Right to Education – Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act, 2009 – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Neighbourhood schools under statutory obligation to admit at least 25% of entry-level class strength – Provision held to be transformative and central to achieving constitutional equality of status – Effective implementation declared a national mission [Paras 1, 7–10].

Fundamental Right – Article 21A – Nature and Scope – Right to free and compulsory elementary education recognised as a positive fundamental right – Identification of five duty bearers: appropriate government, local authority, neighbourhood school, parents/guardians and teachers – Co-relative duties essential for realisation of constitutional mandate [Paras 5–6.5].

Judicial Review – Denial of Admission – High Court dismissed writ petition blaming parent for failure to follow online procedure – Supreme Court held such approach unsustainable in face of administrative directions, RTI disclosures of vacant seats and poverty of petitioner – Courts duty-bound to provide effective relief in cases of denial of fundamental right to education [Paras 2–3].

Access to Justice – Procedural Barriers – Digital illiteracy, language barriers, lack of transparency, absence of help-desks and grievance redressal mechanisms found to obstruct access to Section 12 benefit – Online-only admission processes held exclusionary for vulnerable groups [Paras 3–4].

Constitutional Values – Equality, Dignity and Fraternity – Section 12(1)(c) designed to integrate children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds in common neighbourhood schools – Provision furthers substantive equality, social integration and fraternity – Common School System endorsed as constitutional strategy to dismantle class and caste segregation [Paras 7–12].

Duties of State and Local Authorities – Monitoring and Enforcement – Obligations under Sections 6 to 9 and Section 31 of RTE Act emphasised – National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights entrusted with monitoring, grievance redressal and enforcement of children’s right to education [Paras 6.1–6.3, 11–12].

Standard Operating Procedure – NCPCR – Non-binding Nature – SOPs and guidelines found insufficient in absence of enforceable statutory rules – Lack of uniformity across States and UTs undermining effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) [Paras 12–15].

Subordinate Legislation – Necessity – Supreme Court held formulation of rules under Section 38 of RTE Act imperative – Without enforceable rules, mandate of Article 21A and Section 12(1)(c) would remain illusory – Directions issued to frame rules in consultation with NCPCR, SCPCRs and Advisory Councils [Paras 15–16].

Directions – Compliance and Monitoring – NCPCR directed to be impleaded as party respondent – Directed to collate information regarding framing of rules by States and UTs and file affidavit before Supreme Court – Matter kept pending for further monitoring [Paras 16–16.3].

Decision: Special Leave Petition retained for precedent and policy directions – Appropriate Governments directed to frame enforceable rules for implementation of Section 12(1)(c) – NCPCR tasked with monitoring compliance – Matter listed for further hearing.

Constitutional Law – Validity of Legislation – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Upheld (with interpretation) – The Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which mandates prior approval for inquiry or investigation into offences committed by public servants in discharge of official functions or duties – The provision aims to protect honest public servants from frivolous complaints and policy paralysis – The Court noted that Section 17A, unlike its predecessors (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act), applies across the board to all public servants and includes time limits for approval decisions – It was contended that Section 17A is a salutary provision with checks and balances to prevent harassment of honest public servants – The Court held that the object behind Section 17A to provide previous approval for inquiry/investigation into offences relatable to recommendations or decisions taken by public servants in discharge of official duties cannot be faulted – The Court emphasized the need to balance protecting public servants from mala fide prosecution and upholding probity in public life – The Court also referred to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which advocates for an appropriate balance between immunities for public officials and effective investigation – The Court concluded that Section 17A is constitutionally valid, subject to the condition that the grant or refusal of approval by the competent authority will depend on the recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta – This interpretation ensures an independent screening mechanism, aligning Section 17A with the principles laid down in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – This mechanism addresses concerns about potential abuse and lack of objectivity if the government itself were the sole screening authority – The Court rejected the argument that judicial review alone is sufficient to check misuse of power, as judicial review primarily focuses on the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision itself – The Court also rejected the analogy with the judiciary's screening mechanism as not tenable due to the distinct nature of judicial functioning – The Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process [Paras 45, 53, 58, 59, 81, 87, 88, 89, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122, 124].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Statutes – Reading Down – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Applied – The Court applied the principle of "reading down" to Section 17A to save it from being rendered unconstitutional – The Court noted that where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other upholding it, the latter should be adopted – This approach aims to salvage legislation to achieve its objective without infringing the Constitution – The Court held that Section 17A can be aligned with the pronouncements in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy by ensuring a screening mechanism by an independent agency before the grant or refusal of approval by the government, and that the recommendations of this independent agency are binding on the government – This ensures the salutary provision in preventing frivolous complaints against honest public servants is not set at naught – The Court emphasized that this interpretation does not amount to "substitution" or "judicial legislation" but rather ensures safeguards for its implementation and attracts talent to public service [Paras 97, 98, 99, 100, 111, 114, 122, 123, 124].

