Panchayati Raj – Scheduled Areas – 100% Reservation for Chairpersons – Constitutional Validity – Article 243M(4)(b), PESA Act, 1996 – Sections 21(B), 40(B), 55(B) of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 – High Court held cent-percent reservation of Chairperson posts unconstitutional as excessive and violative of Article 14 – Supreme Court reversed – Held: Parliament under Article 243M(4)(b) empowered to enact exceptions for Scheduled Areas – Reservation of all Chairperson posts for Scheduled Tribes justified by historical disadvantage and need for tribal self-governance – Bhuria Committee Report and PESA intended to ensure effective tribal participation – Protective discrimination permissible for Scheduled Areas – [Paras 15–23].

Reservation – Aggregate Limit – 80% Reservation for SCs, STs, and OBCs – Article 243D – Challenge to Sections 17(B)(2), 36(B)(2), and 51(B)(2) of Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act on ground of excessive reservation beyond 50% ceiling – Held: 50% rule in Indra Sawhney applies to public employment, not to political representation – Article 243D a distinct constitutional source – Scheduled Areas constitute an exceptional class warranting special treatment – Reservation up to 80% permissible under Article 243M(4)(b) – [Paras 24–42].

Affirmative Action – Reasonable Classification – Scheduled Tribes in Scheduled Areas – Reservation exceeding 50% justified by social and historical conditions – Objective is substantive equality and democratic decentralization – PESA provisions protect tribal communities from exploitation and preserve autonomy – [Paras 28–37].

Election Law – Right to Contest and Vote – Right to vote or contest elections is statutory, not fundamental – Limitations arising from reservation policy incidental to larger objective of ensuring representation of weaker sections – Compelling state interest outweighs individual inconvenience – [Paras 39–40].

Judicial Review – Policy Decisions – Legislative choices for protective discrimination in Scheduled Areas not open to interference – Courts not to second-guess legislative wisdom when policy is founded on intelligible differentia and rational nexus to objective – [Paras 37–38].

Decision:

Appeals allowed – Judgment of Jharkhand High Court set aside – Second proviso to Section 4(g) of the PESA Act, 1996 and Sections 21(B), 40(B), 55(B), 17(B)(2), 36(B)(2) and 51(B)(2) of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 held constitutionally valid – State Election Commission directed to con

Reservation – Adjustment of Reserved Category Candidates in General Quota – Concessions vs. Merit – Appellants challenged selection of reserved category candidates adjusted in general category despite availing fee/age relaxation – Held: Relaxation in age and fee under Section 8 of the 1994 Act relates to eligibility and does not affect the selection standard – Reserved category candidates securing higher merit than last general category candidate can be adjusted in unreserved quota under Section 3(6) – No conflict with constitutional equality principles under Articles 14 and 16(1) – Distinction drawn between eligibility concession and merit-based selection – Interpretation consistent with object of empowering disadvantaged groups without undermining open competition [Paras 1, 6–10, 16–18, 37–43, 49–53].

Horizontal Reservations – Vacancies for Women and Sportspersons – Carry Forward – 2% posts reserved for sportspersons and 10% for women under horizontal reservations – Held: Horizontal reservations cannot be carried forward – Government Order dated 26.02.1999 mandates unfilled posts under women/sports quotas to be filled by suitable male/general candidates in same cycle – High Court erred in holding such posts were carried forward – Supreme Court clarifies that vacancies were lawfully filled and no illegality occurred in this regard – Directions of High Court modified and set aside [Paras 19–20, 55–64].

Reservation – Constitutional Interpretation – Article 16(4) vs. 16(1) – Held: Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but a facet of equality – Reservations must not breach the 50% ceiling (Indra Sawhney) – Reserved category candidates qualifying on merit cannot be excluded from general quota due to non-substantive relaxations – PGIMER v. Faculty Association reaffirms that equality must be balanced with empowerment [Paras 33–36, 48, 54].

Precedents – K.L. Narasimhan Overruled – Reliance on K.L. Narasimhan v. PGIMER for exclusion of reserved category candidates from general quota is misplaced – Overruled by Constitution Bench in PGIMER v. Faculty Association – Observations in Narasimhan not binding – Only candidates benefiting from relaxation in standard (not eligibility) are to be confined to reserved quota [Paras 40–47].

