Court Not Bound To Entertain Grounds Beyond Pleadings, But Action Defying Judicial Order Is Nullity: Supreme Court

20 November 2026 12:26 PM

By: kapil


"The present case illustrates how a meritorious cause was allowed to fail by reason of inept drafting of a writ petition, the substance having been eclipsed by form." Observing that a court is under no legal obligation to entertain a plea unsupported by pleadings in a writ petition, yet substantive injustice stemming from the breach of a judicial order cannot be ignored, the Supreme Court bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu on November 18, 2026, invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to award Rs 10 lakh compensation each to two school clerks whose wrongful termination went unremedied due to flawed drafting before the High Court.

The appellants, who served as senior clerk and head clerk respectively, faced departmental proceedings for alleged misappropriation and were terminated ex parte after objecting to the composition of the inquiry committee. They approached the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, where the High Court, through a consent order, permitted the management to lead fresh evidence to substantiate the charges. However, the management led no evidence, and the Tribunal upheld the dismissals, prompting a writ petition that omitted these fundamental flaws and solely pleaded parity with an in-charge headmaster.

Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to entertain arguments that are entirely absent from the factual averments and grounds in the writ petition?

Whether the non-compliance with a binding consent order to lead evidence to establish misconduct renders subsequent disciplinary action and approval a nullity, justifying relief under Article 142 despite deficient pleadings?

Parties bound strictly by pleadings in Article 226 writ petitions

Addressing the scope of arguments before the writ court, the bench emphasized that litigants cannot expect adjudication on points never pleaded. The Court affirmed that an opponent is entitled to know the case it has to meet, and courts cannot make out a new case ungrounded in the writ record.

"A party is under obligation to plead its case by making the requisite averments/assertions in support of the relief that it claims, whereas a court is under no obligation to entertain a plea if the same is not supported by the necessary averments/assertions in the petition."

Omission to challenge breach of consent order fatally weakened challenge

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s consent order dated March 17, 2005, had expressly granted liberty to the school to lead evidence afresh before the School Tribunal to substantiate misconduct. Inexplicably, the management led no evidence whatsoever, and the final inquiry reports were never served on the delinquent employees prior to dismissal.

Despite these glaring legal breaches, the counsel drafting the writ petitions raised none of these vital grounds, restricting the challenge solely to a plea of parity with the headmaster. Consequently, the Single Judge of the High Court could not be faulted for rejecting the writ petition as presented.

Action contrary to express judicial order constitutes a nullity

The Court underscored that despite the strict rule disentitling litigants from securing unpleaded reliefs under Article 226, the overarching principles of justice compelled judicial intervention where solemn orders of a competent court were flouted.

"Though law is well-settled that a high court cannot grant any relief under Article 226 to a litigant who has approached it without pleading an appropriate case for relief, this is a fit case where the appellants deserve to be granted some relief based on the principle that an action/order which is wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted."

Article 142 invoked to grant compensation for wrongful termination

Noting that one appellant had passed away during pendency and recognizing that both employees were denied substantive justice because of poor drafting, the apex court exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 to grant complete justice without reopening stale proceedings.

"Ex debito justitiae, the appellants would have been entitled to larger relief if only their writ petitions had been appropriately drafted and the right points had been argued. Since that stage has passed, we exercise our power under Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the school to pay to each of the appellants Rs.10,00,000/- only as lump sum compensation for wrongful termination of their services."

The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals by directing the respondent school management to pay Rs 10 lakh each to the surviving appellant and the legal representatives of the deceased appellant within three months, failing which default interest at 12% per annum would attach until actual realization.

Date of Decision: November 18, 2026

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