A Plaintiff Cannot Choose When to Sue—The Clock Starts When the Title is First Denied - Courts Will Not Let Property Sharks Exploit Legal Loopholes: Madras High Court

“Plaintiff failed to explain source of title and did not examine vendor—documents appear fabricated; no indulgence can be shown,” in a sharply worded judgment, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed a Second Appeal filed by a litigant who sought to assert ownership over a vacant plot of land using what the Court found to be “fabricated and untrustworthy documents.” In the case, the Court refused to interfere with concurrent findings of the trial and first appellate courts, which had earlier dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for permanent injunction, holding that “the plaintiff has not discharged the burden of proving title and has approached the court with unclean hands.”

Justice G. Arul Murugan observed that the case exposed a pattern of calculated abuse of process, aimed at usurping property by creating fictitious documents and prolonging litigation. The Court further held that a belated attempt to amend the plaint to add a relief of declaration—made after eight years of written statement denying title—was barred by limitation and amounted to “nothing more than a litigation tactic.”

“A Plaintiff Cannot Choose When to Sue—The Clock Starts When the Title is First Denied”

The appellant-plaintiff S. Ramakrishnan had filed a suit in 2005 for permanent injunction over a vacant land situated in Vadiveeswaram Village, claiming ownership through a registered sale deed dated 30.08.2001 (Ex-A1) allegedly executed by one Thangaraja, represented by his power agent Antony.

The defendant, M. Ramadas (later represented by his legal heir R. Balachandan), contested the claim, asserting that the plaintiff’s title deed was fabricated, and he himself was the rightful owner of the adjacent Plot No. 4, which he had purchased under a registered sale deed dated 13.04.2005 (Ex-B5). The defendant produced original chain-of-title documents from 1938, patta, and property tax receipts in his name, asserting actual possession.

The trial court and appellate court both found that the plaintiff failed to establish title or possession, and his documents were contradictory and unreliable. Aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, raising three substantial questions of law, primarily centered around title adjudication in injunction suits, amendment of pleadings, and reception of additional evidence in appeal.

Justice G. Arul Murugan framed the core legal issue succinctly:
“Can a plaintiff assert possession over vacant land through a sale deed that does not explain title, and then belatedly seek to amend the plaint to cure fatal defects when litigation goes against him?”

The Court answered that firmly in the negative.

On Title and Possession: “Plaintiff Has Failed to Discharge Burden Under Section 101 of Evidence Act”

The Court emphasized that in cases involving vacant land, title becomes central even in injunction suits. Citing the Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, the Court reiterated:

“Where the property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed or enjoyed, possession follows title. In such a situation, even in a suit for injunction, it is necessary to examine and determine title.”

The plaintiff’s reliance on Ex-A1 was dismantled by the Court. It noted that the vendor Thangaraja was never examined, nor was there any proof as to how he acquired the land from the original owner Chellammai. Even worse, Thangaraja was described as Chellammai’s “only son,” a claim flatly contradicted by multiple historical title documents produced by the defendant showing Chellammai had two different sons—Mahalingam and Saravana Perumal.

“The plaintiff’s case is riddled with contradictions—he has not produced parent title, he did not examine the vendor, and he relies on documents which contradict his own pleadings. He has not discharged the burden under Section 101 of the Evidence Act. In such cases, the Court must draw an adverse inference under Section 114,” the Court stated.

On Fabrication and Fraud: “Documents in Ex-A1 and Ex-A10 Appear Fabricated—Vendor Is Fictitious”

The Court found that the plaintiff’s sale deed Ex-A1 and the power deed Ex-A10 were created within a span of three days, and tax receipts were obtained just 20 days before filing the suit. The Court noted that:

“When the title was traced by the defendant clearly from 1938 via gift deeds and regular sale deeds, and the plaintiff’s documents offer no trace of parentage, it becomes evident that the documents relied upon by the plaintiff are fabricated.”

The Commissioner’s Report (Ex-C1 and C2) confirmed that Plot No. 4, claimed by the defendant, was being mistakenly or deliberately targeted by the plaintiff under the garb of Plot No. 2, which had already been sold in 1966.

On Amendment to Seek Declaration: “Belated Amendment Cannot Breathe Life Into a Dead Claim”

The plaintiff’s attempt to amend the plaint in 2014, seeking to include a relief of declaration of title, was rejected. The Court ruled that the limitation period under Article 58 of the Limitation Act began in 2006, when the defendant first denied title in his written statement.

“The limitation period starts from the date when the right to sue first accrues. A plaintiff, though dominus litis, cannot pick and choose a convenient time to file a declaratory relief. The right to sue arises when title is first denied—not when the plaintiff feels ready to amend.”

Citing Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg (2025), the Court added: “Even though the appeal is a continuation of the suit, and amendments usually relate back, this doctrine cannot be used to revive a claim that was dead by limitation.”

On Additional Evidence: “No Error in Dismissing Documents That Were Neither Relevant Nor Necessary”

The High Court rejected the argument that the First Appellate Court erred in hearing interlocutory applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC along with the appeal. The Court held that the Appellate Court had rightly evaluated the admissibility and relevance of additional documents and concluded that:

“They were neither required for deciding the appeal nor met the conditions laid under Rule 27.”

Justice G. Arul Murugan concluded with a clear caution against speculative litigation:

“The courts cannot adopt a liberal approach and allow the plaintiff to amend the relief and start the litigation from square one, thereby frustrating the defendant and encouraging fabricated title claims. Property litigation cannot be allowed to become a game of attrition.”

The Court further remarked:

“This is not a case where a litigant is being deprived on technicalities. Rather, it is a calculated attempt to usurp another’s property by creating false documents and prolonging litigation. Courts must discourage such predatory tactics.”

The Second Appeal was dismissed with costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

Date of Decision: 25 July 2025