GST Law — Jurisdiction — Cross Empowerment — APGST Officers — IGST Act — Interstate Supply — In all these cases, officers appointed under the APGST Act intercepted consignments moving in interstate trade with both origin and destination outside Andhra Pradesh, and initiated proceedings under Sections 129 and 130 of the GST Acts primarily on grounds of undervaluation or quantification discrepancy — Held: An officer appointed under the APGST Act is cross empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the CGST or IGST Acts in relation to a taxpayer only when such taxpayer has been administratively allotted to the State and the State officer has been designated as the proper officer assigned to discharge that function by the Chief Commissioner — A proper officer under the APGST Act assigned functions under Sections 129 and 130 can exercise such functions under the IGST Act in relation to interstate sales only when the State of Andhra Pradesh is entitled to an allocation of a share of the tax under Section 17 of the IGST Act in relation to that transaction — Such officer cannot exercise powers under the IGST Act in relation to interstate sales which originate outside the State and culminate outside the State — In case of discrepancies, State officer may forward findings to the proper officer of the consignee and consignor [Paras 7–29, 37].

GST Law — Sections 129 and 130 — Interception — Valuation — Grounds for Detention and Confiscation — Held: Questions of valuation, undervaluation, or quantification discrepancy in invoices or e-way bills do not constitute valid grounds for detention, seizure or confiscation of goods and conveyances in transit under Sections 129 or 130 of the GST Acts — Power of seizure or confiscation during transit can be exercised only where there is blatant violation or contravention of provisions of the Act with a direct nexus to intention to evade payment of tax — Minor aberrations such as discrepancies in value between e-way bill and delivery challan or minor errors in vehicle number do not justify seizure — Proper officer cannot venture into assessment and valuation of goods at the point of interception — Statutory scheme of GST facilitates free movement of goods after self-assessment [Paras 30–33, 37].

GST Law — Section 129 — E-Way Bill — Inspection — Recording of Report — W.P. No. 3258 of 2026 — Respondents contended that goods were transported without e-way bills and that the driver refused to reveal details — Held: Where two inspections are alleged but only one is recorded in the online report and the first inspection finds no mention, this Court cannot accept the claim that inspection occurred prior to the officially recorded inspection — Rule 138C requires a summary report within 24 hours and a final report within three days — Contention of respondents rejected [Paras 34–35].

GST Law — Constitutional Framework — IGST — Parliament's Exclusive Power — Interstate Supply — Article 246A(2) and Article 269A of the Constitution confer exclusive power on Parliament to tax interstate supply of goods and services — Tax on inter-state supply under the IGST Act is levied and collected by the Union Government and apportioned among Union and States under Section 17 of the IGST Act — An intermediary State through which goods merely transit has no share in the IGST collected on such transaction — Accordingly, State officers of an intermediary State cannot press Sections 129 or 130 to collect penalties and fines in relation to transactions not taxable in that State, as amounts rightfully due to the origin or destination State would be appropriated by the intermediary State — No provision exists under the GST Acts for reimbursing such amounts to the entitled States [Paras 14–16, 27–29, 37].

Decision: All writ petitions allowed — Proceedings initiated against petitioners under Sections 129 and 130 of the GST Acts set aside — Respondents at liberty to forward records and samples drawn pursuant to the interlocutory order dated 16.02.2026 to the respective proper officers of the petitioners — Pending miscellaneous petitions closed — No costs.

Criminal Trespass – Section 447 IPC – Encroachment on Forest Land – Ingredients Not Proved – Accused alleged to have encroached upon approximately 30 bighas 13 biswas of Reserved Forest land by raising an apple orchard and a house – Complaint merely stated that encroachment had occurred without averring that the accused entered with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the State – Held: Mere unauthorised entry or possession, even if illegal, does not constitute criminal trespass unless the specific intent enumerated under Section 441 IPC is proved – Prosecution failed to establish the requisite intent; ingredients of Section 447 IPC not satisfied [Paras 22–24].

Demarcation – Validity – Procedure Not Followed – Accused Absent – Demarcating officer (PW5) admitted that he could not recall whether three permanent points were taken, that he was not competent to carry out demarcation, and that no notice was issued to the accused – HC Sanjay Kumar (PW7) confirmed the accused was absent during demarcation – Patwari, through whom intimation was allegedly given, was not examined – Held: Demarcation not conducted as per law; report does not describe the procedure adopted and cannot be relied upon – Conviction cannot be based on a demarcation conducted in the absence of the accused and without following prescribed instructions [Paras 15–21].

