Service Law – Pay Anomaly – Drivers vis-à-vis Clerks/Patwaris – Mid-term Pay Revision 2011 – Petitioners sought pay band of Rs.10,300-34,800/- + Grade Pay Rs.3,200/- w.e.f. 01.12.2011 alleging anomaly – Claim earlier rejected vide order dated 23.03.2020 – Petition filed after more than five years – Held: Inordinate and unexplained delay disentitles petitioners to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Petition dismissed on ground of delay and laches [Paras 6, 12, 13].

Writ Jurisdiction – Delay and Laches – Stale Claims – Cause of action arose on rejection of claim on 23.03.2020 – Petitioners approached Court after lapse of over five years – No satisfactory explanation for delay – Held: High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction where petitioner is negligent in asserting rights – Equity aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights [Paras 6, 12].

Service Benefits – Repeated Representations – Effect on Limitation – Mere representations or reliance on subsequent Pay Commission observations do not revive stale claims – Issue of delay to be examined with reference to original cause of action – Belated invocation of writ jurisdiction cannot unsettle settled matters [Paras 8, 9, 12].

Precedents – Supreme Court on Delay – Court relied upon Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar, State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and other judgments holding that delay and laches are relevant factors in exercise of writ jurisdiction – Discretionary relief may be denied even where claim otherwise appears arguable on merits [Paras 7, 8].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed on ground of gross delay and laches – No relief granted – Parties left to bear their own costs [Paras 12, 13].

Industrial Land Allotment – Cancellation and Resumption of Unutilised Portion – SIPCOT – Clause 14(i) of Lease Deed – Appellant allotted an industrial plot on 05.12.2005 for manufacture of Forged/Machined Auto Components and a Lease Deed executed on 02.03.2006 – SIPCOT found 3.70 acres of allotted land lying unutilised – Appellant declined to surrender the unutilised portion upon notice – SIPCOT invoked Clause 14(i) and cancelled allotment of unutilised land and ordered resumption – Single Judge upheld the cancellation and directed refund of deposit – Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of Single Judge confirmed [Paras 1–7].

"Unutilised Industrial Land — Clause 14(i) — Right of SIPCOT to Cancel and Resume"

Industrial Plot – Lease Deed – Clause 14(i) – Cancellation – Clause 14(i) of the Lease Deed unequivocally confers upon SIPCOT the right to cancel the allotment and resume land, at any time, if the allotted land is not put to use for the purpose for which it was allotted or is found to be in excess of actual requirements – Upon resumption of excess land, allottee is entitled only to refund of plot deposit – Development charges, additional development charges, lease rent, interest and enhanced interest paid or due are not refundable – Appellant having agreed to the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed is bound by Clause 14(i) [Paras 3–4].

"Installation of Solar Panel Does Not Constitute Industrial Use — Purpose of Allotment Must Be Fulfilled"

Industrial Allotment – Purpose of Allotment – Utilisation – Appellant contended that a Solar Panel had been installed on the subject portion of land and produced a photograph in support – Held: A Solar Panel is not an industrial structure – Installation of a Solar Panel does not amount to utilisation of allotted land for the purpose of setting up a unit for manufacture of Forged/Machined Auto Components as stipulated in the Lease Deed and Project Report – Clause 14(i) mandates utilisation of allotted land strictly for the purpose for which it was allotted – Authorities rightly found that the land had not been utilised for any industrial purpose – Photograph produced is of no avail [Paras 5–6].

"Writ Court's Findings on Facts and Scope of Clause 14(i) — No Infirmity Found"

Writ Appeal – Scope of Interference – Single Judge elaborately considered the admitted facts between the parties in the context of the Lease Deed and Clause 14(i) – Writ Court directed refund of deposit amount as stipulated under Clause 14(i) – Division Bench found no infirmity in the Writ order – Impugned order confirmed – SIPCOT bound to refund the deposit amount as directed [Paras 5–7].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of the Single Judge dated 22.07.2022 in W.P. No. 13565 of 2012 confirmed – No costs – Connected Miscellaneous Petition closed.

