Decree Based On 'Evasive Denial' Improper If Defendant Raises Specific Defenses Going To Root Of Case: J&K & Ladakh High Court

"The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order…” show that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court," High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, in a significant ruling, held that a decree cannot be passed under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) if the defendant has raised specific objections and defenses that go to the root of the case.

A single bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar observed that the power to pass a judgment on admissions is discretionary and should not be exercised blindly when disputed questions of fact require a full trial.

The case arose from a suit filed by faculty members of Vishwa Bharati Women’s Welfare Institution (the appellant) challenging their retirement at age 60. The plaintiffs claimed that according to the institution's bye-laws and official RTI responses, the retirement age was 65. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, concluding that the defendant-institution’s denial in its written statement was "evasive" and amounted to a deemed admission.

The primary question before the court was whether the power to pass a judgment on admissions under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is mandatory or discretionary. The court was also called upon to determine whether a decree could be sustained when the defendant had pleaded specific amended bye-laws and factual circumstances that contradicted the alleged admissions.

Power Under Order XII Rule 6 CPC Is Discretionary, Not Mandatory

The Court began by analyzing the statutory language of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, emphasizing the use of the word "may." The bench noted that this provision empowers the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of admissions made in pleadings or otherwise, but it does not make it obligatory to do so. The primary object of the rule is to enable an expeditious judgment, but only to the extent of admissions that are clear and unequivocal.

"The provisions contained in Rule 6 are discretionary in nature and not obligatory or mandatory, as is evident from the use of the word “may” in the provision. Consequently, the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case."

Court Explains Interplay Between Order XII Rule 6 And Order VIII Rule 5 CPC

Justice Dhar highlighted that Order XII Rule 6 must be read alongside Order VIII Rule 5 of the CPC and Section 58 of the Evidence Act. While Order VIII Rule 5 states that an allegation not specifically denied shall be taken as admitted, the proviso grants the Court the discretion to require such facts to be proved otherwise. The bench relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, noting that the court should not act mechanically.

"The court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement... if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts."

Decree On 'Evasive Denial' Improper When Specific Defences Are Pleaded

Examining the merits, the High Court found that the trial court erred in seizing upon an alleged "evasive denial" to decree the suit. The appellant-institution had categorically pleaded that its bye-laws were amended to fix the retirement age at 60 years. Furthermore, the appellant explained that any instances of employees serving until 65 occurred because the management had migrated from the Kashmir Valley in 1990 due to militancy and was unaware of such unauthorized continuations.

"Once the appellant-defendant has taken a categorical stand regarding the age of superannuation of its teaching and non-teaching staff, it was not open to the learned trial Court to seize upon an alleged instance of evasive denial... and pass a decree against the defendant-college on the basis of a so-called admission."

Applicability Of Bye-Laws And SRO 339 Is A Matter Of Trial

The Court observed that whether the original bye-laws or the amended versions (including SRO 339 of 2005) applied to the plaintiffs was a matter that required adjudication at trial. The bench noted that the trial court ignored the basic stand taken by the defendant regarding the applicability of rules and instead clinched the issue solely on a narrow interpretation of two paragraphs in the written statement.

"Whether or not the said stand of the defendant-college can be accepted and whether or not they would be able to prove this fact is a matter of trial. The same cannot be determined at the stage of considering an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."

The High Court concluded that the trial court fell into grave error by passing the impugned judgment and decree without a full trial. The bench emphasized that unless admissions are "clear and unequivocal," a court may refuse to pass a decree and instead call upon the plaintiff to lead evidence. Consequently, the High Court set aside the decree dated January 29, 2025, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law.

Date of Decision: 05 June 2026