Facts:

The case involved an application for grant of exemption under Section 20(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The State of Andhra Pradesh contended that such an application for exemption was not maintainable once the excess land had been declared and vested in the state under Section 10 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether an application for exemption under Section 20(1)(b) is maintainable after the excess land has been declared and vested in the state under Section 10.

Interpretation of the term "to hold" as defined in Section 2(1) of the Act in the context of Sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(b).

Held:

The court disagreed with the State's contention. It explained that the scheme of the Act required a detailed computation of land ownership and statutory deductions based on individual cases. The Act's provisions made it challenging for a person to definitively know whether they held excess land or the extent of that excess at the time of filing a declaration.

The court emphasized that it was only after the excess land was determined under Section 10, following the various provisions of the Act, that a person could accurately know the extent of their excess land and consider seeking exemption.

The court held that the definition of "to hold" in Section 2(1) could not be applied in the context of Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b). If the State's argument were accepted, it would frustrate the entire purpose of Section 20. The court reasoned that a person couldn't apply for exemption before the excess was determined because they wouldn't know the actual excess, and after the excess was determined, they couldn't apply because they wouldn't be "holding" the excess land.

In essence, the court rejected the State's argument and upheld the view that an application for exemption under Section 20 could be maintained even if filed after an order of vesting of excess land had been passed under Section 10.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement regarding a property transfer. The defendant-appellants are subsequent purchasers of the property.

Respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement on June 26, 1977, with the first respondent to transfer his life interest in the property in question.

On December 29, 1979, respondent No. 2 transferred the rights to the defendant-appellants for a consideration of Rs. 4,40 lakhs.

Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 initiated a suit for specific performance, which was initially decreed by the trial court and later affirmed by the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the lengthy delay in delivering the judgment by the High Court warrants setting aside the judgment.

Whether the arguments raised at the bar have been properly reflected or appreciated in the judgment.

Held:

The court acknowledged the five-year delay in delivering the judgment and the concerns raised by the appellants regarding the proper reflection and appreciation of their arguments. The court decided not to express an opinion on the merits of the case at this stage but recognized that such delays can create doubts in the minds of the parties. Consequently, the court set aside the judgment under appeal without expressing any opinion on the case's merits. The matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits. The High Court was requested to expedite the proceedings, aiming for a decision within six months.

The court addressed the issue of possession during the pendency of the case. Respondent No. 1, as the lawful owner based on the decree, was allowed to continue in possession. An agreement was made that during the appeal in the High Court, respondent No. 1 would refrain from creating third-party rights in the property and would deposit the rent/income received from the property in the High Court, subject to the High Court's decision.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute involving a shop-cum-office located in Sector 17-C, Chandigarh. The respondent was the landlady, and the appellant was the tenant of the property. The respondent initiated a civil suit for the eviction of the appellant and the recovery of rent arrears in 1982. The central issue was whether the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 applied to the building at the time the suit was filed. The contention primarily revolved around the date from which the 5-year exemption under the Act should be calculated.

Issues:

Whether the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was applicable to the building in question at the time of filing the suit?

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit?

Held:

The trial court initially dismissed the suit, concluding that the 5-year exemption period under the Act should be calculated from the date of the electric connection, making the suit time-barred. The first appellate court disagreed and remanded the case for further consideration. The High Court upheld the first appellate court's view, asserting that the exemption period should be calculated from the date of sewerage connection and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, relied on a previous decision in "Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh and Others Vs. Central Government and Others." The Court held that the exemption under the Act applied only to buildings that met specific conditions on or after January 31, 1973. Since the building in question had received an electric connection before that date, it was not eligible for the exemption. Consequently, the civil court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the first appellate court and the High Court were set aside. The trial court's judgment, which held the suit was not maintainable, was confirmed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Dev Samaj Girls Senior Secondary School in Chandigarh is a private educational institution that received recognition and grant-in-aid from the Chandigarh Administration.

The school initially offered education up to class 10 but later expanded to include 11th and 12th classes in Humanities and Commerce.

Respondents 1 to 12 are lecturers at the school, and they sought equal pay with their counterparts in other aided schools in Chandigarh.

The appellants (Chandigarh Administration) argued that the permission to expand to higher secondary classes was conditional and did not include grant-in-aid for additional staff.

