Criminal Law – Defamation – Freedom of Speech – Court examined the legality of FIR of offences under Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504, 34, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the appellant, the director of an e-newspaper, for allegedly publishing defamatory content. The bench evaluated the applicability of these provisions in the context of freedom of speech and the threshold for constituting offences of defamation and incitement. [Paras 2, 8-10, 22-24, 26-28]

Test of Cognizable Offence – evaluated – considered whether the contents of the news report published in the e-newspaper Parvatjan constituted a cognizable offence warranting investigation. The court scrutinized the allegations within the FIR and the legal requirements for the offences alleged. [Para 22-24, 26-31]

Freedom of Speech and Expression – upheld – affirmed the importance of freedom of speech, emphasizing that not every offensive statement qualifies as defamation or incitement to disharmony under the IPC. The Court delineated the boundaries between lawful expression and criminal conduct. [Para 14-17, 26, 28-30]

Decision – Quashing of FIR – The Supreme Court quashed FIR No. 31 of 2020, finding no substantial basis for the alleged offences. It held that the news article in question did not meet the criteria for offences under Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504, 34, and 120B of the IPC, thereby safeguarding the appellant's right to freedom of speech. [Para 33-34

Civil Law – Adverse Possession – Inadequate Pleadings and Proof –Court, in this case, clarified the legal principles governing the claim of adverse possession. The Court emphasized that such a claim requires adequate pleadings and proof, including the establishment of continuous, peaceful, and open possession adverse to the true owner for over twelve years. [Para 9, 12-16]

Evidence – Adverse Possession – Necessity of Specific Pleadings and Clear Proof – It was held that for a successful claim of adverse possession, the claimant must specifically plead and prove certain essential elements. These include demonstrating the exact time from which possession commenced, that it was known to the true owner, and that it was open and uninterrupted. The Court found that the appellant failed to establish these crucial facts. [Para 13, 16]

Probate and Letters of Administration – Importance in Claiming Rights Based on Wills – The Court discussed the necessity of obtaining probate or letters of administration to claim rights based on wills, particularly in Chennai. The judgment underscored the legal requirement of these formalities to establish rights under a will. [Para 8, 16]

Dismissal of Appeals and Extended Time for Vacating Property – Court dismissed the appeals due to failure to establish adverse possession but granted the appellant until 31st March 2025 to vacate the property, conditional on filing undertakings on oath by the appellant and his adult family members [Paras 16-18].

Late Payment Surcharge Dispute – Request for payment of Rs.1376.35 crore as LPS by Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL) from Rajasthan Discoms under PPA-2010 – Applicant relies on Article 8.3.5 of the PPA-2010 – Main appeal related to additional payment claims under PPA-2010 due to change in law was previously disposed of [Paras 2, 4].

Judicial History – The Supreme Court's 2020 judgment in the main appeal held APRL entitled to compensation due to change in law but capped interest for late payment surcharge at 9% per annum – Contempt proceedings in 2022 led to direction for payment of principal amount with capped interest, without addressing LPS specifically [Paras 3-7, 67].

Application Dismissed – The Court ruled that the Miscellaneous Application for LPS is not maintainable as the main judgment had conclusively dealt with issues around LPS – Emphasized on the improper use of Miscellaneous Applications to alter or modify concluded judgments – Costs imposed on the applicant for multiple hearings [Paras 8-23].

Electricity Act, 2003 - Payment of Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) - The Supreme Court deliberated on the claim of Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL) for a Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) from the Rajasthan Discoms, as per the Power Purchase Agreement dated 28.01.2010. The main issue revolved around the non-payment of LPS by the Rajasthan Discoms, following a change in law clause under the agreement.

Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and Late Payment Surcharge – Discussion – The Court focused on the interpretation of Article 8.3.5 of the PPA and its application, considering the context of late payment for electricity supplied by APRL under changed conditions due to non-availability of domestic coal and subsequent reliance on imported coal. [Para 3, 4, 66, 67]

Judicial Review and Interpretation – Limited Scope – The Court reiterated its limited scope in reviewing and interpreting contractual obligations under a Power Purchase Agreement, emphasizing on the specific clauses and the context of their execution. The court also reviewed previous judgments and APTEL's findings on the matter. [Para 5, 6, 14, 20]

Decision – Dismissal of Application – The Court dismissed the application filed by APRL seeking LPS, noting that the issue had been addressed in the earlier judgment, and no grounds for review or reinterpretation were established. The Court further imposed costs on APRL for the miscellaneous application. [Para 23]

Decision – Imposition of Costs – The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on the applicant (APRL) to be remitted to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, citing the multiple listings of the application and the need to discourage such repetitive and non-meritorious litigation. [Para 23]

