Carbon Copy Of Recovery Memo Without Signatures Cannot Sustain Conviction: Allahabad High Court Acquits Man In Section 412 IPC Case

“Confession To Police About Source Of Gun And Its Dacoity History Is Inadmissible”, In a reportable judgment dealing with the evidentiary threshold for conviction under Section 412 of the Indian Penal Code, the Allahabad High Court has held that mere alleged recovery of a firearm is not enough unless the prosecution proves that it was the very property looted in dacoity and that the accused knew or had reason to believe that it had been transferred by commission of dacoity. The Court further held that a confessional statement made to police about the source and history of the gun has no evidentiary value unless it leads to discovery within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Allahabad High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the appellant’s conviction under Section 412 IPC. The Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove recovery in a reliable manner, failed to establish the identity of the gun as looted property, and failed to prove the accused’s knowledge that it was stolen in dacoity.

The prosecution case arose out of a dacoity allegedly committed on the night of 28 March 1987 at the house of informant Ram Nath in Kanpur Dehat. According to the FIR, 9 to 10 armed miscreants entered the house, assaulted the informant’s wife, opened fire, and looted various articles including a licensed DBBL gun, 12 bore, bearing No. 72944, along with cartridges, licence papers, cash, ornaments and other household articles.

The prosecution further alleged that in the intervening night of 24/25 June 1987, during routine patrolling, a police party led by S.O. Chandra Pal Singh apprehended the appellant Ramesh near village Mulukpur. It was alleged that he was carrying a double-barrel gun and had fired at the police while trying to flee. The prosecution version was that after his apprehension, the appellant told the police that he had purchased the gun from one Rampal @ Mama, who had told him that it had been looted in the dacoity at village Nimndapur.

On this basis, the appellant was prosecuted and eventually convicted under Section 412 IPC, which deals with dishonest receipt or retention of property stolen in the commission of dacoity.

Justice Sanjiv Kumar began by examining the legal ingredients of Section 412 IPC and made it clear that the prosecution had to prove far more than bare possession. The Court noted that to bring home a charge under Section 412 IPC, the prosecution was required to establish that the looted property was recovered from the accused, that the accused had reason to believe it was stolen, that he had reason to believe it had been transferred through commission of dacoity, and that he had received it from a person whom he knew or had reason to believe was connected with a gang of dacoits.

The first major blow to the prosecution case came from the Court’s scrutiny of the alleged recovery. The Bench found it significant that the prosecution had not produced the Rawangi General Diary entry showing the departure of the police party from the police station for patrol duty. Referring to Mathura Prasad v. State of U.P., the Court observed that the Rawangi G.D. is “one of the most important documents” to prove that the police party actually left the station at the stated time and reached the alleged place of recovery.

In a key finding, the Court held that the absence of the Rawangi G.D., coupled with the failure of police witnesses to mention its number or precise details, created serious doubt about the very presence of the police party at the place of occurrence. The judgment records:

“The absence of Rawangi G.D. as well as the failure of P.W.-2 and P.W.-3 to mention the date, time and Rawangi G.D. number, raises serious doubt regarding the departure of the concerned police personnel from the Police Station and their presence at the place of occurrence.”

The Court then turned to the fard baramdagi, or recovery memo, which was central to the prosecution case. Here again, the Court found the evidence deeply deficient. The original recovery memo was said to be on the record of another sessions trial, while what was filed in the present case was only a carbon copy. The High Court found that this copy was neither shown to be a true copy nor properly proved in accordance with law.

Justice Sanjiv Kumar observed that the carbon copy did not bear signatures of the police party or the accused, did not disclose the date on which it was prepared, and the person who allegedly prepared it was never examined. The witness also did not state that the copy had been prepared before him or at his dictation. On this, the Court made a pointed observation:

“It cannot be termed as a true copy of the original fard baramdagi… accordingly, it is not admissible in evidence, accordingly, the very basis of the prosecution case becomes doubtful.”

Even assuming the recovery had taken place, the Court held that the prosecution had still failed to prove that the gun recovered from the appellant was the same gun looted in the dacoity. This aspect became decisive because, according to the prosecution’s own case, the serial number on the allegedly recovered gun had been erased.

The Court noted that once the gun number was not visible, it became the prosecution’s duty to establish by other reliable evidence that the weapon was the same one looted from the informant’s house. However, the prosecution failed to adduce any such evidence and instead relied almost entirely on the alleged confession made by the appellant to police at the time of arrest.

The High Court rejected this approach in clear terms. It held that the accused’s statement to police that he had bought the gun from Rampal @ Mama, and that the latter had told him it was looted during the dacoity, was inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The Court further held that Section 27 could not rescue the prosecution, because the statement did not lead to any new discovery.

Relying on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru and Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, the Court reiterated that only that portion of an accused’s statement in custody is admissible which relates distinctly to the fact discovered. The High Court emphasized that statements about the past history or source of an object do not become admissible merely because the object itself was seized.

In one of the most important passages of the judgment, the Court said:

“The statement of the appellant in police custody is not admissible in evidence, as it has not led to any recovery or discovery.”

The Court added that the appellant’s alleged statement about having purchased the gun from Rampal @ Mama and knowing it was looted also could not be relied upon, because it related to the past use or past history of the gun and did not lead to discovery. The prosecution had also not interrogated Rampal @ Mama, nor made him an accused in the dacoity case, a lapse which the Court held seriously weakened the prosecution story.

The informant’s evidence on identification of the gun also failed to satisfy the Court. During trial, the informant stated that he identified the gun in court by its number and butt. But this, the High Court found, was inherently unreliable because the prosecution’s own case was that the number on the recovered gun had been erased. The Court therefore found no reason why the informant could claim to identify it by the gun number in court. The Bench also noted the informant’s admission that guns with similar kinds of butts are available.

Rejecting the attempt to invoke the presumption under Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act, the Court further observed that the alleged recovery had taken place about three months after the dacoity, and in any case it had not been proved that the recovered weapon was the same as the looted one. Hence, it could not be said that stolen property was recovered “soon after” the theft so as to raise any presumption against the accused.

The Court thus concluded that the prosecution had failed on every essential requirement of Section 412 IPC. It held that the prosecution had not proved that the gun recovered from the appellant was the same gun looted in the dacoity, had not proved that the appellant knew or had reason to believe it was stolen in dacoity, and had not proved that Rampal @ Mama was a member of a gang of dacoits.

Summing up the defects, Justice Sanjiv Kumar held:

“The essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 412 I.P.C. are neither made out nor proved by the prosecution.”

The Court also found that the trial court’s conviction rested on “incorrect appreciation of the evidence” and could not be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the judgment dated 23 September 1988 was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the offence under Section 412 IPC. Since he was already on bail, the High Court directed that he need not surrender, while requiring him to furnish a bond under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. / Section 481 BNSS.

The ruling is significant because it underscores that Section 412 IPC demands strict proof not only of possession, but of the identity of the property and the accused’s knowledge of its dacoity origin. It also serves as a reminder that police-custody confessions about the source or history of an article remain inadmissible unless they directly lead to discovery, and that defective proof of recovery can itself be fatal to the prosecution case.

Date of Decision: 16 March 2026