Indian Forest Act – Section 26 – Reserved Forest – Proof of Notification Mandatory – Prosecution relied on a notification (Ex.PW6/B) which did not mention any Khasra number corresponding to the disputed land – No copy of notification declaring Khasra Nos. 644/1, 646/1 and 804/641/1 as Reserved Forest was placed on record – Held: Issuance and publication of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Indian Forest Act are mandatory prerequisites to attract Section 26 – In the absence of proof of notification, no offence under Section 26 is made out [Paras 25–29].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Held: Appellate court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading or omission to consider material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible – Trial Court's findings on invalidity of demarcation and absence of proof of Reserved Forest notification constitute a reasonable view – Interference not warranted [Paras 12–14].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent confirmed – Respondent directed to furnish bail bonds of ₹25,000/- with one surety to the satisfaction of the Trial Court within four weeks, effective for six months

Criminal Law — Framing of Charge — Fake Allotment Orders — Kerosene Oil — CAPD Department Officials — Petitioners, serving as departmental employees, challenged the order framing charges against them under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, arising from a racket involving fabrication and circulation of fake kerosene oil allotment orders — Trial court discharged petitioners for offences under Sections 467 and 471 RPC while proceeding against them for remaining offences — On revision, High Court finds material on record prima facie sufficient — Petitions dismissed [Paras 1, 12, 35].

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction — Framing of Charge — Test of Prima Facie Case — At the stage of framing charge, the Court is not required to meticulously evaluate evidence as in a full-fledged trial — The test is whether the material on record, taken at face value, discloses a prima facie case or raises grave suspicion warranting trial — The threshold is intentionally low so as not to stifle legitimate prosecution at inception — Mere strong suspicion founded on material is sufficient — Defence material ordinarily cannot be considered at this stage [Paras 20, 21, 32].

Circumstantial Evidence — Conspiracy — Organised Modus Operandi — Seizure of twenty-five allotment orders, forensic indication of at least one being fake, and repeated typing of such orders by private individuals over a period of time prima facie suggests an organised and systematic racket — Conspiracy is seldom proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances — Direct evidence not a sine qua non for framing charge [Paras 22, 24, 33].

Statements under Section 161 CrPC — Co-accused — Corroborative Material — Implication of petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma on the basis of statements of co-accused under Section 161 CrPC challenged — Held: Such statements are not substantive evidence and a co-accused cannot be implicated solely on their basis — However, prosecution case not resting exclusively on such statements — Charge-sheet discloses additional material including existence of multiple forged orders, their circulation, verification by departmental officials and interaction between private accused and departmental authorities — At the stage of charge, admissibility and probative value are matters for trial [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28].

Role of Departmental Officials — Verification of Forged Document — Statement of PW-Omesh Sharma indicating that when suspicion arose regarding a forged allotment order, it was shown to petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh who represented it to be genuine, whereafter kerosene oil was released — This prima facie indicates that petitioners were not passive spectators but facilitated use of a forged document — Whether such conduct constitutes criminal culpability is a matter for trial [Para 23].

Second FIR — Permissibility — Test of Sameness — FIR No. 91/2006 of Police Station Satwari pertained to a specific incident of black-marketing based on a particular allotment order — FIR No. 31/2006 of Police Station Peer Mitha pertained to a larger conspiracy involving preparation and circulation of multiple fake allotment orders — Two FIRs, though connected, operate in distinct spheres of criminality — Second FIR held permissible as it falls within the category where subsequent investigation reveals a wider conspiracy justifying independent registration [Paras 29, 30, 31].

Decision: Revision petitions dismissed — Order of the Principal Sessions Judge framing charges against the petitioners upheld — Interim direction, if any, vacated — Trial court directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law [Para 35].