Criminal Law - Unlawful Detention and Assault by Police - Compensation and Accountability - legality and repercussions of the actions of police officers, especially in relation to the unlawful detention and assault of the appellant, Somnath, by respondent no.2, a police officer. The appellant was subjected to undignified treatment, including being paraded half-naked, and was detained illegally despite being granted bail. The Court examined the accountability of police officers and the appropriate compensation for the appellant. [Para 7-9, 21]

Abuse of Power by Police – Held – The Court condemned the high-handed actions of the respondent no.2, emphasizing that such misuse of power and violation of the appellant’s dignity and rights were inexcusable. The Court noted that respondent no.2 had abused his official position and acted in contravention of the principles set forth in landmark judgments like D K Basu v State of West Bengal and Sube Singh v State of Haryana, which lay down guidelines for the treatment of detainees. [Para 15, 21]

Compensation for Violation of Rights – Awarded – The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, with modifications, ordering respondent no.2 to pay a total compensation of Rs.1,75,000 to the appellant. This included Rs.75,000 as per the High Court's judgment and an additional Rs.1,00,000 as directed by the Supreme Court. The Court also acknowledged the appellant’s receipt of Rs.25,000 from the National Human Rights Commission. [Para 21-22]

Criminal Proceedings Against Police Officer – Declined – The Court refrained from directing criminal proceedings against respondent no.2, who had retired and complied with the compensation orders. However, it expressed a zero-tolerance policy towards such acts of misconduct by those in power and highlighted the importance of balancing justice with mercy in peculiar circumstances. [Para 23]

Directive to Police Forces – Court issued a general directive to police forces across States and Union Territories, emphasizing the need to adhere strictly to constitutional and statutory safeguards, as well as additional guidelines laid down by the Court, when arresting and detaining individuals. This directive was in line with earlier judgments aiming to protect individual dignity and prevent misuse of police authority. [Para 24]

Decision - The appeal was disposed of by upholding the High Court’s judgment with modifications concerning compensation, and emphasized the necessity for police forces to strictly adhere to legal and constitutional guidelines in the exercise of their duties. [Para 22, 24]

Criminal Law – Fair Trial – Right to Legal Representation –Court examined whether the trial procedure adopted by the Trial Court in the absence of legal representation for the appellants adhered to the principles of a fair trial. The Court scrutinized the conduct of the Trial Court in recording examination-in-chief of prosecution witnesses without providing legal aid to unrepresented appellants. [Para 3-7]

Criminal Procedure – Section 242 of Cr.PC – Examination of Witnesses – Discussed – Emphasized the importance of adhering to the normal rule of witness examination as per Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Court highlighted the irregularity in the Trial Court's approach in deferring cross-examination and not following the proviso to Section 242(3) of the Cr.PC. [Para 6]

Right to Counsel – Violation – Held – The absence of legal representation for the appellants during the examination-in-chief of prosecution witnesses constituted a violation of the appellants' right to a fair trial. The Court noted the Trial Court’s failure to appoint a legal aid lawyer for the appellants. [Para 5, 10]

Decision – Bail Granted – Considering the nature of the offences, duration of custody, and the procedural irregularities during the trial, the Court granted bail to the appellants subject to stringent conditions including the surrender of passports. [Para 8, 11(i)-(iii)]

Direction for De Novo Trial – The Court ordered a fresh trial (de novo) with the re-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Directed the Trial Court to ensure the appointment of a legal aid lawyer for the appellants, adhering to fair trial principles. [Para 9, 11(iv)-(v)]

Criminal Appeal – Outcome – The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeals, mandating a re-trial with proper legal representation for the appellants and setting terms for their bail. [Para 11]

Challenge to High Court Order – Appeal against Karnataka High Court's order quashing proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. against the accused for offences under IPC and SC/ST Act – High Court found inconsistencies in the complainant's statements and lack of evidence for the forced abortion [Paras 2, 7, 9, 15].

Factual Background – Alleged sexual relationship under the promise of marriage, resulting in pregnancy and subsequent abortion – Complaint involved accusations against the partner and his family members under IPC and SC/ST Act [Paras 3.1-3.6].

Changed Narrative and Inconsistencies – Shift in complainant's narrative regarding the abortion – Initially claimed hospitalization for abortion, later altered to consumption of Ayurvedic medicine leading to abortion – Statement of doctor from Krishna Nursing Home refuting complainant’s claims of hospital visit [Paras 3.4, 9].

Legal Principles on Consensual Relationships and Promise of Marriage – Court discussed criteria for determining consent and false promise of marriage in sexual relationships, referencing Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh cases [Paras 11, 13, 16].

Application of Bhajan Lal Guidelines – Application of guidelines from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for quashing proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – High Court's decision found to fit under categories of allegations that do not constitute an offence or are absurd or inherently improbable [Paras 17, 18].

