Resolution Plan – Approval – IBC, 2016 – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant, Noida Special Economic Zone Authority, contested the reduced allocation in the approved resolution plan for recovering dues from the corporate debtor and challenged procedural and statutory non-compliance. Held: The Committee of Creditors (CoC)’s approval of the resolution plan falls within its commercial discretion, and courts must not intervene absent statutory violations. The appellant’s claim was rightly addressed within the plan's framework, and the plan's terms were found to conform to legal requirements, including IBC's prioritization over SEZ Act obligations [Paras 10, 20, 32-35].

Overriding Effect of IBC over SEZ Act – Section 238 of IBC – The Court confirmed that IBC’s provisions supersede those of the SEZ Act where conflicts arise. The appellant’s demands for additional fees and statutory payments were deemed subordinate to the approved resolution plan under Section 238, validating SEZ payment exemptions granted to the resolution applicant. The SEZ provisions must yield where they conflict with IBC objectives of corporate resolution [Para 27].

Valuation Dispute – Limited Judicial Review – Addressing the appellant’s challenge to asset valuation, the Court reaffirmed that valuation under IBC is a factual determination within the CoC’s purview, insulated from judicial review barring procedural breaches. The CoC had reasonably adopted a fair market value assessment, consistent with Section 35 of IBC [Para 24].

Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Judicial Restraint – The Court underscored the principle of non-interference with the CoC’s commercial decisions, affirming that statutory guidelines limit judicial oversight to instances of illegality. Here, the CoC’s financial determinations, including treatment of operational creditors, followed the prescribed IBC process and required no intervention [Paras 31, 36].

Exemptions from Statutory Payments in Resolution Plan – Appellant’s claim that the resolution plan contravened SEZ guidelines on transfer fees was dismissed, with the Court upholding that CoC-approved exemptions are binding under IBC. The judgment reinforced that any demand conflicting with the resolution’s framework post-approval is non-maintainable [Para 28].

Decision:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the NCLAT judgment dated 14.02.2022 and the preceding NCLT orders, upholding the resolution plan’s validity and its allocation scheme. The Court emphasized that IBC's overriding provisions preclude additional demands by operational creditors post-resolution. The resolution plan’s implementation, including payment to the appellant, was confirmed as lawful and conclusive.

Permanent Disability Compensation – Assessment under Motor Vehicles Act – Appeal Partly Allowed – The appellant, a minor who suffered 75% permanent disability from a vehicular accident, challenged the compensation determined by the MACT and later enhanced by the High Court. Held: The Supreme Court recalculated the compensation based on a more appropriate income estimation for loss of future earnings, increased future medical expenses, and included lifetime attendant charges. The total compensation was increased to ₹34,07,771/- with 7.5% interest from the date of the claim [Paras 10-14, 16].

Calculation of Notional Income for Child Victim – Determining Loss of Earnings and Future Prospects – Following the precedent in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, the Court applied the minimum wages for a skilled worker to assess loss of earnings for a school-going child rather than unskilled labor wages. This approach accounted for probable educational progress and potential income, fixing the notional monthly income at ₹5,250/- and adding 40% towards future prospects [Paras 11-13].

Attendant Charges and Future Medical Expenses – Life-long Assistance Requirement – Given the appellant’s extensive disability, the Court recognized a need for lifelong attendant support and applied the multiplier method to award ₹9 lakh for attendant charges. The Court also increased future medical expenses to ₹5 lakh, considering the appellant’s ongoing care requirements [Paras 12-14].

Interest and Fund Allocation for Sustained Support – The awarded sum is subject to interest at 7.5% per annum from the claim date, with instructions for placement in fixed deposits to maximize returns. Monthly interest proceeds are to be made accessible, with options for additional withdrawal upon proving necessity before the MACT [Para 15].

Decision: The appeal is allowed to the extent of enhancing the compensation to ₹34,07,771/-. The insurance company is directed to pay interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing the claim until deposit with the MACT. The deposited amount is to be invested in fixed deposits to ensure the appellant’s long-term welfare, with provisions for accessing funds as needed.

