Bail Jurisprudence – Cancellation vs. Revocation – Bail Restored – Supreme Court set aside High Court’s order revoking bail granted to accused in murder case – Held: Bail once granted can only be revoked if found illegal, perverse, or against settled legal principles – No proven violation of bail conditions – Liberty restored with stringent conditions [Paras 17-25, 31-32].

Maintainability – Second Application for Bail Cancellation – Section 439(2) CrPC – Permissible – Held: Once Sessions Court rejects cancellation, High Court may entertain subsequent application under Section 482 read with 439(2) CrPC – No bar on High Court’s jurisdiction – Application was maintainable [Paras 14-15].

Grounds for Cancellation – Mere Delay Not a Bar – High Court rightly held that delay of 18 months in filing cancellation application was not fatal – However, Supreme Court held that delay coupled with absence of violation of bail terms did not justify revocation of bail after 2 years of liberty [Paras 6, 19-21, 24].

Violation of Bail Conditions – Alleged Misconduct by Accused Vishnu – FIR under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita quashed – Supreme Court noted denial of involvement by complainant via affidavit – Held: Allegation did not merit cancellation of bail [Paras 22].

Antecedents – Not Sufficient by Themselves – Criminal antecedents not conclusive ground for cancellation – Supreme Court followed Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan – Held: Bail may still be justified if long incarceration and cooperation shown [Para 23].

Trial Progress and Liberty – 141 Witnesses – Trial in Initial Stages – Supreme Court found that given volume of witnesses and lack of delay caused by accused, incarceration not justified – Directed continued bail with stringent conditions [Paras 25-26, 28-30].

Decision – Bail Restored – High Court’s revocation of bail set aside – Appellants to remain on bail during trial – Strict conditions imposed to prevent tampering with evidence or intimidation of witnesses [Paras 26, 28, 31-32].

Criminal Law – Murder - Section 302, 34 IPC - Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession in police station inadmissible – Section 27 recovery from “simultaneous disclosures” unsafe – Mere presence of body in accused’s house does not by itself trigger Section 106 presumption – Motive not proved – Parity with acquitted co-accused charged differently not available – Conviction set aside – Accused acquitted [Paras 6–7, 14–17, 20–31, 35–37].

Circumstantial Evidence – Requirement of a complete chain – Acquittal – The case was entirely based on circumstances – Key witnesses including PWs 11 and 12 turned hostile – No eye-witness account of assault – The Trial Court and High Court erred in presuming guilt by piecing hostile testimony – Held: In a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, if the links of the chain are missing, conviction cannot stand – Benefit of doubt must go to accused [Paras 6, 16–19, 32–35].

Section 106, Evidence Act – Recovery of body from accused’s house – Limits of presumption – Allegation that the dead body was recovered from accused’s premises – No clarity or consistent proof in testimony of PWs 1–3 (tenants/eyewitnesses) – Hostile witnesses denied discovery from accused’s house – Held: Section 106 cannot be invoked unless prosecution first establishes foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt – Mere allegation of body being in house insufficient – Reliance on Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Shivaji Chintappa Patil – No adverse inference can be drawn [Paras 20–22, 35].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Inadmissibility of statements in police station – Alleged confessions by A3 and A4 made before deceased’s wife (PW-18) and neighbour (PW-9) inside the police station – Held: Hit by Sections 25–26 Evidence Act – Even if made before private individuals, statements lose sanctity when within police precincts – Extra-judicial confessions must be voluntary, truthful, and free from police influence – Here, inadmissible [Paras 23–25].

Section 27, Evidence Act – Simultaneous disclosures and doubtful recovery – Alleged joint confessions by A3 and A4 leading to discovery of billhook and blood-stained clothes – IO’s deposition vague on sequence, location, and who led to actual recovery – Recovery witnesses (PW-5 and PW-6) turned hostile – Held: Simultaneous disclosures not reliable – Cannot be made basis for conviction – Principle affirmed from Navjot Sandhu (Afsan Guru), Kishore Bhadke, Mohd. Inayatullah and Manoj Kumar Soni – Section 27 recovery discarded [Paras 26–31].

