Protection of Children from Sexual Offences – Conviction under POCSO – Credibility of Child Witness – DNA and Medical Evidence – Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault – Appeal Dismissed.

Penetrative Sexual Assault – Minor Victim – Appellant, maternal uncle of the survivor aged 5 years, convicted under Sections 376(2)/506 IPC and Section 6 read with Section 5 of POCSO Act – Trial Court sentenced him to 11 years RI with fine under POCSO and 3 years RI under IPC Section 506 – Conviction based on consistent testimony of the child survivor (PW-1), corroborated by her medical examination (MLC) and FSL report indicating presence of appellant’s genetic material on jute bag recovered from scene [Paras 2, 17, 21-22, 42-43].

Child Witness – Competency and Tutoring Allegation – Survivor’s testimony held reliable despite minor discrepancies due to age (5 years) and time gap – Court found survivor’s version consistent on key allegation of penetrative assault – Allegation of tutoring rejected in light of corroborative evidence including MLC and FSL report – [Paras 28-29, 35].

Corroborative Testimonies – Sister (PW-2), mother (PW-6), and father (PW-3) of the survivor corroborated the sequence of events including seeing the accused in compromising position, immediate complaint and recovery – Minor discrepancies in the account regarding breaking of door/window held immaterial – [Paras 18-20, 34].

Medical and Forensic Evidence – MLC confirmed bruise and hymenal tear on survivor – DNA from jute bag matched with appellant’s blood sample – Chain of custody of forensic samples established – FSL report deemed reliable and corroborative of survivor’s allegations – [Paras 21-22, 30-33].

Presumption under POCSO – Court upheld statutory presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO Act – Held that appellant failed to rebut presumption beyond reasonable doubt – Allegation of false implication due to property dispute not supported by credible evidence – [Paras 36-37].

Sentencing – Appellant was 19 years old at the time of offence – Trial Court considered mitigating factors but held offence severe, justifying 11-year sentence under POCSO – [Para 43].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence affirmed – Court found no infirmity in the judgment of conviction and sentence – Directions issued to jail authorities and legal services for further assistance to appellant – [Paras 44-48].

Bail – NDPS Act – Possession of Intermediate Quantity – Long Incarceration Without Trial – Bail Granted – The petitioner was arrested for offences under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act, alleging recovery of 16.01 grams of heroin – He has remained in custody since 31.07.2023 – Co-accused released on bail – Trial not commenced; no witness examined despite lapse of over 1 year and 9 months – Held: Though petitioner has prior conviction, the prolonged incarceration without progress in trial amounts to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution – Right to speedy trial paramount – Criminal antecedents not sufficient to deny bail in absence of timely trial – Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 1, 18-29].

Service Law – Regularisation – Omission from Earlier List – Entitlement Established – The Travancore Devaswom Board sought permission to regularise the services of three additional respondents who had completed five years of service as on 31.03.2012 – Their omission from the list regularised pursuant to judgment dated 31.05.2012 in W.P.(C) No. 6021/2011 was inadvertent – Held: The omission was administrative in nature and did not affect their entitlement to regularisation – Petition allowed [Paras 1–9, 22–23].

Irregular vs Illegal Appointments – Application of Uma Devi Doctrine – Irregular Appointments Covered – The Court considered the doctrine in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 and clarified that the appointments of the applicants were not illegal but irregular – Citing Supreme Court rulings in Jaggo (2024 SCC OnLine 3826), Vinod Kumar (2024) 1 SCR 1230, and Shripal (2025 SCC OnLine SC 221), the Court held that long-serving employees on sanctioned posts are entitled to regularisation – Backdoor entries distinguished from legitimate irregular appointments [Paras 10–16, 22–23].

Constitutional Principles – Parity and Fairness – Equal Treatment Mandated – Other similarly situated employees were already regularised pursuant to the 2012 judgment – Held: Denial of regularisation to the petitioners while others were regularised constitutes violation of the principle of parity and equal treatment – The constitution of the Devaswom Recruitment Board post-2012 cannot retrospectively affect their claims [Paras 10–12, 21–23].

