Criminal Law – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of defamation charges – Accusations against the petitioners (including the Chief Minister of Delhi) for imputing that BJP had orchestrated deletion of voter names from specific communities – The High Court examined the validity of summoning orders issued by the Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Court – Court found that the statements made by the petitioners were prima facie defamatory, targeting a determinable and identifiable group (BJP and its Delhi Pradesh unit) – Court emphasized that political parties are identifiable entities under law, capable of being defamed – Held that the allegations against BJP were made without factual basis, potentially swaying public opinion, and harming BJP's reputation – The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed. [Paras 14-33].

Defamation Law – Evaluation of Evidence for Defamation – The Court held that even though the initial evidence was derived from newspaper reports and video clippings (generally considered hearsay), it was supported by certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, making it admissible – Summoning orders were based on sufficient prima facie evidence, and the absence of witness testimony at the pre-summoning stage did not invalidate the summoning order – The scope of inquiry under Sections 202 and 204 Cr.P.C. was limited to determining if there was sufficient ground to proceed, not to ascertain the truth of the allegations conclusively – Reliance was placed on precedents that allowed the continuation of defamation proceedings even when initial evidence was not fully established at the pre-summoning stage – Petition dismissed. [Paras 23-26].

Decision – Dismissal of Petition – Held – The High Court dismissed the petition, confirming the maintainability of defamation charges against the petitioners – The Court found that the tweets and public statements made by the petitioners were defamatory, particularly as they accused BJP of engaging in unethical practices without factual support – The petitioners' defense that their statements were made in good faith and for public good was reserved for trial – The Court emphasized that reputation, particularly of political entities, is protected under law, and defamatory imputations without factual basis cannot be shielded under the guise of free speech – The Court directed the continuation of proceedings before the Trial Court. [Paras 32-42].

Service Law – Pay Scale Parity – Appellants challenged the Single Judge’s order granting higher pay scales and benefits to the respondents, similar to those awarded to another set of petitioners in a prior case – Appellants argued the respondents were “fence sitters” and their claims were time-barred due to delay, waiver, and acquiescence – High Court set aside the impugned order, holding that the respondents failed to approach the court in a timely manner and were not entitled to claim benefits granted in previous proceedings involving different parties – Appeal allowed, writ petition dismissed [Paras 1-27].

Delay and Laches – Applicability of Arvind Kumar Srivastava Principle – Court held that although similarly situated employees should normally be treated alike, the respondents’ significant delay in approaching the court disqualified them from claiming benefits granted to others in earlier judgments – Cited Tarsem Singh and T.T. Murali Babu to emphasize the importance of promptness in seeking legal redress [Paras 20-27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order set aside – Writ petition dismissed – No costs awarded [Paras 27-28].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference – Court reiterated the limited scope of interference in second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Findings of fact by lower courts cannot be disturbed unless there is clear perversity – Appeal dismissed as no substantial question of law arose [Paras 16-22].

Specific Performance – Registered Agreement – Execution and Validity – Defendant's plea that the agreement was fraudulently executed was rejected due to lack of sufficient evidence – Registered agreement and payment endorsements made by the Sub-Registrar were presumed correct under law – Concurrent findings of lower courts upholding the specific performance decree were affirmed [Paras 8-14].

Decision: Second Appeal dismissed at the stage of admission. The concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts were upheld, and no substantial question of law was found to warrant interference.

Prisoners' Rights - Unauthorized Possession of Mobile Phone - Parole Denial - The court examined whether the unauthorized possession of a mobile phone by a prisoner, without any accompanying conviction or evidence of misuse, justifies the denial of parole. The court emphasized that such denial, in the absence of a full trial or a conviction, infringes upon the presumption of innocence, a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence. The decision of the District Magistrate to deny parole based solely on the recovery of a mobile phone was deemed oppressive, as it violated Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. [Paras 18-22].

Judicial Review - Fair Trial - Application of Criminal Jurisprudence in Prison Discipline - The court found that the procedural safeguards typically applied in criminal trials must extend to prison discipline cases involving severe consequences, such as the denial of parole. It held that the Superintendent of Jail cannot impose punishments without the procedural rigor required in a fair trial, including cross-examination and the opportunity for the prisoner to present a defense. [Paras 27-30].

Constitutional Law - Article 21 - Fair Trial Principles - The Full Bench overruled the decision in Kulwant @ Monu v. State of Haryana, which had upheld the denial of parole based on the mere possession of a mobile phone, declaring it inconsistent with the principles of a fair trial under Article 21. The court ruled that any denial of parole must be grounded in a full judicial process, respecting the prisoner’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. [Paras 25-36].

Decision: The Full Bench set aside the impugned order denying parole, holding that the denial was unjustified without a proper judicial process, and declared that mere possession of a mobile phone by a prisoner cannot lead to automatic denial of parole. The court remanded the matter for reconsideration in line with these findings. [Para 36].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR under Sections 498A, 406, 420, 506(2), 114 IPC and Sections 3, 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – High Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused (father-in-law and mother-in-law) under Section 482 CrPC – The complainant filed a case alleging harassment after marriage, but the Court found the allegations to be general and unsubstantiated – The Court held that the complainants had falsely implicated the applicants in order to pressure the family into a settlement – Court observed the applicants, aged 90 and 80, had no involvement in the alleged offences [Paras 1-7, 17].

Abuse of Process – Court found that the FIR was an abuse of the legal process, aimed at harassment rather than the pursuit of justice – Referring to multiple precedents, including Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand and Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court emphasized caution in matrimonial disputes, especially when extended family members are implicated without specific evidence – It was noted that the marriage had dissolved via divorce, and there was no substantial proof of harassment against the in-laws [Paras 6-7, 13].