Criminal Law – Corruption – Investigation – Prior Approval – Role of Lokpal/Lokayukta – The Court directed that the Union of India or State Governments and the authorities competent to remove public servants, upon receiving information under Section 17A, shall immediately forward it to the Lokpal/Lokayukta (in case of States) – The Lokpal/Lokayukta shall then conduct an inquiry on the information in accordance with their respective statutes and forward a recommendation to the appropriate authority – This authority shall be bound by and act in accordance with the Lokpal/Lokayukta's recommendation regarding the grant or refusal of permission under Section 17A – For bodies/organizations/public servants not covered under the Lokpal's jurisdiction, the competent authority to remove the public servant shall commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information and act on its recommendation – The time-limit stipulated in the proviso to Section 17A (three months, extendable by one month) shall apply, and all authorities must adhere to it – The Lokpal/Lokayukta must provide reasons for their recommendations [Paras 124(i), 124(ii), 124(iii), 124(iv), 124(v)].

Dissenting Opinion – Constitutional Validity of Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Unconstitutional – Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in a separate opinion, held that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down – The dissenting opinion argued that Section 17A is contrary to the objects of the Act and is an attempt to reintroduce provisions (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act) previously struck down by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – It was contended that the requirement of prior approval forestalls inquiry and protects the corrupt, rather than the honest – The dissenting opinion found the substitution of "Government" with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" impermissible by way of interpretation, as it amounts to judicial legislation – It highlighted that the provision is arbitrary due to "policy bias," potential conflict of interest within government departments, and the difficulty in identifying a single public servant responsible for decisions – The dissenting opinion emphasized that the classification of public servants based on their decision-making duties, effectively protecting higher-level officers, violates Article 14 of the Constitution – It concluded that Section 17A, in substance, is a resurrection of Section 6A and continues to suffer from the infirmities identified in Subramanian Swamy, including impeding independent investigation and forewarning potential culprits – The dissenting opinion stressed that the overarching object of the Act is to prevent corruption, and Section 17A undermines this purpose by creating a shield for dishonest public servants [Paras (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), 19.1, 20.1, 20.3, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 20.14, 20.15, 21, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 22(i), 22(ii), 22(iii), 22(iv), 22(v), 22(vi)].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The writ petition is disposed of with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench to consider the issues afresh due to divergent opinions.

Consumer Law – Execution Proceedings – Liability of Directors and Promoters – Consumer complaints admitted only against company – Directors/promoters not proceeded against at adjudicatory stage – No notice issued, no pleadings, no findings recorded against them – Held: Execution must strictly conform to the decree – Persons against whom no adjudication of liability exists cannot be proceeded against in execution merely because they are directors/promoters of judgment-debtor company [Paras 9–13, 17, 23].

Execution of Decree – Scope and Limitations – Executing forum cannot go behind or enlarge decree – Liability cannot be shifted or expanded at execution stage – Decree binding exclusively on company cannot be enforced against non-judgment debtors – Settled principle reiterated – Executing court may construe decree but cannot travel beyond it [Paras 12–13].

Consumer Protection Act – Adjudicatory Safeguards – Necessity of pleadings, notice and findings – Personal liability cannot be fastened without foundational adjudication – Execution proceedings cannot operate as substitute for trial or adjudication – Absence of pleadings and findings fatal to execution against individuals [Paras 11, 17].

Insolvency Law – Moratorium under Section 14 IBC – Effect on execution proceedings – Moratorium shields only corporate debtor – Does not automatically extend to directors/promoters – However, execution against directors permissible only if independent liability is established – Moratorium cannot be indirectly bypassed by proceeding against non-liable directors [Paras 7, 15, 20–22].

Company Law – Separate Legal Entity – Company distinct from shareholders and directors – Liability of directors limited unless personal guarantees, undertakings or statutory exceptions shown – Doctrine of corporate personality reaffirmed – No material to show guarantees or statutory basis for fastening personal liability [Paras 13–16].

Corporate Veil – Piercing of – Exceptional doctrine – Requires specific pleadings and findings of fraud or misuse of corporate form – Invocation impermissible at execution stage without prior adjudication – Directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal liability in absence of established grounds [Paras 18–19].

