Disputed Bids, Missing Evidence and No Prejudice: Delhi High Court Refuses to Intervene in Tender Challenge under Article 226

“Where the controversy involves mutually contradictory documents and facts requiring proof, judicial review under Article 226 cannot be invoked” – High Court declines to annul tender process despite admitted procedural lapse

No Writ Relief in Tender Disputes Based on Contested Facts: “Judicial Review Is Not A Trial Court”

In a significant judgment Delhi High Court dismissed a writ petition filed by Tarun Aggarwal, who sought the cancellation of a tender awarded for the development of wayside amenities in Mathura, claiming his higher revised bid was ignored, and the tender process was vitiated by procedural lapses. The Division Bench of Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela ruled that the petition raised hotly contested questions of fact, rendering it unsuitable for adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution.

While the petitioner alleged that his revised bid of ₹62,22,222 was arbitrarily discarded by the National Highway Logistics and Management Limited (NHLML) and sought a direction either to award the contract to him or to cancel the entire process, the Court found that critical factual issues—such as what bid was actually submitted, and who was present when bids were opened—could not be resolved without evidence.

“Where the adjudication requires examination of disputed and contested facts and authenticity of documents, the High Court would not exercise writ jurisdiction,” the Court observed, dismissing the petition while leaving the petitioner free to pursue civil remedies.

Clause 6.3 of RFP Violated, But Without Demonstrated Prejudice It Does Not Vitiate the Tender

A major plank of the petitioner’s argument was that the NHLML had violated Clause 6.3 of its own Request for Proposal (RFP) by failing to issue the mandatory 7-day advance notice before opening financial bids on 8 June 2023. This, it was argued, prevented his representative from attending, and allowed NHLML to disregard his revised bid without scrutiny.

Interestingly, the respondents admitted this procedural lapse, yet maintained that no prejudice was caused. The High Court agreed that mere violation of a tender clause does not automatically invalidate the process unless real harm is established:

“Mere violation of tender condition does not ipso facto vitiate tender process unless serious prejudice is demonstrated.”

In this case, the Court found no such prejudice. The only way to prove prejudice, the Court said, would be to establish that a higher bid was actually submitted and ignored. But that issue itself was disputed and hinged on contested documents, making it impossible to evaluate under writ jurisdiction.

“Document at Page 171 or 255?” – Court Declines to Choose Between Two Mutually Exclusive Bid Records

The core factual controversy turned on whether the petitioner had indeed submitted a revised bid of ₹62,22,222 as claimed, or if his last bid remained at ₹11,00,000, as per NHLML records.

The petitioner relied on a bid acknowledgment dated 1 February 2023, purportedly showing the higher amount. NHLML, on the other hand, produced its own records indicating the last bid submitted was still ₹11,00,000, and dismissed the petitioner’s document as fabricated.

The Court held: “In respect of the controversy regarding the revised bid, there are two dramatically opposite and mutually exclusive documents produced on record… This controversy cannot be considered or adjudicated by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

The Bench concluded that determining which document was genuine would require leading of oral and documentary evidence, and that such a dispute must go before a competent civil court, not be entertained in writ proceedings.

Presence or Absence of Petitioner’s Representative at Bid Opening Also Disputed – Adds Another Layer of Factual Complexity

The petitioner claimed that no representative was present on his behalf during the opening of the financial bids on 8 June 2023, allegedly due to lack of notice. NHLML, however, stated the opposite—that his representative was indeed present, and the bid of ₹11,00,000 was opened in his presence.

The Court refused to determine who was right: “Whether the representative of the petitioner was indeed present… is an issue requiring adduction of evidence… thus, we are of the opinion that we cannot exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction.”

The Court noted that prejudice arising from the violation of Clause 6.3 could only be assessed if it was first proved that the petitioner was absent, and a higher bid was indeed suppressed. But since both elements were hotly contested, the Court could not proceed further in writ jurisdiction.

“No Prejudice, No Relief – Procedural Lapse Alone Not Enough”

Even though Clause 6.3 had been admittedly violated, the Court stressed that proof of prejudice is a precondition to judicial interference. Without proving that his higher bid was overlooked, or that he was unfairly excluded, the petitioner could not seek relief merely because the process was flawed.

The Bench explained: “Except to contend that there has been an infraction of Clause 6.3, the petitioner has been unable to show any prejudice which might have been caused to him.”

Thus, the Court refused to direct either cancellation of the tender or re-opening of bids in favour of the petitioner.

Civil Court Is the Right Forum for Factual Adjudication

In summing up, the Court found that serious and complex factual disputes regarding the genuineness of bid documents and attendance of parties made it impossible to issue any writ relief.

“Finding no merits in the writ petition, we dismiss the same, however, without any order as to costs,” the Court held, adding that appropriate civil remedies were open to the petitioner.

The ruling serves as a clear reaffirmation of judicial restraint in contractual disputes involving public tenders. Article 226 cannot become a substitute for trial when facts are contested, documents are disputed, and prejudice is not evident.

Date of Decision: 12 December 2025