Motive – Loan dispute – Not proved – Prosecution alleged deceased constable lent ₹1 lakh to A3 and A4 – PW-18 (wife of deceased) did not corroborate demand – PWs 11–12 unreliable – Held: Motive not established – In circumstantial cases, absence of motive assumes greater importance in assessing guilt – Reference to Babu v. State of Kerala – Here, lack of motive weighs in favour of accused [Paras 10–14, 32].

Hostile Witnesses – Weakening prosecution’s chain – PWs 1–3 (tenants) and PWs 11–12 (key witnesses) turned hostile – Courts below improperly relied on stray contradictions under Section 161 CrPC – Held: Hostile testimony cannot be elevated to substantive evidence unless independently corroborated – Here, no corroboration – Chain of circumstances broken [Paras 6, 32–34].

Medical Evidence – Homicidal death proved but authorship unconnected – Post-mortem report confirmed multiple chop/lacerated wounds – PW-15 (doctor) affirmed death was homicidal – However, medical evidence only proves nature of death, not identity of assailants – Held: Without reliable circumstantial links, medical evidence alone insufficient to convict [Paras 7–8].

Parity with Acquitted Co-Accused – Distinction between Section 34 and Section 109 IPC – A1 (alleged instigator) acquitted as prosecution failed to prove presence and role – A2–A4 charged with direct participation under Section 302/34 IPC – Held: Acquittal of A1 does not exonerate A2–A4 – Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani and Suraj Pal distinguished – No parity in charges or roles [Paras 3–4, 8–9].

Principle of Burden of Proof – Prosecution duty not diluted – Fundamental principle reiterated that prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Section 106 is not a substitute for prosecution’s failure to prove case – Any weakness in defence does not absolve prosecution’s burden [Paras 20–22, 35].

Decision – Conviction set aside – Considering (i) inadmissibility of extra-judicial confession, (ii) unreliable Section 27 recovery, (iii) absence of motive, (iv) hostile witnesses, and (v) misuse of Section 106, conviction of A2–A4 unsustainable – Appeal allowed – Appellants acquitted – Release ordered if not wanted in any other case – Bail bonds cancelled [Paras 35–38].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – FIR alleging rape on pretext of marriage filed by complainant after she was issued a show cause notice by her employer pursuant to the appellant’s complaint – Appellant and complainant were colleagues for five years and were in a consensual relationship – FIR filed four months after the alleged incident – Held: FIR and chargesheet manifestly attended with mala fide intention and instituted to wreak vengeance after administrative action was initiated against the complainant – Quashing justified under Bhajan Lal guidelines [Paras 4-7, 13-15].

False Implication – Abuse of Criminal Process – High Court refused to quash FIR stating it was a matter of trial – Supreme Court finds delay in lodging FIR, prior complaints by appellant, and proximity to disciplinary proceedings against complainant raised strong inference of vendetta – FIR held to be retaliatory and not bona fide – Proceedings quashed to prevent abuse of process and to secure ends of justice [Paras 9, 13-15].

Judicial Precedent – Bhajan Lal principles – Supreme Court reiterates that FIR/chargesheet may be quashed if initiated with ulterior motives – Reference made to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. – Court stresses need to examine attendant circumstances and not merely the face of the complaint [Paras 12, 14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court refusing to quash FIR and chargesheet set aside – FIR and chargesheet quashed – Pending applications, if any, disposed of [Para 15].

SARFAESI—Sec. 13(8) (post-2016)—Borrower’s redemption ends on valid publication of composite sale notice under Rule 8(6)—only one notice required—amendment applies to alive claims where auction notice is after 01-09-2016—High Court order quashing sale certificate set aside—auction purchaser protected [Paras 169–178, 179–193, 202].

SARFAESI – Redemption Right – Section 13(8) as amended in 2016 – Scope and cut-off – Borrowers sought redemption relying on pre-amendment law and Mathew Varghese – Held: Under amended Section 13(8), borrower’s right to redeem is available only till valid publication of the composite sale notice – Once published in the manner required by the Rules, redemption is not permissible even before registration of sale certificate – High Court’s view to the contrary set aside [Paras 95–100, 170–178, 183].