Minor – Representation in Suit – Next Friend – Order XXXII CPC – Mohammedan Law – Secular Nature of CPC – Appellant minor impleaded as added defendant in partition suit through his mother as next friend – Respondent challenged representation on the ground that under Section 359 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, the mother is excluded from being a legal guardian of the property of a Mohammedan minor – Held: Representation of a minor in court proceedings is governed by Order XXXII CPC, which is secular in nature and not tied to the personal law of the parties – Rule 4 of Order XXXII permits any person of sound mind who has attained majority and has no adverse interest to act as next friend – Concept of "legal guardian" under Mohammedan Law is not germane to the question of representation in court proceedings – Rule 3 of Order XXXII applies only where the minor is already a defendant in a suit; since the appellant entered the litigation by his own application for impleadment, Rule 3 was not attracted at the relevant stage – Mother qualified to act as de facto guardian under Section 361 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law – Respondent estopped from raising the objection for the first time in appeal, having not objected before the Trial Court – Representation of minor through mother as next friend held legal and valid [Paras 29-47].

Partition Suit – Temporary Injunction – Status Quo – Minor Co-sharer's Right – Balance of Convenience – Added defendant/appellant sought injunction restraining respondent/plaintiff from making construction on the best portion of the joint suit property – Trial Court refused injunction on the ground that no construction was going on and that the plaintiff had obtained conversion and sanction plan – Held: Findings of Trial Court were mutually contradictory and perverse – Commissioner's Report confirmed accumulation of construction materials indicating imminent threat of construction – Mere obtaining of conversion and sanction plan does not confer a right to construct on joint property as per one's own choice during pendency of partition suit – Courts are to maintain suit property in statu quo during partition proceedings so that no party steals a march over others by raising permanent construction on the best portion – Once construction is raised, courts generally allocate such portion to the constructing party and award owelty money to others, thereby prejudicing co-sharers – Plaintiff purchased property in 2013 but obtained conversion only in 2023 and filed partition suit in 2024 without making any construction, demonstrating absence of urgency – Affidavit-in-opposition filed without jurat; averments in injunction application to be accepted under doctrine of non traverse – Balance of convenience squarely in favour of appellant – Trial Court erred in refusing injunction [Paras 48-66].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 03.12.2025 set aside to the extent it dismissed the added defendant's injunction application – Temporary injunction granted restraining the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and his men and agents from changing the nature and character of the suit property and/or altering existing possession till disposal of the partition suit – CAN 1 of 2025 disposed of – No order as to costs.

Land Acquisition – Eviction Notice – Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013 – Writ Dismissed – Petitioner's property acquired for IInd Phase of Atlantis Railway Over Bridge project – Award passed and compensation deposited before the District and Sessions Court – Petitioner filed representation under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 seeking release of compensation and protection from dispossession pending consideration – Despite representation, eviction proceedings initiated – 3rd respondent (GCDA) contended that it is the rightful owner, land having been acquired from petitioner's grandfather for Elamkulam West Extension Scheme, and that petitioner's constructions were unauthorised encroachments – Structural valuation amount credited to petitioner's account not in dispute – Held: No ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution; petitioner at liberty to seek disbursement of compensation before competent court [Paras 1-4].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Liberty granted to petitioner to pursue remedies available in law for disbursement of compensation.

Service Law – Pay Scale – Post Graduate Scale – Teacher Appointed in 'Pass' Graduate Category – Acquisition of Higher Qualification During Service – Entitlement to Higher Pay Scale – Petitioner appointed as assistant teacher in 'pass' graduate category in 1998 – Subsequently obtained permission from school managing committee and acquired Master Degree during service – Application for post graduate scale of pay refused by District Inspector of Schools by impugned order dated 03.12.2013 on the ground that pay scale is determined by qualification at the time of appointment – Held: Controversy is no longer res integra in view of the Larger Bench judgment in Utpal Kanti Karan v. State of West Bengal and Others (2024 SCC OnLine Cal 2274) – G.O. No. 735 (03.06.2002) and G.O. No. 1334 (03.11.2004) amended G.O. No. 155-SE(B) dated 13.07.1999 to make teachers who improve qualifications with due permission eligible for higher scale of pay – Entitlement governed by rules operative at the time of acquiring qualification, such as ROPA 1998 – Eligibility for higher pay scale is not frozen at the stage of initial appointment but is capable of being altered upon acquisition of higher qualification with due permission [Paras 5-19].

