Criminal Law – Inherent Powers of High Court – Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of Interlocutory Order – Petition filed seeking quashing of trial court order rejecting application under Section 311 CrPC for summoning record of another complaint case – Held: No perversity or illegality found in the impugned order warranting interference under inherent jurisdiction [Paras 1, 12–13].

Criminal Trial – Power to Summon or Recall Witness – Scope of Section 311 CrPC – Discretionary Power – Petitioner sought summoning of record of an entirely different complaint case to rely on alleged admissions – Trial court found that petitioner had ample opportunity earlier and application was filed at belated stage – Held: Power under Section 311 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly, with caution and only when evidence is essential for just decision of the case [Paras 8–10].

Stage of Trial – Final Arguments – Belated Application – Delay as Relevant Consideration – Complaint under Section 138 NI Act pending since 2017 – Defence evidence stage since 2019 – Application under Section 311 CrPC moved only at fag end of trial – Held: Unexplained delay militates against grant of relief and supports inference of attempt to delay proceedings [Paras 11–12].

Evidence – Summoning of Records of Another Case – Relevance and Necessity – Alleged testimony of power of attorney holder in separate proceedings – Trial court noted contradictions between application and submissions and absence of examination of such witness in the other case – Held: Summoning of such record not essential for just decision of present case [Paras 7, 11].

Abuse of Process – Section 311 CrPC – Safeguard Against Misuse – Court reiterated that provision cannot be used to derail proceedings or cause prejudice to opposite party – Held: Application rightly rejected to prevent miscarriage of justice [Paras 10, 13].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 07.02.2025 upheld – Pending applications also dismissed [Para 14].

Partition Suit – Intestate Succession – Christian Law – Oral Family Settlement – Claim Rejected – Plaintiffs and defendant, children of deceased K.M. Marykutty, inherited her property including ‘MGM Lodge’ upon her intestate death – Defendant claimed exclusive right based on alleged oral family settlement and plea of adverse possession – Trial court rejected both claims and decreed ⅓ share to each heir – Held: No documentary or oral evidence to prove family settlement – Mere assertion without corroboration insufficient – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2–4, 6–8, 10].

Adverse Possession – Co-Ownership – No Proof of Ouster – Defendant claimed title over inherited property by adverse possession – Held: In case of co-ownership, burden is on party claiming adverse possession to prove ouster of others – Long possession not sufficient – No independent evidence of exclusion of other co-owners – Plea rightly rejected [Paras 9–10].

Oral Family Arrangement – Proof Required – Defendant alleged oral settlement occurred on 40th day after mother’s death – No supporting documents, no examination of independent witnesses, and no mutation or change in title records – Held: Oral family arrangement requires strict proof especially when it alters succession – Evidence wholly lacking – Trial court’s findings upheld [Paras 7–8].

Christian Succession – Equal Share – Application of Indian Succession Act – Parties being Christians, succession governed by Indian Succession Act – On intestate death, children equally inherit – In absence of proof of waiver or relinquishment, each child entitled to equal share – Held: ⅓ share rightly declared for each of the three siblings [Para 10].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Preliminary decree for partition affirmed – Each party entitled to ⅓ share in plaint schedule property – No interference warranted with trial court’s findings.

Revenue Law – Private Lease under Section 94 – Locus Standi – Petition Dismissed – Petitioner, who was a rival applicant for IOCL dealership, challenged a private lease deed executed under Section 94 by alleging it was contrary to permitted use under the Code – Held: Petitioner is neither lessor nor lessee, nor owner or co-sharer of the land, and thus has no locus standi to seek cancellation of the lease – Mere participation in dealership process does not confer enforceable legal interest in the land [Paras 3, 9–11, 15].

UP Revenue Code – Section 94 – Scope and Applicability – Lease for IOCL Outlet – Lease executed for retail outlet held to be a private lease under Section 94 – Court rejected contention that such lease was void under Section 104 – Held: Section 105(e) specifically excludes leases under Section 94 from consequences of void transfer – Sections 104, 105 and Rule 103 apply only to transfers in violation of Code by bhumidhar involving State land, not private leases [Paras 4–5, 10].

