Condonation of Delay – Inordinate Delay – Administrative Lapses – The State sought condonation of a delay of 1679 days (4 years and 7 months) in filing a review petition – Court held: The State's reasons, including reliance on administrative procedures, COVID-19 pandemic, and rainfall in Kolhapur, were insufficient to explain the inordinate delay – Mere procedural formalities and bureaucratic inertia do not constitute "sufficient cause" under the law of limitation [Paras 6-9].

Review Petition – Change in Law – Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC – The primary ground for review was the subsequent overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Solanki by Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal – Court held: Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 bars review on the basis of a subsequent change in law – The review petition was therefore not maintainable even if the delay were condoned [Paras 11-14].

Finality of Proceedings – Judicial Efficiency – The Court emphasized that allowing review petitions based on changes in legal interpretation would undermine the finality of judgments and open a floodgate of litigation, disturbing settled rights – The principle of finality of judgments was upheld [Paras 17-18].

Decision – Review petition and all associated interim applications dismissed – No order as to costs [Para 19].
 

Murder - Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Chain of Events Incomplete - The accused was convicted of murdering the deceased based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution failed to establish a continuous chain of events leading exclusively to the guilt of the accused, leaving room for doubt. The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain without any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The conviction was overturned, and the accused was acquitted [Paras 25, 28, 33, 49].

DNA Evidence - Delay in Collection and Chain of Custody - Acquittal - The prosecution relied on DNA evidence linking the accused to the crime. However, due to significant delays in collecting and forwarding samples for DNA testing, and a broken chain of custody, the court found the DNA evidence unreliable. The absence of proper documentation for the transfer of samples further weakened the prosecution's case, leading to acquittal [Paras 42, 44, 46].

Absence of Corroboration - “Last Seen Theory” Insufficient to Convict - The prosecution’s reliance on the “last seen theory” was insufficient for conviction due to a significant time gap between the accused being seen with the deceased and the time of death. The court held that in the absence of corroborative evidence, the accused could not be held guilty of murder solely based on the last seen theory [Paras 52, 55].

Benefit of Doubt - Evidence Inconsistent with Prosecution's Case - The evidence provided by witnesses, particularly the minor son of the deceased, was inconsistent with the prosecution's case of enmity and animosity between the accused and the deceased. The court granted the accused the benefit of the doubt due to inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies and evidence [Paras 58, 62].

Decision - The appeal was allowed, and the conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside. The accused was acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case [Paras 67, 69].

Civil Law – Second Appeal – Permanent Injunction – The appellant sought a permanent injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering with possession of the disputed property – The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court confirmed the dismissal – Held: Both the trial court and the first appellate court did not err in dismissing the suit as the appellant failed to identify and prove possession of the property on the ground – The appeal was dismissed [Paras 1-9].

Burden of Proof – Failure to Prove Possession – In a suit for permanent injunction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove possession of the property as on the date of filing the suit – Held: The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence, such as the exact location of the property, and was unable to identify the property on the ground when the Advocate Commissioner visited – The suit and appeal were rightly dismissed [Paras 10-20].

Appointment of Advocate Commissioner – Delayed Petition – The appellant filed a petition for the appointment of an Advocate Commissioner after a delay of 12 years, claiming that the respondent had obstructed the survey – Held: The court rejected the application as the delay was unexplained, and the appellant had opportunities to appoint a commissioner earlier but failed to do so [Paras 21-30].

Decision: Second appeal and interlocutory applications dismissed – No costs awarded to either party.

Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Petitioner accused of sexual assault under sections 376, 417, 420, and 354(D) of IPC – Allegations based on a promise to marry, which later did not materialize – The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual, and the promise to marry was not false from the outset – High Court examined the distinction between breach of promise and false promise – Held: The factual disputes raised require evidence to be recorded, and it cannot be quashed at this stage [Paras 1-9].

Consent – Misconception of Fact – The victim alleged that the consent for a sexual relationship was based on the petitioner’s promise to marry her, which he did not fulfill – The court considered whether the promise was made with mala fide intentions or if the circumstances changed subsequently – Held: The issue of whether consent was obtained through a misconception of fact must be decided after a full trial, as the material prima facie indicates a possible false promise [Paras 10-15].