SARFAESI Rules – Notice regime – Rule 8(6), Proviso, Rule 8(7), Rule 9(1) – One composite notice of sale – Conflicting High Court views resolved – Held: The scheme envisages a single composite “notice of sale” which is served on the borrower and, where applicable, published to the public, affixed on the property and uploaded on the creditor’s website – No requirement of two distinct sale notices nor two separate 30-day gaps – The 30-day bar in Rule 9(1) runs from service/affixation/publication (whichever later) to the date of sale [Paras 137–169].

Interpretation – Expression “before the date of publication” in Section 13(8) – Harmonious construction with Rules – Held: “Publication” covers the valid completion of the composite notice of sale process as required for the chosen mode (service, newspaper publication where applicable, affixation, website upload) – The borrower’s redemption right is extinguished upon such valid publication, irrespective of mode (auction, tender, quotations, private treaty) [Paras 170–178].

Retrospectivity / Retroactivity – Amended Section 13(8) – Procedural/remedial operation – Loans predating amendment – Held: Amendment applies to “alive claims” where auction notice is issued after 01.09.2016 – Presumption against retrospectivity does not apply to procedural/remedial provisions – Right of redemption under SARFAESI is statutory and subject to special-law curtailment – Borrowers’ contrary plea rejected [Paras 179–193].

Writ Jurisdiction – Availability of alternate remedies – Sanctity of SARFAESI auctions – High Court interference disapproved – Held: Having availed SARFAESI remedies before DRT, borrowers could not bypass statutory appeal by invoking writ to upend a concluded auction and sale certificate – Equitable considerations cannot override the statutory auction framework or vested rights of the auction purchaser [Paras 26–31, 100 (110.1, 110.5 of Bafna Motors discussed), 202].

Auction Purchaser – Vested rights and protection – Held: Upon confirmation under Rule 9(2) and compliance, purchaser has a vested right to sale certificate under Rule 9(6); third-party rights created by borrower during pendency declared non-est; Court warns of strict action for obstruction to delivery of possession [Paras 99, 194–195].

Legislative Clarification – Drafting anomaly – Court’s recommendation – Noting inconsistency between Section 13(8) and Rules 8–9 causing litigation, Court urges Ministry of Finance to cure ambiguities to protect creditor and purchaser interests and further expeditious recovery [Paras 199–201, 203].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Impugned High Court judgment quashing sale certificate set aside – Borrowers’ right of redemption stood extinguished on date of valid publication of auction notice (22.01.2021) – Auction on 26.02.2021 and sale certificate dated 22.03.2021 sustained – Directions issued regarding possession and disregard of any third-party rights created pendente lite [Paras 181–183, 194–202].

Criminal Law – Rape – Quashing of FIR – Consent and promise of marriage – Complainant alleged that the appellant had physical relations with her on false promise of marriage – Appellant contended that the FIR was filed only after he initiated administrative complaints against the complainant for harassment, including suicide threats and workplace misconduct – Supreme Court observed that FIR was lodged four months after the alleged last incident and only after the complainant was served with a show cause notice at work – Held: Filing of FIR appears motivated by vengeance and as an afterthought – FIR and charge sheet quashed [Paras 4-7, 13-15].

Inherent Powers – Section 528 BNSS (Equivalent to Section 482 CrPC) – Court reiterated principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. on the scope of inherent powers to prevent abuse of process – Held: FIRs filed with malicious intent or to wreak personal vengeance warrant intervention under Section 528 BNSS – FIR in present case satisfies Bhajan Lal’s test of being manifestly attended with mala fides [Paras 12-14].

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Delay in Filing – FIR filed months after incident and subsequent to administrative proceedings against complainant – Supreme Court inferred lack of bona fide intention – Emphasised need to look beyond pleadings in FIR in such cases – Appeal allowed – FIR and charge sheet quashed [Paras 13-15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment refusing to quash FIR set aside – FIR and charge sheet against appellant quashed.

NI Act, S.138(b) — Notice must demand the very cheque amount — Any variance renders notice invalid — Typographical error no defence — Complaint rightly quashed — Appeals dismissed

Negotiable Instruments — Section 138(b) — Meaning of “said amount of money” — Notice must demand the cheque amount and none other — Demand for a figure different from the cheque amount invalidates notice — Additional claims like interest/legal charges are permissible only after and in addition to a correct demand of the cheque amount, and are severable — Held, variance between cheque amount and notice demand is fatal [Paras 5.2–5.2.4, 5.3–5.3.1, 8–8.1].

