Criminal Law - Rape of Minor – Conviction under Section 376(2) IPC & Sections 4, 6 POCSO – Trial Court’s Conviction Restored – High Court erred in acquitting accused on grounds of procedural irregularities and alleged inconsistencies – Held: Evidence of victim consistent and corroborated by medical records (pregnancy, abortion); procedural lapses (Section 223/defective charge) did not cause prejudice or failure of justice – High Court judgment unsustainable – Conviction and life sentence restored [Paras 13-23, 25-36, 38].

Age of Victim – Proof – Minor Status Established – Transfer Certificate, testimony of parents, statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and medical report showed victim aged 12-15 years – Defence did not rebut or challenge minority – High Court erred in doubting age determination – Victim entitled to protection under POCSO [Paras 16-18].

Evidence – Testimony of Victim – Sole Basis for Conviction – Consistency of statements before Magistrate, police, and court; corroborated by medical reports of pregnancy and abortion – Absence of DNA test not fatal where identity and acts proved – Victim’s testimony reliable and trustworthy [Paras 14-15, 19-24].

Procedural Irregularity – Section 223 Cr.P.C. – Joint Trial of Two Accused – Even if joinder was technically improper, no prejudice or failure of justice shown – High Court wrongly treated misjoinder as fatal without proof of prejudice – Mere irregularity does not vitiate trial [Paras 29-35].

Defective Charge – Section 215 & 464 Cr.P.C. – Error in mentioning date of offence (02.07.2016 instead of March 2016) – Did not mislead accused or affect fair trial – Accused aware of allegations and time frame – Conviction not invalidated [Paras 25-27].

Standard of Proof – Beyond Reasonable Doubt – Misapplication – High Court erred in elevating minor inconsistencies to reasonable doubt – Principle must not be misused to acquit actual culprits – Doubts must be serious and rational; not trivial inconsistencies [Paras 22-23, 36].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s acquittal set aside – Trial Court’s judgment of conviction and concurrent life sentences restored – Respondents directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which Trial Court to secure custody [Paras 38-39].

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Section 18 SC/ST Act – Bar on Applicability – Offences under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act alleged against respondent, including casteist abuses and assault for voting against accused in assembly election – High Court granted pre-arrest bail holding prosecution exaggerated – Held: Section 18 creates absolute bar to anticipatory bail when prima facie offence disclosed – High Court erred by conducting mini trial and ignoring statutory bar – Anticipatory bail cancelled [Paras 3.4–3.5, 4, 5.2, 6–9].

SC/ST Act – Offence by Casteist Abuse – Intention and Public View – Utterances “Mangtyano, you have become arrogant” directed at complainant and his mother, accompanied by beating and threats to burn house – Abuses in public view outside complainant’s house – Prima facie caste nexus established – Offence under Section 3(1)(r)(s) SC/ST Act made out [Paras 3.3, 7–7.2, 8].

Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Bail Stage – No Mini Trial – At anticipatory bail stage, court must only examine prima facie case from FIR – Detailed appreciation of evidence not permissible – High Court exceeded jurisdiction by doubting witness accounts and speculating on political overtone [Paras 4.1, 5.5.1, 6.2, 9].

Constitutional Validity – Bar on Anticipatory Bail – Section 18 & 18A SC/ST Act – Upheld by precedents (Ram Krishna Balothia, Vilas Pandurang Pawar, Prathvi Raj Chauhan) – Denial of anticipatory bail not violative of Articles 14 or 21 – Bar furthers constitutional mandate of equality and social justice under Articles 14 and 17 [Paras 5.3–5.7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court order dated 29.04.2025 set aside – Anticipatory bail granted to respondent No.1 cancelled – Observations confined to bail question, trial to proceed uninfluenced [Paras 9–10.1].

