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by sayum
13 June 2026 3:52 PM
"Appellant’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA," Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling dated June 10, 2026, held that an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution can override the stringent statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
A bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja observed that the rigors of special statutes "will melt down" where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial.
The case arose from the arrest of Kashmiri human rights activist Khuram Parvez by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in November 2021 for his alleged involvement with the proscribed terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The NIA alleged that Parvez, under the guise of activism, recruited over-ground workers, gathered intelligence on security forces, and bribed an NIA officer. He approached the High Court after the Trial Court rejected his bail application in December 2024, citing a prima facie true case against him.
The primary question before the court was whether prolonged incarceration of nearly four and a half years and a slow-moving trial could justify the grant of bail despite the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. The court was also called upon to determine if the appellant’s physical disability rendered him an "infirm person" entitled to special consideration under the proviso to Section 437(1) of the CrPC.
Court On Interplay Between Article 21 And Section 43D(5) UAPA
The High Court placed heavy reliance on the Supreme Court's landmark judgment in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, noting that statutory restrictions do not oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. The bench observed that while courts must appreciate legislative policy against bail at the commencement of proceedings, these restrictions lose their force when the trial is unlikely to conclude soon.
The bench emphasized that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt but into whether continued detention remains permissible under the specific circumstances of the case. It noted that the law does not contemplate an "either-or" approach between national security and personal liberty but requires a disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
"Pre-trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment."
Prolonged Incarceration As Ground For Bail
In the present case, the court noted that the appellant had been in custody since November 22, 2021, marking an incarceration period of almost four and a half years. The bench expressed concern over the "realistic trajectory of the trial," pointing out that the case is still at the stage of arguments for framing charges.
The court highlighted that the prosecution intends to examine 197 witnesses, making it evident that the trial is not ending in the near future. The bench reasoned that such a scenario necessitates a balance between the state's interest in prosecution and the individual's right to liberty, especially when the delay is not solely attributable to the accused.
Evaluation Of Prosecution Evidence And Approver Statement
Conducting a "surface evaluation" of the evidence, the court observed that the NIA's case primarily rested on the statement of a co-accused, Muneer Ahmad Kataria, who turned approver and claimed to be an NIA informer. The bench noted that while the allegations were serious, they remained based on testimony that is yet to be tested during a full-fledged trial.
Regarding the NIA’s claim that Parvez collected sensitive information on army structures, the court took note of the defense's submission that such information was already in the public domain. It was observed that reports like the "Structure of Violence Report" and "Alleged Perpetrators 2012" were published years ago and were publicly available on the JKCCS website, a fact not disputed by the prosecution.
"The statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain a circumscribed restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution."
Appellant Considered 'Infirm' Due To Physical Disability
The court also addressed the appellant's physical condition, noting that he had lost a leg in a landmine blast in 2004 and uses a prosthetic limb. The bench held that the appellant qualifies as an "infirm person" under the proviso to Section 437(1) of the CrPC, which is applicable even in UAPA cases.
While the prosecution argued that this infirmity did not prevent the appellant from allegedly engaging in anti-national activities, the court held that the fact remains that the appellant is infirm and deserves special consideration. The bench clarified that this physical condition, coupled with the delay in trial, created a compelling case for the grant of bail.
Concluding its findings, the High Court set aside the Trial Court's order and directed the release of Khuram Parvez on regular bail. The bench clarified that its observations were limited to the grant of bail and should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case. The court imposed several conditions, including the execution of a personal bond of Rs. 2,00,000, surrender of passport, and a restriction on leaving the National Capital Territory of Delhi without permission.
Date of Decision: 10 June 2026