Penal Statutes — Strict construction — Compliance with Proviso (b) to S.138 is mandatory and technical — Court cannot cure or overlook errors on an assumption of “slip” or typographical inadvertence — Even an inadvertent/typographical mistake in the amount demanded defeats the statutory requirement — No scope for elasticity or reading the notice “as a whole” to correct an incorrect amount [Paras 6–6.4, 8.1–8.2, 9].

Purpose of S.138(b) Notice — To afford the drawer a chance to pay the cheque amount within 15 days and thus avoid prosecution — If the notice demands more/less than the cheque amount, the drawer is not put to a clear, lawful demand and the complaint is not maintainable [Paras 5.2.4, 5.4].

Practice & Procedure — “Typographical error” plea — Repeated overstatements (double the cheque amount in two notices) undermine the plea — Mere mention of correct cheque number or other particulars cannot salvage an incorrect monetary demand — Doctrine of severability does not apply where the core cheque amount itself is misstated [Paras 3.3–3.4, 8.1–8.2, 10].

Decision — High Court order quashing complaint upheld — Appeals dismissed — Held, for a valid S.138(b) notice, the “said amount” must be exactly the cheque amount and none other — Typographical error is no defence — Complaint based on an invalid notice is liable to be quashed [Paras 9–11].

Taxation Law - Central Excise – Manufacture – Containerized Gensets – Transformation and marketability test applied – Held: Process amounts to “manufacture” under Section 2(f) – Excise duty payable – Appeals dismissed [Paras 21, 33, 50-53].

Central Excise – Manufacture – Section 2(f), Central Excise Act, 1944 – Process of containerizing imported Gensets with additional components – Held to amount to “manufacture” – The appellant imported complete Gensets and placed them into steel containers with added components for portability and functionality, resulting in a distinct product known as Power Pack – Supreme Court applied the transformation and marketability test – Held: Power Pack is a new, distinct commodity, marketable as such, and excise duty is leviable – Appeals dismissed [Paras 21, 33, 50-53].

Manufacture – Transformation and Marketability Tests – Reiterated – Both tests must be satisfied – Transformation into a distinct product and its marketability are essential – Containerized Gensets and Power Packs distinct from imported Gensets – Essential character and utility altered, imparting portability and structural change – Thus, “manufacture” established [Paras 27, 30-33, 41-49].

Parts vs. Accessories – Distinction – Radiator, ventilation fan, air filter, etc., not mere accessories but essential parts for functioning of Power Pack inside the container – Without them, the Genset could not function in containerized form – Thus, transformation substantive and not superficial [Paras 44-47].

Excise – Extended Limitation, Penalty, Confiscation – Tribunal rightly set aside extended limitation, penalty, and confiscation, but upheld normal duty demand with interest – No suppression or intent to evade duty – Bona fide belief of assessee accepted [Paras 14, 17-20].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Order of CESTAT upheld to the extent it sustained demand of duty with interest for the normal period – No interference warranted [Para 53].

Sports Governance – AIFF Constitution – Supreme Court directions – Draft Constitution prepared by CoA and modified by Justice L. Nageswara Rao examined alongside objections of stakeholders and provisions of NSC 2011 and FIFA Statutes – Court held that sports bodies though autonomous must function within framework of transparency, democratic representation and accountability – AIFF directed to adopt Constitution with modifications within 4 weeks – Held: Constitution to serve as structural foundation of Indian football in line with NSGA 2025 [Paras 23, 122-125].

Eminent Players – Representation in AIFF General Body – Article 20.2 providing for 15 eminent players with voting rights (5 women) challenged by State associations – NSC 2011, Clause 3.20 envisages minimum 25% representation of sportspersons of outstanding merit with voting rights – FIFA Statutes 2022 and Standard Statutes 2005 contemplate membership for players, referees, coaches – Justice L N Rao finalised provision after consultation with FIFA – Held: Inclusion valid, enhances fairness and transparency, no violation of NSC or FIFA norms [Paras 25-36].

