High Court Cannot Grant Fresh Bail By Ignoring Supreme Court’s Earlier Order Cancelling Bail Without Change In Circumstances: Supreme Court

"While there is no absolute bar against a High Court granting bail to an accused whose bail was previously cancelled by this Court, the grant of bail must be supported by reasons demonstrating either a change in circumstances or the existence of fresh grounds not considered by this Court at the time of cancellation," Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated May 22, 2026, held that the High Court cannot grant bail to an accused in a mechanical manner if the top court has previously cancelled bail for the same individual in the same case.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that any fresh grant of bail must identify a supervening change in the factual matrix that justifies a departure from the Supreme Court's earlier stance.

The case originated from an incident where the Respondent No. 2 (Jeeshan) and others allegedly intercepted and assaulted witnesses to a murder trial, firing gunshots to intimidate them into withdrawing the case. While the Allahabad High Court initially granted Jeeshan bail, the Supreme Court cancelled it on January 27, 2025, noting his active role in the crime. Despite the cancellation, the High Court again enlarged the accused on bail through the impugned order dated September 22, 2025, leading to the present appeal by the informant.

The primary question before the court was whether the High Court could grant bail afresh without addressing the reasons for which the Supreme Court had previously cancelled the accused's bail. The court also examined whether the absence of firearm injuries automatically negates a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the correct application of the principle of parity in bail matters.

High Court Erred By Not Engaging With Supreme Court’s Cancellation Order

The Supreme Court expressed sharp disapproval of the High Court's failure to mention or consider the previous order dated January 27, 2025, whereby Jeeshan's bail was cancelled. The bench noted that the impugned order did not advert to the reasons that impelled the top court to interfere in the first round, nor did it identify any supervening circumstances justifying a new bail order.

The Court emphasized that judicial discipline requires lower courts to engage with the findings of superior courts. An order that fails to identify a changed factual matrix while granting relief previously denied by a higher forum suffers from a manifest error of law.

"The first and most fundamental infirmity in the impugned order is the complete absence of any engagement with the order dated 27.01.2025 passed by this Court... whereunder the first bail of the Respondent No. 2 was cancelled."

Absconding After Bail Cancellation Is Contumacious Conduct

The bench took serious note of the accused's conduct following the initial cancellation of his bail. Instead of surrendering "forthwith" as directed by the Supreme Court, the accused evaded arrest for approximately 42 days, surrendering only after the initiation of Section 82 CrPC proceedings and the issuance of Non-Bailable Warrants.

The Court rejected the accused's argument that the delay was due to a pending Review Petition. It clarified that the filing of a Review Petition does not operate as an automatic stay on a surrender direction. Such conduct, the Court held, is a crucial factor that must weigh against the grant of fresh bail.

"The filing of a Review Petition does not operate as an automatic stay upon the original order... the Respondent No. 2 was bound to comply with the direction forthwith."

Absence Of Firearm Injury Does Not Negate Section 307 IPC Charge

Addressing the High Court’s reliance on the fact that no one was injured by the gunshots, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled law on Section 307 IPC. The bench observed that the provision requires an act done with the intent or knowledge that it could cause death. If an accused fires at a victim with intent to kill, the fact that the victim escaped by chance does not diminish the gravity of the offence.

The Court noted that CCTV footage and eyewitness accounts corroborated that the accused retrieved a pistol and fired shots. These materials constituted a prima facie case that the High Court ignored in favor of a "medical corroboration" requirement that is not absolute at the bail stage.

"The absence of firearm injuries does not negate the charge under Section 307 IPC. This Court has consistently held that what Section 307 IPC requires is the doing of an act with intent or knowledge that it can cause death."

Principle Of Parity Is Not An Inflexible Rule

The High Court had granted bail partly on the ground of parity with co-accused Aurangzeb. However, the Supreme Court found this reasoning to be "manifestly erroneous." The bench pointed out that Jeeshan's role involved firing a country-made pistol, whereas Aurangzeb was primarily accused of assault with a knife.

Citing Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., the Court held that parity cannot be mechanically applied when the roles of accused persons are materially different. Furthermore, since Jeeshan had specific recoveries made at his instance and additional charges under the Arms Act, his case was distinct from that of the co-accused.

"The principle of parity in bail is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied when the roles of the accused persons are materially different."

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's order was perverse as it overlooked crucial materials and the broader context of witness intimidation. The bench observed that the crime was a premeditated attempt to terrorize eyewitnesses in a murder case. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and cancelled Jeeshan's bail, directing him to surrender to custody immediately.

Date of Decision: May 22, 2026