Prior Gram Sabha Consent Under Section 41(3) LARR Act Is Mandatory In Scheduled Areas; Land Acquisition For Private Mining Requires 80% Prior Consent Before Section 8 Stage: Supreme Court

20 November 2026 4:23 PM

By: kapil


NEW DELHI — In a landmark pronouncement reinforcing tribal safeguards and statutory discipline in land acquisition, the Supreme Court on November 18, 2026, held that obtaining the prior consent of the Gram Sabha under Section 41(3) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is strictly mandatory before acquiring land in Scheduled Areas. A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma quashed the acquisition of 273.57 acres in Sundargarh, Odisha, for mining operations by M/s Dalmia Cements Bharat Limited, ruling that an acquisition for a private lessee is governed by Section 2(2)(b) and necessitates the prior consent of at least 80 percent of affected families before the Section 8 appraisal stage.

The appellants, residents of Kukuda, Bihabandha, and Lanjiberna villages in the Fifth Schedule District of Sundargarh, challenged the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State of Odisha to confer surface rights upon Dalmia Cements. Although the company held a subsisting mining lease under the MMDR Act, both concerned Gram Panchayats had passed unanimous resolutions in January 2020 expressly rejecting the acquisition proposal. The High Court of Orissa had dismissed their writ petition by treating prior consent requirements as directory under an invoked doctrine of substantial compliance.

Whether land acquisition for surface rights initiated for a private mining lessee is governed by Section 2(1) or Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act, and whether the requirement of obtaining prior consent of 80 percent of affected families can be treated as a continuous process throughout the proceedings?

Whether the requirement of obtaining prior consent of the Gram Sabha under Section 41(3) of the 2013 Act for acquiring land in Scheduled Areas is mandatory or merely directory?

Whether the constitution of an Expert Group evaluating a Social Impact Assessment under Section 7 of the 2013 Act is vitiated by the inclusion of an advisor belonging to the requiring body?

Whether the provisions of Section 24A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 override the statutory mandate and land acquisition procedure of the 2013 Act?

The Supreme Court rejected the State's contention that the acquisition was governed by Section 2(1) as an acquisition for its "own use, hold and control", clarifying that the land was acquired solely to enable mining operations by a private corporate entity. The bench held that the dominant purpose at the time of acquisition is decisive, and speculative possibilities of the land reverting to the State upon lease expiry in 2040 cannot circumvent Section 2(2)(b).

Dominant purpose governs applicability of Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act

The Court observed that where an acquisition is undertaken for a private company to conduct mining activities, it falls squarely under Section 2(2)(b), making the prior consent of at least 80 percent of affected families indispensable. Emphasizing the threshold purpose, the bench observed: "The enquiry does not turn on this aspect. The determining factor is the purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired – whether for own use of the State or for a private entity."

Statutory requirement of prior consent cannot be converted into an ongoing or ex-post facto process

Overruling the High Court’s ruling that obtaining consent is an ongoing process extendable across all acquisition stages, the apex court held that the second proviso to Section 2(2) and Section 8(3) mandate that prior consent in Form J under Rule 21 of the Odisha Rules must be secured during the Social Impact Assessment and verified prior to governmental appraisal under Section 8.

The bench observed: "The statute provides for prior consent and there is no basis to justify subsequent consent, even if assumed to have been taken. It would not only amount to defeating the core idea of the legislation but would also amount to rewriting the statute by introducing or materially modifying a requirement, which revolts against its entire scheme."

Prior consent of Gram Sabha under Section 41(3) is an absolute mandatory command

The Court firmly disapproved of the High Court's reasoning, which borrowed the discretionary expressions "as far as possible" and "demonstrable last resort" from Section 41(1) and (2) to dilute Section 41(3) into a directory provision. The bench held that once the government decides to acquire land in Fifth Schedule Areas, Section 41(3) operates independently as a mandatory statutory command requiring prior consent of the Gram Sabha before issuing any notification.

The Court held that the absence of express statutory penalties does not render the provision directory: "Once a provision is placed in the statute book after being clothed as a mandatory provision and the State acts in breach of the same, the remedy of judicial review by the Constitutional Courts gets triggered, irrespective of whether the statute does or does not explicitly provide for it."

Inclusion of company advisor in Expert Group compromised statutory independence

The apex court held that the composition of the Expert Group was vitiated due to the inclusion of an Advisor (Land Acquisition) of the private company. While Section 7(2) permits technical experts, the bench clarified that such inclusion cannot override the core mandate of Section 7(1) requiring an independent multi-disciplinary body.

Finding a manifest conflict of interest, the bench observed: "Is a person having direct financial and professional link with the requiring entity/project proponent expected to give an independent opinion that the required project is against public interest or involves disproportionate social costs or adverse social impacts? The answer is a clear 'no'."

MMDR Act does not override the 2013 Act to expropriate surface rights

Addressing Section 24A of the MMDR Act, the bench rejected the argument that a mining lessee can enter private lands and conduct mining simply by paying surface compensation without acquiring the land under the 2013 Act. The Court ruled that compensation for surface damage under Section 24A cannot be equated with compulsory acquisition of proprietary surface rights.

The Court reasoned: "If mining activity was permissible solely on the basis of a mining lease and compensation under Section 24A of MMDR Act, the legislature ought to have omitted 'mining' from the list of purposes for which land acquisition could be carried out under the 2013 Act."

State precluded from alleging lack of locus after defaulting on duty to update records

The Supreme Court dismantled the State's challenge to the appellants' locus standi, holding that the administration cannot capitalize on its own default in failing to update the record of rights. The Court ruled that hyper-technical objections relating to Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC or defective affidavits cannot preclude Constitutional Courts from redressing flagrant statutory violations.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Orissa High Court and quashed the entire land acquisition proceedings along with the notifications issued under Sections 11 and 19 of the 2013 Act, while granting liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings strictly in accordance with law.

Date of Decision: November 18, 2026

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