Effect of Prior Supreme Court Order – Scope clarified – Earlier order permitting continuation of execution against directors removed only moratorium-related bar – Did not adjudicate or declare personal liability – National Commission rightly examined executability on merits and declined execution against directors – No inconsistency with prior order [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Order of NCDRC declining execution against directors/promoters upheld – Decree executable only against corporate debtor – Liberty reserved to appellants to pursue other remedies available in law against directors/promoters in appropriate proceedings – No order as to costs [Paras 24–27].

Service Law – Misconduct – Impersonation and Use of Bogus Educational Certificate – Departmental Punishment – Workman initially engaged as contract labour and later absorbed as Helper – Disciplinary proceedings revealed impersonation of brother and use of forged educational certificate to secure employment – After domestic enquiry, workman dismissed from service – Labour Court modified punishment of dismissal to reduction of pay and increment cut for three years – Single Judge upheld award – Division Bench further modified punishment to compulsory retirement [Paras 4–6].

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Effect of Release on Probation – Stigma of Conviction – Division Bench relied on fact that workman was granted benefit of probation in criminal case and held that conviction would not operate as a disqualification – Held: Release on probation does not obliterate stigma of conviction – Conviction remains intact; only sentence is substituted – Departmental action for misconduct leading to conviction is permissible notwithstanding grant of probation [Paras 7–10].

Section 12, Probation of Offenders Act – Scope and Interpretation – Section 12 removes statutory disqualifications attached to conviction under other laws – It does not exonerate misconduct nor bar departmental proceedings – Does not entitle a dismissed employee to reinstatement merely because benefit of probation was granted – Law reiterated from Union of India v. Bakshi Ram [Paras 10–11].

Precedent – Binding Nature – Error by High Court – High Court’s observation that conviction cannot be a ground to remove workman from service due to grant of probation held contrary to settled law – Supreme Court set aside said observation and reiterated correct legal position laid down in Bakshi Ram [Paras 11–12].

Equitable Consideration – Death of Workman – No Interference with Relief Granted – Though legal position clarified and erroneous observation of High Court set aside – Supreme Court declined to interfere with modified punishment of compulsory retirement considering that the workman had died and benefits had accrued to his legal heirs – Appeal disposed of accordingly [Paras 8, 13–14].

Decision: Civil Appeal disposed of – Observation of High Court holding that conviction does not disqualify the workman set aside – Law laid down in Union of India v. Bakshi Ram reiterated – Modification of punishment as ordered by High Court not disturbed due to death of workman – Pending applications disposed of.

Consumer Law – Execution Proceedings – Liability of Directors and Promoters – Consumer complaints admitted only against company – Directors/promoters not proceeded against at adjudicatory stage – No notice issued, no pleadings, no findings recorded against them – Held: Execution must strictly conform to the decree – Persons against whom no adjudication of liability exists cannot be proceeded against in execution merely because they are directors/promoters of judgment-debtor company [Paras 9–13, 17, 23].

Execution of Decree – Scope and Limitations – Executing forum cannot go behind or enlarge decree – Liability cannot be shifted or expanded at execution stage – Decree binding exclusively on company cannot be enforced against non-judgment debtors – Settled principle reiterated – Executing court may construe decree but cannot travel beyond it [Paras 12–13].

Consumer Protection Act – Adjudicatory Safeguards – Necessity of pleadings, notice and findings – Personal liability cannot be fastened without foundational adjudication – Execution proceedings cannot operate as substitute for trial or adjudication – Absence of pleadings and findings fatal to execution against individuals [Paras 11, 17].

Insolvency Law – Moratorium under Section 14 IBC – Effect on execution proceedings – Moratorium shields only corporate debtor – Does not automatically extend to directors/promoters – However, execution against directors permissible only if independent liability is established – Moratorium cannot be indirectly bypassed by proceeding against non-liable directors [Paras 7, 15, 20–22].

Company Law – Separate Legal Entity – Company distinct from shareholders and directors – Liability of directors limited unless personal guarantees, undertakings or statutory exceptions shown – Doctrine of corporate personality reaffirmed – No material to show guarantees or statutory basis for fastening personal liability [Paras 13–16].

Corporate Veil – Piercing of – Exceptional doctrine – Requires specific pleadings and findings of fraud or misuse of corporate form – Invocation impermissible at execution stage without prior adjudication – Directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal liability in absence of established grounds [Paras 18–19].

Effect of Prior Supreme Court Order – Scope clarified – Earlier order permitting continuation of execution against directors removed only moratorium-related bar – Did not adjudicate or declare personal liability – National Commission rightly examined executability on merits and declined execution against directors – No inconsistency with prior order [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Order of NCDRC declining execution against directors/promoters upheld – Decree executable only against corporate debtor – Liberty reserved to appellants to pursue other remedies available in law against directors/promoters in appropriate proceedings – No order as to costs [Paras 24–27].