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Invocation – The court dismissed the petition to quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., citing the need for the trial to resolve contested facts – It noted that the allegations made by the complainant were not inherently absurd or baseless – Held: Criminal petition dismissed, as this case does not meet the criteria for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Paras 16-20].

Decision: Criminal Petition dismissed – Proceedings under P.R.C. No. 38/2022 to continue in the trial court – Interlocutory applications, if any, are also dismissed.

Civil Procedure – Recall of Witness – Change of Counsel – Ineffectiveness of Previous Cross-examination – Petitioners sought to recall the respondent-landlord for further cross-examination after changing their counsel, arguing that the previous counsel had not effectively cross-examined the witness – Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding that inefficiency or omission by previous counsel does not warrant recall of the witness – Held: The Court found that the petitioners had ample opportunity for cross-examination, and allowing the recall application would lead to unnecessary delays – Application for recall rejected – Revision petition dismissed [Paras 3, 4, 7, 10, 11].

Powers of Court – Order 18 Rule 17 CPC – Court's Discretion to Recall Witness – It was reiterated that Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is intended for the convenience of the Court and not for parties to re-open or fill lacunae in their case – Recalling a witness cannot be allowed merely due to a change of counsel or dissatisfaction with the previous cross-examination – Reference made to various judgments reinforcing this principle [Paras 7, 8, 9].

Eviction Proceedings – Personal Necessity – Delay Tactics – Petitioners accused of delaying the proceedings by filing repeated applications for further cross-examination – Held: The application was a tactic to delay the eviction proceedings, filed more than eight months after the previous cross-examination – Repeated adjournments were noted in the order [Paras 3, 10].

Decision:

The revision petition was dismissed as meritless, upholding the Rent Controller's order rejecting the application for recalling the witness. The Court found no error of jurisdiction and emphasized that the petitioners had sufficient opportunity for cross-examination previously [Paras 11, 12].

Bail under UAPA – Long Custody – Article 21 of the Constitution – The appellant has been in custody for over 2 years, 4 months, and 17 days. The appellant was nominated based on a co-accused’s disclosure statement, and despite serious allegations, no charges have been framed yet. Held: The appellant’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution was being violated due to prolonged custody. The court emphasized that long custody without trial progress is grounds for bail under UAPA, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb and similar cases. Bail was granted, subject to conditions [Paras 6-8].

Serious Allegations Alone Not Sufficient to Deny Bail – The court referred to the principle that serious charges alone cannot justify the denial of bail if the accused’s prolonged incarceration infringes on their constitutional rights. The court highlighted that other co-accused had been granted bail and noted the lack of progress in the trial as a critical factor in granting the appellant bail [Paras 9-10].

Decision:

Bail Granted – The court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The appellant was released on regular bail subject to conditions, including furnishing a bond of ₹1 lakh with two sureties, surrendering his passport, and adhering to court dates. The court underscored that the observations made were limited to the bail appeal and did not affect the merits of the ongoing trial [Paras 12-14].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonor of Cheque – Presumption of Liability – The petitioner issued a cheque for Rs. 8,00,000, which was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The complainant provided evidence of the cheque, the dishonor memo, and service of legal notice, which the petitioner failed to rebut. Held: The presumption of liability under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies, and the petitioner failed to present a probable defense [Paras 7-10].

Legal Notice – Proper Service Established – The petitioner disputed the proper service of the legal notice but failed to provide sufficient evidence to support this claim. The court found that the notice was served at the address mentioned by the petitioner, and the statutory requirements were satisfied [Paras 12-13].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Limited Scope – The court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the CrPC is limited to supervisory review and cannot re-appreciate evidence unless there is a gross miscarriage of justice. Held: No such miscarriage of justice was found, and the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts were upheld [Paras 17-19].

Decision:  The criminal revision petition is dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of two years' imprisonment and compensation of Rs. 8,00,000 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are upheld. The petitioner is directed to surrender to serve the sentence, and the trial court is instructed to release any amount deposited by the petitioner to the respondent on filing the appropriate application [Paras 20-21].