Criminal Law – Murder – Appeal against conviction - Circumstantial Evidence – Requirement of a Complete Chain – Appeal Allowed – The appellant was convicted for murder and disposing of evidence under Sections 302 and 201 IPC based on circumstantial evidence alone. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the evidence constituted a complete and conclusive chain that pointed solely to the appellant's guilt. Held: Conviction based on circumstantial evidence demands an unbroken chain leading to no other plausible explanation but the accused's guilt. Here, discrepancies in witness testimony, questionable recovery evidence, and the prosecution’s failure to prove critical facts undermined the chain of evidence and warranted acquittal [Paras 26-32, 42-45].

Key Principles in Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel Principles – Relying on Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., the Court underscored that suspicion cannot substitute proof. For conviction, each link in the evidence chain must conclusively establish guilt. The Court further stressed that any break or inconsistency in circumstantial evidence entitles the accused to benefit of doubt, aligning with established judicial principles [Paras 26-28].

Last Seen Theory – Insufficient Corroboration – The prosecution’s case leaned on the last seen theory, contending that the appellant was the last to be seen with the deceased. The Court held that the time gap and lack of corroborating evidence between the last sighting and discovery of the body introduced doubt, highlighting that such cases require tight proximity and supporting evidence to preclude alternative explanations [Para 28].

Recovery of Alleged Murder Weapon and Other Articles – Lack of Credible Evidence – The prosecution's recovery of the alleged murder weapon and blood-stained items was found unreliable due to procedural lapses and inconsistent testimony. Witnesses contradicted each other, some claiming that police obtained evidence off-site rather than directly from the appellant’s possession, further casting doubt on the integrity of the recovery evidence [Paras 34-37].

Acquittal in Cases with Doubts in Evidence – Gaps in Proof Benefit the Accused – Following precedents, the Court reinforced that circumstantial evidence must unequivocally establish guilt; any gaps favor the accused. Here, inconsistencies in witness accounts and procedural ambiguities in the prosecution’s evidence led to acquittal, underscoring that conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 41-45].

Decision:

The appeal is allowed, and the judgments of the High Court and Sessions Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish a conclusive chain of circumstantial evidence. If the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds and sureties are discharged, and he is to be released immediately.

Second Complaint – Maintainability – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Appeal Allowed – The issue involved whether the second complaint, filed with the same allegations as a previously dismissed complaint following acceptance of a final police report, was maintainable. Held: A second complaint on identical facts is generally not maintainable when the first was disposed of on merits unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. The Court upheld the Chief Judicial Magistrate's order dismissing the second complaint, determining that it mirrored the original complaint in both facts and allegations and did not introduce new grounds [Paras 5, 20, 31-32].

Interpretation of Section 300 Cr.P.C. – Application of Double Jeopardy Principles – 'Autrefois Acquit' and 'Autrefois Convict' – Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. invokes the doctrine of double jeopardy, barring a subsequent trial for the same offense if previously tried. However, the Court held this principle inapplicable here as no trial or acquittal/conviction occurred under the initial complaint. Reiterated that procedural dismissals do not constitute acquittal or bar further proceedings unless substantive judgment is reached on identical allegations [Para 9].

Magistrate's Discretion on Protest Petitions – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 156(3), 173, and 202 – No Blanket Bar on Second Complaint – Reviewed four options available to a Magistrate upon receiving a negative report: (1) accepting and closing proceedings; (2) ordering further investigation; (3) conducting or delegating investigation; or (4) taking cognizance as a private complaint. Noted that while second complaints are permissible in limited situations, they require new facts or exceptional justification, which was not presented in this case [Para 12].

Exceptional Circumstances Standard – Absence of New Evidence or Miscarriage in Initial Complaint – The Court emphasized that maintaining repeated complaints requires evidence of exceptional circumstances, such as new facts or procedural errors in the initial handling. Here, the second complaint did not present new evidence or allege factual misunderstandings, and hence failed to meet the standard for exceptional circumstances [Paras 16, 25, 31].

