Police Have No Power To Probe Or File Chargesheet Under PCPNDT Act: Supreme Court Rules Cognizance Bar Absolute

"The language of the statute, more particularly Sections 27 and 28 of the Act when read together... indicates that the police are not meant to be the investigators for the purpose of this Act. This is further made clear by the fact that an FIR once registered cannot be taken to its logical conclusion as per the procedures of this Act." Supreme Court, in an authoritative pronouncement dated August 20, 2026, held that the State Police has no jurisdiction to independently register an FIR, conduct an investigation, or submit a chargesheet for offences punishable under the Pre-conception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act).

A bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh ruled that merely because Section 27 classifies offences under the Act as cognizable and non-bailable, it does not confer independent investigative powers on the police or displace the exclusive statutory mechanism of the Appropriate Authority.

The appeal arose from a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court under Article 134-A read with Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, after quashing a chargesheet filed against a medical practitioner under Sections 315 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23, and 25 of the PCPNDT Act following a decoy operation. The High Court certified the questions for adjudication by the top court in light of sharp divergences among High Courts across the country regarding the role of police machinery and the competence of Magistrates to take cognizance of police chargesheets in PCPNDT matters.

The primary question before the court was whether registration of an FIR and police investigation are permissible for PCPNDT Act offences solely because they are made cognizable and non-bailable. The bench was also called upon to decide who is competent to investigate complaints under the Act, and whether a Magistrate can validly take cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a police chargesheet.

Special Law Overrides General Procedural Code

The bench emphasized the foundational canon that special legislation must override the general procedural provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Noting that Section 4(2) and Section 5 of CrPC/BNSS expressly save special procedures, the court observed that the PCPNDT Act constitutes a comprehensive and self-contained code detailing specific investigatory and enforcement mechanisms.

Appropriate Authority Entrusted With Exclusive Investigative Powers

The court underscored that Section 17(4) explicitly casts the responsibility of investigating complaints and initiating legal action upon the Appropriate Authority (AA) and its designated officers. The bench pointed out that under Section 17A and Section 30, the legislature equipped the Appropriate Authority with specialized quasi-judicial powers to summon persons, compel document production, and conduct searches and seizures based on the 'reason to believe' standard, thereby leaving no room for standard police machinery.

Police Chargesheet Under PCPNDT Act Rendered Entirely Nugatory

Examining the logical conclusion of a police investigation, the court observed that if the police were permitted to register an FIR and file a chargesheet, it would ultimately result in complete futility before the trial court. Because Section 28 creates an absolute jurisdictional bar prohibiting a Magistrate from taking cognizance except on a formal complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority or an authorized person, a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a police chargesheet under Section 190 of CrPC.

"The Court cannot take cognizance thereof due to the mandatory jurisdictional bar under Section 28, and, as such, the effort made by the police would result in being nugatory in the eyes of law. Can such an interpretation be countenanced in law? Certainly not."

Cognizable Nature Does Not Confer Investigative Primacy To Police

Addressing the Union of India's contention that Section 27 makes offences cognizable and non-bailable, the bench held that the classification of an offence as cognizable cannot be read in isolation to dismantle the specialized statutory architecture. Citing Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh and the Privy Council's ruling in Salmon v. Duncombe, the court applied the rule of harmonious construction, affirming that the qualification of offences under Section 27 must yield to the specific cognizance and enforcement procedure under Section 28.

Rule 18A Has Mandatory Statutory Force

The court rejected arguments that Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996, which mandates that the Appropriate Authority shall as far as possible not involve police for investigating cases, is purely administrative or directory. Relying on PEPSU RTC v. Mangal Singh and State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, the bench held that rules validly laid before Parliament possess full statutory force, and the phrase 'as far as possible' grants controlled discretion to the Appropriate Authority to seek police aid strictly in an assisting capacity rather than allowing police to take over the investigation.

"The Appropriate Authority is the only competent authority to conduct investigation and the police, if involved, can only be so in a supplemental capacity. In effect, there is a bar on the police being the investigator under this Act."

Precedents Under Analogous Medical And Special Statutes

The bench drew extensive parallels from coordinate bench decisions under analogous legislations, including Jeewan Kumar Raut v. CBI under the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO), Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. under the UP Conversion Act. The court reiterated that in all such specialized regimes, the statutory requirement of filing a complaint through an authorized officer excludes independent police FIRs and investigation under Section 154 CrPC.

Lalita Kumari Mandate Subject To Specialized Statutory Frameworks

Distinguishing the Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., the court explained that the mandatory duty of the police to register an FIR upon receipt of cognizable information does not override specialized statutory schemes where the police lack foundational subject-matter jurisdiction. The bench noted that an initial inquiry must verify whether the police have jurisdiction to investigate at all, and where an offence falls squarely under the PCPNDT Act, the police have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

Dual-Track Mechanism For Overlapping General Penal Offences

In a detailed concurring opinion, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh formulated explicit guidelines for instances where a single connected medical transaction discloses offences under both the PCPNDT Act and the IPC or BNS. Citing State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, the concurring judgment clarified that the police are not disabled from investigating independent cognizable penal offences, such as culpable homicide or causing miscarriage, but cannot use those general offences as a back door to seize jurisdiction over the PCPNDT component.

Guidelines Delineating Police And Regulatory Jurisdictions

The court directed that where information received by a police station discloses only PCPNDT violations, the police must record a general diary entry and promptly transmit all material to the notified Appropriate Authority without commencing an independent probe. Reciprocally, if the Appropriate Authority uncovers independent IPC/BNS offences, it must communicate those facts to the jurisdictional police, while maintaining its independent statutory proceedings under the Act.

Answering the reference, the Supreme Court held that the police cannot register FIRs, investigate, or submit chargesheets for offences under the PCPNDT Act, and trial courts are strictly barred from taking cognizance of such chargesheets. The bench remanded the proceedings to the High Court for fresh disposal in terms of the declared law and disposed of the appeal.

Date of Decision: August 20, 2026