Removal For Minor Administrative Lapses Is Strikingly Disproportionate: Bombay High Court Sets Aside Removal Of Juvenile Justice Board Member

"Once The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 Was Repealed, Removal Proceedings Had To Be Governed By The Juvenile Justice Act, 2015" — Bombay High Court, in a significant judgment delivered by the Division Bench of Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Jitendra Jain, held that the removal of a Member of the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), Mumbai, for minor administrative lapses was grossly disproportionate and unjustified. The Court set aside the removal order dated 22/25 September 2017, emphasizing that the punishment of removal with stigma for trivial allegations could not be sustained in law, particularly when there was no allegation of corruption, abuse of power, or serious misconduct.

In the case titled Dipak Kumar Chattopadhyay vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, the core issue revolved around whether the removal suffered from procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, or was disproportionate to the charges. The Court observed that while the removal action was valid under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the charges were so trivial that the extreme penalty was wholly unwarranted.

"The 2000 Act And The 2007 Rules Ceased To Apply Once The 2015 Act Came Into Force" — Court Rejects Procedural Challenge Based On Repealed Law

The petitioner was appointed as a Member of the Juvenile Justice Board through a notification dated 18 June 2015, under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007. However, his removal took place on 22/25 September 2017, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 had come into force, having repealed the earlier law on 15 January 2016.

The petitioner contended that since his appointment was under the 2000 Act, the procedure for removal ought to have followed Rule 92(2) of the 2007 Rules, which required the Selection Committee to conduct an inquiry. He argued that the failure to refer the matter to the Selection Committee rendered the removal order invalid.

Rejecting this contention, the Court categorically observed, “By the time the Petitioner was removed, the 2000 Act and 2007 Rules were no longer in force. The removal was rightly governed by the 2015 Act. Therefore, the argument that the complaint ought to have been referred to the Selection Committee under the 2007 Rules has no legal basis.”

The Court clarified, “The mere fact that the 2018 Rules under the 2015 Act had not yet come into force does not mean that the State Government was powerless to act under the 2015 Act. The authority of the State Government to remove a Member under the 2015 Act was intact.”

The judgment further relied on the decision in Anita Sadanand Vipat vs. State of Maharashtra, affirming that “the State Government is the competent authority to remove a Member of the Juvenile Justice Board under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015”, provided that it conducts an inquiry.

“Violation Of Natural Justice Must Be Real, Not Mere Technicality” — Court Rejects Challenge On Natural Justice

A second line of challenge by the petitioner was that he was not furnished with the statements of three witnesses—Priya Gawade, Sandhya Ballal, and R.R. Kulkarni—during the inquiry, and was denied an opportunity to cross-examine them, constituting a violation of natural justice.

The Court admitted that “there is no record of such statements being furnished to the Petitioner during the inquiry or before the inquiry report was made, wherein these statements were relied upon”.

However, the Bench held, “There is nothing like a mere technical breach of the principles of natural justice. The party alleging failure must plead and establish prejudice.”

The Court further recorded, “Apart from vaguely alleging violation of natural justice, no specific objection was taken about the deprivation of opportunity for cross-examination. The Petitioner himself admitted some of the facts during his response, which diluted the prejudice.”

The judgment firmly concluded on this aspect: “Considering the totality of circumstances, we do not think that a case is made out to fault the removal order for want of natural justice.”

“Penalty Of Removal With Stigma Is Grossly Disproportionate To Trivial Allegations” — Court Condemns Excessive Punishment

The heart of the judgment lay in the Court’s assessment of the proportionality of punishment. The Bench minutely examined the findings of the inquiry, noting that the allegations were limited to:

• Preparation of a private rubber stamp for use in official documents instead of procuring it through the office;

• Permitting a visit by 30-35 law students to the Observation Home without prior permission, allegedly causing disruption;

• Sitting on the Chairperson’s chair in her absence while addressing the students;

• General complaints of not devoting full time to the JJB, while simultaneously working as an advocate and lecturer;

• Interpersonal conflict with the Chairperson affecting smooth functioning.

The Court noted emphatically, “The charges are trivial administrative lapses and temperamental issues. There are no allegations of corruption, abuse of power, or misuse of position for extraneous considerations.”

On the issue of the rubber stamp, the Court remarked, “There are no allegations about the Petitioner misusing the rubber stamp or that the Petitioner was disentitled to use one. The only objection is that it should have been made through the office. There is nothing remotely connected to misconduct in this.”

Regarding the chair incident, the Court found, “If the Petitioner, in the absence of the Chairperson, sat on her chair while addressing the students, we do not think that this solitary instance amounts to any misconduct deserving removal.”

Dismissing the allegation about allowing law students to visit, the Court observed, “The idea of acquainting students with the functioning of the JJB is not, per se, wrongful. At best, the Petitioner should have intimated or sought prior permission. This procedural lapse does not justify removal.”

Summarizing the finding on proportionality, the Bench stated, “The penalty of removal, in the facts of the present case, is strikingly disproportionate. At the highest, some warning or counselling could have sufficed. The extreme penalty of removal with stigma is wholly unwarranted.”

“Punishment Must Be Proportionate To Misconduct, Not An Instrument To Settle Temperamental Clashes” — Court Grants Relief To Remove Stigma

The Court was also mindful of the fact that the petitioner was a senior citizen, an advocate, and a lecturer, and had already endured the stigma of removal and the stress of litigation for 7-8 years. It noted the petitioner’s clear statement in court that he was not seeking reinstatement, nor any financial benefits like arrears or back-wages, but only a declaration to clear the stigma attached to his removal.

The Court concluded, “In the peculiar facts of this case, any further penalty or a remand for determining the quantum of punishment is not called for. The established charges are certainly not of a magnitude deserving of his stigmatizing removal.”

Ultimately, the Court allowed the petition and directed that the removal order dated 22/25 September 2017 be set aside, clarifying that the relief is limited to removing the stigma. The Court made no order as to costs.

This judgment stands as a vital reaffirmation of the doctrine of proportionality in disciplinary matters, particularly in quasi-judicial and administrative roles. The Bombay High Court decisively held that “punishment must be commensurate with the nature of misconduct, and where allegations are limited to temperamental conflicts and minor lapses, removal with stigma amounts to an abuse of disciplinary power.”

The judgment also provides clarity on the applicability of laws during transitions between repealed and current statutes, holding that the 2015 Act governs actions post-repeal of the 2000 Act, irrespective of the date of appointment.

Date of Decision: 01 July 2025