-
by Admin
06 December 2025 9:59 PM
“Law and Order Disturbance Ends Where Even Tempo of Society Is Disrupted” – Bombay High Court, in a reportable judgment delivered by Justice Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale and Justice A.S. Gadkari, upheld a preventive detention order passed under Section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (MPDA Act) against one Aman @ Amaan Jamir Shaikh. The petitioner, detained for allegedly being a “dangerous person”, had challenged the order as violative of his fundamental rights under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
The central argument made by the petitioner was that his acts — as alleged in two FIRs and two in-camera witness statements — amounted only to “law and order” violations, not serious enough to justify detention under the MPDA Act. He further argued that the detaining authority improperly relied on stale past offences, and there was no live link between his past conduct and the present threat to public order.
Rejecting all these contentions, the Division Bench ruled:
“The acts and conduct of the Petitioner are such as would disturb the public peace and harmony of the society and certainly disturb the even tempo of the society. They fall squarely within the scope of ‘public order’ under the MPDA Act.” [Para 23]
“Petitioner’s Acts Created an Atmosphere of Terror – This Is Not a Private Dispute” – Preventive Detention Held Justified
The Court observed that the petitioner, along with accomplices, had repeatedly engaged in violent extortion, public threats, and weapons-based intimidation in public spaces. Referring to incidents cited in the FIRs and in-camera witness statements, the Court found:
“The Petitioner habitually threatened the general public by using dangerous weapons, assaulted them and created an atmosphere of terror and a sense of insecurity in the minds of the public.” [Para 22]
Noting that local vendors were coerced into paying ‘hafta’ (protection money) under threat of violence, and that shopkeepers closed their shops and people fled upon seeing the petitioner, the Court remarked:
“This is not a mere law and order issue between individuals. This conduct clearly affects the community at large and disrupts public peace.” [Para 23]
“Past Offences Only Referred, Not Relied Upon – Detention Order Based Solely on Live Incidents and Witness Statements” – No Staleness in Grounds of Detention
A major plank of the petitioner’s challenge was the reference to earlier offences and preventive actions in the detention order. It was argued that the detaining authority unlawfully relied on stale and unrelated incidents, violating the law laid down in Khaja Bilal Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2020) 13 SCC 632.
However, the Court clarified that the past offences were only referred to, and explicitly not relied upon for the purpose of subjective satisfaction. In fact, the detention grounds expressly stated:
“Accordingly, I had relied upon material in Para 5.1; 5.2 & 6.1 and 6.2 of the grounds of detention to arrive at my subjective satisfaction...”
The Court held:
“In view of the aforesaid specific references, it is clear that the Detaining Authority has relied only on the two recent offences and two in-camera statements to arrive at the subjective satisfaction... The question of live link with past offences does not and cannot arise.” [Para 17, 19]
“Raju @ Shendi Decision Is Per Incuriam – Coordinate Bench Failed to Consider Binding Supreme Court Precedents”
The petitioner heavily relied on a recent coordinate bench decision in Raju @ Shendi Bhishan Tak v. State of Maharashtra, W.P. No. 311/2025, to support his claim that mere reference to past offences invalidated the detention. The Court decisively rejected that reliance:
“The judgment of Raju @ Shendi is per incuriam. It failed to consider binding precedents such as Khaja Bilal Ahmed (2020) and decisions of this Court in Shital @ Nitin Kharat and Ram @ Pappu Kore. It is not a binding precedent.” [Para 21]
“Eyewitness Accounts Are Specific, Credible and Indicative of Public Disorder” – In-Camera Statements Validly Relied Upon
The Court examined in detail the in-camera statements of two witnesses — one a female pedestrian and the other a fruit vendor — who described specific incidents where the petitioner extorted money using bladed weapons, issued threats to kill, and invoked fear in the community.
Witness “A” described being slapped, threatened with a gupti (sword-stick) to her neck, and robbed in public by the petitioner and his accomplices.
Witness “B”, a fruit vendor, was slapped and threatened with a koyta (sickle), extorted of ₹750, and warned of being cut into pieces if he complained.
The Court observed:
“These are not vague or general statements. They are consistent, detailed, and directly implicate the Petitioner in repeated acts of violent extortion in public areas. The material is sufficient to justify preventive detention.” [Paras 14–15, 23]
“Even One Valid Ground Is Sufficient to Sustain Detention” – Section 5A MPDA Attracts Severability Clause
Invoking Section 5A of the MPDA Act, the Court reaffirmed the principle of severability, which states that even if one ground of detention is valid and supports the authority’s satisfaction, the entire detention order survives.
“Assuming that one ground does not fall within the purview of public order, the order can still be sustained on the other ground or incident.” [Para 24]
Preventive Detention Validly Invoked to Curb a Local Threat Who Disturbed the Social Fabric
The Bombay High Court’s judgment affirms the legal boundaries between "law and order" and "public order", emphasizing that weaponised extortion, public threats, and disruption of community peace justify preventive detention. The Court upheld the authority’s decision as being rooted in credible, proximate and specific material, and refused to let procedural semantics defeat the larger goal of protecting public order.
“The subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is well founded, well placed and based on the material before it. Hence, the submissions of the Petitioner deserve to be rejected.” [Para 23]
The Petition was accordingly dismissed, and rule discharged.
Date of Decision: 15 October 2025