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by sayum
23 May 2026 2:59 PM
"Prosecutions for Alleged False Complaints Are Not To Be Initiated At The Instance Of Officers Lower In Hierarchy Than The Authority Before Whom The Alleged False Complaint Was Made", On March 05, 2026, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana addressing a crucial question of criminal procedure — whether a Station House Officer can file a Qalandra (police complaint) against a person whose complaint was enquired into at the level of the Commissioner of Police.
Justice Sumeet Goel quashed the entire proceedings, holding that the Qalandra filed by the SHO was not maintainable in law as it violated the mandatory jurisdictional bar under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and further directed the Director General of Police, Punjab to institutionalize a comprehensive sensitisation programme for all police officials in the State.
The petitioner, Vinod Kumar @ Akhtar, claimed to be a social worker who had submitted representations to higher police authorities alleging that a certain individual had secured public employment on the basis of a fraudulent OBC certificate. When the welfare authorities found no grounds for cancellation of the certificate, the petitioner escalated his representations to the office of the Commissioner of Police, Ludhiana. An enquiry was conducted by a senior officer at that level, which concluded that the allegations were not substantiated and further found that the complaint had the effect of casting aspersions upon a sitting Judicial Officer. On the basis of this enquiry report, directions were issued to the Station House Officer of P.S. Haibowal, Ludhiana to initiate proceedings under Section 66 of the Punjab Police Act, 2007. The SHO accordingly filed a Qalandra before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, who issued notice to the petitioner by order dated 11.06.2018. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the Qalandra and all consequential proceedings.
The core legal question before the Court was whether the Qalandra filed by the SHO — an officer admittedly subordinate in the police hierarchy — at the direction of the Commissioner's office, was maintainable under Section 195 CrPC when the original complaint had been made to, and enquired into by, a superior authority. The petitioner's counsel argued that Section 195 CrPC mandates that any prosecution for an alleged false complaint must be initiated only by the authority before whom the complaint was made, or by an officer administratively superior to that authority, and not by an inferior officer. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's judgment in P.D. Lakhani and Another versus State of Punjab and Another, 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 838. It was further contended that the Magistrate issued notice mechanically without examining the statutory bar. The State, on the other hand, contended that the SHO merely acted upon directions of the superior authority and was a competent officer of the concerned police station; that a prima facie case was disclosed; and that the petitioner could raise all pleas before the trial court.
Justice Sumeet Goel, at the outset, clearly identified the legal issue: "The scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. clearly mandates that in respect of certain offences relating to public justice, cognizance can be taken only upon a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of a public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. The legislative intent is to ensure that prosecutions for alleged false complaints or offences affecting administration of justice are not initiated at the instance of officers lower in hierarchy than the authority before whom the alleged false complaint was made."
The Court found it undisputed that the petitioner's representations were addressed to the Commissioner of Police and the enquiry was conducted by a senior officer at that level. It therefore held that if the complaint was found to be false, the law required that any consequential proceedings ought to have been initiated by that authority or by an officer administratively superior to it. The initiation of proceedings by the SHO, who is admittedly subordinate in the hierarchy, was held to be "contrary to the mandate of Section 195 Cr.P.C."
The Court placed extensive reliance on the Supreme Court's ruling in P.D. Lakhani, which had categorically held: "No complaint, therefore, could be lodged before the learned Magistrate by the Station House Officer. Even assuming that the same was done under the directions of Senior Superintendent of Police, Section 195, in no uncertain terms, directs filing of an appropriate complaint petition only by the public servant concerned or his superior officer. It, therefore, cannot be done by an inferior officer. It does not provide for delegation of the function of the public servant concerned."
On the mechanical functioning of the Magistrate, the Court was equally severe: "The order dated 11.06.2018 passed by the learned Magistrate reflects that the Impugned Qalandra was registered and notice was issued in a routine manner without examining the statutory bar and without application of judicial mind to the question of maintainability. The requirement of due consideration at the stage of taking cognizance cannot be treated as a routine formality."
"The Entire Prosecutorial Exercise A Brutum Fulmen That Unnecessarily Squanders Judicial Time And State Resources"
The Court took serious note of the systemic problem of such procedural dereliction, observing that the filing of the Qalandra without adherence to the strictures of Section 195 CrPC "represents a textbook example of procedural dereliction, rendering the entire prosecutorial exercise a brutum fulmen that unnecessarily squanders judicial time and state resources."
Justice Goel also provided an important clarification on the nature of the quashing order, making it clear that it does not operate as a perpetual injunction against the State or grant absolute immunity to the petitioner: "This Court has not delved into the factual culpability or innocence of the Petitioner, and thus the instant Order does not clothe the petitioner with the mantle of a 'meritorious acquittal'. The interference by this Court acts to vindicate the due process of law rather than to provide a final absolution of the alleged acts." The State was held to be at liberty to initiate a fresh complaint in strict accordance with law.
In a remarkable passage on the constitutional role of Section 195 CrPC, the Court elevated it beyond a mere procedural restriction: "filing of Qalandra by the police under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is not a perfunctory procedural ritual, but a substantive exercise of sovereign power aimed at vindicating the majesty of the law... Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., transcends its role as a restrictive shield and emerges as an enabling mandate, empowering the State to act as the custodian of public order and the parens patriae of the administration of justice."
The Court also warned that laxity in this duty has serious consequences: "Any delay or lackadaisical approach in filing the Qalandra not only undermines the efficiency of the administration but also grants a de facto immunity to offenders, thereby compromising the Rule of law."
In exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court issued remedial directions to the Director General of Police, Punjab to institutionalize a comprehensive sensitisation programme for all police officials to ensure strict adherence with Section 195 CrPC / Section 215 BNSS. The DGP was further directed to conduct a formal inquiry to ascertain whether the SHO's filing of the Qalandra was a result of bona fide professional error or was motivated by malafide intentions or ulterior considerations. A detailed compliance report was directed to be filed before the Registrar General within six weeks.
The Court allowed the petition in its entirety and quashed the Qalandra under Section 66 of the Punjab Police Act, 2007 along with all consequential proceedings including the notice order dated 11.06.2018. The requirements of Section 195 CrPC / Section 215 BNSS were reaffirmed as mandatory jurisdictional pre-requisites — not mere directory guidelines — and the State's power to prosecute for false complaints was held to be non-delegable downward in the hierarchy.
Date of Decision: March 05, 2026
