Surrogacy Law – Retrospective Application – Age Restrictions – Section 4(iii)(c)(I), Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 – Prospective Operation Only – Intending couples (petitioners) commenced surrogacy procedures prior to 25.01.2022 and had frozen embryos before the Act came into force – They were later denied eligibility certification on ground of crossing age limits prescribed (50 years for female, 55 for male) – Held: The Act does not operate retrospectively – Couples who had completed fertilisation and freezing of embryos prior to enforcement of the Act had a vested and constitutionally protected right to continue surrogacy – Retrospective application would unreasonably extinguish their reproductive autonomy under Article 21 – Section 4(iii)(c)(I) to apply prospectively only [Paras 13.8–15.10, 16–18].

Reproductive Autonomy – Right under Article 21 – Reproductive choice includes right to procreate through surrogacy where medically indicated – Prior to enforcement of the Act, no age bar existed; hence intending couples had an unfettered right to exercise reproductive autonomy – Such vested right cannot be retrospectively curtailed by statute unless expressly stated [Paras 12.5–12.7, 13.8–13.9].

Statutory Interpretation – Presumption Against Retrospectivity – Unless expressly provided or necessarily implied, legislation is presumed prospective – Retrospective application of Section 4(iii)(c)(I) would impair vested rights and impose new disability, hence impermissible – Rule against retrospectivity invoked to preserve rights of intending couples who had commenced surrogacy procedures prior to enforcement [Paras 15.2–15.10].

Meaning of ‘Commencement’ of Surrogacy Procedure – ‘Commencement’ for purpose of exemption from age bar occurs when intending couple completes extraction and fertilisation of gametes and freezes embryos with intent of implantation – Freezing of embryos marks crystallisation of right to pursue surrogacy – Couples at this stage prior to 25.01.2022 protected from age restrictions [Paras 14.1–14.4].

Transitional Provision – Section 53 – Scope – Ten-month transitional protection applies to existing surrogate mothers, not intending couples – However, this does not authorise retrospective deprivation of vested reproductive rights of intending couples who had completed embryo creation before the Act [Paras 11–12, concurring opinion].

Decision: Writ petitions and application allowed – Section 4(iii)(c)(I) held to operate prospectively – Petitioners exempted from age qualification for certification under the Act provided other statutory conditions are met – Similarly placed couples may approach jurisdictional High Courts for relief [Paras 17–19].

Constitution of India – Article 233 – Appointment of District Judges – Eligibility – In-service Judicial Officers – Direct Recruitment – Interpretation of Clause (1) and (2) – Held: Both clauses form a complete code – Article 233(1) covers appointments, postings and promotions – Article 233(2) lays down qualification only for advocates/pleaders not in service – Judicial officers already in service are governed by Article 233(1) – No constitutional bar against their participation in direct recruitment – Textual and contextual reading must give effect to both clauses without rendering any part redundant [Paras 118–126].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Appointments – Article 233 – Eligibility of In-service Judicial Officers – Held: No constitutional bar against judicial officers competing in direct recruitment process for District Judges – Judicial officers having combined experience of seven years as advocate and judicial officer entitled to apply – Level playing field to be maintained between advocates and in-service candidates – Minimum age 35 years for both categories – Appointment to be based on merit through written examination and viva voce – No weightage to in-service candidates – Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service to continue in 50:25:25 ratio as per All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170 [Paras 155–161, 157–159, 172(i)–(v)].

Constitutional Law – Article 233(2) – Bar Quota – Reservation – Interpretation – The 25% direct recruitment under Article 233(2) is not an exclusive quota for advocates – Clause (2) only prescribes qualification for advocates/pleaders not in service – Reading it as a reservation for advocates would violate Article 14 and constitutional equality – Both advocates and judicial officers with requisite experience entitled to compete [Paras 164, 19–23 per Sundresh, J.].

Judicial Service – Independence of Judiciary – Article 50 – Separation of Powers – Held: Judicial officers are not “employees” of the State – They discharge sovereign judicial functions – To debar them from open competition would offend the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers – Recruitment and control over the judiciary is insulated from legislative and executive interference – Reliance placed on State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640, and Registrar (Admn.), Orissa High Court v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, (1999) 7 SCC 725 [Paras 8–13, 33–35 per Sundresh, J.].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation – Constitutional Silence – Doctrine Explained – Absence of express qualification for in-service candidates under Article 233(2) is a deliberate constitutional silence – Framers left it to the discretion of High Courts and Governors under Articles 233–235 – Such silence is not a gap but an intentional flexibility to preserve the independence and adaptability of the judiciary – Principle discussed in Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 [Paras 14–16 per Sundresh, J.].