Declaratory Relief – Section 144 of U.P. Revenue Code – Interpretation – Court held that only persons claiming to be bhumidhar or asami can file declaratory suits, including suits seeking cancellation of lease – Petitioner having no right, title or interest in the land cannot invoke Section 144 or challenge the lease instrument [Paras 6, 12].

Interpretation of Statutes – Harmonious Reading – Sections 94, 104, 105 and Rule 103 – Court harmoniously construed that lease under Section 94 is governed solely by terms agreed between lessor and lessee – Rule 103 procedures for void transfers not applicable due to statutory exclusion under Section 105(e) [Paras 5, 10].

Procedural Law – Rule 186 – Inapplicability without Locus – Court held that invocation of Rule 186 (regarding non-application of Civil Procedure Code) is irrelevant when the petitioner lacks locus to maintain proceedings against a private lease [Para 16].

Alternative Remedy – Challenge to IOCL Dealership – Court clarified that the petitioner is not without remedy – Any grievance regarding dealership allotment, including lease legality, can be raised before competent forum in IOCL process – But such remedy does not justify locus to cancel private lease deed [Para 14].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned orders of Sub-Divisional Officer and Revisional Court upheld – Petitioner found to lack locus standi to challenge private lease deed under Section 94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 [Paras 17–18].

Constitutional Law – Live-in Relationship – Right to Protection – Petitioners in consensual live-in relationships alleged threats to life from private individuals and sought police protection – Held: Right to cohabit without marriage is protected under Article 21 – Personal autonomy cannot be compromised by societal disapproval – Police directed to grant protection if petitioners are adults and living willingly [Paras 1–3, 22, 45–49, 51–52]

Live-in Relationships – Legality and Social Morality – Court held that live-in relationships, though not widely accepted socially, are not illegal or punishable under law – Such arrangements are not barred by any legislation and are protected by constitutional rights to life, liberty and equality [Paras 6–9, 18–21, 30–33, 45–48]

State Obligation – Protection under Article 21 – Rejected State's contention that police cannot protect non-marital couples – Observed that State is duty-bound to protect life and liberty irrespective of marital status – No justification to deny anticipatory protection where threat is genuine or credible [Paras 12–13, 22, 46]

Personal Autonomy – Right to Choose Partner – Emphasised that major individuals have full autonomy under Article 21 to choose life partners and live together – State or family cannot compel marriage or interfere – Morality cannot override legality [Paras 6–7, 22, 33, 48–49]

Presumption of Marriage – Long-term Cohabitation – As per Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act and Section 119(1) of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, long-standing cohabitation gives rise to presumption of marriage – Ensures protection of women and children from such relationships [Para 50]

Judicial Precedent – Binding Nature – Court relied upon extensive Supreme Court and High Court rulings recognising live-in relationships and protecting individual choice – Distinguished the contrary view in Kiran Rawat as not binding and factually distinguishable [Paras 18–21, 24–33, 40–44]

Decision: Writ petitions allowed – Petitioners declared free to live together peacefully – Police directed to provide protection upon verification of age and willingness – No coercive action to be taken unless FIR is registered – Petitioners may produce educational documents or undergo ossification test to prove majority if required [Paras 51–53]

Administrative Law – Blacklisting – Show Cause Notice – Violation of Natural Justice – Petitioner blacklisted and debarred from future tenders for three years and Performance Bank Guarantee forfeited on grounds of supplying non-standard quality drugs – Show cause and hearing notices failed to specify that blacklisting or debarment was proposed – No laboratory test reports or sample analysis data provided to petitioner despite repeated requests – Held: Non-disclosure of proposed action and denial of opportunity to contest findings violated principles of natural justice – Impugned order quashed [Paras 1, 5–7, 13–19].

Tender Contracts – Supply of Medicines – Alleged Breach – Respondents relied on Clause 24(C) of tender terms to impose penalty for supply of non-standard quality drugs and short supply – However, absence of specific mention of blacklist/debarment in notices and non-supply of relevant reports rendered the order legally unsustainable – Existence of penalty clause does not exempt requirement of specific notice for harsh measures like blacklisting [Paras 10, 14–17].

