NDPS Act – Section 42 – Mandatory or Directory – Compliance Requirement – Constitutional Bench Clarification – Conflict between Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri and Sajan Abraham resolved – Held: Total non-compliance with Section 42 impermissible – Delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation permissible – Compliance with Section 42(1) and 42(2) should normally precede search and seizure but may follow in cases of emergent situations – Amendment of 2001 (Act 9 of 2001) introducing 72-hour limit reflects legislative intent to balance effective enforcement with procedural fairness – Provisions to be construed pragmatically to prevent offenders from exploiting technical lapses [Paras 11, 15, 17].

Section 42(1) and (2) – Recording and Communication of Information – Officer receiving prior information must record it in writing and send a copy forthwith to superior officer – Where officer acts while on patrol or receives information through mobile or wireless and immediate action is required, compliance may be postponed but must follow soon thereafter – Total omission to record or inform vitiates prosecution – Delayed compliance with valid explanation acceptable [Paras 11, 17(d)].

Section 42 vs Section 43 – Distinction in Scope – Section 42 applies to search in building, conveyance, or enclosed place and mandates prior written record and report to superior officer – Section 43 governs search and seizure in public places and contains no such requirement – Each operates independently [Para 12].

Technological Context – Mobile and Wireless Communication – In modern policing, information may be received instantly while in motion – It may be impractical to record and communicate before acting – Courts must interpret Section 42 flexibly to avoid frustrating urgent law enforcement while maintaining fairness to accused [Para 16].

Legislative Amendment, Act 9 of 2001 – Replacement of “forthwith” with “within 72 hours” for forwarding report to superior officer shows legislative intent to make timing of compliance directory while preserving its substantive mandatory nature – Ensures practical enforcement without procedural rigidity [Paras 9, 15].

Conclusion – Compliance with Section 42 is mandatory in substance but directory in timing – Total non-compliance impermissible – Delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation acceptable – Abdul Rashid and Sajan Abraham harmonized – Question of compliance is fact-specific – Reference answered accordingly – Appeals to be placed before appropriate Bench for disposal [Paras 17, 18].

Decision: Reference answered – Abdul Rashid and Sajan Abraham reconciled – Compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act is mandatory in substance, directory in timing – Total non-compliance vitiates prosecution, but delayed compliance with reasonable explanation is permissible – Appeals to be listed before the appropriate Bench for final disposal.

Accident Claim - Motor Vehicles Act – Compensation under Section 166 – Application of Second Schedule – Structured formula and multiplier – Reference to Larger Bench – Multiple appeals arising from dissatisfaction with quantum of compensation awarded in motor accident claims – Supreme Court examined whether the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule to the MV Act, 1988 should be mandatorily applied under Section 166 – Held: The Second Schedule may serve as a guide but is not binding in Section 166 claims – Courts must determine just compensation based on case-specific facts, including future prospects – In light of conflicting precedents and legislative inaction, matter referred to Larger Bench for authoritative resolution [Paras 8, 14–16, 20–21, 34–36, 38–46]

Structured Formula – Second Schedule – Errors and inconsistencies – Not decisive – Second Schedule introduced for claims under Section 163A on no-fault basis – Contains calculation errors as noted in prior judgments – Though it includes a multiplier table, the same is not meant to bind tribunals deciding claims under Section 166 – Tribunal must exercise discretion to achieve just compensation [Paras 14, 15, 39–43]

Future Prospects – Assessment of multiplicand – Career advancement and promotions must be factored – Held: While multiplier is guided by age, the multiplicand should reflect realistic income growth – Stable employment, upcoming promotions, and pay revisions are valid considerations – Rigid reliance on current income defeats the principle of restitutio in integrum [Paras 12, 21–22, 34]

Just Compensation – Need for balance – No unjust enrichment but no under-compensation either – Principle of restitution governs compensation under MV Act – Compensation must not overcompensate but must also reflect the real financial loss to dependents – Inflation, job stability, and rising cost of living are relevant considerations – One-size-fits-all approach rejected [Paras 20, 30–31, 33–36]

