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by sayum
06 April 2026 2:01 PM
“Defences Are for Trial, Not for Rejection at Threshold—Explanation Cannot Defeat Election Challenge Merely at the Stage of Pleading”, In a detailed and legally robust ruling Bombay High Court, presided by Justice Gauri Godse, dismissed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, filed by a returned candidate seeking rejection of Election Petition. The Court held that the election petition, filed by Sulakshana Raju Dhar challenging the election of Anna Dadu Bansode from the 206 Pimpri (Scheduled Caste) Assembly Constituency, disclosed material facts and posed substantial triable issues, thus warranting a full trial.
“The petition cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the petitioner may or may not ultimately succeed in proving the allegations. The explanation or the defence of the returned candidate is a matter of evidence, not a ground for dismissal at the outset,” held the Court, while firmly applying the established doctrine on material facts in election law.
The petitioner had alleged that the respondent, the returned candidate in the 2024 Assembly election, had concealed property ownership and liabilities in the statutory affidavit, that her objection to nomination papers was wrongfully rejected, and that there was non-compliance with mandatory procedures governing the use of EVM and VVPAT machines, rendering the election void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Court’s decision thus allows the election petition to proceed to trial on the merits of these allegations.
“Suppression of Assets and Liabilities in Affidavit is a Serious Allegation—Defence Cannot Be Tested at Threshold Stage”
In examining the petitioner’s contention that the elected candidate had failed to disclose jointly owned agricultural land and had not clarified past liabilities declared in earlier affidavits, the Court emphasised that such matters are not to be tested under a threshold application under Order VII Rule 11.
“Whether the land in question was merely held by a society or whether the candidate’s role was limited to being an office bearer are matters for trial. The petition has annexed revenue records and clearly pleaded the basis of the allegations,” Justice Godse stated, rejecting the contention that the petition was vague or speculative.
The petitioner had referred to discrepancies in Form 26 affidavits filed in past elections and had included relevant extracts to establish suppression. The Court observed that these were “material facts which form the foundation of the challenge and cannot be dismissed as mere conjecture.”
“Objections to Nomination Rejected on Erroneous Grounds—Petitioner Raised a Substantive Challenge Under Section 100(1)(d)(i)”
Another pivotal issue raised by the petitioner pertained to the wrongful rejection of her objection to the returned candidate’s nomination. She asserted that her objection, submitted before 11:00 a.m. on the day of scrutiny, was acknowledged but later rejected on the false ground that it was submitted after the scrutiny concluded.
Justice Godse held that this contention could not be brushed aside and stated, “The documents annexed to the petition, including email communication with the Election Commission, show that the objection was filed in time but was rejected without rationale. This raises a triable issue under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.”
The Court clarified that the correctness or falsity of the Returning Officer’s conduct cannot be adjudicated at the stage of rejecting the petition, but requires evidence and examination during the trial.
“Use of EVMs Without Permanent Identification Mark Violates Section 61A—Compliance Cannot Be Assumed Without Trial”
The petitioner also raised a significant legal issue regarding the alleged irregularities in the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and VVPATs, asserting that the machines used in the Pimpri Assembly constituency did not carry permanent and irreplaceable identification marks, as required by the Election Commission's guidelines and Section 61A of the Act.
“It is pleaded that the serial numbers were affixed through detachable stickers rather than engraved markings, violating the prescribed safeguards,” observed the Court. The petitioner’s request for election documents, including Form 17C and polling booth data, was rejected by authorities, further supporting her claim that procedural compliance was compromised.
Justice Godse noted, “The petitioner has annexed copies of her RTI application under Rule 93 and the rejection letter from the Election Officer. These are material facts supporting the claim of procedural violations and are sufficient to warrant a trial under Section 100(1)(d)(iv).”
“Petition is Verified in Manner Prescribed—Form 25 Duly Filed and No Procedural Deficiency Exists”
Responding to the contention that the petition failed to comply with verification requirements under Section 83 of the RP Act and Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, the Court concluded that the petition was properly verified, with annexures supported by an affidavit and Form 25 filed as per procedure.
“The petitioner has clearly indicated that the contents are based on her personal knowledge and observations during the election process. There is no requirement to disclose a separate source of knowledge in such circumstances,” Justice Godse ruled.
The Court further rejected the argument that defects in the affidavit warranted rejection, holding that “the petition satisfies the procedural mandate of the Act and Rules, and there is no defect that renders it non-maintainable under Order VII Rule 11.”
“Material Facts Pleaded; Particulars May Emerge at Trial—Pleading Standard Is Met”
Summarising the applicable legal standard, the Court observed that “material facts” are basic facts upon which the claim rests, and which must be distinguished from “particulars” or evidentiary details. Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh and Ashraf Kokkur v. K.V. Abdul Khader, the Court stated:
“Once the foundational facts are pleaded and supported by documents, the absence of further evidentiary particulars does not make the petition liable for rejection. The petitioner is entitled to prove her case during trial. It is well settled that the cause of action must be disclosed, not proven, at this stage.”
Justice Godse further remarked, “Election petitions are special statutory proceedings, but they are not to be struck down as ritualistic exercises in procedural perfection. The threshold is not one of proof, but of disclosure.”
“Objections Raised Are Within Statutory Grounds Under Section 100(1)(d)—Trial Must Proceed”
The Court decisively concluded that although the petition did not plead corrupt practice under Section 100(1)(b), it did make specific allegations under Section 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv), namely:
Improper acceptance of nomination
Non-compliance with provisions of the Constitution or the Act that materially affected the result
Justice Godse ruled, “The petitioner has pleaded sufficient grounds to challenge the election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv). Whether she succeeds is a matter of evidence, not law. Hence, the petition discloses a cause of action and cannot be rejected at the threshold.”
Final Observation: “Rules of Pleading Are Not Rituals—They Serve Justice, Not Formality”
Quoting the Supreme Court’s caution in Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi, the High Court reinforced a principle often overlooked in procedural arguments:
“Rules of pleading are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. Provisions of law are not mere formulae to be observed as rituals.”
On that note, the Court dismissed the interim application, paving the way for a full-fledged trial into allegations of false affidavit, nomination irregularities, and EVM-related procedural violations.
Date of Decision: 20 November 2025