Decision:

Civil Appeals filed by general category candidates dismissed – High Court’s interpretation upheld on merit-based inclusion of reserved candidates in general quota – Civil Appeals filed by State of U.P. allowed – High Court’s directions regarding carry forward of women and sportspersons’ quota set aside – Posts lawfully filled by male/general category candidates.

Limitation – Declaratory Relief – Article 58, Limitation Act, 1963 – Accrual of Cause of Action – Mere existence of wrong entry in revenue records not sufficient to give rise to cause of action – Right to sue arises only when right asserted is infringed or threatened – Suit for declaration filed on 21.08.1990 after parties’ compromise of 26.10.1972 alleged to be barred by limitation – Trial Court, First Appellate Court and High Court dismissed the suit holding limitation began from date of compromise – Held: Right to sue first accrued when defendants refused to correct revenue entries and denied plaintiffs’ title about a week before filing the suit – Plaint averments must be accepted for deciding limitation at threshold – Suit therefore within time – Judgments of courts below and High Court set aside – Matter remitted to High Court for decision on merits [Paras 7–12].

Interpretation of “Right to Sue” – Cause of Action – When Arises – Judicial Precedents – Reiterated that there can be no right to sue until there is infringement or clear threat to infringe the right – Followed C. Mohammed Yunus v. Syed Unissa, AIR 1961 SC 808 – Applied principle that limitation begins when threat to right is manifest, not when adverse entry first made [Paras 7–9].

Revenue Records – Wrong Entry – Effect – Mere wrong entry in record of rights does not confer or extinguish title and cannot by itself start limitation – Cause of action arises when person entitled becomes aware and is denied his claim [Paras 9–10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court set aside – Matter remitted for decision on merits – No order as to costs.

Industrial Law – Retrenchment – Section 25G ID Act – Rule of “last come, first go” – Violation established – Labour Court’s award of reinstatement with 50% back wages justified – High Court substituted compensation of Rs. 87,582/- on erroneous assumption of illegal appointment – Held: High Court exceeded jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 – No such plea or evidence before Labour Court – Findings of fact not open to reappreciation in writ jurisdiction – Labour Court award restored [Paras 5–13, 16].

Constitution of India – Articles 226 & 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Limits of Interference – High Court cannot act as appellate court or entertain new factual pleas – Interference permissible only for jurisdictional or patent errors of law – Findings supported by evidence not open to review [Paras 10–11].

Labour Law – Employment Status – Erroneous assumption by High Court that workman was a daily wager despite documentary evidence showing appointment in regular pay scales – Decision vitiated [Para 12].

Social Welfare Legislation – Interpretation – Courts bound to adopt beneficial construction advancing objectives of the Industrial Disputes Act – Relief cannot be denied to workmen on technical grounds – Courts must be guided by Directive Principles (Articles 38, 39, 43, 43A) and constitutional philosophy of social justice [Paras 17–23].

Judicial Function – Role of Judiciary – Judiciary included in “State” under Article 12 – Duty under Article 38 to secure social, economic, and political justice – Judges must uphold the Preambular promise and protect weaker sections through purposive interpretation of welfare laws – Social justice forms the constitutional arch ensuring dignity and equality [Paras 26–43].

Globalisation and Social Justice – Liberalisation trends cannot dilute constitutional imperatives – Courts must remain vigilant to ensure that social justice and protection of workmen are not sacrificed to economic expediency [Paras 43–46].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Labour Court’s award of reinstatement with 50% back wages restored – Costs of Rs. 25,000/- awarded to the appellant [Para 24].

Contract Law - Agency – Duty to Insure – Negligence of Agent – Section 211 & 212 Contract Act – Agent Liable as Insurer – The appellants, acting as commission agents, undertook to insure 92 bales of piecegoods for the respondents but failed to do so – Goods were destroyed in the Bombay dock explosion of 14 April 1944 – Held: Where an agent agrees to insure but fails, equity treats him as insurer himself and renders him liable for the loss as if a valid policy had existed – Neglect of duty directly caused the principal’s loss, not remotely – Appellants liable [Paras 12-14, 17].

Measure of Damages – Effect of Subsequent Ordinance – Bombay Explosion Compensation Ordinance, 1944 – Restitutio in integrum – Ordinance provided full compensation for insured property and only 50% for uninsured property – Goods being uninsured due to appellants’ neglect, respondents recovered only half from Government – Held: Loss of remaining half directly attributable to agent’s default – Ordinance merely substituted statutory yardstick for assessing damages but did not create new liability – Appellants must make good balance [Paras 17-19].