Actuarial Principles – Mortality tables, discounting, and future loss – Detailed discussion of actuarial methodology for present value calculation – Indian courts must evolve realistic models considering economic conditions – Structured formulas useful but cannot replace judicial assessment based on facts [Paras 25–29]

International Precedents – House of Lords and other jurisdictions considered – Relevance of English decisions such as Mallett v. McMonagle and Wells v. Wells acknowledged – However, Indian courts cannot blindly follow foreign standards ignoring local economic realities [Paras 27–28, 37–38]

Decision: Appeals partly allowed – Matter referred to a Larger Bench to settle legal issue of whether multiplier and structured formula in Second Schedule are binding in Section 166 claims – Registry directed to place matter before Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of appropriate Bench [Paras 45–46]

Arbitration – Contract for Handling Work – Escalation in Rates – No Escalation Clause – Contractor’s Claim for Enhanced Payment due to Statutory Wage Revision – Held, even in absence of express escalation clause, contractor entitled to compensation for increased statutory wages – Obligation to pay “fair wages” implies reciprocal obligation of employer to reimburse increased wage costs – Principle of implied reimbursement recognized in Tarapore & Co. v. State of M.P. followed – Arbitrator and High Court justified in granting enhanced rates [Paras 12–13].

Arbitration – Escalation and Fair Wages – Interpretation of Contract – When Contract Requires Contractor to Pay ‘Fair Wages’ as Notified by Authorities from Time to Time – Implied Agreement by Employer to Reimburse Increased Expenditure – Arbitrator empowered to award differential amount arising from retrospective wage revision circulars issued by Railway Administration – Escalation a normal incident of long-term contract in inflationary conditions – Food Corporation of India v. A.M. Ahmed & Co. applied [Paras 4–5, 13].

Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction – Distinction Between Contractual and Post-Termination Periods – Held, Clause 31 (bar against interest) applies only while contract subsists – After termination (from 1.1.1993 onwards), contractor continued work at Railway’s request and outside scope of contract – Therefore, bar clause inapplicable to post-contract period – Arbitrator justified in awarding pre-reference and pendente lite interest for that period [Paras 19, 24–25].

Interest – Power of Arbitrator – Pre-reference, Pendente Lite, and Post-Award Periods – Legal Position Clarified – Constitution Bench in Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj affirmed power to grant pre-reference interest where not expressly prohibited – Secretary, Irrigation Dept. v. G.C. Roy upheld arbitrator’s competence to grant pendente lite interest – Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of J&K recognized power to grant post-award interest – Held, arbitrator competent to award interest unless contract expressly forbids it [Paras 17–18].

Interest – Bar under Contract – Clause 31 – “No Interest or Damage for Delay in Payment” – Scope and Effect – Clause prohibits payment of interest or damages for delay in payment of any bill or amount due “for any reason whatsoever” – Bar absolute for period covered by the contract – Arbitrator acted in breach of Clause 31 by awarding pre-reference and pendente lite interest for contractual period (Item No. 3) – Award modified to delete such interest [Paras 20–23].

Distinction between Item Nos. 3 and 4 – Claim No. 3 (3.8.1991 to 31.12.1992): Within Contract Period – Bar of Clause 31 applies – No interest payable. Claim No. 4 (1.1.1993 to 31.8.1994): Post-Termination Period – Clause 31 inapplicable – Interest @16% per annum justified. Arbitrator rightly allowed post-award interest @18% per annum until payment – Calculation to exclude period of stay of award [Paras 19, 24–25].

Arbitration – Judicial Review – Scope under Section 34 – High Court not to interfere with arbitrator’s interpretation of contract unless perverse or contrary to express stipulation – Arbitrator’s findings on escalation, wage revision, and quantum of compensation within jurisdiction – Division Bench rightly restored full award except for interest barred by contract [Paras 10–11, 23–25].