Decision - Judicial Finality and Preventing Abuse of Process – Court affirmed the dismissal of repetitive litigation tactics, emphasizing the judiciary's responsibility to curb frustrated or malicious litigants from repeatedly challenging procedural orders absent substantial grounds. Noted this approach safeguards judicial resources and protects individuals from harassment through legal process [Para 32].
 

Civil Law – Mega Power Policy and Change in Law – Press Release as Binding Legal Instrument – Appeal Dismissed - Mega Power Status and Notification Requirements – Appellants contended that the 01.10.2009 press release announcing the Union Cabinet's decision on the revised Mega Power Policy constituted a legally binding "Change in Law" under Clause 13 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – The Supreme Court rejected this view, affirming that a press release does not enact or modify existing law and lacks the necessary formalities of a notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act – Held: The extant legal regime was modified only on 11.12.2009 and 14.12.2009 with the issuance of the official notifications and policy documents [Paras 42, 55, 57].

Interpretation of "Law" and "Order" in the PPA – The definition of "Law" in the PPA requires that any change must be implemented through a formally recognized instrument, such as a notification, for it to qualify as a legal enactment – Court held that the term "order" under the PPA did not extend to an informal announcement like a press release – The 01.10.2009 press release was deemed a statement of intent rather than a formal order or legally binding change [Paras 39-43, 48].

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel – Argument of estoppel advanced by appellants asserting reliance on the press release in their bid submission was rejected – Court found the doctrine inapplicable since PSPCL (respondent) was not the promisor of any customs duty concession – Additionally, the Union of India, as the entity capable of conferring such benefits, was not a party to the agreement, making promissory estoppel inapplicable in inter-party disputes under the PPA [Para 65].

Business Efficacy Test and Clause 13 – Appellants invoked business efficacy to assert that the press release should be treated as law to prevent commercial detriment – Supreme Court clarified that business efficacy cannot override explicit terms of the PPA, which clearly define "Law" and prescribe specific enactment requirements for changes in law – The business efficacy test cannot contradict the express terms, and here the PPA’s requirements were clear and did not accommodate the appellants’ interpretation [Paras 41, 63-64].

Doctrine of Legal Certainty – Supreme Court underscored the principle of legal certainty as fundamental to the rule of law – Held: Allowing a press release to alter legally enforceable terms without official notification would create dual, conflicting legal regimes, which undermines predictability and certainty in contractual obligations – Court emphasized that the formal requirements under the Customs Act and the General Clauses Act must be met for a change in law to be recognized [Paras 58-61].

Notification and Official Gazette Requirements – Section 25(1) of the Customs Act mandates that exemptions must be notified in the Official Gazette – The Court highlighted the importance of compliance with procedural requirements, ruling that the absence of such formal publication invalidates any claim of legal change based on informal announcements or press releases [Paras 50-51].

Decision – Appeal dismissed, with the Court affirming that no "Change in Law" occurred as of 01.10.2009 – Concurrent findings of the lower tribunals upheld, and the appellants' request for benefits based on the press release was denied – PSPCL entitled to adjustments in tariff for the benefits accrued from the formal change in law on 11.12.2009 [Paras 72-73].

Eligibility for Public Employment – Requirement of CCC Certificate at Interview Stage – Termination of Candidates' Services Deemed Arbitrary – Candidates selected under the 2014 recruitment for the post of Technician Grade-II in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited challenged their termination on the ground that they fulfilled the CCC (Computer Concepts Course) certification requirement at the time of interview, as stipulated in the Corporation’s regulations – Held: Candidates possessing CCC certificates by the interview stage were eligible, and their termination by the Corporation based on the lack of the certificate by the application deadline was erroneous – Court directed reinstatement of candidates meeting the CCC certification requirements at interview stage [Paras 15-16, 26].

