Criminal Law - Section 21(c), 29, and 52A of the NDPS Act – Clubbing of Contraband Quantity – No Presumption of Conspiracy – Conviction Set Aside – The appellant and co-accused were apprehended together and found with 125g and 130g of heroin respectively – Held: Mere physical proximity does not justify presumption of common intent or conspiracy – No evidence led to establish prior knowledge or conspiracy between accused – Therefore, quantity cannot be clubbed to reach commercial threshold under Section 21(c) [Paras 22–25].

Procedural Lapses – Section 52A NDPS Act – Violation Undermines Prosecution – Non-Compliance Fatal – Samples were not drawn in duplicate nor in presence of Magistrate – Inventory not certified – Absence of appellant’s signature on sealed packets – Failure to produce test memo and weighment chart – Held: Cumulative procedural lapses render seizure and sampling unreliable – Violation of Section 52A and Standing Order 1/1989 vitiates trial [Paras 26–30].

Evidentiary Value – Forensic Report Not Admissible – Flawed Sampling Process – Since FSL report was based on improperly collected samples and no procedural safeguards were followed, the report was deemed inadmissible – Held: Without legally admissible evidence, conviction cannot be sustained [Paras 31–32].

Delay in Appeal – Appeal Rejected by High Court – Supreme Court Intervenes – The High Court rejected the appeal solely on the ground of 1183-day delay – Held: Incarcerated appellant with financial constraints ought not be penalized – Delay should have been condoned – Supreme Court decided to hear appeal on merits instead of remand [Paras 13–20].

Decision – Conviction and Sentence Quashed – Acquittal Ordered – Due to failure in proving conspiracy, clubbing of quantity, and multiple procedural lapses, conviction under Sections 21(c) and 29 of NDPS Act held unsustainable – Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith [Paras 33–34].

Criminal Procedural Law  – Powers of Sessions Court under Section 193 CrPC – Summoning of Additional Accused – Supreme Court upheld the orders of the Sessions Court and High Court summoning the petitioner, not named in the charge-sheet, for trial of offences under Sections 302 and 376 IPC. It was held that upon committal of a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Sessions Judge, as a court of original jurisdiction, is empowered under Section 193 CrPC to summon any person against whom there is prima facie material on record, prior to commencement of trial, without having to wait for evidence to be led or for the stage under Section 319 CrPC. The petition was dismissed, and expeditious trial was directed [Paras 2-107].

Cognizance – Concept and Stage – Sections 190, 200, 202, 209 CrPC – The judgment clarified that 'cognizance' is of the offence, not the offender, and is taken only once—either by the Magistrate or by the Sessions Court. The Magistrate takes cognizance upon judicial application of mind to the complaint or police report and, in cases triable exclusively by Sessions, commits the case under Section 209 CrPC [Paras 29-56].

Magistrate’s Role and Duty – Judicial Application of Mind – It was reiterated that the Magistrate must exercise judicial discretion and not act mechanically while taking cognizance, examining whether the materials disclose a prima facie case before proceeding to commit the case to the Sessions Court. The process is intended to safeguard against frivolous or vexatious prosecutions [Paras 31-33].

Committal of “Case” Not “Accused” – The transition from the old Code to the CrPC, 1973 shifts focus from committal of the “accused” to committal of the “case”, thus empowering the Sessions Court to act upon the entirety of the offence, and not being restricted to the individuals named by the police [Paras 77-83].

Sessions Court’s Power to Summon Under Section 193 CrPC – Upon committal, the Sessions Court’s embargo to take cognizance is lifted, and the court is competent to summon any person against whom material is found in the case file. This summoning is not a fresh “taking of cognizance” but is incidental to the jurisdiction conferred by committal [Paras 80-84, 90, 103].

Distinction from Section 319 CrPC – The Sessions Court’s power under Section 193 CrPC to summon an additional accused at the pre-trial stage (based on the police report/case record) is distinct from the power under Section 319 CrPC, which is exercisable only during trial on the basis of evidence adduced [Paras 85, 101].

Duty to Bring Real Offenders to Trial – Both Magistrate and Sessions Court, after cognizance, have the duty to bring before the court all those prima facie implicated in the offence, even if not named by the police. This is essential for ensuring substantive justice and fairness [Paras 92-93, 100].