Civil Law – Permanent Prohibitory Injunction – Boundary Wall Dispute – Second Appeal – Dismissal – Appellants/plaintiffs sought permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from raising construction over and excavating beneath the boundary wall claimed to be situated over Khasra Nos.1958, 1959 and 1960 – Trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 14.05.2018 – First Appellate Court (District Judge, Chamba) confirmed the dismissal vide judgment dated 01.10.2018 – High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, found concurrent findings of fact warranting no interference – Held: Second appeal dismissed [Paras 1–7, 32–33].

"Burden of Proof – Failure to Establish Location of Boundary Wall – Adverse Inference"

Injunction – Proof of Title and Possession – Burden on Plaintiff – Plaintiffs claimed joint ownership and possession of land and asserted the boundary wall stood over Khasra Nos.1958, 1959 and 1960 – However, no demarcation was obtained to ascertain the precise location of the boundary wall – Plaintiff (PW-1) admitted in cross-examination that no demarcation was carried out and no Local Commissioner was appointed – Corroborating witness (PW-2) admitted he did not know the khasra number over which the boundary wall stood – Neither oral nor documentary evidence established that the defendant excavated beneath the wall or caused danger to the plaintiff's house – Held: In absence of demarcation, adverse inference is required to be drawn against the plaintiffs [Paras 12–13, 22–23].

"Agreement Between Parties – Estoppel – Plaintiff's Admission"

Estoppel – Prior Agreement – Plaintiff's Undertaking – Defendant placed on record agreement (Ext. DW-5/B) dated 26.10.1998 executed between plaintiff Jitender Kalia and defendant Mohammad Hameed – Agreement showed plaintiff had installed glaze/window of his house towards the defendant's wall and had given undertaking that he would not object if the glaze is closed due to construction of the wall – Agreement admitted by marginal witnesses DW-5 (Anand Sagar) and DW-6 (Vijay Kumar) – Additionally, a prior decree dated 30.04.2014 (Ext. DY) was passed against plaintiffs restraining them from discharging dirty water towards defendant's property – Held: Prior agreement and decree operated against the plaintiffs' claim [Paras 19–21].

"Scope of Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Concurrent Findings of Fact"

Second Appeal – Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Limited Scope – High Court's power under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law – Interference with concurrent findings of fact returned by both Courts below is not permissible unless findings are perverse or based on no evidence – High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view for that of the first appellate court – Substantial questions of law framed at admission answered against the appellants – Held: Concurrent findings of fact rendered by Courts below are legal, valid and sustainable and call for no interference [Paras 24–25, 32–33].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts below affirmed – Pending applications, if any, also dismissed.

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Allegation of Multiple FIRs – Petition under Section 528 BNSS read with Article 227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of FIR registered at Kohima North Police Station on ground that earlier FIR on same transaction had already been registered at Hare Street Police Station, Kolkata – Petitioners contended that continuation of second FIR violates “test of sameness” and amounts to abuse of process – Held: Second FIR permissible where allegations arise from different perspectives and disclose additional offences including forgery of official logo, forging signature of Director of Nagaland State Lotteries and misuse of confidential government documents – FIR lodged by Director of Nagaland State Lotteries revealed wider factual matrix and distinct offences causing financial loss to State – Petitioners failed to make out case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction – Petition dismissed [Paras 15–29].

Multiple FIRs – Test of Sameness – Applicability of principles laid down in T.T. Anthony and Babubhai – Court examined whether the FIR registered at Kohima North P.S and the FIR registered at Hare Street P.S Kolkata related to identical occurrence – Held: Test of sameness not satisfied as complainants, allegations and scope of offences were different – Second FIR disclosed offences relating to forging official logo of Nagaland State Lottery, forging signature of Director and causing loss to State revenue – Such allegations formed a broader factual matrix and were not merely repetition of earlier FIR – Therefore registration of second FIR legally sustainable [Paras 21–25].

Criminal Law – Rival Versions of Same Transaction – Permissibility of multiple FIRs – Court relied on Supreme Court rulings holding that rival versions or different perspectives of same incident may lead to separate FIRs – When FIR is lodged by a different aggrieved person disclosing additional offences and wider conspiracy, second FIR does not violate criminal procedure jurisprudence – Investigation cannot be curtailed merely because earlier FIR exists if new facts and victims are disclosed [Paras 16–20, 24–25].

