Order XII Rule 6 CPC | Filing Of Suit For Eviction Itself Serves As Notice To Quit Under Section 106 TPA: Delhi High Court

"It is well settled that the filing of a Suit for eviction under the general law, itself amounts to a notice to quit, upon the tenant." Delhi High Court held that the institution of a suit for possession against a tenant constitutes sufficient notice to quit, effectively dispensing with the requirement of a formal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA).

A bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed that when a defendant admits to their induction as a tenant, the court is empowered to pass a decree of possession under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) based on such clear admissions.

The Respondent (Plaintiff) instituted a suit seeking possession and mesne profits for a property in Daryaganj, New Delhi, which had been occupied by the Appellant (Defendant) since 1986. The Appellant contested the suit, claiming that they held a "permanent tenancy" pursuant to an oral agreement with the Plaintiff's husband, and disputed the service of the legal notice for termination. The trial court decreed the suit for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, relying on the Appellant’s admissions in the written statement, a decision subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Court.

The primary question before the court was whether a decree of possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is sustainable when the defendant disputes the service of a notice to quit under Section 106 TPA. The court was also called upon to determine whether an oral agreement for "permanent possession" overrides the requirement for a registered instrument under the Registration Act, 1908.

Admission of Tenancy Suffices for Decree

The court noted that while the Appellant denied the specific lease deed relied upon by the Plaintiff, the written statement contained clear admissions regarding the Appellant’s induction as a tenant and the subsequent payment of monthly rent to the Plaintiff. The court observed that these admissions were sufficient to establish the landlord-tenant relationship, regardless of the Appellant's attempts to frame the possession as "permanent" or "perpetual."

Court Rejects Plea of Permanent Tenancy

Addressing the argument that the Appellant was entitled to permanent possession due to an alleged oral agreement and the payment of a "premium," the court held that any right to continue in possession for a period exceeding one year must be created through a registered instrument. In the absence of such registration, the Appellant’s claim was patently barred under Section 17 of the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act, rendering the defense untenable.

Institution of Suit as Constructive Notice

The court addressed the Appellant's contention regarding the non-service of the legal notice dated 07.08.2003. Relying on the Supreme Court’s dictum in M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), the court ruled that the very act of filing a suit for eviction operates as a valid notice to quit. Consequently, the dispute over the prior service of notice did not preclude the grant of a decree for possession.

"Any such creation of possession on permanent basis could have been done only through registered document, which admittedly did not exist and thus, such contention was patently barred under Section 17 Registration Act."

No Substantial Question of Law

The High Court observed that the lower courts had correctly exercised their discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The court held that while the assessment of mesne profits might necessitate the recording of evidence, the entitlement to possession was fully supported by the pleadings. Finding no substantial question of law, the court dismissed the Regular Second Appeal, affirming the decree of possession.

Date of Decision: 23 September 2026