NGT – Appeal under Section 22 NGT Act – Environmental Compensation of ₹18 Crore Imposed on Sugar Mill – Orders Set Aside – Appellant challenged NGT orders dated 15.02.2022 and 16.09.2022 which imposed 2% of annual turnover as environmental compensation based on a joint committee report alleging effluent discharge violations – Held: NGT acted in violation of Sections 21–22 of the Water Act and principles of natural justice under Section 19 NGT Act by not impleading or hearing the appellant and by relying solely on a committee report – Orders declared illegal and quashed; UPPCB given liberty to act in accordance with law – Appeals Allowed [Paras 19, 30-34].

Evidence – Sampling of Trade Effluent – Sections 21–22, Water Act – Admissibility – The statutory protocol (notice to occupier/agent, splitting, sealing, dual-lab analysis, delivery of reports) is mandatory; results are inadmissible unless the procedure is followed – NGT’s reliance on committee findings absent compliance vitiates the basis for compensation [Paras 10.5–10.9, 30-33].

Role of Expert/Joint Committees – Adjudicatory Function vs. Fact-Finding – Committees appointed by tribunals assist in fact-finding but cannot substitute adjudication; their reports must be subject to party participation and judicial determination – NGT erred in basing liability solely on committee recommendations without hearing the affected party [Paras 27, 31-33].

Audi Alteram Partem – Opportunity to be Heard – Section 19 NGT Act – Even in suo motu or preventive environmental jurisdiction, affected parties must be heard before adverse directions – Failure to implead and hear the appellant rendered the proceedings non-est [Paras 19(i)-(ix), 31-33].

Relief and Liberty – Appeals Allowed – Consequential Directions – Setting aside of NGT orders does not preclude lawful regulatory action; UPPCB is at liberty to inspect and take remedial steps in accordance with the Water Act and principles of natural justice [Paras 33-34].

Right to Education – Applicability of RTE Act to Minority Institutions – Reconsideration of Pramati – Court records serious doubts about Pramati which exempted all minority institutions (aided/unaided) from the “entirety” of the RTE Act without analysing provisions beyond Section 12(1)(c) – Finds blanket exclusion disproportionate and potentially sub-serviating Article 21A; notes data-based consequences post-Pramati including increased claims to minority status and low representation of disadvantaged children – Reference framed to larger Bench on correctness of Pramati, scope of Article 29(2), and possibility of reading down Section 12(1)(c) rather than wholesale exclusion – Outcome: Questions referred; interim application of RTE preserved for non-minority schools [Paras 70-71, 115-132, 171, 174-177, 184-186, 188-190, 207-210].

Article 21A vs Article 30(1) – Harmonious Construction – No Inherent Conflict – Article 30(1) is not a blanket immunity from regulation; rights must be harmonised with Article 21A which operationalises the foundational right to elementary education through minimum standards – Core RTE norms (infrastructure, teacher qualifications, child safety, curriculum) are regulatory and child-centric and do not “annihilate” minority character – Outcome: Court affirms coexistence and rejects reading Article 30(1) as a trump over Article 21A [Paras 85-92, 133-143, 145-151, 171-174].

Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act – 25% Entry-Level Admissions – Minority Institutions – Reading Down – Section 12(1)(c) furthers social inclusion and common schooling; minority character is not necessarily diluted since admissions under the quota can include disadvantaged/weaker-section children from within the same minority community; reimbursement preserves financial neutrality – Outcome: Instead of blanket inapplicability, Court moots reading down as a reconciliation tool; issue sent to larger Bench [Paras 100-107, 178-183, 185].

Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Mandatory Nature – Statutory Architecture and Rationale – NCTE designated as academic authority under Section 23; 2010 Notification introduced TET as a mandatory component of “minimum qualifications” for Classes I–VIII; 2011 amendment retained TET; 2014 Regulations continued the scheme; NCTE Guidelines (11.02.2011) justify TET for national standards and signalling teacher quality; MHRD clarified no relaxation and fixed 01.04.2019 as last date for in-service compliance – Outcome: TET held a binding minimum qualification, not a mere procedural eligibility [Paras 60-69, 64-66, 167-170, 202-206].