Remoteness of Damages – Intervening Legislation – Not Too Remote – Passing of Ordinance did not break chain of causation – Liability arose from neglect to insure; Ordinance only quantified damages – Anticipation of Government intervention irrelevant once breach established – Damages claimed were direct consequences of breach [Paras 15-19].

Section 18, Bombay Explosion Ordinance – Bar of Claims – Not Applicable to Counter-claim – Respondents’ claim not for “explosion damage” but for breach of duty by agent in business of agency – Cause of action was failure to insure, not explosion – Bar under Section 18(2) does not apply [Para 20-21].

Decision – By Majority (Kania C.J. & Das J.) – Appeal dismissed – Appellants held liable to make good balance of loss to respondents – Dissent (Patanjali Sastri J.) – Held that as ordinary fire insurance policy excluded explosion, no direct liability could arise – Ordinance did not enlarge agent’s liability – Counter-claim barred under Section 18(2) – Would have allowed appeal and dismissed counter-claim – Majority prevails; appeal dismissed with costs [Paras 22-33].

Criminal Law – Murder – Dying Declarations – Acquittal – Deceased Sarla suffered 90% burns in her matrimonial home – Three dying declarations recorded – In first two statements (Exh. D-3 and Exh. P-3), deceased stated she sustained injuries accidentally while cooking – In third dying declaration (Exh. P-18), recorded three days later by Executive Magistrate, she implicated her mother-in-law (appellant) for setting her on fire – Supreme Court found Exh. P-18 unreliable due to suspicious overwriting, unexplained delay, and possibility of tutoring – Held: First two consistent and voluntary statements inspire confidence, while third statement lacks credibility and cannot form basis for conviction [Paras 5-31]

Criminal Procedure – Evaluation of Dying Declarations – Principles reiterated – Dying declarations can form sole basis of conviction if found to be voluntary and trustworthy – However, where multiple declarations are inconsistent, Court must determine which, if any, inspires confidence – Held: Courts below erred in discarding earlier two declarations which were consistent, recorded promptly in presence of medical professionals and police officers, and supported by witness testimony [Paras 19-25, 31, 35]

Evidence Law – Weight of Dying Declarations – Earlier declarations made immediately after the incident without suspicion or signs of coercion given greater weight than subsequent contradictory version – Discrepancy in complainant’s conduct, delay in filing complaint, and sudden change in deceased's narrative highlighted as serious infirmities affecting reliability of Exh. P-18 [Paras 28-30]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC set aside – Appellant acquitted – Directed to be released forthwith unless required in another case [Para 36]

Litigation – Duty of Candour – Clean Hands Doctrine – Litigant must come to court with true, complete, and candid disclosure of facts – Courts are not to grant relief to a party who suppresses material facts or misleads the court – Held: A litigant who pollutes the stream of justice or touches the fountain of justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or final [Paras 1, 9, 19–21].

Writ Jurisdiction – Suppression and Misrepresentation – Petition under Article 226 containing misleading statements to obtain interim relief – Appellant falsely claimed ignorance of notice under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Ceiling Act and illness of his predecessor – Held: Misleading statement resulted in stay of lawful proceedings for over eleven years, frustrating statutory distribution of surplus land – Conduct held reprehensible [Paras 14–21].

Public Law – Misuse of Judicial Process – Courts have evolved principles to deny relief to litigants who abuse process through falsehood or concealment – Litigants who mislead the court in obtaining orders have no right to be heard on merits – Appeal liable to dismissal on this ground alone [Paras 2–6, 19–21].

Equitable Relief – Article 226 – Discretionary Nature – Exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 32, 136, and 226 is extraordinary, equitable, and discretionary – Persons guilty of suppression, misrepresentation, or misleading conduct are disentitled from invoking such jurisdiction [Paras 7–9].

Land Ceiling – U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 – Tenure-holder failed to file statement under Section 9(2A) and ignored notice under Section 10(2) – Ex parte order declaring surplus land passed after due service – Subsequent challenge based on false claim of non-service and illness rejected – Held: Proceedings before authorities and courts based on deception – No interference warranted [Paras 10–16, 20–22].

Judicial Ethics – Truth as Foundation of Justice – Court deplored growing tendency of litigants to resort to falsehood and suppression – Emphasised that truth must remain integral to justice delivery system, warning against abuse of courts by unscrupulous litigants [Para 1].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Orders of Prescribed and Appellate Authorities upheld – No interference warranted – Court refrained from imposing exemplary costs considering that the surplus land had already been distributed among landless persons [Para 22].