Decision – Application Allowed – Regularisation Directed – The Court allowed the Travancore Devaswom Board to regularise the services of additional respondents 3 to 5 – Their appointments, being on sanctioned posts with more than five years’ continuous service as of 31.03.2012, were held to be irregular but not illegal – Omission from the earlier list was inadvertent – Regularisation ordered in parity with 28 others previously regularised under the same criteria [Paras 22–23].

Criminal Law - Dishonor of Cheque – Acquittal by Trial Court – Opportunity to Examine Bank Manager Denied – Matter Remanded – The complainant filed a case under Section 138 of the NI Act which was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that the dishonor memos (Exts.P2 and P3) did not contain the cheque number – Held: As per Section 146 of the NI Act, bank’s dishonor memo is prima facie evidence, but it must contain the cheque number and related details – Trial Court erred in denying the complainant’s request to examine the Bank Manager to prove this crucial fact – Acquittal set aside – Matter remanded for fresh disposal after granting the complainant opportunity to examine the Bank Manager [Paras 6, 9-13].

Section 146 NI Act – Presumption of Dishonor – Applicability Explained – The Court clarified that while Section 146 creates a presumption based on the bank’s slip or memo, the memo must contain specific details like the cheque number, date, and amount to be effective evidence – In absence of these details, oral evidence through the Bank Manager is necessary to prove dishonor – Failure to permit such evidence amounts to violation of fair trial principles [Paras 9-11].

Natural Justice – Denial of Right to Adduce Evidence – Judgment Unsustainable – The dismissal of the complainant’s petition to summon the Bank Manager deprived him of a fair opportunity to prove his case – Held: Such denial vitiates the trial – Appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the judgment and remand the case for proper adjudication [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Judgment of Acquittal Set Aside – Matter Remanded – The judgment dated 06.02.2014 in S.T. No.10 of 2012 passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Karunagappally is set aside – The complainant is directed to appear before the Trial Court on 01.07.2025 at 11:00 a.m. – Trial Court to dispose of the case afresh after permitting examination of the Bank Manager – Appeal allowed [Paras 13].

Intellectual Property Law – Trademark Infringement – Use of Registered Trademark by Intermediary – Dispute over IndiaMART listing of 'PUMA' as a drop-down option – PUMA SE (PSE) alleged counterfeit listings of its trademarked products on IndiaMART – Single Judge restrained IndiaMART from providing 'PUMA' as an option and ordered takedown of infringing listings – Division Bench analyzed extent of 'use' under Section 29 TM Act and safe harbour under Section 79 IT Act – Held: Drop-down listing alone not infringing if reasonable diligence followed – Injunction lifted for drop-down use, but takedown obligation upheld [Paras 1–4, 49–59, 94–96].

Trademark Use – Section 29 TM Act – Interpretation – Court held that listing 'PUMA' in seller registration drop-down constitutes "use" of trademark under Sections 2(2)(b) and 2(2)(c)(i) of TM Act – However, such use, by itself, does not show dishonest practice unless it facilitates counterfeit trade or misleads consumers – Use not automatically actionable unless shown to unfairly benefit from or damage trademark's distinctiveness [Paras 21–23, 27, 63–66, 69–70].

Safe Harbour Protection – Section 79 IT Act – Applicability to IndiaMART – Court distinguished IndiaMART from traditional e-commerce platforms like Amazon – IndiaMART operates as B2B listing service akin to Yellow Pages – Prima facie found to meet intermediary criteria under Section 2(1)(w) IT Act – Held: Section 79(1) protection applies unless intermediary conspires or fails to act on specific knowledge of infringement – Absence of proactive conspiracy or inducement protected IndiaMART [Paras 58, 77–80, 81–83, 90–93].