Role of Recognized Certification in Public Appointments – Compliance with Article 16 and Requirement of DOEACC/NIELIT Certification – The requirement of a CCC certificate by DOEACC/NIELIT was deemed necessary for entry into public service under Article 16 – Court upheld that self-certification of equivalency was inadequate and that recognized certifications from DOEACC/NIELIT or equivalent qualifications should govern eligibility – Equivalence of certificates must follow formal inquiry and standards; informal certifications were disallowed [Paras 14-15, 19-20].

Interpretation of Advertisement and Service Regulations – Validity of CCC Certification Obtained Before Interview Date – Division Bench’s Order Overturned – Despite conflicting stances by the Corporation, the Court found that the 2014 advertisement and the 1995 Regulations mandated CCC certification only by the interview date – The Court dismissed the contention that the last date for application controlled eligibility, ruling that eligibility compliance at interview suffices under the amended service regulations [Paras 24-25, 27].

Doctrine of Legal Consistency – Contradictory Positions of Respondent Corporation – Respondent Corporation’s shifting stances on eligibility, first accepting DOEACC/NIELIT and later rejecting equivalent self-certified qualifications, constituted a breach of consistent legal approach in hiring practices – Court exercised Article 142 powers to rectify Corporation’s misinterpretation, ruling that candidates were entitled to continued service if CCC certified by interview date [Paras 23, 28].

Equitable Relief Under Article 142 of the Constitution – Reinstatement Without Back Wages but With Service Continuity – Recognizing the misinterpretation of eligibility standards by the Corporation, the Court exercised Article 142 to reinstate the applicants without back wages, but with continuity of service and placement in the seniority list as per the original select list – Relief limited to non-back wage compensation but includes seniority and consequential benefits [Para 29].

Decision:

Appeal allowed, with the Supreme Court ordering the reinstatement of candidates who had obtained the CCC certificate by the interview date, rejecting the Corporation’s termination based on application date eligibility. Candidates were denied back wages but granted continuity in service and benefits, including seniority adjustments, as per the 2015 select list [Para 30].

Secularism and Minority Rights – Constitutional Validity of Madarsa Act – The Court analyzed whether the Madarsa Act violates secularism, a core principle of the Constitution, by establishing a board that regulates Islamic educational institutions – Held: The Act, being regulatory and aiming at educational standardization, does not per se contravene secularism if balanced with minority rights under Article 30. However, provisions granting legislative discretion in the membership structure were adjusted to reinforce neutrality and inclusivity. The Act remains largely valid under Entry 25, List III [Paras 29-45, 51].

Legislative Competence – Entry 25, List III vis-à-vis Entry 66, List I – The Act’s provisions were scrutinized for potential overlap with the UGC’s powers under Entry 66, List I, particularly concerning higher education standards – Held: State law is constitutionally valid under Entry 25, List III for primary and secondary education; higher education must comply with UGC standards without contravening Entry 66, List I. Only provisions that exceed state competence or conflict with UGC norms require revision [Paras 54-59].

Right to Education – Exemption of Madarsas from the RTE Act – Section 1(5) of the RTE Act exempts religious institutions, including madarsas, from compliance – Held: While exclusion of madarsas from the RTE Act is constitutional, States should ensure curriculum standards and educational quality to facilitate secular and skill-based learning for greater integration of minority students into the broader socio-economic framework [Paras 25-28].

Equality and Non-Discrimination – Article 14 and Discrimination based on Religion – The composition of the Madarsa Board, largely drawn from members of a specific religious community, was challenged for violating Article 14’s equality mandate – Held: The selection process is permitted under Article 30 but requires adjustments to include educational experts regardless of religious affiliation to maintain neutrality in regulatory oversight [Paras 36-39].

Right to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions – Article 30 and Minority Rights – The Court examined whether the Act infringes upon the minority community's rights to administer educational institutions – Held: Regulation by the State is constitutionally sound as it aims to enhance educational quality while respecting minority rights under Article 30 [Paras 41-45].

Judgment – Legislation Upheld with Modifications – The Court upheld the Madarsa Act with stipulations to ensure adherence to secular principles in governance while allowing state oversight for standardizing educational standards in minority institutions [Paras 69-70].
 