Judicial Review – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Availability of alternative remedy under Clause 25 of tender terms – Held: Writ maintainable in case of breach of natural justice principles – Availability of statutory appeal not a bar to writ jurisdiction in such cases [Para 20].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Order of blacklisting and debarment dated 26/09/2025 set aside – Liberty granted to respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity to the petitioner [Paras 19–22].

Service Law – Recruitment Process – Reservation Policy – Horizontal Reservation Misapplied Vertically – Invalid Implementation of Ex-Servicemen Quota – Petitioners challenged recruitment to 303 posts of Security Guard (T&S Grade G) in Mahanadi Coalfields Limited – Court found that Ex-Servicemen reservation of 24.5% was applied vertically by adjusting candidates in General category instead of horizontally across all vertical categories – Held: Application of horizontal reservation must cut across SC/ST/OBC/General categories and not disturb overall vertical structure – Misapplication invalidated the recruitment process to that extent [Paras 6–19].

Reservation – Ceiling Limit – Breach of 50% Cap – Ex-Servicemen Quota Pushed Reservation to 74.5% – Petitioners argued inclusion of 24.5% Ex-Servicemen quota resulted in total reservation exceeding 50% ceiling laid down in Indra Sawhney – Court held that such reservation, being horizontal, should not have inflated vertical quota – Improper classification and adjustment led to excessive reservation, contrary to constitutional principles [Paras 4(ii), 9–10, 14–16].

Recruitment – Change in Criteria – Post-Advertisement Modification Not Permissible – Ex-Servicemen quota was not clearly mentioned in employment notification dated 19.02.2014 – Applying such quota retrospectively and without proper disclosure in advertisement violates fairness and transparency in recruitment – Held: Selection criteria cannot be altered mid-way unless compliant with law and advertisement terms [Paras 4(i), 20].

Equitable Relief – Regularization – No Displacement of Appointed Candidates – Creation of Supernumerary Posts Directed – Despite flaws in application of reservation, Court declined to displace already appointed Ex-Servicemen candidates – Held: Appointments made in good faith should not be disturbed – Directed reconsideration of petitioners’ candidature in fresh recruitment – Supernumerary posts to be created to absorb both groups without prejudice [Paras 21–27].

Recruitment Process – Judicial Approach – Balancing Legality with Equity – Relying on Ran Vijay Singh, Rajesh Kumar, and Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi, Court held that mistaken appointments should not result in termination if done in good faith – Instead, directed prospective corrective action and seniority protection for rightful candidates [Paras 22–25].

Decision: Writ Petitions allowed – Selection process to be reviewed – Petitioners to be considered afresh – Existing appointees to retain posts under supernumerary category – Seniority of petitioners to be maintained over them – Entire exercise to be completed expeditiously [Paras 26–30].

POCSO Act – Rape of Minor – Stepfather – Life Imprisonment – Accused repeatedly raped his 13-year-old stepdaughter after threatening her and her mother with a knife – Incident occurred early morning on 02.04.2018 – Victim lodged prompt FIR, examined as PW3 – Medical evidence revealed fresh hymenal tear and knife wounds – Held: Testimony of PW3 consistent, credible, and supported by medical and documentary evidence – Conviction under Sections 376(2)(f)(n) IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act affirmed – Sentence of life imprisonment for remainder of natural life upheld [Paras 2–3, 7–10, 14–19].

Criminal Trial – Sole Testimony of Victim – Evidentiary Value – PW3 deposed clearly and consistently regarding multiple instances of rape by stepfather – Withstood cross-examination without contradictions or omissions – Medical evidence corroborated injuries – Held: Victim's uncorroborated testimony sufficient for conviction where it inspires confidence – No legal requirement for corroboration if prosecutrix is found reliable [Paras 11–14].

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act – Section 29 – Presumption and Burden of Proof – Once foundational facts established regarding age, sexual act, and identity of accused, presumption under Section 29 applies – Accused failed to rebut presumption even by preponderance of probabilities – Held: Statutory presumption stands unrebutted – Conviction legally sustainable [Paras 16–17].

Hostile Witness – Victim’s Mother – Mother (PW12) turned hostile but admitted taking victim to police and fear of accused – Her hostility found immaterial as victim’s testimony independently credible and corroborated – Held: Hostile testimony of PW12 does not dent prosecution case – Court right in relying on victim’s version [Paras 9, 15].