West Bengal Schools (Control of Expenditure) Act, 2005 – Bar to Higher Pay Scale – Retrospective Operation – Estoppel – Respondent contended that Section 14(2) of the Act bars the petitioner's claim and that Notification No. 593-SE(B) dated 27.11.2007 mandates prior permission of the District Inspector of Schools as a condition for higher scale – Further contended that petitioner, having applied as 'pass' graduate, is estopped from claiming higher scale – Held: Control of Expenditure Act, 2005 has no retrospective operation and cannot bar claims arising from earlier Government Orders – Notification No. 593-SE(B) dated 27.11.2007 lacks statutory force as it was not published in the Official Gazette and cannot override earlier binding Government Orders and Rules – Doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against law; petitioner could not have disclosed higher qualification which she had not yet acquired at the time of applying – Permission of school managing committee constitutes prior permission of competent authority – All objections of State negatived [Paras 20-25].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 08.12.2013 passed by District Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education), Kolkata set aside and quashed – District Inspector directed to grant post graduate scale of pay to the petitioner with effect from the day after the last date of her Part-II Master Degree examination, by issuance of appropriate order and refixation of pay scale within three weeks – Arrear salary to be disbursed within eight weeks from communication of judgment.

Civil Court — Jurisdiction — Bar under Section 430, Companies Act, 2013 — NBFC Loan Dispute — Plaintiff-NBFC obtained loan of ₹19.25 crores from defendant-company under an agreement dated 4.4.2019 for a tenure of nine years — Defendant demanded premature repayment and had already filed petition under Section 45QA of the RBI Act before NCLT, Allahabad Bench — Plaintiff suppressed this fact and filed suit for permanent injunction restraining defendant from premature recovery — Held: Section 45QA of the RBI Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the NCLT to adjudicate disputes regarding repayment of deposits/loans by NBFCs — Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 expressly bars civil courts from entertaining suits and granting injunctions in matters falling within NCLT's domain — Plaint rejection upheld [Paras 47–53, 58].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of Plaint — Scope of Inquiry — At the stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine its examination strictly to the averments in the plaint and documents filed therewith — Defence averments and documents of the defendant cannot be looked into — Suit cannot be summarily rejected if triable issues arise from the plaintiff's pleadings — However, where the plaint itself discloses a statutory bar to the suit, rejection is warranted [Paras 39–41].

Section 45-I(bb), RBI Act — Definition of 'Deposit' — Loans Included — Plaintiff contended that money advanced as a loan by the defendant to it was not covered under Section 45QA of the RBI Act — Held: The definition of 'deposit' under Section 45-I(bb) expressly includes money received by way of loan — Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to invoke Section 45QA before the NCLT for recovery of loan advanced to the plaintiff-NBFC — Contention rejected [Para 47].

Injunction — Clean Hands — Suppression of Material Facts — Plaintiff suppressed from the civil court the pendency of the defendant's petition under Section 45QA before the NCLT, Allahabad Bench, which was filed prior to institution of the suit — Plaintiff also sought to pre-empt NCLT proceedings by filing the injunction suit — Held: A party seeking equitable relief of injunction must approach the court with clean hands and disclose all material facts — Suppression of pending proceedings before a statutory tribunal disentitles the plaintiff from any discretionary relief — Suit also barred under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act [Paras 49–51, 58].

Procedural Error — Application Numbers — No Prejudice — Trial court inadvertently referred to the original application 17-C (dismissed for non-prosecution) instead of the subsequent application 27-C (on identical grounds) while passing the impugned order — Held: Mere mentioning of an incorrect application number due to inadvertent error does not prejudice the plaintiff where parties were fully aware of the application being argued and the court decided the correct controversy — Procedural irregularity does not vitiate the order [Paras 54–57].

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs throughout — Impugned order of the trial court dated 01.03.2025 rejecting the plaint affirmed — Interim order earlier granted by the High Court, noted to have been patently erroneous, already vacated on 24.02.2026.

Criminal Law — Deferment of Cross-Examination — Section 231(2) CrPC/Section 254(3) BNSS — Timing of Application — Petitioner accused in a case under BNS and SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act filed application on 02.03.2026 seeking deferment of cross-examination of four related prosecution witnesses (prosecutrix, her sister, mother and bua) till completion of their chief examination, on the ground that premature cross-examination would disclose defence strategy enabling prosecution to fill lacunae — Application filed after completion of chief examination of the prosecutrix — Trial Court dismissed the application — Held: Prayer for deferment of cross-examination should preferably be made before preparation of the trial programme/case-calendar — Application filed after completion of chief examination of first witness, with no sufficient reason assigned for deferment, is not maintainable — Criminal revision dismissed [Paras 8–9, 13, 15].