Interpretation of Constitution – Textual and Contextual Reading – Harmonious construction required – Interpretation must give meaning to every word – Article 233(2) must be read so as not to render the words “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” redundant – Applying Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, and RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 [Paras 114–125].

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Article 14 – Exclusion of Judicial Officers from Direct Recruitment – Held: Such exclusion would amount to unconstitutional classification and deny equal opportunity – Would also amount to reservation in favour of advocates – Broader competition enhances merit and efficiency in judiciary [Paras 19–23, 153–155].

Judiciary – Efficiency and Merit – Object of Recruitment – Purpose of direct recruitment is to secure best talent for judicial service – Open competition between advocates and in-service judges fosters excellence and efficiency – Observations in Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2013) 4 SCC 540, relied upon [Paras 149–151].

Administrative Law – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Accepted – Commission found that allowing in-service judges to compete would promote efficiency, improve discipline and remove frustration – Recommended amendment to Article 233 to formalise such eligibility – Recommendations relied upon to interpret Article 233 in a progressive manner [Paras 128–134].

Professional Ethics – Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules – Enrollment and Suspension – An advocate who joins judicial service only suspends right to practice; remains on Bar Roll – May resume practice after retirement – Such suspended status does not erase prior practice experience – Thus, judicial officers with pre-service Bar practice fulfil eligibility under Article 233(2) [Paras 140–145].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 29, 30, 33 read with BCI Rules – Continuous Experience – Candidate must have continuous seven years’ experience either as advocate or judicial officer, or combined, as on date of application – Discontinuous or interrupted practice not sufficient – Break in practice cannot be condoned [Paras 162–163].

Constitutional Law – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Reconsideration of Long-standing View – Held: Doctrine not inflexible – Earlier rulings in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985) 1 SCC 225, and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 misapplied Constitution Bench decisions in Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 123, and Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 35 – Earlier interpretation perpetuated injustice to judicial officers – Correct view restored – Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor expressly overruled [Paras 165–169, 172(vi)].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Prospective Application – New interpretation to operate prospectively – Past appointments and completed selections not disturbed, except where protected by interim orders [Para 170].

Appointment Rules – Directions – All existing State rules inconsistent with present interpretation quashed – States directed to frame or amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months – Uniform criteria to include combined seven-year experience, minimum age 35, and common competitive examination for advocates and judicial officers [Paras 174–175].

Separate Opinion – Per M.M. Sundresh, J. – Concurred with CJI – Emphasised that Article 233(1) itself covers both promotion and direct recruitment – Clause (2) provides qualification only for advocates – Constitutional silence permits High Court to fix eligibility for in-service candidates – Judicial independence and Article 14 mandate equal opportunity – Interpreting Article 233 to exclude in-service judges would violate basic structure and reduce judicial quality – Advocated open competition to secure excellence in judiciary [Paras 1–23].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Questions answered – In-service judicial officers with combined experience of seven years eligible to compete in direct recruitment for District Judges – Satya Narain Singh (1985) and Dheeraj Mor (2020) overruled – Directions issued to States and High Courts for rule amendment – Prospective application – No retrospective disturbance of existing appointments [Paras 172–175].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Complaint Against Trustee Without Trust as Party – Maintainability – Sections 138, 141, NI Act – Question whether complaint under NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without arraying the Trust as an accused – Held: A Trust is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued – It is an obligation, not an entity – Trustees alone are owners of trust property and must maintain and defend suits – Complaint maintainable directly against the Trustee who issued the cheque – No requirement to implead the Trust [Paras 23–29, 40–41].

Trusts Act – Legal Status of a Trust – Sections 3 and 13 – Trust lacks independent legal personality – Operates only through Trustees – Obligation to maintain and defend suits lies on Trustees, not the Trust – Trust cannot be equated with a “company” or “association of individuals” within the meaning of Section 141 NI Act – Trustees are answerable for acts done on behalf of Trust [Paras 22–27].

Vicarious Liability – Signatory of Dishonoured Cheque – Section 141 NI Act – Signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly responsible for the act and covered under Section 141(2) – No specific averment necessary regarding responsibility where accused is signatory or holds position analogous to Managing Director – Principle affirmed per SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 [Paras 17–20].

Juristic Person – Trust v. Company – Distinction – A Trust cannot be treated as equivalent to a company or corporate body for the purposes of NI Act – Trustees are liable in their individual capacities – Contrary High Court rulings equating Trusts with companies are erroneous and overruled [Paras 34–38].

Precedent – Co-equal Benches – Judicial Discipline – Later coordinate Benches cannot disregard earlier decisions of equal strength – If disagreement exists, reference must be made to larger Bench – Later Kerala HC ruling in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala (2023) held incorrect for ignoring binding coordinate decision in K.P. Shibu v. State of Kerala (2019) – Restatement of law from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh v. J&K National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 [Paras 32–33, 42–44].

