Son Of Deceased Tenant Cannot Claim Statutory Protection Beyond 5 Years Under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act: Calcutta High Court

"Once the respondent admits that upon his father’s death he inherited the tenancy, Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is automatically triggered, and his statutory protection stands extinguished by operation of law." Calcutta High Court, in a significant ruling dated March 20, 2026, held that the son of a deceased tenant is entitled to statutory protection for a maximum period of only five years from the date of the tenant's death under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

A single-judge bench of Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur observed that once the five-year period for a dependent heir expires, the possession becomes unauthorized, warranting a decree for eviction on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC. The Court noted that "unnecessary procrastination of the suit would only result in wastage of time" when the legal ingredients for the extinction of tenancy are clearly met.

The petitioner-landlord moved the High Court in revision against an order of the Alipore Civil Court which had dismissed his application for a judgment on admission. The dispute pertained to a residential flat in South Kolkata originally let out to the respondent’s father, who passed away in 2004, followed by his widow in 2021. The petitioner sought immediate possession on the ground that the respondent son’s statutory right to remain in the premises had expired by operation of law in 2009.

The primary questions before the court were whether the respondent, as the son of the original tenant, could claim any independent tenancy rights beyond the five-year statutory period provided under Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The court was also called upon to determine whether an unconditional admission made in prior litigation regarding the inheritance of tenancy could form the basis for a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC.

Dealing with the definition of a 'tenant' under the 1997 Act, the Court emphasized that Section 2(g) provides a strict timeline for the transmission of tenancy. While a widow enjoys lifetime protection, other heirs like sons and daughters are limited to a five-year window from the date of the tenant's death. Justice Kapur relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajiv Ghosh vs. Satya Narayan Jaiswal, noting that the plain reading of the statute indicates that a dependent heir is entitled to carry on as a tenant for a period not exceeding five years. In the present case, since the original tenant died in 2004, the respondent's protection lapsed in 2009. "The dependent heir of the original tenant unless she is the widow of the original tenant would be entitled to carry on as a tenant in such capacity for a period of 5 years from the demise of the original tenant."

Regarding the applicability of Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC, the Court observed that the provision is enabling and discretionary, aimed at bypassing the requirement of a full trial when there is no real controversy. The bench noted that admissions need not be specific to the present suit's pleadings but can be inferred from the facts, circumstances, or prior litigations. The Court highlighted that the respondent had previously admitted to inheriting the tenancy from his father, which acted as a constructive admission of the facts necessary to trigger the restrictive timeline of Section 2(g). "The Rule permits the Court to sift through unworthy defences and leave the Court to spend time only on such aspects of the claim which call for an adjudication."

The Court further rejected the respondent's attempt to claim "adverse possession" while simultaneously asserting rights as a tenant. Justice Kapur remarked that such pleas are irreconcilable and contradictory. The Court found that the respondent had failed to show any fresh or independent tenancy created in his favour after the statutory period expired. The bench also expressed concern over the respondent's failure to pay any rent or occupational charges since January 2010, noting that false claims in real estate litigation are often driven by escalating property prices. "The plea of adverse possession raised as a counter claim in this suit is contradictory, irreconcilable and meritless with the case of tenancy and is consequently rejected."

The bench clarified that findings in prior litigations—where the respondent might have been described as a tenant rather than a licensee—do not create an embargo against the current suit. Since the current proceedings are founded on a distinct cause of action regarding the extinction of tenancy by operation of law, the previous status of the respondent is not germane once the five-year protection period has lapsed. The Court concluded that the ingredients of Section 2(g) were fully satisfied, and no further evidence was required to prove that the respondent's stay had become illegal. "Upon her death, the respondent ceased to enjoy any statutory protection and his possession became unauthorized and illegal in law."

In its final directions, the High Court set aside the Trial Court's "erroneous" order and directed the drawing of a decree for khas and peaceful possession in favour of the petitioner. While the decree for possession was granted immediately on admission, the Court ordered that the remaining reliefs concerning mesne profits and costs be adjudicated by the Trial Court in accordance with law. The revision was accordingly allowed, ending nearly two decades of litigation over the residential unit.

Date of Decision: 20 March 2026