Xerox Copies of Birth Certificate Cannot Prove Victim's Age Under POCSO Act When Originals Are Available: Madras High Court Acquits Accused Sentenced to 20 Years

The Madras High Court has acquitted a young man sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act, holding that the prosecution's reliance on mere xerox copies of the birth certificate and transfer certificate to prove the victim's age — when the originals were admittedly available — was inadmissible secondary evidence, and that the Trial Court's failure to reject them was a "fatal error" that brought the entire prosecution case crashing down.

Justice N. Mala also used the occasion to issue strong directions to the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu to urgently implement awareness measures under Section 43 of the POCSO Act, endorsing the Supreme Court's call for a "Romeo-Juliet clause" to protect genuine adolescent relationships from the Act's draconian reach.

The appellant Mahesh, a 17-year-old at the time, was alleged to have eloped with the victim — a 16-year-old girl who was the sister of his friend — on 4th March 2018, after she herself expressed unwillingness to go through with a marriage her parents had arranged. The two married at the appellant's uncle's house. Following an anonymous call to the 1098 Child Help Line on 5th April 2018, both were taken to the All Women Police Station, where the victim lodged a complaint. An FIR was registered under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Special POCSO Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act and 5 years under Section 366 IPC, to run concurrently. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Madras High Court.

The appellant's counsel argued that the relationship was consensual, that the victim's earliest statements made no allegations against the appellant, and that her subsequent contradictions were the product of prosecutorial influence — rendering her testimony inconsistent and unreliable. The State defended the conviction, contending that the Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence, corroborated by medical records.

"Primary Evidence Is The Rule And Secondary Evidence An Exception — A Party Is Required To Produce The Best Evidence, If Available"

Justice N. Mala identified one foundational evidentiary failure that demolished the prosecution's case from its very base. To establish that the victim was a minor — the jurisdictional bedrock of any POCSO prosecution — the prosecution produced only xerox copies of the birth certificate (Ex.P.3) and transfer certificate (Ex.P.4). Crucially, the victim herself, while being examined as PW1, categorically stated that the originals of both documents were very much available. Yet the prosecution offered no explanation whatsoever for failing to produce them.

The Court restated the elementary rule of evidence with firmness: "Primary evidence is the rule and secondary evidence an exception. A party is required to produce the best evidence, if available." Relying on the recent ruling in Tharammel Peethambaran and Another v. T. Ushakrishnan and Another, 2026 CC OnLine 169, the Court held that secondary evidence is inadmissible until the non-production of the original is accounted for in a manner that brings the case within the specific exceptions under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Since the originals were admittedly available and their non-production was never explained, the Trial Court ought to have rejected Ex.P.3 and Ex.P.4 at the threshold. Its failure to do so — and its heavy reliance on these very documents to determine the victim's minority — was declared a "fatal error." The consequence was decisive: "If Ex.P.3 and Ex.P.4 are discarded, then the prosecution's case falls to the ground, since the foundational fact regarding the age of the victim stands unproved." The conviction was set aside and the appellant directed to be released forthwith.

Before parting with the judgment, Justice N. Mala turned her attention to a concern that has been growing louder across courts — the systematic misuse of the POCSO Act to punish young boys in what are, at their core, consensual adolescent relationships gone sour due to parental opposition. The Court observed candidly: "In cases involving consensual relationship between adolescents, it is often the young boy, who ultimately bears the consequences. Under parental pressure, the girl may be compelled to marry another person, following which criminal proceedings are initiated against the boy under the POCSO Act, resulting in his prolonged incarceration."

The Court referred with approval to the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in State of U.P. v. Anurudha and Another, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40, wherein the Apex Court had directed the Secretary, Law Department, Government of India to consider introducing a "Romeo-Juliet clause" — exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the Act's stronghold — and also to enact a mechanism to prosecute those who weaponise the POCSO Act to settle personal scores.

The Court then pointed to Section 43 of the POCSO Act, which itself mandates the Central and State Governments to give wide publicity to the Act's provisions through television, radio and print media, and to periodically train officers in its implementation. The Court observed pointedly: "It is fundamentally due to lack of knowledge of the Act and its draconian provisions that the same is misused." Holding that compliance with Section 43 in letter and spirit could, to a significant extent, curb the menace the Supreme Court had flagged, the Court issued binding directions to the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu to immediately implement awareness measures, conduct camps in Government and private schools and colleges, and file a status report — with the matter posted for compliance on 3rd June 2026.

The Madras High Court's ruling delivers two powerful messages simultaneously. First, in a POCSO prosecution, producing xerox copies of age-proving documents when originals are available and admitted to exist is not a procedural lapse — it is a fatal, case-ending failure. The victim's minority is not a background fact; it is the foundation of the court's entire jurisdiction, and it must be proved through the best available evidence.

Second, the growing tide of POCSO cases weaponised by parents to punish young men in consensual adolescent romances demands urgent legislative and administrative attention — and until a "Romeo-Juliet clause" arrives, courts and governments must at the very least ensure that the Act's own awareness mandate under Section 43 is fulfilled.

Date of Decision: 16th February 2026