Summary of Law Declared –

(i) Commitment under Sections 209 and 193 CrPC is of the “case” and not merely the “accused”;

(ii) The Sessions Court assumes original jurisdiction on committal and may summon additional accused if warranted by the record;

(iii) Section 319 CrPC is an additional power to summon others at the trial stage on the basis of evidence;

(iv) The criminal process aims to bring all real offenders to justice, and procedural law must be interpreted to advance, not hinder, this purpose [Paras 103].

Decision – SLP Dismissed – Summoning Upheld – The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upheld the summoning order, and directed that charges be framed and trial completed within six months, also ordering circulation of the judgment to all High Courts [Paras 104-107].

Criminal Matrimonial Law  – Quashing of FIR under Section 498-A IPC – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Marriage Dissolved under Article 142 – Parties married on 25.07.2015 – After brief conjugal life, appellant-husband alleged harassment and left the matrimonial home at Mumbai for Faridabad to care for aged parents and autistic child from previous marriage – Respondent-wife filed FIR alleging cruelty and abandonment under Section 498-A IPC one year after separation – Both parties engaged in protracted litigation – Settlement agreement reached during divorce mediation but respondent-wife subsequently resiled demanding enhanced alimony – Allegations found vague, commonplace, and without substantial specifics – FIR and related criminal proceedings quashed invoking power under Article 142, dissolving marriage due to irretrievable breakdown, ensuring closure of all matrimonial litigation – Held: No prima facie case under Section 498-A established, quashing justified, marriage irretrievably broken down; dissolved under Article 142 subject to settlement terms and conditions [Paras 1-23].

Section 498-A IPC – Allegations Vague and Commonplace – Quashing Justified – Allegations by respondent-wife against appellant under Section 498-A IPC held to be vague, general, commonplace marital disputes without specific credible instances – FIR filed belatedly, one year after separation – Held: Allegations did not constitute prima facie offence; FIR quashed to prevent misuse of judicial process [Paras 8-14].

Divorce on Mutual Consent – Respondent-Wife Resiled from Agreement – Effect on Criminal Proceedings – Wife initially agreed to mutual divorce and property settlement, resiled later demanding enhanced permanent alimony – Appellant sought quashing of FIR based on withdrawal from consent terms – Held: Wife's statutory right to withdraw consent for second motion divorce affirmed; however, this alone not sufficient for refusal to quash FIR when no substantive offence under Section 498-A made out [Paras 4,12-13].

Permanent Alimony – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Just and Equitable Compensation – Respondent demanded Rs. 12 crore alimony in addition to encumbrance-free apartment – Respondent highly educated, capable, previously employed; appellant currently unemployed with substantial responsibility of autistic child from first marriage – Appellant agreed to gift valuable Mumbai apartment with parking areas and settle all pending dues as final settlement – Held: Gift of apartment sufficient compensation, further claim of alimony unjustified considering financial status of parties [Paras 16-20].

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Closure of Multiple Proceedings – Prolonged litigation, acrimonious relationship, and failed reconciliation attempts established irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Supreme Court invoking powers under Article 142 dissolved marriage to achieve complete justice and terminate all pending and future litigations between the parties – Held: Marriage dissolved, criminal and civil litigations closed, no further proceedings permitted [Paras 16-23].

Decision – Criminal Appeal Allowed – FIR and Criminal Proceedings Quashed – Marriage Dissolved under Article 142 – Criminal proceedings against appellant under Section 498-A IPC quashed – Marriage dissolved due to irretrievable breakdown under Article 142 of Constitution subject to compliance with terms agreed upon in settlement, including gifting of apartment and payment of maintenance charges by appellant – All pending matrimonial litigation between parties terminated – Held: Appeal allowed, proceedings closed, marriage dissolved under Article 142 [Paras 21-23].

Civil Law – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Return of Possession of Property – Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Appeal Allowed – Appellants had advanced financial assistance to Nandini Impex Pvt Ltd (corporate debtor) secured through deposit of title deeds of property known as White House – On default, title deeds were transferred to appellants but possession remained with corporate debtor under leave and license agreement requiring payment of monthly rentals – Default in payment of rentals by corporate debtor resulted in termination of agreements by appellants – During CIRP, Committee of Creditors (CoC) and Resolution Professional concluded retaining possession of premises financially unsustainable, recommended handing over possession to appellants – NCLT ordered returning possession – On appeal by suspended director (respondent), NCLAT set aside NCLT order citing Section 14(1)(d) of IBC prohibiting recovery of possession during moratorium, remanded issue – Supreme Court set aside NCLAT order, restored NCLT decision – Held: Returning possession based on CoC’s informed commercial decision permissible and justified; appeal allowed, order of NCLT restored [Paras 1-11].