Contract Law – Termination and Continuation of Work on Request – Continuation beyond contractual term constitutes new arrangement by conduct – Payment for post-termination work governed by equitable principles of quantum meruit – Entitlement to fair compensation and interest upheld [Paras 19, 24].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Arbitrator’s award modified – Respondent entitled to enhanced payment for both contractual and post-contractual periods – However, interest for pre-reference and pendente lite periods disallowed for Item No. 3 (contractual period) due to bar under Clause 31 – Interest @16% per annum payable only on amount under Item No. 4 (post-contract period) from 01.11.1994 to 09.09.2000 – Post-award interest @18% per annum upheld until payment – Calculation to exclude period of stay of award – No order as to costs [Paras 23–26].

SARFAESI Act – Post-13(4) Challenge – Scope of DRT’s Jurisdiction – Borrower’s Right to Challenge – Held: DRT has jurisdiction to examine not just the legality of action under Section 13(4) but also subsequent measures, including sale of secured assets – Tribunal empowered under Section 17(3) to declare bank’s actions invalid and restore possession to borrower – Amended scheme of Sections 13 and 17 supports wider jurisdiction – Borrower's application maintainable even after possession taken and sale initiated – No limitation on timing of DRT scrutiny under amended provisions [Paras 14–24].

SARFAESI Act – Section 36 and Limitation – Action Under Section 13(4) – Held: No specific limitation prescribed for steps post demand under Section 13(2) – Enforcement of security interest not time-barred merely because sale or other measures taken long after notice – Section 36 must be read to relate to enforceability, not procedural timing of steps like sale or possession [Para 10].

Civil Procedure – Appeal from Review Order – Maintainability – Appellants who themselves invoked appellate jurisdiction cannot subsequently question maintainability – Held: Having filed the appeal, appellants estopped from objecting to its maintainability under Order 47 Rule 7 CPC [Para 25].

Judicial Review – Writ Jurisdiction vs Statutory Remedy – SARFAESI Act provides statutory remedy under Section 17 – Borrowers who fail to approach DRT within prescribed period and challenge measures later are not barred from relief if DRT satisfied cause of action persists – Multiple causes including sale notice may give rise to independent right of challenge [Paras 3, 12–13].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – DRT has jurisdiction to entertain borrower’s challenge to sale notice and actions post-possession – Liberty granted to borrower to contest all issues before DRT – No interference with High Court’s order – No costs [Paras 26–27].

Labour and Industrial Law – Retrenchment – Violation of Section 25F – Reinstatement vs. Compensation – Appellant daily wager engaged for less than a year – Termination found violative of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act – Labour Court ordered reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages – High Court set aside reinstatement – Held: Reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic even if termination violates Section 25F – In cases of short, irregular, or daily-wage employment, monetary compensation serves ends of justice – Order of High Court upheld in principle but modified to award compensation of ₹50,000 to the appellant [Paras 7–8, 15–16].

Industrial Disputes – Relief in Lieu of Reinstatement – Judicial trend established that reinstatement with back wages not proper for daily wagers whose appointments were not made through statutory process or who worked for short periods – Compensation may be substituted considering nature, duration, and legality of employment – Principles reiterated from U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Udai Narain Pandey; M.P. Administration v. Tribhuban; Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Ashok Kumar; Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute; Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula [Paras 8–14].

Judicial Discretion – Appropriate Relief – Court emphasised that relief under Section 11A must be exercised judiciously considering the nature of appointment, length of service, delay in raising dispute, and statutory compliance – Payment of compensation of ₹50,000 directed in lieu of reinstatement – To be paid within six weeks, failing which it shall carry 9% interest p.a. [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Award of reinstatement set aside – Appellant to be paid ₹50,000 as compensation by Respondent No. 1 within six weeks, failing which interest at 9% p.a. shall apply – No order as to costs [Paras 16–17].