Decision – Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to quash the proceedings against the accused as no sufficient grounds were found for the case to proceed [Paras 18, 19].

Bail - Criminal Law – Money Laundering – Proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) – Involvement in Money Laundering – The Supreme Court examined the involvement of the appellants in the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the PMLA. The bench evaluated evidence, including statements and documents submitted under Section 50 of the Act, revealing the appellants' roles in acquiring and controlling proceeds of crime through various companies. [Para 22-28]

Definition and Scope of Money Laundering – Clarified – The Court elucidated the definition of money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA, emphasizing its broad scope that encapsulates every activity related to dealing with the proceeds of crime. The Court clarified that mere possession of undisclosed income, irrespective of its volume, does not automatically attract the definition of 'proceeds of crime' unless linked to a scheduled offence. [Para 21, 22]

Beneficial Ownership – Involvement in Money Laundering – The Court found that the appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain, by virtue of being the beneficial owner of the companies involved, was responsible for orchestrating accommodation entries amounting to Rs. 4.81 crores, indicating his direct involvement in money laundering activities. [Para 25, 26]

Income Declaration Scheme (IDS) – Misrepresentation of Facts – The appellants, Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain, were found to have made false declarations under IDS, misleading the Income Tax authorities to shield the primary appellant, Satyendar Kumar Jain. This act was linked to assisting in money laundering under the PMLA. [Para 26-29]

Decision – Dismissal of Bail Applications – The Court dismissed the appeals, finding the appellants prima facie guilty of the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of PMLA. The appellants failed to satisfy the twin conditions of Section 45 of PMLA for grant of bail. [Para 30-34]

Judgment: Bail Denied – The Supreme Court denied bail to the appellants, reaffirming their prima facie involvement in money laundering and the seriousness of the allegations under PMLA. The Court underscored the necessity to meet stringent conditions for bail under special laws like PMLA. [Para 32-34]

Decision: Appeals of Satyendar Kumar Jain, Ankush Jain, and Vaibhav Jain dismissed – Denial of bail upheld by the Supreme Court – Appellants failed to satisfy conditions for bail under Section 45 of PMLA – Satyendar Kumar Jain directed to surrender forthwith. [Paras 30-34]

Criminal Law – Murder and Attempt to Murder – Acquittal – The Supreme Court overturned the convictions for murder under Section 302 and attempt to murder under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellants, Periyasamy (A1) and R. Manoharan (A2), were acquitted of all charges. The Court found inconsistencies in witness testimonies, absence of independent witnesses, delay in filing the FIR, lapses in the police investigation, and lack of corroborative medical and scientific evidence. [Para 48, 49, 50]

Evidence – Testimony of Injured and Interested Witnesses – The Court held that the testimonies of the injured witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) and the Investigating Officer (PW-22) were not credible. The Court observed that despite being in a crowded area, no independent witnesses were examined, and the investigation failed to meet the standard of scrutiny applied in criminal proceedings. [Para 31, 33, 36, 43, 47]

Faulty Police Investigation – The Court criticized the police investigation for its casual and callous approach, noting the absence of scientific investigation at the crime scene, non-examination of critical medical personnel, and failure to provide a clear sequence of events leading to the arrests. [Para 22, 43, 44, 47]

Right of Private Defence – Although raised as a secondary argument by A-1, the Court did not delve into the question of the right of private defence due to the acquittal based on the primary arguments. [Para 49]

Decision – Acquittal – The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the convictions of A-1 and A-2, directing their immediate release unless required in any other case. The Court underscored the principle that criminal convictions must be based on evidence that meets the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, which was not met in this case. [Para 50]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 143A – Exercise of Power – Discretionary nature – Held, the exercise of power under Section 143A(1) is discretionary, not mandatory. The Court must engage in a prima facie evaluation of the merits of the case and consider the accused’s financial distress and other relevant factors before directing payment of interim compensation. The word ‘may’ in the provision cannot be read as ‘shall’. [Para 19(a)]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 143A – Factors for Consideration – In determining whether to grant interim compensation, the Court should evaluate the merits of the complaint, the strength of the defence, the nature of the transaction, and the relationship between the parties. The Court must record reasons for its decision, considering all relevant factors, including financial distress of the accused. [Para 19(b), (c)]

Decision – Directive for Reconsideration of Interim Compensation – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the lower courts for lack of proper application of mind to relevant factors and directed the Trial Court to reconsider the application for interim compensation afresh in line with the principles laid down. [Para 18, 19]

Decision – Partly Allowed Appeal – The appeal was partly allowed, emphasizing the need for judicial discretion and consideration of various factors in granting interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. [Para 20]