Due Diligence Obligations – Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) IT Rules 2021 – Court found that IndiaMART must ensure sellers acknowledge IP compliance obligations prominently during registration – Sellers re-listing after takedown without scrutiny would breach due diligence standards – Court emphasized need for visible undertakings and a robust takedown policy to retain intermediary protection [Paras 84–89, 92].

Doctrine of Exhaustion and Descriptive Use – Court rejected overbroad interpretation of Section 29(4) TM Act as applied by Single Judge – Noted that mere drop-down use describing brand, without intent to mislead or misappropriate goodwill, could fall under permissible descriptive use – Emphasized that infringement must involve confusion or dilution beyond identification of category [Paras 36(b), 41, 64–67].

Distinction from Google LLC v. DRS Logistics and Amazon Case – Court found Single Judge’s reliance on Google LLC decision distinguishable – Google ad program involved adword manipulation, unlike IndiaMART’s passive drop-down menu – Amazon case involved brand ownership and product sale by platform itself, unlike IndiaMART’s third-party listing structure [Paras 60, 73–74].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Injunction restraining drop-down menu usage of 'PUMA' lifted – IndiaMART directed to maintain active takedown mechanism for counterfeit listings and ensure compliance with due diligence requirements – Appeal disposed of accordingly [Paras 94–96].

Criminal Law – Section 406, 420, 34 of the IPC - Debit Freeze of Bank Account – Power Under Section 102 CrPC – Applicability of BNSS Sections 106 and 107 – Debit Freeze Lifted – The petitioner challenged the debit freeze of its bank account imposed by the police during investigation of a cheating case involving transfer of money allegedly from the proceeds of crime – Held: While Section 106 of BNSS (similar to Section 102 CrPC) empowers police to seize property for investigation, attachment or freezing of bank accounts suspected to be proceeds of crime must follow the procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, requiring Magistrate’s order – Police cannot unilaterally impose debit freeze without such order – Debit freeze set aside, liberty granted to police to proceed under Section 107 BNSS if warranted [Paras 6-14].

Attachment vs Seizure – Distinction Clarified – Section 106 BNSS deals with seizure of property related to the offence or under suspicious circumstances for investigation purposes – Section 107 BNSS governs attachment of properties deemed to be proceeds of crime, requiring judicial oversight through Magistrate’s orders – Debit freezing of bank accounts amounts to attachment rather than mere seizure and must comply with Section 107, not Section 106 – Impugned action without following this procedure is invalid [Paras 10-13].

Proceeds of Crime – BNSS Section 107 – Mandatory Judicial Process – Court explained that proceeds of crime as defined under Section 111(c) BNSS can only be attached by a Magistrate after issuing notice, hearing parties, and satisfying statutory conditions – Interim attachment possible only if delay defeats the object – In this case, police acted without initiating such process, rendering the action illegal [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Debit Freeze Order Set Aside – Petition Allowed – The order dated 08.04.2025 passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalamassery in C.M.P. No.739/2025 is quashed – The debit freeze imposed on the petitioner’s account is lifted – Police at liberty to proceed under Section 107 of BNSS if necessary [Para 14].

Service Law - Appointment to Reserved Post  – Scheduled Caste Reservation – Eligibility versus Suitability – Arbitrary Rejection – Petitioner Fully Qualified – The petitioner, an Associate Professor with over 32 years of experience and an extensive publication record, applied for the post of Professor reserved for SC category – He was the only candidate who attended the interview – Despite meeting all UGC eligibility standards, he was declared ‘not suitable’ without reasons – Held: The selection process lacked transparency, was arbitrary, and indicated a pattern of deliberate exclusion of SC candidates – Petitioner’s academic and research achievements far exceeded prescribed norms and warranted appointment [Paras 1–10, 43–45].

Selection Committee – Procedural Impropriety – Post-Facto Authentication – Void Process – The Selection Committee consisted of nine members, but only five attended the interview – Two additional members who did not attend were asked to authenticate the decision three months later – Held: Their endorsement without participating in the interview was invalid and made the selection process vitiated – Such conduct amounted to mala fide action and cannot withstand judicial scrutiny [Paras 44–47].