Minimum Qualifications vs Eligibility – TET is a Qualification under Section 23 – Court rejects semantic distinction; TET forms part of minimum qualifications, the acquisition of which renders a candidate eligible; without TET, a teacher is unqualified for appointment/promotion – Outcome: Challenge to TET’s status as “qualification” rejected [Paras 202-206].

In-Service Teachers (Pre-RTE Appointees) – Continuation and Promotion – Transitional Relief under Article 142 – Statutory scheme (first and second provisos to Section 23(2)) envisages time-bound acquisition of minimum qualifications by in-service teachers; failure leads to ineligibility to continue – Outcome: (i) Teachers with <5 years left in service may continue without TET till superannuation but are ineligible for promotion; (ii) Teachers with ≥5 years left must clear TET within 2 years from the judgment date or face separation with terminal benefits as per rules; (iii) For all future appointments/promotions, TET is mandatory [Paras 167-170, 198-201, 214-218].

High Court Judgments Impugned – Divergent Approaches – Supreme Court’s Resolution – Bombay HC (12.12.2017) upheld Maharashtra G.R. mandating TET even for minority schools relying on St. Xavier’s; Madras HC (02.06.2023) mandated TET for non-minority institutions and for promotions but treated minority institutions as exempt per Pramati; Bombay HC (01.04.2019) granted interim protection to minority-school teachers against TET-based termination; Madras HC (08.01.2019) directed approval of appointment in aided minority school without TET relying on Pramati – Outcome: SC doubts Pramati, refers questions; meanwhile, applies RTE/TET to non-minority schools; modifies impugned orders accordingly for in-service teachers; minority-institution appeals governed by reference [Paras 5-13, 14-23, 24-27, 28 (table), 207-215, 219].

Article 29(2) – Relevance to Aided Minority Institutions – Court notes Pramati did not engage with Article 29(2) while declaring RTE inapplicable to aided minority schools; admission non-discrimination mandate bears on Section 12(1)(b) – Outcome: Article 29(2) explicitly flagged as a reference question affecting the Pramati ratio [Paras 141-142, 210(c)].

Regulatory Power and Reasonable Restrictions – Articles 19(6) & 21A – RTE-driven quality norms are reasonable restrictions in public interest; T.M.A. Pai and St. Xavier’s affirm regulations for standards, efficiency, welfare; “right to administer is not a right to maladminister” – Outcome: Regulatory floor under RTE/NCTE is constitutionally legitimate and applies generally, subject to minority identity preservation [Paras 144-151, 176 (extracts), 150].

Procedural Bar – New Grounds in Supreme Court – Tamil Nadu Surplus Staff vs TET – In CA Nos. 6365-6367/2025, State raised TET for first time in SC; ordinarily impermissible; however, since the school is a minority institution, appeals brought within ambit of reference – Outcome: Appeals to be governed by reference order under Para 211 [Paras 9-13, 212-213].

Decision – Reference to larger Bench on Pramati and interrelated questions (scope of RTE vis-à-vis minority institutions, Article 29(2) effect, possibility of reading down Section 12(1)(c)) – Interim: RTE/TET regime applies to all non-minority schools; minority schools’ position subject to reference outcome – TET mandatory for appointments and promotions; Article 142 relief carved out for in-service teachers as specified – Impugned judgments/orders modified/disposed accordingly [Paras 207-211, 214-219].

Admission to Medical Courses – Article 371D – Definition of Local Candidate – High Court Expanded Definition – Orders Set Aside – The High Court widened “local candidate” beyond the Presidential Order and Rules of 2017/2024 by accepting residence certificates as eligibility – Held: Legislative and executive wisdom in framing rules consistent with the Presidential Order cannot be substituted by judicial expansion – Definition of “local candidate” in Rules of 2017 and 2024 is valid; High Court erred in reading down the rule – Appeals by State allowed; Student Writ Petitions dismissed – Admissions already granted under interim orders not to be disturbed – Relief carved out for children of Telangana employees posted outside the State (as per new proviso to Rule 3) [Paras 2-7, 19, 31-36].