Forgery and Fraud – Lottery Tickets – Allegations of forging official logo and signature of Director of Nagaland State Lotteries – Charge sheet and witness statements under Section 161 CrPC disclosed prima facie involvement of accused in manufacturing fake lottery tickets and evading GST and TDS causing financial loss to Government of Nagaland – Such allegations constitute distinct offences warranting investigation and trial – Court declined to interfere at preliminary stage [Para 23].

Quashing of FIR – Scope of High Court’s Inherent Powers – Reliance on Bhajan Lal principles – Power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly and only where allegations are inherently improbable, malicious or fail to disclose any offence – In present case allegations disclosed prima facie offences and did not fall within categories warranting quashing – High Court refused to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS read with Article 227 of the Constitution [Paras 27–28].

Non-Cognizable Offence – Defamation under Section 500 IPC – Effect of Section 155(4) CrPC – Even though Section 500 IPC is non-cognizable, when combined with other cognizable offences the entire case is treated as cognizable – Issue regarding applicability or dropping of Section 500 IPC to be considered by Trial Court at appropriate stage [Para 26].

Decision: Criminal Petition dismissed – Prayer for quashing FIR in Kohima North P.S Case No. 009/2023 rejected – Investigation and trial proceedings permitted to continue.

Criminal Law – Rash and Negligent Driving – Acquittal – Appeal Against Acquittal – Accused alleged to have driven a truck at high speed causing it to hit an auto resulting in it falling into a gorge and causing injuries to a passenger — Trial Court acquitted the accused finding material contradictions in prosecution evidence and non-establishment of identity of the driver — High Court on appeal finds no perversity in the view taken by the Trial Court — appeal dismissed [Paras 6–31].

"Appeal Against Acquittal – Parameters of Interference – Double Presumption of Innocence"

Interference with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, is based on misreading or omission to consider material evidence on record, and no two reasonable views are possible — after acquittal, the accused is entitled to a reinforced or double presumption of innocence — if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed — Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing — relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433; P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291 [Paras 12–14].

"High Speed – Relative Term – Insufficient to Prove Rash and Negligent Driving – Section 279 IPC"

Mere use of the expression "high speed" by a witness is not sufficient to establish rash and negligent driving unless the approximate speed of the vehicle is also stated — high speed is a relative term and what one person understands by high speed may differ from another — prosecution must bring on record material to establish what is meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case — negligence and rashness cannot be presumed and criminality is not to be inferred — speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence; the deciding factor is the situation in which the accident occurs — relying on Mohanta Lal v. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; State of H.P. v. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest HLJ (2) 925; State of H.P. v. Parmodh Singh, 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 [Paras 22–26].

"Witness Cannot Depose on Negligence – Opinion on Negligence Not Relevant Evidence"

A witness can only depose about facts which occurred in his presence and is not permitted to draw inferences or express opinions thereon — it is for the court to draw inferences from proved facts — a witness's opinion that an accident occurred due to the negligence of a driver is not relevant evidence — the issue whether a vehicle was driven rashly and negligently is a conclusion to be drawn by the court on the basis of evidence led — statement of witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused cannot, by itself, advance the prosecution's case — relying on Hollington v. Hawthorn, 1943 KB 507; State of H.P. v. Niti Raj, 2009 Cr.LJ 1922 (HP) [Paras 27–29].

"Corroboration by Mechanical Report and Photographs – Absence of Damage to Truck and Rear of Auto – Prosecution Version Doubtful"

Prosecution case was that the truck hit the auto from the rear causing it to fall into a gorge — mechanical inspection report does not mention any damage to the rear of the auto — photographs also do not show any damage to the rear of the auto or the front of the truck — site plan prepared on the date of the accident records that the front tyres of the truck were punctured at the spot, casting doubt on whether the truck was moving at the time — oral testimony of eyewitnesses that the truck hit the auto from behind not corroborated by documentary evidence — prosecution version rendered doubtful [Paras 18–21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — acquittal of the respondent under Sections 279, 337 and 201 IPC upheld — Trial Court's view held to be a reasonable view warranting no interference — respondent directed to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (Section 481 BNSS) effective for six months [Paras 30–32].