Service Law – Promotion – Disability – Section 47(2) of Persons with Disabilities Act – Colour Perception – Medical Standards – Denial of Promotion Not Discriminatory – Respondent, an employee in the Research Designs and Standards Organisation (RDSO), was denied promotion to the post of Chief Research Assistant for not possessing B1 medical fitness, which required normal colour perception – High Court held that such denial violated Section 47(2) of the Act – Supreme Court held that Section 47(2) prohibits denial of promotion merely on ground of disability – However, where the disability impairs performance or compromises safety, promotion can be withheld – Colour perception, being essential to the duties of the promotional post, justified the B1 medical requirement – Lack of colour perception is not recognized as "disability" under Section 2(i) of the Act – Denial of promotion on medical grounds does not violate Section 47(2) [Paras 8–9, 12–16].

Medical Fitness – Prescription of Higher Standards for Promotional Post – Validity of Revised Medical Criteria – Revised medical classifications issued by RDSO in 1990 were based on expert recommendations – Prescription of B1 category for higher posts made in interest of public safety and administrative efficiency – Respondent, who did not meet B1 standards, could not claim automatic entitlement to promotion – Held: Revision of medical categories by competent authority, even if it results in disqualification, does not violate rights under Disabilities Act [Paras 3, 16–17].

Judicial Review – New Ground Raised for First Time in Writ Petition – Procedural Impropriety – Respondent had not raised any contention based on Section 47(2) before the Tribunal – High Court entertained this ground during oral arguments without giving proper opportunity to appellant to respond – Held: Procedurally improper – High Court erred in relying on Sanjay Kumar Jain without examining its limited ratio [Paras 6–7, 11].

Statutory Interpretation – Beneficial Legislation – Limits of Protection Under Disabilities Act – While the Disabilities Act is a welfare legislation, its provisions cannot be applied in a mechanical or expansive manner – Minimum performance or safety standards required for public employment cannot be diluted under the guise of disability rights – Section 47(2) protects only against discrimination arising solely due to disability, not against legitimate eligibility criteria [Paras 12–13, 18–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment set aside – Order of Central Administrative Tribunal restored – Respondent not entitled to promotion without meeting B1 medical fitness standard – Section 47(2) not violated where disability affects functional suitability for higher post [Para 20].

Criminal Procedure – Section 167(2) CrPC – Default Bail – Cognizance under TOHO – Appellants arrested in connection with organ transplant racket – CBI filed complaint under Section 22 of the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 – Appellants claimed entitlement to statutory bail as no chargesheet (police report) was filed within 90 days – Held: CBI, though having powers of investigation under the CrPC, was precluded from filing a chargesheet in view of the special procedure prescribed under TOHO – Cognizance could only be taken on a complaint filed by an authorized officer under Section 22 TOHO – Therefore, complaint is not a police report – Section 167(2) CrPC not attracted [Paras 5–6, 19–20, 24].

Special Law vs. General Law – TOHO is a special statute with overriding effect over CrPC – Section 4(2) CrPC makes CrPC applicable only to the extent not inconsistent with special laws – TOHO mandates exclusive procedure for investigation and cognizance – Complaint filed under TOHO within 90 days satisfies legal requirements – Indefeasible right to default bail under CrPC does not survive after such complaint is filed [Paras 13–16, 24–25].

Complaint vs. Police Report – Statutory Interpretation – Under Section 2(d) CrPC, a complaint excludes police report – Section 2(r) defines police report as one filed under Section 173(2) CrPC – CBI complaint under TOHO is not such a report – Filing of FIR and use of CrPC powers during investigation does not convert a TOHO complaint into a police report – Cognizance must be based only on complaint under TOHO [Paras 11, 19–22].

Remand Powers – Pre-cognizance vs Post-cognizance – Detention before cognizance governed by Section 167 CrPC – Post-cognizance remand governed by Section 309(2) – Once cognizance is taken on a valid complaint, remand continues lawfully under Section 309 – No procedural illegality [Paras 26].