Legislative Competence – Rules of 2017 – Source of Power – The 2017 Rules derive authority from the 1983 Admission Act which in turn traces its power to Entry 25 List III read with Articles 245, 246 and 371D – Rules consistent with the Presidential Order; Division Bench erred in holding otherwise [Paras 10-16, 19].

Judicial Review – Limits – Article 226 – Courts cannot expand statutory definitions framed under Presidential Orders – Policy choices in admission rules lie within legislative/executive domain unless manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory or unconstitutional – Hardship alone cannot invalidate rules [Paras 19, 23-25, 30-33].

Residence/Nativity – Validity of Requirement – Longstanding Precedent – Requirement of residence or study within State for local quota upheld in D.P. Joshi, Kumari Vasundara, Pradeep Jain, Anand Madaan, Rajdeep Ghosh – Rules of 2017/2024 fall within same framework – No arbitrariness or Article 14 violation [Paras 20, 24-29].

Relief – Mitigation Clause – Proviso to Rule 3 – State introduced proviso covering children of Telangana employees in Government, All-India Services, Defence, CAPF, and State PSUs posted outside Telangana – Such candidates eligible despite part of studies outside – Appeals allowed subject to this proviso [Paras 34-36].

Probate—Escheat—Locus of State—Sections 8–13, 29, 30 HSA; Sections 63, 263 IS Act—State has no standing to assail probate where Will stands proved and probated—Grant of probate renders escheat inapplicable; Government is a stranger to probate/succession proceedings unless there is failure of heirs upon intestacy—SLPs by State dismissed on locus—Explained with reference to “State of Rajasthan v. Lord Northbrook” and Delhi HC’s judgment granting probate [Paras 1–6.5, 7–8].

Succession—Testamentary vs. Intestate—Sections 8–13, 29, 30 HSA—Where a competent court finds the Will valid and grants probate, succession is testamentary and devolves as per the Will; escheat under Section 29 arises only on failure of heirs upon intestacy—Held, doctrine of bona vacantia has no play when probate subsists [Paras 4–6, 6.5].

Probate Practice—Revocation—Section 263 IS Act—Who may challenge—Only those who would succeed if the Will failed (i.e., heirs under HSA) may appeal/revoke probate; State cannot do so merely by invoking a State Escheats statute—Clarified [Paras 6.2, 6.4].

Evidence—Proof of Will—Section 63 IS Act & Section 68 Evidence Act—Delhi High Court’s finding of due execution and proof affirmed as context; probate upheld—Will executed on 30.10.1985 at Tis Hazari in presence of two attesting witnesses—Compliance recorded [Para 1.2].

Agnates’ SLP—Suppression of material facts—Article 136—CPC O.XXIII R.1—Litigants who withdrew a civil suit challenging the same Will (without liberty) and withdrew objections in probate cannot later maintain SLP; suppression of withdrawal disentitles discretionary relief—Costs of ₹1,00,000 each imposed; SLP dismissed on suppression and locus [Paras 9–13].

Estoppel—Probate Objections Withdrawn—No “blowing hot and cold”—Where objections to probate and independent suit are withdrawn, petitioners estopped from re-agitating validity—High Court’s grant of probate stands; consequential steps to follow [Paras 10–14].

Decision—SLP (C) Nos. 14721–14723/2024 dismissed on ground of locus of State; SLP (Civil) Diary No. 30645/2023 dismissed for suppression and lack of locus—Costs imposed ₹1,00,000 each on agnate-petitioners; probate to proceed per law [Final Paras].

Promissory Note – Proof of Debt – Presumption under Negotiable Instruments Act – Decretal Amount Restored – The Trial Court decreed the suit for ₹35,29,680 based on a promissory note acknowledging receipt of ₹30,80,000 – The High Court reduced the recoverable amount to ₹22,00,000 on the ground that only this portion was evidenced by bank transactions – Held: Once the execution and contents of the promissory note are not disputed, and the document is upheld, the entire amount therein must be presumed valid under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – The presumption includes both bank and cash payments – Rejection of the cash component solely due to lack of documentary evidence, in absence of rebuttal by the respondent, was erroneous – Onus to disprove the debt lay on the respondent, who neither appeared nor contested – Trial Court’s decree restored [Paras 3-7].

