Mobility Is the Essence of Invention: Delhi High Court Upholds Injunction in Patent Dispute Over Brick-Making Machines

“If someone has changed the mode of mobility by improvement or development, it may amount to intruding the patent rights of the patentee” – Delhi High Court

High Court of Delhi delivered a significant ruling in the case of Vishal Choudhary v. SNPC Machines Private Limited, dismissing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC read with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, against the grant of an interim injunction in a patent infringement suit concerning mobile brick-making machines. The Division Bench, comprising Justices Dinesh Mehta and Vimal Kumar Yadav, upheld the Single Judge’s discretionary order restraining the appellant from manufacturing or selling allegedly infringing machines, affirming that “mobility” was the core of the patented invention and minor variations in mode of achieving it do not negate prima facie infringement.

The case centers around the scope of appellate interference in discretionary interim orders, the interpretation of the Patents Act, 1970, particularly Sections 10 and 48, and competing legal tests such as the Pith and Marrow Doctrine versus the All-Elements Rule, in assessing patent infringement.

“The injunction is a proscriptive relief — an actual, concluded sale is not a condition precedent” – On Territorial Jurisdiction in Patent Suits

The core contention in the appeal was twofold: territorial jurisdiction and the correctness of the interim injunction granted in favour of the patentee, SNPC Machines Pvt. Ltd..

The appellant, Vishal Choudhary, contended that no part of the cause of action arose within Delhi as neither sale nor business took place there. However, the Court rejected this jurisdictional objection, holding that:

“For the purpose of maintaining a suit for injunction, the probability, preparedness or even potentiality of the goods being sold or offered for sale in Delhi may be a ground enough to maintain a suit… Injunction is always a prohibitory relief, for which an actual, confirmed or concluded transaction is not necessary.”

Thus, even an offer for sale made to a Delhi-based party was sufficient, notwithstanding allegations that the offer was a “trap sale”.

"The invention is the integration of brick-laying and mobility — the method of movement is immaterial"

SNPC Machines Pvt. Ltd. is the registered holder of four patents (Nos. 353483, 359114, 374814 & 385845) pertaining to integrated mobile brick-making machines that automate the process of moulding and laying bricks while eliminating manual labour. The machine comprises a moving chassis, roller-die assembly, raw material hopper, and is self-propelled.

The appellant claimed that his machine, marketed under the name Padma, is not self-propelled but towed by a tractor, and hence materially distinct. It allegedly lacks a cabin, steering mechanism, and motor-driven wheels.

The Court, however, dismissed this as a distinction without real difference, observing:

“Mobility of the machine, according to us, is the essence of the invention… If someone has changed the mobility by any improvement, development or even using other mode… it may amount to intruding the patent rights.”

Reinforcing this position, the Bench asked rhetorically:

“Had someone used bullocks instead of a tractor, would that not amount to infringement? Merely altering the source of propulsion does not change the functional core of the invention.”

According to the Court, prima facie infringement was made out, as the defendant’s machine performed the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result, aligning with the Doctrine of Equivalence, even if not literally identical.

“Differences in design must not distract from substance — they all pertain to the same functional unit of mobility”

In paragraphs 39 to 41 of the Single Judge’s order, which the Division Bench endorsed, the following differences were raised by the appellant: absence of cabin, absence of steering, no steered front wheels, and lack of motor-driven rear wheels.

But the Court reasoned:

“All the four differences are really parts of the same fundamental issue, i.e., the mobility and the mechanism to ensure mobility of the assembly… Without mobility, the defendant’s machine would serve no purpose.”

Thus, the “pith and marrow” of the patented invention was preserved in the appellant’s machine, and mere alterations in design or propulsion mechanism did not negate infringement at the interim stage.

All-Elements Rule vs Pith and Marrow — Not to be conclusively decided at interim stage

One of the key legal submissions of the appellant was that the Single Judge erred in applying the pith and marrow test instead of the all-elements rule, allegedly expanding the scope of monopoly beyond the statutory claim under Sections 10 and 48 of the Patents Act.

However, the Division Bench declined to enter into this legal thicket at the interim stage:

“The judgments on this subject are numerous and diverse… We would not like to go into the intricate question of applicability of these principles because any observation or finding recorded by us, at this stage, may affect rights of either of the parties…”

The Court clarified that such questions require detailed examination of evidence, and can only be conclusively resolved at trial.

“Monetary loss can be compensated; infringement of patent and goodwill cannot”

On the aspect of balance of convenience and irreparable harm, the Court aligned with the Single Judge’s reasoning:

“If an injunction were not granted, it would have seriously infringed the plaintiff's patent rights and its goodwill. In absence of injunction, the consequential loss or damage cannot be measured in terms of money.”

In contrast, the defendant, if ultimately successful, can be compensated monetarily based on turnover and loss assessments.

In upholding the injunction, the Division Bench reaffirmed the high threshold for interfering with discretionary interim orders:

“The view of the learned Single Judge is a possible and reasonable view, which may or may not be a correct view in ultimate analysis after the evidence is led and suit is finally decided.”

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, without costs, and the Court cautioned that its observations were confined to the interim stage and would not prejudice the final adjudication.

Date of Decision: 16 January 2026