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by Admin
22 March 2026 10:28 AM
“Public Duty is the Gateway — Private Contract Bars the Door of Writ Jurisdiction”, High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu delivered a deeply instructive ruling on the constitutional contours of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, particularly against statutory religious bodies.
The Court held that although the Shrine Board is not ‘State’ under Article 12, the High Court can still exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 only where a public law element exists. However, where the dispute arises purely out of a private contract of service, no writ would lie. On this reasoning, the Court dismissed the petition both on maintainability and on merits.
The petitioner, appointed as a Pujari on an ad hoc basis in 1986, challenged the discontinuation of his services in 1988, claiming that the action was arbitrary, violative of Articles 14, 16, and 311, and taken without any inquiry.
He further argued that his employment was effectively permanent in nature, and that termination had caused severe hardship, alleging malafides and stigma. The petitioner also mounted a constitutional challenge to Section 14(2) of the Shrine Act, terming it as conferring “vague and unbridled powers.”
The matter had a long journey through the judicial system, including a remand by the Supreme Court, directing the High Court to first determine the maintainability of the writ petition in light of earlier precedent.
The High Court framed the core constitutional question as whether the Shrine Board is amenable to writ jurisdiction, and if so, to what extent.
Reaffirming earlier Division Bench precedent, the Court categorically held:
“In the absence of any kind of control of the Government—financial, functional or administrative—it cannot be said to be ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12.”
This finding effectively barred direct enforcement of fundamental rights against the Shrine Board.
However, the Court immediately introduced a crucial constitutional nuance, observing: “The language of Article 226 is wide… writs can be issued to ‘any person or authority’.”
Drawing from landmark precedents like Anandi Mukta and BCCI, the Court emphasized that Article 226 travels beyond Article 12, and extends to bodies performing public duties, regardless of their formal status.
The Court clarified with precision: “What is relevant is not the form of the body, but the nature of the duty imposed.”
The judgment carefully builds a doctrinal distinction between public law remedies and private law disputes.
The Court held: “If the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus can issue.”
Applying this test, it concluded that the petitioner’s claim was rooted entirely in a contract of service, devoid of any public element: “The petitioner… is only seeking enforcement of his rights under a contract of service… which is purely private in character.”
The Court further stressed that: “A writ would not lie… in respect of an action which is essentially of a private character.”
Thus, even though the Shrine Board performs certain public functions, every action of such a body does not acquire a public law character.
The Court also relied on Binni Ltd. v. Sadasivan, reiterating:
“There must be a public law element… it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts.”
“Ad Hoc Employment Ends With Its Purpose”: No Right to Continue, No Inquiry Required
Even assuming maintainability, the Court proceeded to examine the merits and found the petitioner’s case untenable.
It held in unequivocal terms: “An adhoc appointee has no vested right to the post.”
The Court noted that the petitioner’s disengagement was non-stigmatic and non-punitive, and merely based on non-requirement of services.
Rejecting the argument of violation of natural justice, the Court observed: “The impugned order does not cast any stigma… nor is it punitive in nature.”
Further clarifying the nature of such employment, the Court held: “Employment of an adhoc appointee ends the moment the purpose… comes to an end.”
The plea of protection under Article 311 was also rejected, since the Shrine Board is not a government entity, and thus such constitutional safeguards were inapplicable.
Dismissing the writ petition, the High Court delivered a clear constitutional message:
“Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is expansive, but not meant for enforcement of private contractual rights.”
The judgment draws a fine yet firm line—while Article 226 empowers courts to reach even non-State bodies, that power is conditioned by the presence of a public duty.
In doing so, the Court preserves the balance between constitutional oversight and contractual autonomy, ensuring that writ remedies are not transformed into substitutes for civil suits in service disputes.
Date of Decision: 12/03/2026