Maintainability of Second SLP – Dismissal of Earlier SLP Without Leave – Abuse of Process – A second SLP was filed challenging the same High Court judgment after the earlier SLP had been dismissed without granting leave – The petitioner argued that the non-speaking dismissal did not bar a second SLP relying on S. Narahari v. S.R. Kumar – Held: The earlier dismissal constituted finality under Article 136 and re-litigating the same issue through a second SLP was impermissible – The attempt was viewed as an abuse of process and contrary to the principle of finality in litigation – Reference to larger bench in Narahari held not applicable as facts not pari materia – Present SLP dismissed [Paras 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10].

Review Jurisdiction – Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC – No Appeal from Order in Review – Petitioner challenged the High Court’s dismissal of the review petition, but Supreme Court held that under Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC, no appeal lies from such order – Any attempt to challenge the main judgment through this route is an indirect method to re-agitate concluded issues – No relief can be granted where the main order has attained finality – SLP dismissed [Paras 5, 8].

Constitutional Law – Article 141 and Judicial Discipline – Reference to Larger Bench Does Not Stay Binding Precedent – Just because a legal issue has been referred to a larger bench does not permit departure from binding law under Article 141 – Courts must continue to apply prevailing precedents unless overturned – SLP rightly dismissed in line with established precedents [Para 10].

Decision – Second SLP dismissed as not maintainable – Held to be an abuse of process – Dismissal of review petition by High Court upheld – No tagging or reference to larger bench warranted [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Motor Vehicles – Motor Vehicle Tax – Scope of ‘Public Place’ – Section 3 of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 – Rule 12A of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 – Interpretation – Liability to pay tax arises only when motor vehicle is used or kept for use in a public place – Appellant’s vehicles used exclusively within the restricted premises of RINL – Area not accessible to public – Held: Not a ‘public place’ – No tax liability incurred – Appeal allowed.

Motor Vehicle Tax – Use in Restricted Industrial Premises – Section 3 of A.P. Act, 1963 – Exemption Allowed – The appellant operated heavy vehicles solely within the enclosed and access-controlled premises of Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (RINL), which is not a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act – Held: Section 3 imposes tax only on vehicles used or kept for use in a public place – Since the site was not accessible to the general public, tax under the Act was not leviable [Paras 8–10, 28, 45–46, 50].

Interpretation of Rule 12A – Presumption of Use Must Align with Section 3 – No Automatic Liability – Rule 12A creates a deeming fiction of vehicle use unless prior intimation is given – Held: As subordinate legislation, Rule 12A cannot override Section 3 – Where actual use was exclusively in a non-public place, absence of intimation under Rule 12A is irrelevant – The vehicles were not ‘kept for use in a public place’, hence no tax liability arose [Paras 29, 43, 47–48, 50].

Public Place – Meaning under Section 2(34) of Motor Vehicles Act – Premises of RINL Not a Public Place – Appellant’s vehicles operated within a compound guarded by CISF with no public access – Held: ‘Public place’ requires a right of public access – Presence of a government company does not convert private industrial premises into a public place – Reliance on Bolani Ores Ltd. upheld – Decision in Akhil Gujarat Pravasi distinguished as not dealing with ‘public place’ requirement [Paras 28, 31–34, 44–46].

Constitutional Principle – Article 265 – Tax Only by Authority of Law – Literal Interpretation – Held: Taxing statutes must be strictly construed – There can be no presumption or inference of tax liability – Since Section 3 clearly restricts tax to vehicles used or kept for use in a public place, the levy in this case was without authority of law [Paras 36–38, 50].

Decision – Civil Appeal Allowed – Division Bench Set Aside – Judgment of learned Single Judge restored – Appellant not liable to pay motor vehicle tax for the period when its vehicles were confined to non-public premises – Refund of Rs. 22,71,700 ordered – No order as to costs [Para 51].