Section 14(1)(d) IBC – Recovery of Property by Owner – Interpretation and Application – Section 14(1)(d) imposes moratorium prohibiting recovery of property occupied by corporate debtor during CIRP – Supreme Court clarified that instant case distinct, as decision for return of property emanated from Resolution Professional and CoC due to financial burden of rentals rather than from owner's unilateral attempt for recovery – Held: Moratorium provision not applicable in this unique situation; property return permissible under commercial wisdom of CoC and Resolution Professional [Paras 8-10].

Resolution Professional & Committee of Creditors – Commercial Wisdom – Paramount Consideration – The decision by the CoC to hand back possession due to heavy financial liability and lack of requirement of premises for business justified and must be accorded primacy – Relied on K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank [(2019) 12 SCC 150] – Held: Commercial wisdom of CoC paramount, judicial intervention limited; CoC's informed decision endorsed [Paras 8-9].

Conduct of Suspended Director – Unwarranted Obstruction – Suspended director respondent singularly opposed property’s return despite unwillingness to personally bear expenses and financial impracticality for corporate debtor – Held: Such obstruction unjustified, untenable, and driven by undisclosed extraneous motives [Paras 6-7,10].

Remand Order – NCLAT’s Order of Remand Unnecessary – Supreme Court found remand by NCLAT for fresh adjudication unjustified as facts clearly established no requirement of continued possession – Held: NCLAT order erroneous, remand unnecessary; NCLT's original order restored [Paras 10-11].

Decision – Civil Appeal Allowed – NCLAT Order Set Aside, NCLT Order Restored – NCLAT’s order remanding matter set aside; original order by NCLT directing Resolution Professional to return property possession to appellants restored and affirmed – Held: Appeal allowed; Resolution Professional to implement expeditiously [Paras 10-11].

Civil Law - Specific Performance – Section 20, Specific Relief Act - Execution and Enforceability of Agreement to Sell – Plea of Fabrication and Blank Stamp Papers – Appeal Allowed – Respondents filed suit for specific performance based on alleged agreement to sell and delivery of possession, contending that substantial consideration had been paid and appellant failed to execute sale deed – Appellant denied execution, claimed signatures obtained on blank stamp papers in context of money-lending, and alleged misuse – Both Trial and First Appellate Courts found for appellant, holding respondents failed to prove valid execution of agreement or payment of rent and noting disproportionate consideration vis-à-vis market value – High Court reversed, relying on admission of signatures and handwriting – Held: Supreme Court found respondents failed to examine attesting witnesses or produce cogent evidence of agreement, and only self-serving evidence of plaintiff was adduced; plea of ‘blank paper theory’ not properly discredited; High Court erred in reversing findings on mere admission of signature without proof of consensus ad idem – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside [Paras 1-16].

Burden of Proof – Onus on Plaintiff – Requirement to Prove Valid Execution – Respondents failed to discharge onus to prove execution of genuine agreement of sale and readiness and willingness to perform contract; did not produce attesting witnesses or evidence regarding movement of possession and payment of rent as per agreement – Held: Plaintiffs must prove existence of valid agreement and their readiness and willingness; burden not discharged by self-serving testimony alone [Paras 9, 14-15].

Money-Lending Transaction – Allegation of Fraud and Misuse of Documents – Appellant’s defence of borrowing money and providing signatures on blank stamp papers found plausible, with supporting evidence of professional money-lending practices by respondents; absence of credible evidence of agreement and consideration supports appellant’s version – Held: Courts below correctly accepted appellant’s defence and rejected claim of specific performance [Paras 8-9, 15].

Relief – Refund of Amount Received – Appellant’s Admission of Debt – Supreme Court, despite allowing appeal and setting aside specific performance decree, directs appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/- to respondents towards repayment of admitted debt, in view of appellant’s admission of borrowing and absence of proof of discharge – Held: Respondents entitled to receive amount; appeal otherwise allowed [Para 10].

Second Appeal – Interference with Concurrent Findings – Principles – Supreme Court reiterates that High Court’s interference with concurrent factual findings is limited to cases of misreading, non-appreciation, or perversity; not justified on mere re-appreciation of evidence or admission of signature alone – Held: High Court’s judgment unsustainable; concurrent findings of lower courts restored [Paras 11, 16].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Decree for Specific Performance Set Aside – Respondents to Receive Rs. 3,00,000/- from Appellant – Impugned High Court judgment set aside, concurrent findings of Trial and Appellate Courts restored, but appellant directed to pay Rs. 3,00,000/- within four weeks; all pending applications disposed of [Paras 10, 16].