Eminent Players – Eligibility Criteria – Dispute whether 15 matches (earlier CoA draft) or 7/3 matches (Justice L N Rao draft) should be minimum – AIFF sought inclusion of domestic matches – Court noted insufficient pool of international players, directed reduction of threshold to 5 matches for men, 2 matches for women – Domestic matches not considered, as Constitution seeks to promote international competitiveness – Wider base of retired players secured for governance [Paras 37-40].

Office-Bearers – Definition – Article 1.43 read with Article 25 defines office-bearers as President, Vice-Presidents, Treasurer and 10 members (including 5 eminent players) – State associations contended “office-bearers” restricted to President, Treasurer, Secretary under NSC 2011 – Court rejected reliance on 1975 Govt. letter, held inclusive definition necessary for applying age/tenure/cooling-off – Aligned with reform intent and BCCI principles – No modification warranted [Paras 41-42].

Vice-Presidents – Number of posts – State associations sought 5 zonal VPs; AIFF sought 3 (with 1 woman) – Court noted NSGA 2025 caps EC members at 15 – Held: Increasing to 5 would violate statutory scheme – Accepted AIFF’s plea for 3 VPs including one woman, ensuring gender balance and statutory compliance [Paras 43-47].

Disqualification – Criminal Charges – Draft provided disqualification on framing of charges for offences with ≥2 years punishment – Ministry argued charges not equivalent to conviction; Law Commission 244th Report and RPA provisions considered – Court held only conviction with ≥2 years sentence warrants disqualification, not mere charges – Provision aligned with BCCI precedent and safeguards against misuse [Paras 53-55].

Disqualification – Public Servants – Draft excluded all public servants – State associations sought restriction only to Ministers and Govt. servants – Court relied on BCCI-I and subsequent modification approved in BCCI-II restricting disqualification – Held: Provision modified to “Minister or Government Servant” – MPs/MLAs not barred; Govt. servants may contest if approval taken under NSGA 2025 [Paras 56-59].

Disqualification – Cross-holding in NSFs – Suggestion to disqualify anyone who served as office-bearer in any NSF rejected – Court noted similar BCCI clause was later diluted to avoid barring eminent sportspersons holding posts in multiple sports – Held: Would impose unjust burden, not adopted [Paras 60-61].

Conflict of Interest – Retention of “indirect interest” – AIFF sought deletion claiming duplication with Article 73.5 – Court held 73.1 covers indirect conflicts (through relatives/associates), while 73.5 covers direct role conflicts – Both necessary, consistent with BCCI reforms – Held: Indirect interest must remain to safeguard fairness [Paras 62-63].

State Associations – Applicability of AIFF Constitution – Objection citing federalism, Article 19(1)(c), Damyanti case and Delhi HC’s IOA ruling rejected – Court distinguished cricket (BCCI) from football’s pyramidical structure – Relied on FIFA Statutes 2024 Art. 20 and Delhi HC decision in Rahul Mehra v. UOI – Held: State associations bound to adopt AIFF Constitution to prevent evasion of term/age restrictions and ensure uniform governance [Paras 64-71].

AIFF & Third Parties – Delegation of rights – FSDL opposed restriction on commercial delegation – Court noted Master Rights Agreement (2010) gave FSDL near-total control of ISL – NSC 2011 requires federation to retain primacy – Article 1.21 defining “essential aspects” upheld – Addition of “ownership” in Art. 63.1 unnecessary – FSDL’s plea to allow complete divestment rejected – Held: Private participation permitted but AIFF must remain accountable for core functions [Paras 72-79].

Promotion & Relegation – Article 1.54 defines senior-most league to implement promotion and relegation – FSDL opposed, citing CAS Miami FC v. FIFA – Court noted ISL already committed to principle from 2024-25, and FIFA Statutes mandate sporting merit – Promotion alone insufficient, relegation vital for competitiveness – Held: Principle mandatory, no deletion permitted [Paras 80-87].

BCCI Precedents – Applicability – AIFF argued BCCI not NSF hence principles inapplicable – Court rejected distinction, held BCCI jurisprudence aimed at fairness, transparency, efficiency in sports governance – Principles extend to AIFF as well – NSC 2011 to be read purposively – BCCI reforms applicable mutatis mutandis [Paras 88-90].