Pending Reference – Effect of Larger Bench Referral – Though Pratibha Pratisthan v. Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712 is under reference to a Larger Bench (Tara Bai Desai Charitable Ophthalmic Trust Hospital v. Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., (2025) 3 SCC 80), it continues to hold the field till the Larger Bench decides otherwise – High Courts must follow prevailing law unless directed to await reference outcome [Paras 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing complaint under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside – Complaint restored against Trustee who issued cheque – Held: A Trust has no separate juristic existence; proceedings under NI Act maintainable directly against the Trustee/Chairman who signed the cheque. Directions issued for expeditious trial.

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Retrospective Application – Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000 – Petitioner convicted for murder committed in 1981 when he was aged 12 years and 5 months – Sessions Court had extended benefit under the Children’s Act, 1960 and sent him to a children’s home – His conviction restored by Supreme Court in 2009 after High Court acquittal – Petitioner re-arrested in 2022 and in custody for more than 3 years and 10 months – Held: By virtue of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal – Petitioner entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act as per Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan – Detention beyond 3 years is contrary to Section 15(1)(g) and violative of Article 21 [Paras 3, 9–13].

Children’s Act, 1960 – Section 24 – Joint Trial of Child and Adult Accused – No justification shown by the State for breach of Section 24 which prohibits joint trial of a child with non-children – Court notes that legislative safeguards under the Children’s Act were ignored by the trial court [Para 8].

Juvenile Justice – Period of Detention – Illegal Custody – Once the petitioner is found to have been a juvenile on the date of offence, continued incarceration beyond three years amounts to deprivation of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law – Detention beyond permissible period illegal [Paras 8, 13].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Protection of Personal Liberty – Continued custody of a person entitled to juvenile justice protection is unconstitutional – Breach of fundamental right to life and liberty warrants immediate release [Para 13].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioner directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case – Jail authorities to act on downloaded copy of judgment without insisting on certified copy [Paras 14–16].

Contract Law – Specific Performance – Agreement to Sell – Appeal against rejection of specific performance on ground of illegality – Plaintiff-bank entered into agreement to purchase 8 flats to be constructed on a 300 sq. yd. plot for ₹32.07 lakhs – Plaintiff paid ₹28.86 lakhs (about 90%) – Construction not completed – Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance – Trial Court decreed the suit, allowing performance to the extent possible under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act – Division Bench reversed, holding the agreement to be void for being contrary to building laws – Supreme Court upheld Division Bench’s view – Held: Construction of 8 flats was the essential object of the agreement – Since such construction was impermissible under prevailing building bye-laws, agreement was illegal and void – Courts cannot reframe or rewrite contracts to make them lawful – Specific performance rightly denied [Paras 1, 3.1, 5.2, 7.2, 11–13, 14–18, 19–25].

Illegality of Contract – Violation of Building Bye-laws – Agreement contemplated construction of 8–10 flats on 300 sq. yd. plot where only 2.5 units were permissible under 1983 Building Bye-laws – Both Trial Court and High Court found such construction illegal – Trial Court erroneously attempted to enforce the agreement by allowing construction of only 3 flats – Supreme Court held that courts cannot enforce a contract whose object is prohibited by law – Such agreement is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act – Held: Trial Court erred in modifying agreement and granting partial performance – Division Bench rightly reversed [Paras 5.2, 8.1, 8.2, 15–18, 23–25].

Specific Relief – Section 12 of Specific Relief Act – Partial performance – Applicability – Plaintiff invoked Section 12 and expressed willingness to accept modified performance (lesser number of flats) – Trial Court accepted and decreed partial performance – Supreme Court held that Section 12 does not permit enforcement when essential terms (construction of 8 flats) are removed – Construction was central to the contract – Courts cannot enforce only the lawful part if it involves removing core obligations – Such re-writing of contract is impermissible [Paras 6, 7.2, 19–22, 24–25].

Public Authority Conduct – Public Sector Bank – Due Diligence and Legality – Plaintiff being a nationalised bank was expected to act lawfully – Agreement entered into was contrary to law and in contravention of building bye-laws – Court observed that state instrumentalities are expected to avoid camouflage agreements and uphold legality – No equitable relief can be granted to a party engaged in illegal contractual arrangement, even if it is a public authority [Paras 8.2, 27].