Criminal Law – Quashing - SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential ingredients – Quashing of proceedings – FIR alleged caste-related abuses by accused persons – No specific role or utterance attributed to the appellant – Mere presence at the spot insufficient – Held: In absence of intentional insult or abuse by caste name with intent to humiliate, offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) not made out [Paras 9, 18–19].

SC/ST Act – Section 3(1)(r) – Intent to humiliate – Requirement of mens rea – Mere knowledge of complainant’s caste or general altercation not sufficient – Insult or intimidation must be on account of victim belonging to SC/ST – FIR and chargesheet silent as to any such intention on part of appellant – Prosecution unsustainable [Paras 12–14].

SC/ST Act – Section 3(1)(s) – Abuse by caste name – Scope – Mere abuse or mere reference to caste not enough – Allegations must disclose caste-based abuse intended to humiliate in public view – No such allegations against appellant – Charge not attracted [Paras 15–17, 19].

Criminal Law – Cognizance and Summoning – Vicarious liability – Presence at scene – Mere presence of accused with co-accused without specific overt act does not justify framing of charge – Criminal prosecution cannot be sustained on vague and omnibus allegations [Paras 8, 20].

Inherent Powers / Appellate Interference – Abuse of process – Continuation of prosecution without prima facie material against appellant would result in miscarriage of justice – Held: Putting appellant to trial would be travesty of justice [Paras 21–22].

Precedent – Interpretation of SC/ST Act – Reliance placed on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249 – Reiterated strict construction of penal provisions under SC/ST Act and necessity of clear allegations satisfying statutory ingredients [Paras 11–14].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 15.02.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.112 of 2023 set aside – Cognizance and summoning order dated 09.10.2020 quashed insofar as the appellant is concerned – Criminal proceedings against the appellant terminated – Pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

Service Law – Government Employment – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents – Cancellation of Appointment – Respondent selected as Sahayak Samiksha Adhikari – Required to disclose pendency of criminal cases in attestation and verification forms – Respondent answered in the negative despite two criminal cases pending against him – Held: Proper and complete disclosure of criminal antecedents is a fundamental requirement rooted in fairness, integrity and public trust – Repeated non-disclosure amounts to deliberate concealment and is a serious lapse justifying cancellation of appointment [Paras 3–6, 8–9].

Service Law – Attestation / Verification Forms – Effect of Disclaimer – Forms contained clear stipulation that furnishing false information or suppressing material facts would render candidate unfit and ineligible for government service – Respondent submitted incorrect information twice in clear violation of disclaimer – Held: What is decisive is the status of criminal cases at the time of filling the forms – Subsequent acquittal or later disclosure does not efface the misconduct of suppression [Paras 7–9].

Service Law – Criminal Cases – Pending Investigation – Relevance at Time of Disclosure – At the time of filling forms, investigations in criminal cases were pending – Acquittal or dropping of proceedings occurred later – Held: Subsequent developments cannot accrue to benefit of candidate who furnished false information at the relevant time [Paras 8–9].

Service Law – Equity and Sympathy – Limits – High Court interfered on grounds of triviality of offences, absence of charge-sheet, subsequent disclosure and opinion of District Magistrate – Supreme Court held that sympathy cannot supplant law – Maxim “juda lex sed lex” applied – Loss of employment cannot justify overlooking deliberate concealment of material facts [Paras 9–10].

Precedents – Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. – Applicability – Principles relating to consideration of surrounding circumstances in cases of non-disclosure reiterated – Held: Facts of present case show demonstrated mal-intent due to repeated false declarations – Hence benefit of said precedents not available to respondent [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of Allahabad High Court set aside – Cancellation of respondent’s appointment upheld – Pending applications disposed of [Para 10].

Civil Law – Abatement of Appeal – Non-substitution of one legal heir – Estate sufficiently represented – No abatement – Vendor Kishorilal died during pendency of first appeal – All four legal heirs initially substituted – One heir (Murarilal) subsequently died – Remaining three legal heirs and transferees lis pendens continued on record – Held: Where estate of deceased party is substantially and sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record, appeal does not abate merely due to non-substitution of one heir – High Court erred in holding appeal abated [Paras 25, 26, 38–40, 43].

Specific Performance – Vendor as necessary party – Distinction between total non-representation and partial non-substitution – Vendor is a necessary party in suit for specific performance notwithstanding transfer of property – However, where vendor’s estate is represented by some legal heirs, absence of substitution of one heir does not render appeal incompetent – Decision in Dwarka Prasad distinguished on facts [Paras 32–36, 39–40].

