Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters – Definition and Scope – The appeals focus on whether the Master Circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) covers defaults in derivative transactions. The Supreme Court clarifies that the Master Circular is intended to cover all cases of wilful defaults involving payment obligations to banks, not limited to traditional lender-borrower relationships. The Circular's objective is to prevent further financial assistance to parties who have defaulted on payment obligations, including those arising from derivative transactions .

Context and Interpretation – The Court emphasized that statutory provisions and regulatory circulars must be interpreted in their entirety and context, taking into account the purpose and mischief they aim to address. The term "wilful default" in the Master Circular must be understood broadly to include defaults on derivative transactions, ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial system .

Confidentiality and Disclosure – The Court discussed the confidentiality provisions under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and the circumstances under which information regarding defaults can be disclosed. The Court upheld that banks are required to disclose default information to the RBI and other banks, ensuring compliance with regulatory standards and transparency .

Principle of Natural Justice – The Supreme Court highlighted the need for banks to adhere to principles of natural justice when classifying a party as a wilful defaulter. The banks must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard to the parties involved before making such determinations .

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The interpretation of the Master Circular by the Calcutta High Court was incorrect, and the Bombay High Court's broader interpretation was upheld. The Master Circular applies to defaults under derivative transactions, and banks must ensure proper procedure and transparency in reporting wilful defaulters. The appeals are allowed, and the matters are remitted to the respective High Courts for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation .

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 – Professional Misconduct – The complainant, Narain Pandey, filed a complaint against Pannalal Pandey, an advocate, alleging involvement in numerous false cases by forging documents, including settlement documents, without the knowledge of the parties in the Consolidation Court – The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh (BCUP) found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct, and he was debarred from practice for seven years – The Bar Council of India (BCI) modified the punishment to reprimand and a fine of Rs. 1000, failing which suspension for six months – Supreme Court restored the findings of BCUP and modified the punishment to suspension from practice for three years [Paras 1-19].

Professional Misconduct – Importance of Integrity – The Supreme Court highlighted the significance of maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession, stressing that misconduct by advocates must be dealt with strictly to uphold the dignity and integrity of the profession – The Court emphasized that leniency in cases of grave misconduct would compromise the administration of justice and public trust in the legal system [Paras 18].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The Supreme Court restored the findings of the Disciplinary Committee BCUP, confirming the serious professional misconduct by the respondent – The punishment awarded by the BCI was modified, and the respondent was suspended from practice for three years from the date of the judgment – Copies of the order to be sent to the Secretary of the State Bar Council Uttar Pradesh and the Secretary of the Bar Council of India [Paras 19-20].

Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Article 5 – Stamp Duty on Lease-cum-Sale Agreements – The respondents were members of KendriyaUpadhyayaraSangha (the Sangha), which allotted residential sites to its members through Lease-cum-Sale Agreements. The sub-Registrar collected stamp duty on the market value of the properties at the time of execution of the Absolute Sale Deeds. The respondents sought a refund of the stamp duty paid on the absolute Sale Deeds, claiming it was excessive and already covered under the Lease-cum-Sale Agreements. The High Court directed the refund, holding that the respondents were entitled to a deduction of the stamp duty already paid [Paras 1-3].

Condonation of Delay – Sufficient Cause – The State of Karnataka filed an appeal against the High Court's decision with a delay of 449 days. The Supreme Court condoned the delay, emphasizing the financial implications on the State Exchequer and the importance of addressing the substantive legal issues raised by the State. The reasons provided for the delay were deemed acceptable [Paras 7-8].

High Court’s Jurisdiction – Examination of Merits – The Supreme Court criticized the Division Bench of the High Court for dismissing the appeals on the ground of delay and failing to adequately consider the substantive grounds urged by the State, particularly in light of Article 5(e) and Explanation (ii) of the Karnataka Stamp Act. The Court directed the High Court to reconsider the matter on merits [Paras 8-9].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh consideration. The High Court was directed to restore the writ appeals and dispose of them on merits, in accordance with law, after providing an opportunity to all parties involved, including the newly impleaded respondents. The High Court was requested to complete the proceedings within six months from the date of receipt of the judgment [Paras 9-10].