Decision – FIR Quashed – Held – The application under Section 482 CrPC was allowed – The Court quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings against the petitioners, ruling that their implication in the case was motivated by personal grievances rather than actual evidence of wrongdoing [Paras 15-17].

Taxation Law – Central Sales Tax – Inter-State Sales – The petitioner, a public sector undertaking, entered into an agreement with the Government of Bihar to supply energy food. The Sales Tax Tribunal upheld the assessment of the transactions as inter-state sales liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, despite the petitioner's contention that these were stock transfers and not sales. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, where it was held that movement of goods pursuant to a contract of sale qualifies as inter-state sales [Paras 8-11].

Sales Tax Tribunal – Misconception in Classification of Transactions – The petitioner argued that sales tax had already been paid in Bihar and U.P., and thus, Haryana could not levy the tax again. The Tribunal rejected this claim, asserting that the payment of local sales tax in other states does not preclude the imposition of Central Sales Tax on inter-state sales [Paras 12-14].

Refund and Double Taxation – In light of Tata Motors Limited v. Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, the court recognized the issue of double taxation and allowed the petitioner the liberty to seek a refund of the amount already paid to the concerned states. However, the petition was dismissed, upholding the imposition of Central Sales Tax by Haryana [Paras 15-17].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed. The court granted the petitioner the right to claim a refund for taxes paid to other states but upheld the tax demand by Haryana.

Taxation Law – Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Dispute over classification of transactions as Inter-State Sales or Stock Transfers – Challenge to assessment by State of Haryana imposing tax on transactions treated as inter-State sales – High Court examines whether movement of goods from Haryana to Bihar under an agreement constituted a sale or stock transfer – Held: Supply of goods pursuant to a prior contract with the Government of Bihar constituted an inter-State sale under the CST Act – Petitioners already assessed for local sales tax in Bihar cannot claim exemption from inter-State tax in Haryana – Dismissal of writ petitions, affirming the validity of Haryana’s tax demand. [Paras 1-16]

Inter-State Sales vs. Stock Transfer – High Court relies on precedents to determine that movement of goods occasioned by a contract of sale constitutes an inter-State sale – Reliance on Supreme Court’s ruling in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, and Bharat Electric Ltd. vs. Union of India – The issuance of Form F by Bihar for stock transfer did not absolve the petitioner from the obligation to pay inter-State sales tax in Haryana – Tax Tribunal’s findings upheld – Claims of double taxation refuted. [Paras 8-14]

Decision – Dismissal of Writ Petitions – Held: Petitioner’s arguments regarding double taxation and erroneous classification as inter-State sales rejected – Haryana entitled to impose Central Sales Tax on transactions – Refund claims to be pursued per Tata Motors Ltd. vs. CST Appellate Authority ruling – Interim orders vacated – Final judgment dismisses all petitions and pending applications. [Paras 15-19]

Income Tax Law – Reopening of Assessment – Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Whether reopening based on "change of opinion" without new tangible material is valid – Held, reopening was invalid due to lack of new material. The Court referred to CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., noting that mere change of opinion cannot justify reopening an assessment under Section 147 without tangible material – [Paras 29-31]​.

Reassessment and Change of Opinion – Difference Between Short-Term Capital Gain and Adventure in the Nature of Trade – The Assessing Officer initially treated the income as short-term capital gain, but later classified it as "adventure in the nature of trade" without any fresh notice or valid reasoning – The Court found this change arbitrary and unsustainable as there was no new material to substantiate the reassessment – [Paras 35-40]​.

Constitutional Law – Article 226 – The Court exercised its discretion to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy, as the reassessment proceedings were arbitrary and without jurisdictional basis. The alternative remedy rule does not apply when reassessment is based on procedural irregularity or arbitrary exercise of power – [Paras 14-16]​.

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Reassessment proceedings quashed – All orders dated 29.09.2021, including the demand notice, were set aside – [Paras 41-42]​.

Income Tax – Final Assessment Order – Draft Assessment Order Requirement – Petitioner contended that the final assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) was invalid as it was not preceded by a draft assessment order, violating Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Court held that the failure to issue a draft assessment order during remand proceedings as mandated by Section 144C rendered the final assessment order invalid – Assessment and demand notices quashed [Paras 1-6, 14].

Jurisdictional Error – Procedural Compliance – Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the procedural requirement under Section 144C, underscoring that any final assessment order passed without adherence to this process, particularly in remand cases, is legally untenable [Paras 4-5, 51-52].

Procedure under Section 144C – Scope of "In the First Instance" – The respondents argued that the expression "in the first instance" in Section 144C obviates the need for a draft assessment order upon remand – The Court rejected this argument, affirming that the draft order requirement is mandatory regardless of whether the proceedings are initiated anew due to remand by the Tribunal [Paras 14-16, 19-23].

Comparative Analysis – Section 144B vs. Section 144C – The Court found that Section 144C establishes a distinct and comprehensive assessment regime for eligible assessees, which differs fundamentally from the earlier Section 144B. Section 144C involves multiple levels of review and corrective mechanisms that are not merely procedural but essential to ensuring a fair assessment process [Paras 36-45].

Limitation and Remand – Statutory Period – The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the assessment could be remanded for fresh proceedings despite the lapse of the statutory period under Section 153. The Court held that extending the limitation period or condoning the delay in such cases would be impermissible [Paras 54-60].

Decision:
Writ Petition allowed. The impugned final assessment orders and consequent demand and penalty notices were quashed due to non-compliance with Section 144C. The petitioners were entitled to all consequential reliefs.