Constitutional Mandate – Article 16 Violation – Discrimination Established – The post had remained unfilled since the Centre’s inception in 2009, despite being reserved – Repeated non-appointment of SC candidates showed deliberate denial of opportunity – Held: Rejection of the petitioner was a breach of the right to equality in public employment under Articles 16(1) and 16(2) – The rationale of ‘none found suitable’ was a smokescreen to subvert constitutional policy [Paras 47–50].

Judicial Review – Power to Interfere – Court’s Role When Selection is Arbitrary – Held: While courts generally refrain from interfering with expert opinion of selection committees, this case justified intervention due to patent illegality, arbitrariness, and mala fides – The Court exercised its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the selection and direct appointment of the petitioner with full service and monetary benefits from 18.12.2023 [Paras 49–56].

Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Appointment Directed – The Court held that the petitioner was unjustly denied appointment despite fulfilling all qualifications and being the only candidate interviewed – The order rejecting his candidature as “not suitable” was declared arbitrary, opaque, and mala fide – The Court quashed the impugned order dated 18.12.2023 and directed the University to appoint the petitioner within two weeks with retrospective service and monetary benefits from the said date [Paras 55–57].

Civil Law - Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Delay Condonation – Exorbitant Delay – Lack of Bona Fides – Delay Not Condoned – The petitioner sought to condone a delay of 4864 days in filing a revision petition against the dismissal of an application to implead legal heirs in a suit for specific performance – The only ground cited was ignorance of earlier proceedings due to residing at her matrimonial home – Held: No sufficient cause was made out – Delay attributed to a casual and negligent approach without due diligence or urgency to pursue legal remedy [Paras 2–6].

Specific Performance Suit – Legal Heirs and Procedural Diligence – Dismissal for Delay – Earlier revision filed by co-legal heirs was dismissed in 2020 for non-compliance of court directions – The petitioner, despite knowledge, did not act promptly even post-dismissal – Held: The conduct revealed a callous and indifferent attitude – Relief in equity-based suits like specific performance demands timely, diligent participation – Petition dismissed [Paras 5–6].

Decision – Petition Dismissed – Court held that the explanation offered for the inordinate delay was unsatisfactory and indicative of negligence – Delay of over 13 years (4864 days) was not condonable in the absence of genuine reasons – The petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected and the unnumbered revision suit stood dismissed without costs [Para 6].

Civil Law - Debts Recovery – Cross-Examination – Denial of Opportunity – Tribunal Order Set Aside – The petitioner, a partner of the 1st defendant firm, contested liability for crop loans claimed by the bank and sought to cross-examine the bank’s witness – DRT rejected the application citing delay and the non-necessity of oral evidence from a bank official relying on records – Held: Given the contested liability and criminal proceedings against a former bank manager for fraud, denial of cross-examination violated principles of natural justice – Tribunal’s order quashed [Paras 1–13].

Natural Justice – Right to Cross-Examine – Procedural Fairness Required – The Court held that though DRT proceedings are summary in nature, when core facts are disputed and liability is denied, cross-examination becomes essential to ensure fair adjudication – Discretion under Rule 12(9) of DRT Rules must be exercised judiciously, not arbitrarily – The Tribunal failed to consider relevant facts and misapplied delay as a ground to deny a substantive right [Paras 10–13].

Delay – Not Sole Ground to Deny Cross-Examination – Absence of Prejudice – The Court observed that the O.A. was pending since 2006, and no specific delay was attributable to the petitioner – The finding of delay as a tactic to protract proceedings was not supported by record – Court emphasized that delay alone cannot override the need for fair hearing when substantial prejudice is shown [Paras 11–13].

Decision – Petition Allowed – Tribunal Directed to Permit Cross-Examination – The High Court set aside the DRT’s order and directed it to allow cross-examination of the bank’s witness – Tribunal was further directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, with final orders to be passed on or before 31.12.2025 [Para 13].