The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, directing the appellants to pay the same salary as teachers in other privately managed government-aided schools in Chandigarh.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to salary parity with teachers in other aided schools in Chandigarh.

Whether the appellants' argument regarding the financial burden is valid.

Held:

The respondents are entitled to salary parity with teachers in other aided schools in Chandigarh. The principle of equal pay for equal work was emphasized, and the court cited previous cases where it had intervened to ensure such parity.

The appellants' argument regarding the financial burden was rejected. The court stated that the state administration cannot shirk its responsibility of providing quality education due to a lack of resources. The sharing of the financial burden will be in accordance with the Grant-in-aid Scheme applicable to the school.

Facts:

In Civil Appeal No. 7717 of 1994, a seniority list was issued under the Maharashtra Sales Tax Inspectors Recruitment Rules, 1971, for Sales Tax Inspectors (STIs) from direct recruits and promotees in the ratio of 60:40 as far as practicable.

Two direct recruits challenged this seniority list before the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT), resulting in the list being quashed.

An SLP filed by promotees against this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court, making the SAT judgment final.

A fresh seniority list was issued on 28.12.1992 and finalized on 29.10.1993. The promotees challenged this list before SAT, which dismissed the application on grounds of res judicata and constructive res judicata.

In Civil Appeal No. 6316 of 1997, the dispute concerned the seniority of STIs promoted from the Revenue Department and Sales Tax Department, with the post of STI being a selection post.

The High Court quashed the provisional seniority list, which included absorbed employees from the Revenue Department.

Issues:

Applicability of the principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata in the first case.

Seniority determination between direct recruits and promotees in the second case.

Suit filed in representative capacity and its impact on res judicata.

Held:

The expression "as far as practicable" in Rule 2 of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Inspectors Recruitment Rules, 1971, had already been construed by SAT in a previous application, making the contention of the promotees on res judicata invalid.

SAT's finding was not per incuriam and operated as res judicata.

The plea regarding the Rules not permitting carry forward of vacancies was barred by constructive res judicata.

A certificate dated 21.2.1992, not produced in the earlier case, could not be used in the present proceedings due to constructive res judicata.

SAT rightly dismissed the application on grounds of res judicata and constructive res judicata. Directions issued by SAT on merits were non est.

Absorbed employees from the Revenue Department were entitled to the benefit of service in their parent department but not to claim seniority over those already promoted.

The High Court rightly quashed the provisional seniority list.

Facts:

The appellant, Smt. G. Kaushalya Devi, was a tenant.

The respondent, Ghanshyamdas, filed an eviction petition against the appellant under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent, and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, citing reasons including willful default in rent payment and bona fide requirement for personal occupation for conducting business.

During the proceedings, the ground of securing alternative accommodation was not pursued.

The Rent Controller ruled in favor of eviction on both grounds.

The appellate authority affirmed the Rent Controller's findings.

The appellant filed a revision in the High Court under Section 22 of the Act.

The High Court, in its judgment, found no willful default in rent payment but agreed with the eviction on the ground of the landlord's bona fide requirement for personal occupation.

Issues:

Whether the eviction of the appellant based on the landlord's bona fide requirement for personal occupation was legally justified.

Whether the landlord's existing occupancy of another non-residential premises in the same city precluded him from seeking eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

Held:

The appellant argued that the respondent-landlord's occupation of another non-residential premises in the same city for conducting business made him ineligible to seek eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

The judgment referred to a similar provision in the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, and the precedent of M. Padmanabha Setty Vs. K.P. Papiah Setty to interpret the phrase "entitled to possession" in the context of a landlord's right to seek eviction.

It was determined that the landlord's right to seek eviction was not restricted by the fact that he already occupied another non-residential premises.

The High Court's finding that the respondent required the suit premises for personal occupation for conducting business was upheld.

The appellant's contention that another shop had been purchased by the respondent's mother with a loan from the respondent was rejected by the High Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and granted the appellant time until October 31, 2000, to vacate the suit premises, provided she filed a usual undertaking within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The case revolves around the murder of an individual, SD, allegedly carried out by members of two criminal gangs. The initial investigation was marred by dishonesty, and two accused individuals, A-4 and A-11, were arrested based on incomplete evidence. These accused were released on bail, and the trial could not proceed further. Subsequently, another police officer re-investigated the case and discovered that the acts were of a terrorist nature, falling under TADA. The trial court raised suspicions about the honesty of the first investigation.