Criminal Trial — Section 231(2) CrPC — Discretion of Court — Guidelines — Settled law summarised: Jurisdiction under Section 231(2) CrPC/Section 254(3) BNSS can be invoked (i) before preparation of case-calendar; (ii) when premised on sufficient reasons justifying deferral of cross-examination; (iii) where specific reasons are given showing that defence strategy would be disclosed causing prejudice; (iv) only in very exceptional cases and for recorded reasons, not as a matter of routine — Bald assertion that defence would be disclosed prematurely, without assigning any specific reason, is not a sufficient ground — Cross-examination should as far as possible be completed on the same day or the following day after examination-in-chief — Long deferments are anathema to fair trial [Paras 7, 10–13].

Decision: Criminal revision dismissed — No interference with the order of the Special Judge (SC/ST) dismissing the deferment application — Pending applications disposed of.

Constitutional Law – Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999 – Amendment – Declaration Replaced by Recommendation – Competent Authority Changed from Governor to State Legislature for Chief Minister – Challenge to Constitutional Validity – Petitioners challenged the Kerala Lok Ayukta Amendment Act, 2022 (Act 7 of 2024) whereby the "declaration" in Section 14 was replaced by "recommendation" and the "Governor acting in his discretion" as competent authority in relation to the Chief Minister was substituted by the "State Legislative Assembly" – Contended that the amendment converts a binding judicial or quasi-judicial order into a mere advisory opinion subject to executive review, thereby violating separation of powers, judicial independence, and basic structure of the Constitution – Held: The Lok Ayukta and Upa-Lok Ayukta are sui generis quasi-judicial authorities and neither courts nor tribunals exercising plenary judicial power – Their reports do not determine rights of parties in the manner of judicial adjudication – The substitution of a binding declaration with a recommendation, coupled with an obligation on the competent authority to record and communicate reasons, cannot be construed as conferring appellate powers on the executive or as an impermissible encroachment into the judicial domain – The amendments seek to harmonise the statutory provisions with the constitutional scheme under Articles 163 and 164 whereby Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor [Paras 4–58].

Constitutional Validity of Statute – Grounds of Challenge – Basic Structure Doctrine Not Available Against Ordinary Legislation – Held: The constitutional validity of a statute can be challenged only on grounds of lack of legislative competence or violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution – The basic structure doctrine is not available to challenge the validity of ordinary legislation as a statute – Legislative competence to enact the impugned amendments was not in dispute – No case of violation of Part III or any other constitutional provision was established – Challenge on the ground of violation of basic structure of the Constitution therefore fails [Paras 20–24, 61–62].

Kerala Lok Ayukta Act – Section 14(2) – Deemed Acceptance – Reading Into Statute – The amended Section 14(2) provides a period of 90 days for the competent authority to examine the recommendation but does not contain any provision for "deemed acceptance" unlike the Karnataka Lokayukta Act – Held: In the absence of such a provision, the statute would be rendered otiose as Section 12(5) stage would never be triggered and other provisions would become redundant – The words "deemed acceptance" are read into amended Section 14(2) to give effect to the legislation and in consonance with its object — in the event the report is not rejected within 90 days from the date of receipt, it shall be deemed to have been accepted on the expiry of the said period and the procedure under Section 12(5) shall immediately trigger – Any other interpretation would make the provisions purposeless [Paras 65–73].

Lok Ayukta – Nature of Functions – Sui Generis Quasi-Judicial Authority – Not a Court or Tribunal – The petitioners contended that the Lok Ayukta exercises functions with all the trappings of a court and that the amendment therefore constitutes administrative review of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision – Held: Though the Lok Ayukta follows a procedure resembling adjudication, it does not ipso facto possess the status of a court or tribunal exercising plenary judicial power – The Lok Ayukta is best described as a sui generis quasi-judicial authority – Its report does not determine the rights of either the complainant or the person complained against – Any decision of the competent authority in response to the recommendation remains amenable to judicial review – Neither the independence of the Lok Ayukta nor fair procedure before it is diluted by the amendment [Paras 50–58].

Decision: Writ petitions disposed of — Challenge to constitutional validity of Sections 3 and 14 as amended fails — Deemed acceptance read into Section 14(2) to the effect that non-rejection of recommendation within 90 days shall amount to acceptance — Legislature observed to consider restoring the requirement of appointment of a retired Chief Justice of a High Court as Lok Ayukta.