Held: Complaint by CBI under TOHO is valid and within time – No entitlement to bail under Section 167(2) CrPC – Appeal dismissed [Paras 24–25, 30].

Criminal Law – Cheating and Criminal Breach of Trust – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Allegation that appellants failed to execute sale deed or refund consideration under agreement for sale – FIR registered under Sections 406 and 420 IPC – Held: Mere breach of contract or failure to return advance money does not constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust unless fraudulent or dishonest intention exists at the inception of the transaction – Intention to cheat must be present at the time of making promise or representation – Dispute arising out of contract essentially civil in nature cannot be given colour of criminal offence [Paras 10–12].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 CrPC – Principles Reiterated – High Court can quash FIR only when, even if allegations are taken at face value, no cognizable offence is made out – Power to be exercised sparingly and judiciously – High Court erred in refusing to quash FIR without examining whether ingredients of Sections 406 or 420 IPC were disclosed – Matter remitted for fresh consideration [Paras 12–15].

Mens Rea – Requirement for Cheating and Criminal Breach of Trust – To establish offence under Section 420 IPC, prosecution must show deception and fraudulent intention at inception – For Section 406 IPC, entrustment and dishonest misappropriation must be proved – Absence of such elements reduces matter to civil breach of contract [Paras 10–12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law [Paras 14–15].

Judicial Appointments – Article 217(1) & (2) – Eligibility vs. Suitability – Scope of Judicial Review – Petition challenging appointment of Dr. Satish Chandra as Additional Judge of the Allahabad High Court on grounds of lack of ten years’ actual practice and ineffective consultation – Held: A clear distinction exists between eligibility (objective fact under Article 217(2)) and suitability (subjective assessment under Article 217(1)) – Judicial review confined only to (i) lack of eligibility and (ii) lack of effective consultation – Fitness or desirability of candidate not justiciable [Paras 10–12, 30–31].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Article 217(2)(b) and Explanation (aa) – Meaning of “Advocate of a High Court” – Enrolment under the Advocates Act, 1961 gives an advocate the right to practice in all courts – Actual practice not a constitutional prerequisite for eligibility – “Right to practice” or “entitlement to practice” sufficient to constitute qualification – Explanation (aa) widens eligibility by including service as Member of a Tribunal or in a post requiring special knowledge of law – [Paras 16–23].

Legal History – 1879, 1926 and 1961 Acts – Evolution of “Right to Practice” – Comparative study of Legal Practitioners Act, 1879; Bar Councils Act, 1926; and Advocates Act, 1961 reveals consistent focus on entitlement to practice – After 1961, distinction between “advocate of a High Court” and “advocate” ceased to exist – [Paras 17–23, 28–29].

Appointment Process – Collegium System – Effective Consultation – Consultation under Article 217(1) is a participatory, integrated process involving the Chief Justice of India, the Governor, and the Chief Justice of the High Court – The Supreme Court Collegium does not sit in appeal over the High Court Collegium – Effective consultation implies participation of all constitutional functionaries; its content is beyond judicial review – [Paras 31, 34–35].

Facts Applied – Eligibility of Respondent No. 3 – Respondent enrolled as Advocate in 1975; served as Member, ITAT (1997–2008); period computable under Explanation (aa) to Article 217(2)(b) – Held: Respondent possessed requisite eligibility; consultation process duly complied with – No lack of eligibility or consultation established – [Paras 32–35].

Judicial Review – Quo Warranto – Limited Scope – In proceedings under Article 226 seeking quo warranto, court examines only legality of appointment, not merits – Allegations of fraud or misrepresentation rejected – Institutional “trust” and continuity in judicial appointments reaffirmed – [Paras 12, 30–36].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Appointment of Dr. Satish Chandra as Additional Judge of the Allahabad High Court upheld – No infirmity in eligibility or consultation – [Para 37].