Issues:

The admissibility of confessions under TADA.

The validity of the identification of the accused.

The conduct of the investigation, particularly the re-investigation.

Held:

The confessions recorded under TADA Act were held to be a substantive piece of evidence and admissible against the accused. The confessions of A-1 to A-6 were deemed voluntary and reliable and could be used as a basis for their conviction.

While the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) did diminish the evidentiary value of the identification of the accused in court, it was corroborated by other evidence (Para 2).

There were doubts about the honesty of the first investigation, but the subsequent investigation was not done with any oblique motive.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeals, the Court found A-1 guilty under s. 302 IPC and A-2 to A-6 guilty under Section 302 read with Sections 120-B and 149 IPC. A-1 to A-6 were also held guilty under s. 3(3) TADA Act. A-14 to A-17's involvement was not conclusively proved, and the case against them was not established.

Facts:

The case involved charges under the Kerala Abkari Act. The offenses in question were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions without examining any witnesses, despite a list of witnesses being available. Importantly, the accused did not raise any objections to the absence of witness examination during various stages of the trial, including the framing of charges, recording of prosecution evidence, and statements of the accused under Section 313. The objections regarding the non-examination of witnesses in the committal court were only raised during the final arguments.

Issues:

The nature of the inquiry under Section 202(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and whether it is discretionary or mandatory.

Whether the omission to examine witnesses in the committal court affects the validity of the proceedings.

The consequences of not raising objections about such omissions at earlier stages of the trial.

Held:

The judgment consists of two separate opinions on the nature of the proviso to Section 202(2):

Justice Shah's Opinion:

Justice Shah considered the proviso to Section 202(2) discretionary.

He believed that failure to follow the proviso did not vitiate the trial unless prejudice was caused to the accused.

Justice Thomas's Opinion:

Justice Thomas considered the proviso to Section 202(2) mandatory.

However, he stated that the omission itself would not vitiate the proceedings.

Any objections regarding this omission should be decided under Section 465 of the Code.

The judgment emphasized the limited nature of the inquiry under Section 202, which aims to determine whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. It also highlighted the obligation of the Magistrate to furnish certain documents to the accused under Section 208.

Importantly, the judgment noted that objections about such irregularities should be raised at an earlier stage. Failure to raise objections at the appropriate time might preclude the accused from raising them later.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the Sessions Court to complete the hearing and dispose of the case on its merits. The Court considered the limited impact of the non-examination of witnesses in the committal court and found that conducting a fresh inquiry under Section 202 was unnecessary in this case.

Facts:

The State Government issued a notification on April 30, 1992, notifying various commodities for the purpose of levying entry tax.

Entry 30 included "Glass sheets and all articles made of glass."

Entry 54 included "Plastic sheets, granules, and articles made from all kinds of and all forms of plastic, including articles made of polypropylene, polystyrene, and the like materials."

The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes clarified that glass bangles and plastic bangles fell under Entry 30 and Entry 54, respectively, and were subject to entry tax at 2%.

Assessment orders were issued, and entry tax was demanded on bangles.

The appellants challenged these assessment orders in writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka.

Issues:

The validity of the imposition of entry tax on glass and plastic bangles under Entry 30 and Entry 54 of the 1992 notification.

The interpretation of the relevant sections of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979, was also in question.

Held:

The identity of bangles as distinct from glass articles did not exempt them from entry tax. Bangles made of glass or plastic were considered articles made of glass or plastic, respectively, and were thus subject to entry tax under Entry 30 and Entry 54 of the notification.

The use of the word "and" in Entry 30 indicated the legislature's intention to levy tax both on glass sheets (raw materials) and finished products made of glass or articles made of glass.

The rule of construction "noscitur a sociis" did not apply to these entries as they were clear and unambiguous.

Decision:

The Supreme Court upheld the division bench's judgment, confirming that glass bangles and plastic bangles were subject to entry tax at 2% under Entry 30 and Entry 54 of the notification. The appeals to stand dismissed.