Mere Presence In Mob Cannot Establish Guilt: Supreme Court Acquits 10 Accused In 1988 Bihar Double Murder Case Over Abuse of Section 149 IPC

“Injuries may indicate presence but not necessarily truthfulness” – Supreme Court warns against blanket convictions in mob violence cases based on unreliable testimony and a flawed FIR In a powerful reaffirmation of fundamental criminal law principles, the Supreme Court on October 7, 2025, delivered a significant ruling, quashing the conviction of ten individuals who were serving life sentences in a 1988 double murder case from Bihar. The Court overturned the judgments of the Trial Court and the Patna High Court, holding that the application of Section 149 IPC was legally unsustainable, and the First Information Report was not genuine, thereby rendering the entire prosecution case doubtful.

“Suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof,” observed the Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, as it underlined that criminal liability cannot rest on vague collective accusations without clear evidence of individual involvement or intent.

Supreme Court holds FIR not genuine, doubts entire investigation

The genesis of the case lay in a violent clash on 20th November 1988 in Katihar district, where a large group allegedly attacked Jagdish Mahato (PW-20) and his brother Meghu Mahato, leading to the death of Meghu and another villager, Sarjug Mahato. Five other persons were injured. A First Information Report naming 72 accused was lodged based on PW-20’s statement, allegedly recorded while he was injured and hospitalised.

However, the Supreme Court found this FIR to be highly suspect. “The statement of PW-20 could not have been treated as the FIR. It appears to have been recorded after deliberations and consultations, not as the first spontaneous account,” the Court held. It noted that the police had already started the investigation by the time the FIR was registered at 2:35 PM, indicating that the statement was not the basis for setting the criminal law in motion.

In a telling observation, the Bench stated, “It is not safe to rest the conviction of the accused solely based on the FIR allegedly recorded at the hospital, when multiple injured witnesses testified that they had not disclosed the names to PW-20, and he himself admitted he was unconscious and unaware.”

Section 149 IPC cannot be used to paint all with the same brush

The core of the Court’s reasoning rested on the misapplication of Section 149 IPC, which imputes vicarious liability on all members of an unlawful assembly for crimes committed in furtherance of its common object. The Trial Court had convicted all the accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, holding them equally responsible for the murders.

Rejecting this view, the Supreme Court held, “Mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly. Each individual’s participation, intent, and role must be clearly established.”

Quoting earlier Constitution Bench precedents, the Court reminded that “the principle of constructive liability cannot be stretched to convict innocent bystanders or those merely present at the spot in the absence of any overt act or corroborated conduct.”

The Court emphasised that a “large mob” does not automatically prove a common object to commit murder. “The prosecution failed to prove the object of the assembly beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies were inconsistent, the FIR was unreliable, and the medical evidence contradicted the ocular version. In such a case, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused,” the Court said.

“Injured witness is not necessarily a truthful witness”

Much of the prosecution’s case relied on the testimonies of five injured eyewitnesses, including PW-20. But the Supreme Court found their statements riddled with contradictions, exaggerations, and inconsistencies with the medical evidence.

“Injuries may indicate presence, but not necessarily truthfulness,” the Court declared, cautioning that the presence of injuries on a witness cannot be treated as a seal of credibility. It further observed, “The testimony of PW-20 is not wholly reliable. He made improvements, omitted names, and could not have known who assaulted whom after he fell unconscious.”

The Court highlighted that witnesses gave versions in court that were inconsistent with what they told the police, often naming individuals who were not accused or failing to identify key assailants. “The prosecution failed to separate truth from falsehood — a duty that lies at the heart of a fair criminal trial,” it held.

Medical evidence contradicts prosecution’s version

The Supreme Court gave detailed attention to the medical reports of the deceased and injured. Several alleged injuries described by eyewitnesses were not found in medical examination, and some medical findings contradicted their narratives.

For example, PW-3 claimed a gandasa injury to the leg, but no such injury was found. PW-5 described multiple blunt force injuries, but the reports showed incised wounds — clearly caused by sharp-edged weapons.

“When medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, and where the prosecution fails to explain these discrepancies, the testimony must be scrutinised with greater caution,” the Court held, citing Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P..

Supreme Court restores criminal jurisprudence: “Benefit of doubt is not a formality — it is a safeguard”

After analyzing all the evidence, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the convictions could not stand.

In a line that anchors the judgment’s moral and legal weight, the Court said, “A person should not suffer rigorous imprisonment for life merely because he was present at the scene and happened to be named in a crowd.”

Calling for utmost judicial care in cases involving mob violence and group liability, the Bench observed, “Where the prosecution drags a multitude of persons into the net of criminal liability, courts must guard against generalisations and presume innocence unless guilt is proven individually and clearly.”

It also warned against drawing “presumptive inferences” from injuries or presence alone. “The golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt must remain unbroken,” the Court declared, granting benefit of doubt to all appellants and acquitting them of all charges.

The Verdict: A Warning Against Abuse of Group Liability and FIR Fabrication

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is a crucial reminder that justice cannot rest on collective assumptions or procedural shortcuts. It has reasserted that in criminal trials — especially those involving mob violence, land disputes, or mass accusations — the courts must demand precise proof, individual culpability, and fair investigation.

The acquittal of the ten men, many of whom had already spent over a decade in incarceration or under the shadow of life imprisonment, brings closure to a deeply flawed trial. It also underscores the importance of protecting individual rights even in cases that evoke strong emotions or collective blame.

“The rule of law demands that courts separate guilt from suspicion — and protect the innocent, even when surrounded by guilt,” the judgment concluded.

Date of Judgment: 7 October 2025