Contract Interpretation – Essential Terms – Construction of Flats – Supreme Court emphasized that the core object of the agreement was construction and delivery of 8 flats – Clause 6 of agreement explicitly stated that Plaintiff was interested in acquiring the flats, not merely rights over land – Such construction being legally impermissible, the contract could not subsist – Held: Essential terms cannot be severed or ignored – Agreement not enforceable without its primary object [Paras 11–13, 24].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of Delhi High Court Division Bench affirmed – Specific performance rightly denied – Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Section 12 – Agreement declared unenforceable – Plaintiff entitled only to refund with interest as per contract – Each party to bear its own costs [Paras 26, 28].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Succession Law – Scheduled Tribes – Applicability of Hindu Succession Act – High Court's direction to extend inheritance rights under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to daughters in tribal areas of Himachal Pradesh – Held: Impermissible in law in absence of Central Government notification under Section 2(2) of the Act – Tribes remain governed by customary law unless notified – High Court's sweeping declaration lacked jurisdiction and was beyond scope of dispute – Direction expunged [Paras 3-6]

Tribal Custom – Judicial Overreach – Hindu Succession Act expressly excluded Scheduled Tribes unless notified otherwise – High Court's pronouncement was uncalled for as issue neither directly nor substantially involved in the appeal – Supreme Court reiterates settled position in Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125, and State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 – Held: Law must evolve, but evolution must come via legislative process, not judicial fiat [Paras 4-5]

Article 342 – Constitutional Scheme – Notification Requirement – Scheduled Tribe status and de-notification must flow from Presidential notification – No such notification shown in present case – Courts cannot presume applicability of personal laws where exclusion is legislatively preserved [Paras 4]

Obiter Dicta – Binding Nature – High Court’s observations in paragraph 63 not founded on pleadings or issues framed – Held: Directions not sustainable – Supreme Court orders expunction of Paragraph 63 from the High Court judgment [Paras 5-6]

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Direction in paragraph 63 of the impugned judgment dated 23.06.2015 expunged – No costs – Pending applications also disposed of.

Criminal Law – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Anticipatory Bail – Bar under Section 18 – Applicability to Accused Added under Section 319 CrPC – Jurisdiction of High Court – Respondent added as accused under Section 319 CrPC in case involving offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act – High Court granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC – Held: Once summoned under Section 319 CrPC, the respondent assumes status of an accused for all offences in the case, including those under the 1989 Act – Bar under Section 18 on consideration of anticipatory bail applies – High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant anticipatory bail in absence of a finding that no prima facie case under the 1989 Act was made out – Order granting anticipatory bail unsustainable [Paras 4–10].

Criminal Procedure – Section 319 CrPC – Effect of Summoning Order – Scope – Where the order summoning the accused under Section 319 CrPC was not under challenge before the High Court, its validity could not be tested incidentally in anticipatory bail proceedings – High Court erred in overlooking the binding nature of the summoning order [Paras 5, 10].

Judicial Review – Scope under Section 438 CrPC – Limits in presence of Statutory Bar – In offences under the SC/ST Act, anticipatory bail is impermissible unless the Court first records a finding that no prima facie case under the Act exists – Mere allegations of false implication insufficient to dilute the statutory bar [Paras 7, 10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside – Respondent at liberty to appear before Trial Court and seek regular bail, to be considered expeditiously in accordance with law [Paras 10–11].

Electricity Act – Theft of Energy – Presumption under Section 39 – Use of Artificial Means Not Established – Reversal of Acquittal Unwarranted – Accused, a company director, was convicted by High Court under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act on the basis of alleged tampering with the meter box and abnormal electricity consumption – Supreme Court held: Presumption under Section 39 arises only when existence of artificial means is proved – Evidence by prosecution witnesses including MSEB officials lacked certainty – Witnesses relied on approximations and inferences – No direct proof of tampering or dishonest abstraction of energy – Presumption under Section 39 not triggered – Conviction not sustainable [Paras 13–15].

Electricity Act – Meter Tampering – Section 44 – Insufficient Proof – Conviction Reversed – High Court invoked Section 44(c) against accused based on existence of holes in meter box – Supreme Court held: No evidence that holes were made or used by accused or his company – No witness saw accused or staff interfering with meter – No conclusive evidence of fraudulent alteration or use of energy – Charge under Section 44 not established beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to accused [Paras 16–17].

Criminal Law – Reversal of Acquittal – Standards for Interference – High Court Must Show Perverse Findings or Miscarriage of Justice – Supreme Court reiterated that reversal of acquittal requires strong reasons such as perversity or grave miscarriage of justice – Trial Court had correctly evaluated lack of concrete evidence – High Court erred in reversing acquittal without compelling grounds – Appeal allowed, acquittal restored [Paras 11–12, 17].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment dated 15/10/2010 convicting appellant under Sections 39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications disposed of [Para 17].