Judicial Independence – Financial Independence of Judges – Non-discrimination based on Source of Appointment – Held: High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source (Bar or judicial service), are entitled to uniform financial benefits to maintain judicial independence – Differentiation between judges based on their pre-appointment service violates Articles 14 and 217 – Directed all judges to have access to the General Provident Fund – The communication dated 13 December 2022 was quashed as unconstitutional [Paras 10-20].

Provident Fund – Section 20 of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 – Scope of Proviso – Mandate to extend GPF benefits to all judges of the High Court – Proviso interpreted as preserving benefits accrued before High Court appointment without creating a discriminatory regime – Directed refund of New Pension Scheme contributions and opening of GPF accounts for petitioners [Paras 22-28].

Constitutional Interpretation – Uniform Service Conditions – Financial Security as Integral to Judicial Independence – Emphasized: Salaries, allowances, and pensions of High Court judges determined by parliamentary enactments to ensure uniformity – Article 221 prohibits discriminatory service terms – Equality in post-retirement benefits like GPF underlines judiciary’s homogeneity [Paras 30-33].

Decision: The petitions were allowed, directing that:

A General Provident Fund account be opened for the petitioners, effective from their date of appointment as High Court judges.

Contributions under the New Pension Scheme be refunded to petitioners within four weeks.

The impugned communication dated 13 December 2022 be quashed.

Service Law - Recruitment Qualification – Prescribed vs. Equivalent Qualifications – Rule Interpretation – The qualification specified for the post of LDC was a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from an approved institution. The Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) initially took a strict stance against recognizing higher qualifications, such as a Diploma in Computer Applications (DCA), as equivalent. The Court held that the Rules of 2011 did not provide for an equivalent qualification to the prescribed certificate, thus precluding DCA and similar qualifications – Held: The prescribed qualification requirement is limited to specific certificate holders, and the equivalence pertains only to the institution, not the qualification [Paras 15-17].

Doctrine of Estoppel – Consistent Stance Required from Public Bodies – The Court observed that the KPSC's inconsistent stance—initially opposing and later supporting the inclusion of DCA holders—led to protracted litigation. The KPSC, a statutory authority, was expected to maintain consistency and transparency in its actions, as inconsistent positions undermine the predictability required under the rule of law – Held: The KPSC is estopped from changing its stance on the eligibility of DCA holders after previously asserting that DCA was not a valid qualification [Paras 20, 24-27].

Equivalence of Higher Qualifications – Requirement of Foundational Inquiry – The Court held that the KPSC failed to conduct a foundational inquiry into whether higher qualifications like DCA presuppose the skills imparted by the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation. The KPSC’s assumption that higher computer-related degrees or diplomas automatically included data entry and office automation skills was arbitrary and unsupported by evidence – Held: KPSC’s decision to treat DCA as equivalent to the prescribed certificate without inquiry was arbitrary and lacked rational basis [Paras 21-23].

Rule of Law – Importance of Predictability and Consistency – The Court emphasized that public authorities must act with consistency to uphold citizens' expectations of fairness and stability in decision-making. Citing the principles of regularity and predictability, the Court criticized the KPSC's arbitrary shift in position, as it resulted in needless litigation and uncertainty for affected candidates – Held: The KPSC’s deviation from its initial stance without public interest justification violates the principles of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution [Para 26].

Procedural Fairness – Representation of Interested Parties – The Court rejected the appellants' contention that all affected candidates had not been impleaded, noting that over 100 candidates with DCA or higher qualifications were already parties, which was sufficient representation of their collective interest. The Court held that the purpose of Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules is to ensure representation of affected persons, not to delay proceedings by requiring individual impleadment of each candidate – Held: No merit in the argument of non-impleadment due to sufficient representation of the affected group [Para 11].

Decision – The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s decision to exclude candidates with DCA or higher qualifications from the LDC selection process, affirming that only those with the prescribed qualification were eligible. The appeals were dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs [Paras 28].