Civil Procedure — Rejection of Plaint — Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Unregistered Gift Deed — Suit for Declaration — Plaint rejected on revision — Plaintiff filed suit for declaration as owner of suit property relying on an unregistered gift deed dated 27.04.2021, executed by her husband 15 years after he had already transferred title to the defendant by registered sale deed dated 08.01.2007 — Trial court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC — On revision, High Court holds that an unregistered gift deed of immovable property is void ab initio under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and inadmissible under Section 49 of the Registration Act — No cause of action can arise from a void document — Suit is manifestly vexatious — Plaintiff failed to seek cancellation of the registered sale deed of 2007 — Held: Plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC — Impugned order set aside [Paras 12–17].

Transfer of Property — Gift of Immovable Property — Mandatory Registration — Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument signed by the donor and attested by at least two witnesses — An unregistered gift deed is a nullity in law and cannot be the foundation of a declaration suit — Courts should not permit a suit to be maintained on a document that has no evidentiary value — Accepting the respondent's argument that the trial court may impound the document for stamp duty would open floodgates of vexatious litigation [Paras 12–16].

Limitation — Limitation Act, Article 59 — Circumvention by Clever Drafting — Plaintiff aware of registered sale deed of 2007 yet failed to seek cancellation thereof — Plaint averments themselves disclose the bar — Court not to allow circumvention of Article 59 by suppression of circumstances giving rise to limitation [Para 5].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition allowed — Order dated 25.07.2022 in I.A. No. 651 of 2021 in O.S. No. 670 of 2021 set aside — Plaint in O.S. No. 670 of 2021 rejected — No order as to costs — Pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

POCSO – Bail Rejected – Rape and Attempt to Murder of Minor – Sections 118(1)/75(2)/76/61(2)(a)/65(1)/109(1) of BNS, 2023 and Sections 4, 8 & 12 of POCSO Act – The accused, known to the victim as "Dadu (grandfather)", lured her to an abandoned house, throttled her, struck her head with a brick, administered organophosphorus poison and sexually assaulted her – SFSL report confirmed presence of Chlorpyrifos and Organophosphorus group of pesticide in victim's stomach wash – Victim referred to AIIMS, Delhi with acute liver failure – Held: "Considering the nature and gravity of the accusations as well as the mode and manner of commission of alleged offences", bail refused [Paras 3–18].

Bail Jurisprudence – Gravity of Offence Overrides Socio-Economic Status of Accused – "Grant of bail calls for exercise of discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course" – Submission that accused being a poor fish-seller had lesser capacity to influence witnesses was rejected – Held: "The gravity and heinousness of the offence and punishment prescribed therefor are also relevant to decide the bail application" – Chance of influencing witnesses is not the sole criterion [Paras 13, 17–18].

Forensic Evidence and Victim's Statement – Prima Facie Case Established – Medical Officer found ligature marks on victim's neck – SFSL report prima facie confirmed Organophosphorus in stomach – Held: "Even if documents regarding treatment at AIIMS are not part of the chargesheet, still the accusations are very serious and grave in nature" [Paras 5–6, 11, 16].

Witness Protection – Victim's Psychological Trauma – Release of accused at this stage would send "a wrong message to society" and cause the victim to "suffer further psychological trauma" – Reliance placed on 198th Law Commission Report as cited in Ramesh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (2017) 1 SCC 529 [Paras 12, 14].

Decision: Bail application dismissed – CD along with SFSL report directed to be returned to the learned PP – Trial Court record to be re-consigned with a copy of this order.

Criminal Procedure – Cancellation of Bail – POCSO Offences – Bail granted after filing of chargesheet without considering gravity and prima facie materials – Trial Court earlier rejected bail noting incriminating materials but granted bail within 10 days solely on ground of submission of chargesheet – Held: Order granting bail suffered from non-application of mind and was vitiated by serious infirmity – Bail liable to be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC [Paras 12.3, 12.5, 16].

Cancellation of Bail – Maintainability – Whether High Court can examine perversity in original bail order despite non-challenge to subsequent order refusing cancellation on ground of misconduct – Distinction between cancellation on supervening circumstances and setting aside a perverse bail order explained – Held: High Court competent to examine legality and propriety of original bail order under Section 439(2) CrPC even if order rejecting cancellation on misconduct not challenged – Application maintainable [Paras 8–11].