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2(b), 12 – Contempt of Court – The appellant, a senior IAS officer, was found guilty of contempt by the High Court of Patna for willfully disobeying its order dated 21.08.1995. The High Court imposed a punishment of two months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000. The Supreme Court, while upholding the finding of contempt, modified the punishment by imposing a stern warning instead of imprisonment, considering the appellant’s remorse and his retirement [Paras 1-12].

Background and Facts – Shiv Prasad Singh, a Block Supply Officer, wasdismissed from service in 1977 on charges of bribery. He was later reappointed in 1980 with a condition of no future promotions. Despite this, he sought time-bound promotions through a writ petition, which was granted by the High Court in 1995, directing the government to consider his representation. The appellant, as Commissioner, later canceled these promotions in 2003, leading to contempt proceedings [Paras 2-5].

Non-Compliance and Contempt – The High Court found the appellant's cancellation order in violation of its 1995 directive. Despite being a senior officer with 30 years of experience, the appellant claimed misunderstanding of the order. The Supreme Court noted that he should have sought clarification from the High Court instead of reversing the promotions [Paras 6-10].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Held – While upholding the finding of contempt, the Supreme Court modified the punishment from two months' simple imprisonment to a stern warning, considering the appellant’s age and expressed remorse. The fine of Rs. 2000 was affirmed, to be paid within four weeks, failing which the imprisonment would be revived. The appeal was disposed of with these directions [Paras 11-12].

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 20(3) – Right against self-incrimination – Voice sample – The Supreme Court examined whether compelling an accused to provide a voice sample during an investigation violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) – The Court concluded that taking a voice sample does not amount to testimonial compulsion – It is akin to providing fingerprints or a handwriting sample, which do not convey personal knowledge but serve as identification data – Hence, it does not infringe Article 20(3) [Paras 8-18].

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 53, 54 – Magistrate's Authority – The Court considered whether there is any provision in the CrPC or any other law that authorizes a Magistrate to direct the accused to provide a voice sample – The Court observed that while there is no explicit provision, the power can be implied under Section 53, which deals with medical examination of the accused at the request of a police officer – The Magistrate can utilize ancillary powers to aid the investigation, including directing the accused to provide a voice sample [Paras 19-42].

Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 – Section 5 – The Court examined whether the Identification of Prisoners Act permits taking voice samples – The Act allows for the measurement and photographs of convicts and others – The term "measurements" can be interpreted to include voice samples, which are a form of physical identification – The Court supported a broader interpretation to strengthen the investigative process [Paras 23-32].

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 73 – Comparison of Signatures, Handwriting, or Seal – The Court noted that Section 73 of the Evidence Act permits the comparison of signatures, handwriting, or seals – While it primarily applies to proceedings before the court, it does not directly address the collection of voice samples during the investigation stage – The Court suggested legislative amendments to explicitly cover such scenarios [Paras 33-44].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Held – The Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court, affirming the direction to the appellant to provide a voice sample – The Court emphasized the necessity of legislative amendments to provide clear guidelines and strengthen the legal framework for modern investigative techniques [Paras 47-49].

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302 and 392 read with Section 34 – Murder – Robbery – Common intention – The appellant and co-accused were convicted of murder and robbery based on witness testimonies and recoveries made from them. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed [Paras 2-8, 18-36].

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 309 – Day-to-Day Trial – The Court reiterated the importance of conducting trials on a day-to-day basis as mandated by Section 309 CrPC. The trial court's failure to adhere to this provision, resulting in a two-month adjournment for cross-examination, was criticized. The Supreme Court emphasized that such adjournments should be avoided to ensure a fair and speedy trial [Paras 25-35].

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 155 – Credibility of Witnesses – The appellant challenged the credibility of witnesses, particularly PW.20, who made inconsistent statements. The Supreme Court held that the trial court and the High Court correctly relied on the initial testimony of PW.20 and the recoveries made from the appellant, which were duly identified by the complainant [Paras 11-21].