Criminal Law – Rape – Conviction – Minor Victim – Intact Hymen – Slightest Penetration is Sufficient – Appellant found committing rape on 12-year-old prosecutrix in bushes by police officer (P.W.3) – Prosecutrix, though initially declared hostile, gave consistent account corroborated by FIR, medical history (Exh. P-9), and eyewitness testimony – Medical report indicated intact hymen, but Supreme Court reiterated legal position that slightest penetration constitutes rape under Section 375 IPC – Held: Offence of rape proved beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction under Section 376 IPC upheld [Paras 12–16, 24–28].

Evidence Law – Prosecutrix as Sole Witness – Hostile Witness – Corroboration – Though prosecutrix was declared hostile, her version aligned with FIR and Section 161 CrPC statement – Medical history recorded immediately post-incident also consistent – Testimony of P.W.3, who caught appellant red-handed, provided strong corroboration – Court reiterated that testimony of prosecutrix, if trustworthy, does not require corroboration – Held: Conviction can be based on prosecutrix’s evidence even if uncorroborated [Paras 12, 15, 20–23, 30].

Medical Jurisprudence – Intact Hymen – Impact on Rape Allegation – Role of Medical Evidence – Defence contention that intact hymen disproved rape rejected – Court cited Modi and Parikh on Medical Jurisprudence to affirm that full penetration or emission of semen is not necessary – Slight penetration sufficient for legal definition of rape – Held: Medical opinion not determinative of legal conclusion on rape – Rape is a legal term, not a diagnosis – Non-examination of doctor not fatal to prosecution case [Paras 24–28].

Precedent – Applicability – Radhu v. State of M.P. Distinguished – Appellant relied on Radhu v. State of M.P. to seek benefit of doubt – Court held that unlike Radhu, present case had consistent evidence of prosecutrix, corroborated by eyewitness testimony of police officer – No major discrepancies found – Held: No ground to extend benefit of doubt – Conviction rightly upheld [Para 29].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 376 IPC confirmed – No interference warranted by Supreme Court.

Criminal Writ - Child Custody – Removal from Jurisdiction – Foreign Court Orders – Habeas Corpus – Appellant-father, a U.S. citizen, filed habeas corpus petition under Article 32 seeking custody of his minor son, an American national, removed by the respondent-mother to India in violation of U.S. custody orders – Child had been missing for over two years until traced by CBI – Supreme Court held that the natural habitat of the child is the United States and that the custody orders passed by American courts by consent of both parties should be respected – Held: In such cases, courts can exercise summary jurisdiction and order return of the child if no evidence suggests harm in repatriation – Detailed inquiry not warranted where custody arrangements have been judicially settled in the country of habitual residence [Paras 21–23].

Parens Patriae – Comity of Courts – Child’s Welfare Paramount – Supreme Court reviewed international and Indian case law on custody of foreign nationals – Held: Indian courts are not bound to blindly enforce foreign orders, but must give them due weight, especially when they are by consent and there is no evidence that enforcing them would harm the child – Comity of courts demands serious consideration of foreign custody decrees; the paramount consideration remains the welfare of the child [Paras 15, 18–20, 23].

Summary vs. Elaborate Inquiry – Application in International Custody Disputes – Court emphasized that the choice between summary return and full inquiry depends on the time elapsed, child’s integration, and any risk to the child – In this case, despite the child having stayed in India for two years, there was no settled life or roots developed – Child changed multiple schools and was concealed by the mother – Hence, summary return to the USA ordered [Paras 22–23].

Maintainability of Article 32 Petition – Habeas Corpus in Child Custody – Objection regarding maintainability under Article 32 was rejected – Supreme Court held that in exceptional cases involving liberty of minor and breach of foreign court orders, Article 32 jurisdiction is rightly invoked [Para 24].

Appreciation – CBI’s Role – Court commended the Central Bureau of Investigation for tracing the child and mother within two months, enabling the Court to exercise its jurisdiction effectively after years of failure by state police authorities [Para 25].

Decision: Habeas corpus petition allowed – Respondent-mother directed to take the child to the USA within 15 days and report to the competent U.S. court – Petitioner-father directed to bear travel and living expenses and provide assurances regarding non-prosecution – In case of failure by respondent, custody to be handed over to petitioner – No costs imposed – Liberty granted to respondent to approach U.S. court for review of custody [Para 26].