Civil Procedure – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Status of transferee pendente lite – Transfer during pendency of suit not void but subservient to decree – Transferee lis pendens can represent estate of vendor as intermeddler and maintain appeal – Such transferee not a substitute for vendor where vendor’s presence is totally absent – But can supplement representation where vendor’s heirs are on record [Paras 10, 36–38].

Civil Procedure – Res Judicata – Applicability at different stages of same proceedings – High Court earlier held that appeal had not abated and permitted impleadment of heirs – Subsequent contrary finding by same court impermissible – Principle of res judicata applies between different stages of same litigation – Earlier determination binding unless set aside in appeal [Paras 30, 41–42].

Civil Procedure – Clerical / Typographical Error – Power of correction – Order deleting name of Kishorilal passed despite his prior death and substitution of LRs – Error apparent on face of record – Such clerical mistake correctable at any stage under Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Party cannot take advantage of court’s inadvertent error [Para 44].

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Impleadment of legal heirs – Effect on abatement – Impleadment of heirs of deceased legal heir as pro forma respondents permissible where appeal had not abated – No necessity of formal order setting aside abatement when abatement itself had not occurred [Paras 45–46].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of High Court dismissing First Appeal Nos. 213 of 2000 and 217 of 2000 as abated set aside – Both appeals restored to file of High Court for decision on merits in accordance with law [Paras 47–48].

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 (Lis Pendens) – Applicability to Transferees Pendente Lite – Upheld – The doctrine of lis pendens, enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies with full force to transfers made during the pendency of a suit – Such transfers are not void ab initio but remain subservient to the decree that may be passed by the court – The Explanation to Section 52 clarifies that pendency commences from the date of plaint presentation and continues until final decree or satisfaction – The Maharashtra amendment requiring registration of lis pendens notice is for the benefit of third parties to prevent undue hardship, but its absence does not render the doctrine inapplicable or grant absolute title to subsequent purchasers who bought during pendency – Appellants, as transferees pendente lite, were bound by the decree for specific performance, and their rights were subservient to the decree holder – The High Court's finding that Section 52 TPA was applicable to the pendente lite transfers was affirmed [Paras 39-45, 65-66].

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) (Relief against subsequent transferees) – Interaction with Section 52 TPA – Distinguished – Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides for specific performance against subsequent transferees for value without notice, operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit or proceeding – Once a suit is instituted and the property is transferred during its pendency, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, takes precedence – A transferee pendente lite cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice under Section 19(b) because the doctrine of lis pendens binds them to the outcome of the litigation irrespective of their knowledge – The interpretation of Section 19(b) must align with Section 52 TPA to avoid incongruous situations [Paras 46-50].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 101 (Execution, Resistance, Adjudication) – Powers of Executing Court – Affirmed – The Executing Court has wide powers under Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 CPC to adjudicate all questions, including those relating to right, title, and interest, arising between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives, when a decree holder seeks possession and is resisted or obstructed – Transferees pendente lite have no independent right or locus standi to obstruct the execution of a decree for possession as they step into the shoes of the judgment debtor and their title is extinguished under Section 52 TPA – The Bombay Amendment to Rule 98(2) CPC further empowers the Executing Court to order civil imprisonment and compensation for obstruction – The Executing Court's decision to allow the decree holder's application for removal of obstruction and reject the obstructionists' objections was upheld [Paras 51-60, 64.5, 65].

Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 129, 134 (Execution of Decree) – Rejection of Limitation Plea – Upheld – A plea of limitation raised by the appellants at a belated stage, not having been pleaded before the High Court or framed as a substantial question of law, was rejected – The decree holder had sought execution within one year of the trial court's judgment and decree – The application for removal of obstruction was filed within 30 days of the resistance, as prescribed by Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 134 was held not to be attracted to the facts of the present case – The High Court's view on this aspect was affirmed [Paras 69-71].

Constitution of India – Article 142 (Extraordinary Powers) – Directions to Prevent Frivolous Litigation – Issued – Considering the peculiar facts of the case, where the decree holder had to suffer multiple rounds of litigation for over three decades despite the decree attaining finality, the Supreme Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Directions were issued to ensure that no further application(s) or petition(s) by the appellants, the judgment debtor, or any other person claiming rights qua the suit property through them, shall be entertained by any court, to prevent further harassment and ensure the ends of justice [Paras 74].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Appellants directed to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on or before 15.02.2026 – No cost – No further application(s) or petition(s) by appellants, judgment debtor, or any person claiming through them regarding the suit property shall be entertained by any court [Paras 72, 73, 75].