Sentencing – Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault by Guardian – Abuse of Trust – Sentence Proportionate – Accused was stepfather and guardian – Act committed after placing child and her mother in fear of death – Held: Crime aggravated by breach of fiduciary relationship – Sentence of imprisonment for remainder of natural life under Section 376(2)(f)(n) IPC appropriate – No separate sentence needed under POCSO due to Section 42 [Para 19].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Sections 324, 506(ii), and 376(2)(f)(n) IPC and Section 6 read with Section 5(l)(n) of POCSO Act confirmed – Life sentence for remainder of natural life upheld – No interference warranted with findings or sentence imposed by Special Court.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(1) – Waiver of One-Year Separation Period – The statutory period of one year separation prescribed under Section 13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting the first motion can be waived by applying the proviso to Section 14(1) of the HMA – It is legally permissible for a court to entertain a first motion even prior to the expiry of the one-year separation period, provided the court is satisfied that circumstances of "exceptional hardship to the petitioner" and/or "exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent" exist, and the case is tested on the anvil of considerations set out in Pooja Gupta – This view overrules previous Single Bench decisions holding Section 13B to be a complete code and Section 14(1) proviso inapplicable [Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 38.1, 38.2, 57.1, 57.4].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(2) – Waiver of Six-Month Cooling-Off Period – The waiver of the one-year separation period under Section 13B(1) does not preclude the waiver of the six-month cooling-off period for filing the second motion under Section 13B(2) – The one-year and six-month periods are to be considered independently – The court has discretion to waive the six-month period based on factors like genuine settlement, no possibility of reconciliation, and to prevent prolonged agony, as established in Amardeep Singh and Amit Kumar – This discretion can be exercised by both the Family Court and the High Court [Paras 22.4, 22.5, 38.3, 42, 43, 57.2, 57.5].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B(1) & (2) – Divorce Decree Effective Forthwith – Where the court is satisfied that both the one-year separation period under Section 13B(1) and the six-month cooling-off period under Section 13B(2) deserve to be waived, the court is not legally mandated to defer the date from which the divorce decree would take effect, and such decree may be made effective forthwith – The legislative intent behind the proviso to Section 14(1) allows for deferral only in cases of misrepresentation or concealment, not as a general rule for all early divorces [Paras 35, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57.3, 57.6].

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B – Interpretation – The opening words "Subject to the provisions of this Act" in Section 13B(1) mean that its provisions are subject to other provisions of the HMA, including the proviso to Section 14(1) – The essential ingredient of Section 13B is the 'consent of parties', not the timelines, which are procedural and can be relaxed in exceptional circumstances to prevent undue psychological and emotional distress and uphold decisional autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution [Paras 30, 32, 37, 40, 45, 54, 55, 56].

Decision: Reference answered accordingly.

Criminal Law – Rape and Murder – Acquittal – Appellant convicted under Sections 376 and 302 IPC for allegedly raping and murdering a 13-year-old girl in a secluded area – Trial Court relied on extrajudicial confessions made before a co-villager (P.W.3) and a doctor (P.W.11) and on the appellant’s suspicious conduct at the crime scene – High Court finds that neither P.W.3’s testimony about the confession was reliable nor corroborated by prior police statements or other witnesses – Medical officer (P.W.11) did not record any confession in his report and his oral testimony contradicted documentary evidence – Confessional evidence not put to appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Held: Extrajudicial confession not reliable or admissible to base conviction [Paras 11–12].

Circumstantial Evidence – Guilt Not Proved – Prosecution case entirely based on circumstantial evidence – Appellant’s presence at crime scene explained plausibly and supported by hostile witness (P.W.7) – Forensic reports failed to find blood, semen, or saliva on appellant’s clothes or body – Court held that the chain of circumstances was incomplete and did not exclude every hypothesis of innocence – Conviction based on suspicion or conjecture unsustainable in law [Paras 13–15].

Medical Evidence – Cause of Death – Deceased died of asphyxia due to compression of neck, chest, and abdomen – Signs of recent violent sexual intercourse found – Though rape and homicidal death established, identity of perpetrator not conclusively proved [Paras 9].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 376 and 302 IPC set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bonds cancelled [Para 15].