Amendments to Constitution – Article 23 allows amendments by 75% majority of GB – Stakeholders sought SC oversight – Following BCCI-II precedent, Court inserted Art. 23.3 requiring Supreme Court leave before amendments take effect – However, continuous monitoring not envisaged – Held: One-time safeguard against dilution [Paras 91-94].

AIFF Administration – Current Executive Committee – Elections held Aug-Sep 2022 under interim orders – Initially treated as temporary, later allowed to continue – Justice L N Rao deleted transitory clause (Art. 84) – Court held current EC to be treated as permanent body till Sept 2026, subject to Constitution and SC orders – Fresh elections thereafter [Paras 95-101].

Other Modifications – Candidate definition clarified: must be Indian citizen + resident + 25 years age + voting member – New clause 25.4A: only eminent sportspersons or experienced administrators eligible for top posts – Immediate family expanded to include siblings – Suspension to require 75% votes both for imposition and revocation – Concurrent membership: national EC members cannot simultaneously hold state posts – Acting President: if President and Senior VP incapacitated, EC may elect one – Quorum: approval required for contracts >4 years or ₹5 crore – Disciplinary/Appeal Committees: only Chair/Deputy Chair need legal background – Dispute resolution: player-related urgent matters to be decided within 30 days – Arbitral Tribunal timeline shortened – Election bye-laws: candidates may nominate agents restored [Paras 103-121].

Decision – Constitution of AIFF finalised with modifications – AIFF directed to convene Special General Body within 4 weeks and adopt Constitution – Court emphasised autonomy with accountability, recorded appreciation for amici and counsels – Held: Constitution marks new era of inclusivity, professionalism and democratic governance in Indian football [Paras 122-125].

498-A IPC—Quashing under S. 482 CrPC—FIR lodged a month after foreign divorce and despite prior Austrian custody-return directions—allegations do not disclose ingredients of ‘cruelty’—Bhajan Lal parameter 7 attracted—FIR and HC order quashed.

Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Prima facie standard and non-mechanical approach – Though investigation is ordinarily warranted where allegations exist, courts must apply judicial mind to the surrounding matrix – High Court erred in declining to consider background of foreign custody orders and timing of complaint – Quashing warranted in the facts [Paras 7-10].

498-A IPC – Ingredients of “cruelty” – Mere assertions of harassment without showing intention to cause grave injury, drive to suicide, or coerce for unlawful demand are insufficient – Court relied on recent exposition that “cruelty simpliciter” will not suffice – FIR lacked requisite averments to make out offence under S. 498-A [Paras 12, quoting principles; 6, 8].

Mala fides / Counterblast – FIR filed on 07/12/2016 after (i) Austrian courts directed return of child to Australia in 2014 and (ii) Australian divorce decree dated 01/04/2016 (effective 04/04/2016) – Complaint lodged 04/05/2016 and FIR registered later – Timing, coupled with non-compliance of foreign orders, supports inference of retaliatory action; attracts Bhajan Lal parameter 7 (abuse of process) [Paras 2.4–2.7, 2.8–2.9, 9–11, 13].

Comity / Foreign Orders – India not a signatory to Hague Convention, yet courts may consider foreign judgments for limited contextual appreciation – Austrian courts had jurisdiction and ordered return; non-compliance noted – Indian standard need not be superimposed to disregard competent foreign decrees when assessing abuse of process [Paras 2.4–2.7, 11–12].

Delay and Overbreadth – Alleged cruelty period extends even beyond subsistence of marriage—casts doubt on veracity – Service of Australian divorce papers effected in India undermines respondent’s plea of integration in Austria – Allegation of potential child abduction by appellant was inconsistent with established record of respondent’s unilateral removal—further dents credibility [Paras 10–11].

Mediation Attempts – Court-facilitated mediations on 04/01/2019 and 27/02/2025 failed—Court records concern for adverse impact of protracted parental hostility on the child—however, failure of settlement does not validate a defective criminal process [Para 5].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Impugned High Court judgment and FIR No. 65 of 2016 quashed and set aside – Continuation would be abuse of process under Bhajan Lal parameter 7 – Pending applications closed [Paras 13–14].