings – Illegality in Investigation – Where investigation is conducted by officers validly authorised under continuing notifications saved by law, proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of competence – High Court’s approach contrary to settled principles on repeal and saving [Paras 1, 5, 24-27].

Interpretation – “Anything done” and Legal Fiction – Section 6(b) GCA saves “anything duly done” under repealed law – Section 30(2) PC Act, 1988 deems actions under the 1947 Act to have been taken under the 1988 Act – Notifications authorising Inspectors under Section 5A(1) of 1947 Act are thus effective under Section 17 proviso of 1988 Act until superseded – No contrary intention expressed in 1988 Act [Paras 16, 20-22, 24-27].

Precedents – Continuity of Notifications and Proceedings on Repeal – Followed: Neel @ Niranjan Majumdar (continuation of notifications under re-enacted statute) – CBI v. Subodh Kumar Dutta (proceedings saved by Section 30(2) of 1988 Act) – The Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar (avoiding hiatus on repeal and re-enactment) – Applied to uphold investigations by Inspectors authorised under 1947 Act [Paras 18-23].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Judgments of High Court quashing FIRs and proceedings set aside – Investigations by authorised Inspectors upheld as legal and valid – Trial courts directed to proceed in accordance with law and conclude trials expeditiously [Paras 27-28].

Society Commission – Deletion and Substitution of Rule – Rule 49 of U.P. Sugarcane Rules – Substituted Rule Ceasing to Operate – Revival of Old Rule – Not Permissible – The appellants challenged the demand of society commission at 5% of the minimum statutory price of sugarcane on the ground that old Rule 49 was deleted and substituted by a new Rule 49 prescribing commission at 2.69% – After expiry of the substituted Rule 49 (operative 1.10.1991 to 30.9.1992), the Cane Commissioner directed revival of the old Rule – Held: Once an old rule is repealed and substituted, it ceases to exist – It does not revive after the substituted rule ceases to operate unless expressly saved – High Court’s reliance on Section 6-C of the U.P. General Clauses Act was erroneous, since Section 6-C does not apply to statutory rules framed under the Act – Therefore, society commission at 5% could not be charged after 30.9.1992 [Paras 6-18].

General Clauses Act – Section 6-C – Applicability – Statutory Rules – Excluded – Section 20 of the U.P. General Clauses Act makes several provisions applicable mutatis mutandis to statutory rules, but not Section 6-C – Hence, Section 6-C cannot be invoked to revive a repealed statutory rule after a substituted rule lapses [Paras 17-18].

Principle of Revival – Substitution Distinguished from Suspension – Where an old provision is repealed and substituted by a new provision, repeal is absolute and substitution takes full effect – Old law does not revive when substituted provision is struck down or ceases to operate – Distinction drawn from situations where amendment is void for lack of legislative competence – Not applicable to present case [Paras 9-15].

Decision – Appeals and Writ Petition Allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Old Rule 49 held not to revive – Demand for 5% commission declared illegal – No refund of commission already paid to be claimed by appellants – No order as to costs [Paras 19-21].

Dowry Death – Conviction based on sole testimony – Deceased, married for 1½ years, died by consuming poison allegedly due to dowry harassment – Trial court convicted respondents under Sections 304B and 498A IPC relying solely on testimony of father (PW4) – High Court disbelieved PW4, noting contradictions and lack of support from other relatives (PW6, PW7) who denied dowry demands – Supreme Court upheld acquittal, holding that sole testimony contradicted in material particulars cannot be safe basis for conviction – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2-6].

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 3 – Value of sole witness – Law is that quality, not quantity, of evidence matters – But when conviction rests on a single witness, his testimony must be wholly reliable, consistent and inspiring confidence – Where witness stands contradicted and not corroborated, conviction cannot stand – If two views possible, one favourable to accused must prevail [Paras 5-6].

Decision – High Court’s view acquitting respondents found reasonable and sound – No interference warranted – Appeal by State dismissed [Para 6].

Juvenile Justice – Determination of juvenility - Murder case – Accused Pranjal Tiwari apprehended on 27.2.1997 for offence under Section 302/34 IPC – Claimed juvenility as date of birth 30.9.1981 – Trial court and Sessions Judge rejected claim citing doubts in documents and variation in ossification test – High Court in revision accepted documentary evidence and held him juvenile – Supreme Court upheld, holding that in borderline cases courts should lean in favour of juvenility – Appeal by complainant (father of deceased) dismissed [Paras 2-6].

Proof of Age – Documentary Evidence – Marksheets, school records, birth certificate, horoscope and Kotwar’s register consistently recorded date of birth as 30.9.1981 – Overwriting in figures in one document did not affect entry in words – Kotwar register corroborated by adjacent entries showing birth on 30.9.1981 – Held: Documents raised high probability in favour of accused’s juvenility [Paras 3-4].

Medical Evidence – Ossification Test – Opinion of 15–16 years with margin of 2–3 years variation cannot outweigh reliable documentary evidence – Ossification test only corroborative, not conclusive [Para 3].

Approach to Age Determination – Arnit Das v. State of Bihar applied – Hyper-technical approach not to be adopted – In borderline cases (age close to 16 years), courts should lean in favour of holding accused juvenile – Purpose of Juvenile Justice Act is reformative and protective, requiring liberal interpretation [Para 5].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – High Court order declaring accused juvenile maintained – Accused entitled to benefit of Juvenile Justice Act [Para 6].