Fee Recovery – Brief of Judgment and Decision – Recovery of enhanced school fees by unaided private school – Dispute arose after government notification restricting fee hike was struck down – Suits by school decreed by trial court, decree made subject to FFRC’s decision under Haryana School Education Act and Rules – Appellate Court affirmed decree but directed refund of entire amount if FFRC found in favour of parents, and reduced interest – Review petition dismissed – High Court set aside decree on ground of alternate remedy and ouster of jurisdiction under Section 22 – Held: Supreme Court restored trial court decree (with 6% interest), holding there is no express or implied ouster of civil court’s jurisdiction for fee recovery – Decree subject to FFRC decision as originally directed – Appeals allowed, no costs [Paras 2-18].

Civil Court Jurisdiction – Ouster under Section 22 of Haryana School Education Act – Not attracted – Section 22 ousts jurisdiction only where government or its officers are empowered to adjudicate – No such adjudicatory power in fee recovery suits by schools – Civil court jurisdiction maintained [Paras 6, 12, 16].

Remedy Before FFRC – Scope and Limitation – FFRC under Rules 158A and 158B is only for complaints by parents/students regarding capitation or excessive fees – No provision for school to enforce fee recovery before FFRC – No alternate remedy for school for recovery of reasonable fee hike [Paras 11, 12].

Limitation – Suits held within time – Cause of action arose on disposal of government appeal against fee notification – Suits filed in 2014 within limitation – Limitation ground rejected [Paras 5, 13].

Fee Notification and Compliance – School complied with Rule 148 for notification and Form VI – No challenge on procedure – Recovery decree subject to FFRC decision [Para 14].

Review and Modification – Appellate Court’s direction for refund of entire amount if FFRC found in favour of parents held erroneous – Refund only to extent FFRC interferes with fee hike – Review ought to have been allowed – Decree modified accordingly [Paras 15, 16].

Decision – Civil Appeals Allowed – Order of trial court restored and modified (interest at 6%) – Fee recovery subject to FFRC’s finding – No costs [Paras 16-18].

Civil Law - Suit for Recovery Against A State Financial Corporation -  Maintainability of Suit – Jurisdictional Bar – Section 80 CPC – Decree Declared Nullity – The appellant/State Financial Corporation, not originally a party to the underlying contract, was impleaded much after the institution of the suit for recovery. The trial court decreed the suit without satisfaction of the mandatory requirement of prior notice under Section 80 CPC. Held: Absence of mandatory notice rendered the entire proceedings and decree a nullity, which could be challenged at any stage, including execution. Objection to jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be cured by acquiescence. [Paras 21-30, 44, 45].

Applicability of Interest on Delayed Payments Act, 1993 – Prospective Operation – Supply Predates Act – The transaction in question, i.e., the supply of goods, occurred in 1985, prior to the enforcement of the 1993 Act. The trial court erroneously imposed liability for compound interest under the repealed Act, 1993. Held: The Act is prospective and applies only to supplies made after 23.09.1992; agreements predating the Act do not attract its provisions even if supplies were pursuant to such agreements. Decree imposing interest under the repealed Act is unsustainable and unenforceable. [Paras 31-35, 43, 52-58].

Liability of State Financial Corporation – Section 29 of SFC Act, 1951 – Limited Liability as Secured Creditor – No Privity of Contract – The appellant, having taken over the assets of the defaulting concern under Section 29, could only be held liable to the extent of surplus sale proceeds, not for the entirety of the defaulting company’s debts. Absence of privity of contract between appellant and supplier precludes direct liability. Orders attaching the Corporation’s personal accounts and assets were without jurisdiction. [Paras 39-40].

Impleadment and Limitation – Section 21 Limitation Act – Relatability of Date – Functus Officio – Impleadment of the appellant was erroneously related back to the institution of suit after decree was passed. Section 21 applies only to pending suits; post-decree application is not maintainable, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to alter party status or rights after decree. [Paras 41-41.1].

Execution and Recovery – Refund Ordered – No Enforceable Decree – Having found the suit to be non-maintainable and the decree a nullity, the Court held all recovery and execution proceedings against the appellant as unsustainable. Respondent directed to refund entire sum of Rs. 2,92,57,559/- received from the appellant, without interest, within three months. [Paras 43, 46].