Day-to-Day Trials – Judicial Instructions – The Court directed all High Courts to ensure compliance with Section 309 CrPC through appropriate circulars and to use their State Judicial Academies to train judicial officers in adhering to this mandate. The aim is to prevent undue delays in criminal trials and ensure justice is served promptly [Paras 33-35].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Held – The conviction and life sentence for murder and ten years' rigorous imprisonment for robbery, along with fines, were upheld. The Supreme Court directed the High Courts to implement and monitor compliance with procedural mandates for day-to-day trials [Paras 18-36].

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Murder – Dying Declaration – The appellant was seen by prosecution witnesses (PWs) throwing acid on the deceased. The prosecution's case was corroborated by medical evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and life sentence imposed by the lower courts, dismissing the appeal. The absence of any injury on the appellant, despite taking precautions, and not sending the deceased's clothes for chemical examination were considered isolated factors that did not affect the prosecution's case [Paras 1-3, 24-26].

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 161 – Dying Declaration as 161 Statement – The Supreme Court held that a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, which subsequently assumes the character of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, can be relied upon if it meets the statutory requirements. The Court emphasized that procedural lapses, such as the absence of respectable witnesses during the recording, do not necessarily invalidate the dying declaration [Paras 16-22].

Reliability of Witnesses – The Court rejected the defense's contention that PWs-1 and 3 were stock witnesses, noting that their presence at the crime scene and their testimonies were credible and consistent. The Court also dismissed the argument that the deceased could not have made a statement due to his injuries, based on medical evidence confirming that he remained conscious for some time after the attack [Paras 6-13].

Procedural Aspects – The Court addressed the contention that procedural guidelines were not followed in recording the dying declaration. It held that while guidelines such as those in police regulations are important, they do not override statutory provisions or invalidate evidence that meets the criteria under the Evidence Act and CrPC [Paras 15-18].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Held – The conviction and life sentence for murder under Section 302 IPC are upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the reliability of the dying declaration and the credibility of witness testimonies, dismissing procedural objections raised by the defense [Paras 31-32].

Land Acquisition – Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act – Dispute over the necessity to acquire land under Chapter VII, Section 126 of the MRTP Act after the finalization of a Town Planning Scheme – High Court held the Town Planning Scheme provisions self-operative, rejecting the need for separate acquisition under Section 126 once the scheme is sanctioned – Supreme Court affirmed High Court’s decision, emphasizing the scheme’s provisions for compensation and land vesting in the Planning Authority as adequate [Paras 18-21, 45-49].

Town Planning Scheme – Vesting of Land – Analysis of statutory vesting of land under the MRTP Act – Court observed that once the scheme is finalized and sanctioned, land required for public purposes vests in the Planning Authority automatically under Section 88, eliminating the need for separate proceedings under Section 126 – Emphasized no discrimination or denial of equal protection under Article 14 [Paras 19, 39-41, 43-44].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court upheld the compensation and land acquisition provisions under the finalized Town Planning Scheme, affirming the High Court’s interpretation of the MRTP Act’s self-contained adjudicatory mechanism [Para 49].

Criminal Procedure – First Information Report (FIR) – A cryptic telephonic information cannot be treated as an FIR – The telephonic message received from an unknown person about an unknown person's murder lacks the formal requirements under Section 154 of the CrPC – The complaint made by PW-1 Susanta Sarkar treated as FIR [Paras 35-42].

Witness Testimony – Examination Delay – Delay in examination of a witness does not necessarily make the prosecution's version suspect – The testimony of PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar rejected due to delayed examination without explanation – PW-8 Achintya Sarkar's testimony accepted despite the delay as he successfully withstood cross-examination [Paras 43-62].

Murder vs. Culpable Homicide – Distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder under IPC – Despite the severe injuries inflicted, the intention to murder was not proven beyond doubt – Conviction altered from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC [Paras 70-72].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside – Appellant convicted under Section 304 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years – Fine and default sentence awarded by the Trial Court maintained [Para 72-73].