POCSO Act – Gravity of Offence – Statement under Section 164 CrPC – Minor victim aged 14 alleged repeated penetrative sexual assault, blackmail through obscene photographs and suicide attempt – Medical report corroborated sexual intercourse – Trial Court failed to advert to gravity, severity of punishment and impact on victim – Held: Grant of bail as a matter of course in serious POCSO offence defeats object of special legislation and reflects improper exercise of discretion [Paras 12.1–12.6].

Bail Jurisprudence – Parameters for Grant of Bail – Court must consider prima facie case, nature and gravity of charge, severity of punishment, possibility of tampering, threat to witnesses and societal impact – Mere filing of chargesheet not determinative – Order devoid of reasons and ignoring settled parameters is unsustainable [Paras 12.4–12.5].

Section 29 POCSO Act – Presumption – Whether applicable at stage of bail – Presumption arises upon proof of foundational facts and operates at trial – Not automatically triggered upon registration of FIR – Held: Argument that presumption under Section 29 vitiated bail order not accepted – However, infirmity in bail order established on other grounds [Para 15–15.1].

Supervening Circumstances – Misuse of Liberty – Though intimidation alleged post-bail, present challenge primarily on ground of perversity in original bail order – Principles requiring special or supervening circumstances not attracted where bail granted on irrelevant considerations – Bail can be cancelled if order granting bail itself is illegal or perverse [Paras 13–14].

Decision: Application allowed – Impugned order dated 20.07.2024 granting bail set aside – Bail granted to accused-opposite party No.2 cancelled – Accused directed to surrender within 10 days failing which coercive steps to be taken – C.R.M. (M) 1069 of 2025 disposed of.

Education Law – Fee Regulation – Removal of Difficulties Order – Interim Stay – Petitioners challenged Notification dated 01.02.2026 advancing timelines for constitution of SLFRC and approval of fee for block commencing 2026-27 – Held: Prima facie timelines unworkable and entire statutory process, including reference to District Fee Appellate Committee, cannot be concluded before 01.04.2026 – Operation of Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of Notification kept in abeyance pending final hearing [Paras 16–22, 28].

Section 3 of 2025 Act – Prohibition on collection of excess fee – Scope – Held: Section 3 does not impose blanket prohibition on collection of fee – Schools entitled to collect fee of previous academic year during pendency of reference before District Fee Appellate Committee under Section 5(7) – Hence, no immediate statutory vacuum necessitating accelerated timelines [Paras 19–22].

Removal of Difficulties Clause – Section 21 of 2025 Act – Limited Scope – Though detailed examination deferred to final hearing – Court observed prima facie that no “difficulty” requiring urgent removal under Section 3 was demonstrated, particularly when Act itself permits collection of previous year’s fee pending approval [Paras 22–23].

SLFRC – Requirement of Unanimous Approval – Challenge Pending – Petitioners contended that requirement of unanimous agreement under Section 5(4) is unconstitutional and unworkable – Court noted that if unanimity not achieved, matter must be referred to District Fee Appellate Committee – Notification did not provide revised timelines for such reference – Process unlikely to conclude before commencement of academic year [Paras 17–20].

Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Injury – Held: No irreparable loss to students if Notification stayed, as any excess fee charged would be subject to refund/adjustment in accordance with final outcome – Practical difficulties including ongoing examinations and non-availability of audited financial statements for FY 2025-26 weigh in favour of interim protection to Petitioners [Paras 24, 27].

Academic Year – Previous Year Concept – Court rejected contention that Notification sought to fix fee in same academic year – Held: Since Academic Year 2026-27 begins on 01.04.2026, fixation prior thereto would relate to previous academic year 2025-26 [Para 25].

Participation of Parents in SLFRC – Argument that newly admitted parents would be excluded – Rejected – Act contemplates fixation of fee for block of three academic years and parents admitted in second and third years would, in any case, not participate in constitution of SLFRC [Para 26].

Decision: Operation and implementation of Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of Delhi School Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2026 kept in abeyance during pendency of writ petitions – Petitioners permitted to collect same fee for Academic Year 2026-27 as collected in previous academic year, subject to final outcome of petitions and adjustment/refund mechanism – Applications disposed of – Final hearing fixed from 12.03.2026.