Conduct of Litigation by State Entities – Duty of Diligence – Observations – The Court deprecated the lack of diligence by the appellant and its counsel, emphasizing that public institutions must pursue litigation responsibly and with all due procedural compliance, and that judicial oversight must not allow public resources to be unjustly depleted. [Para 47].

Decision – Civil Appeal Allowed – All orders and decrees against appellant set aside – Decree found to be a nullity and unenforceable – Directions for refund issued – No order as to costs. [Paras 45-49].

Criminal Law  – Murder  – Acquittal on Ground of Inadmissible Confessional FIR – Sections 302, 304 Part I IPC and Sections 8, 21, 25, 27 Indian Evidence Act – The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant for murder, finding that the High Court erred in relying on the accused's confessional FIR, which is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The medical and circumstantial evidence were held insufficient to sustain conviction, especially as most witnesses turned hostile and discovery evidence was not proved as per law. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC was incorrectly applied by the High Court, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith [Paras 2-53].

Confessional FIR – Admissibility – Section 25, Indian Evidence Act – Acquittal Ordered – The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred by relying on a confessional FIR lodged by the accused-appellant himself, which led to his conviction for murder (Section 302 IPC) later altered to Section 304 Part I by the High Court—Held: FIR containing confession before police is inadmissible in evidence under Section 25 of the Evidence Act; such confession cannot be used to corroborate medical evidence against the maker unless he testifies—Conviction based solely on confessional FIR is unsustainable [Paras 14-26].

Medical Evidence – Value of Expert Testimony – Advisory Character – The Court reiterated that expert (medical) evidence is only advisory and not substantive proof of guilt—Conviction cannot rest solely on medical opinion; corroboration by reliable direct or circumstantial evidence is necessary—Most panch witnesses had turned hostile and panchnama contents were not proved according to law [Paras 27-29].

Discovery and Conduct Evidence – Section 27 & Section 8, Evidence Act – The prosecution failed to establish that any statement made by the accused led to discovery of fact admissible under Section 27—While the conduct of accused (e.g., lodging FIR, pointing out articles) may be relevant under Section 8, such conduct alone is insufficient for conviction in serious offences without other cogent evidence [Paras 30-36].

Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC – Incorrect Application – The High Court erred in extending benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in the absence of any premeditation or sudden fight, and when the appellant took undue advantage and acted in a cruel or unusual manner; deceased was unarmed and there was no mutual combat—Proper application of Exception 4 requires all ingredients to be satisfied including mutual provocation and absence of undue advantage [Paras 37-50].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Acquittal – The Supreme Court held that in the absence of legally admissible evidence, the conviction of the appellant is unsustainable—Appeal allowed; appellant acquitted of all charges and to be set free forthwith [Paras 51-53].

Criminal Law - Sexual Assault on Minor by Father – POCSO Act S. 6 & IPC Sect. 506 – Concurrent Conviction Upheld – Petitioner convicted for repeatedly committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on his 10-year-old daughter—Trial Court relied on clear, cogent victim testimony corroborated by elder sister, medical and forensic evidence including DNA match—High Court affirmed—Supreme Court held presumption under Sect. 29 POCSO Act stood unrebutted—Defence plea of false implication due to strained domestic relations rejected—Credible child victim testimony requires no corroboration but was in fact amply supported here—SLP dismissed in limine [Paras 2–7, 17].

Presumption under POCSO Act §29 – Once foundational facts proved, statutory presumption applies—Burden on accused to rebut—In present case, no credible rebuttal offered—Victim’s disclosure, though delayed, found truthful, consistent, and medically corroborated—Delay explained by threats and trauma [Paras 5–7].

Sentencing – Familial Sexual Abuse – Heinousness and Deterrence – When perpetrator is father, betrayal is personal and institutional—Home must remain sanctuary; such offences warrant severest condemnation—No scope for leniency or mitigation—Life sentence upheld [Paras 8–13, 17].

Victim Compensation – Article 142 – In addition to sentence, SC directed payment of ₹10,50,000 to victim under NALSA “Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes, 2018”—₹7,00,000 to be kept in fixed deposit for 5 years with quarterly interest to victim; ₹3,50,000 to be paid directly—Himachal Pradesh SLSA to monitor—Objective: rehabilitation and affirmation of dignity of child survivor [Paras 14–16].

Interference under Article 136 – Where two courts have concurrently found guilt based on unimpeachable evidence and findings are not perverse, SC will not interfere—Petition dismissed in limine—Prayer for bail declined [Paras 11–12, 17].