Chamber Allotment – Transparency and Notification – Vacancy in Chamber No. 103 – Petitioner challenged the re-allotment of Chamber No. 103 on the grounds that the vacancy was not transparently notified to the general body of lawyers, depriving her of an opportunity to apply for the chamber – Held: The Court observed that the allotment process lacked transparency as the vacancy was not formally advertised to all eligible members. Although such vacancies should ideally be notified to ensure fairness, the Court found no sufficient grounds to interfere with the allotment as the Respondents were senior to the Petitioner, and there was no certainty that she would have been allotted the chamber even if notified. Future vacancies must be notified to ensure transparency and fairness [Paras 10-14].

Medical Grounds for Chamber Exchange – Applicability – Petitioner sought the chamber on the grounds of her husband's medical condition, arguing that the proximity of Chamber No. 103 would assist in managing his care – Held: The Court noted that precedents for chamber allotments on medical grounds pertain directly to the health of the allottee, not their spouse. The medical condition of the Petitioner’s husband did not justify interference in the allotment decision [Paras 12].

Seniority in Chamber Allotment – Guiding Principle – The Chamber Allotment Committee follows seniority as the main criterion for allotment or exchange of chambers – Held: Since Respondents No. 4 and 5 were senior to the Petitioner, they had a stronger claim to the chamber. Even if the vacancy had been notified, the outcome would likely have remained unchanged due to the Petitioner's lower seniority. Additionally, no other senior lawyers challenged the allotment, further indicating that the result might not have differed [Paras 13].

Decision: Petition disposed of – The Chamber Allotment Committee is directed to ensure that future vacancies are transparently notified to all members to avoid similar grievances [Paras 14, 15].
 

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Cause of Action, Locus Standi, Limitation, Court Fees, Non-Joinder of Parties – Plaintiffs (appellants) sought declaration and injunction regarding property inherited from Tej Partap Singh – Suit challenged the validity of a Will dated 20.03.1971 and alleged oral Wills of other deceased family members, and contested over 23 sale deeds – Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, ruling that plaintiffs lacked locus standi, the suit was time-barred, and there was non-joinder of necessary parties – Findings upheld by First Appellate Court [Paras 2, 8-9].

Locus Standi and Cause of Action – Grandchildren’s Claim Over Ancestor's Property – Court held plaintiffs, as grandchildren of the deceased Tej Partap Singh, lacked locus standi to challenge his Will, as inheritance rights crystallize upon death – Grandchildren are excluded from Class-I heirs when direct children are alive under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act – Plaintiffs could only claim a share in their mother’s (deceased daughter of Tej Partap Singh) property, but not directly challenge the Will or other transactions regarding Tej Partap Singh's estate [Paras 30-32, 35, 40-41].

Limitation Period – Bar on Challenging Old Transactions – Claims against transactions executed from 1971 to 2005 were time-barred – Trial Court observed plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent the limitation law by asserting a later "discovery" of facts – Held: Plaintiffs cannot claim inheritance rights directly from Tej Partap Singh or his wives as their mother never contested the Will during her lifetime, and limitation cannot be bypassed by creative drafting [Paras 50-51, 53, 58].

Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – Numerous transactions involved third-party transferees who were not joined in the suit, making the suit defective under Order I Rule 9 CPC – Effective decree could not be passed in their absence, thus defeating the relief sought [Paras 59-62].

Court Fees – Applicability of Ad Valorem Fees on Challenged Transactions – Plaintiffs required to pay ad valorem Court fees as they sought cancellation of transactions executed by the deceased without being in possession – Relief sought was substantive and plaintiffs were held liable to pay fees based on transaction values, rather than a nominal amount [Paras 63-65, 71].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Trial Court’s rejection of plaint upheld as plaintiffs lacked cause of action and locus standi – Suit was barred by limitation, non-joinder of necessary parties, and improper valuation of Court fees – Reaffirmed that plaintiffs, as non-Class I heirs, have no direct claim over the ancestral property while direct heirs are alive, and inheritance rights cannot be challenged decades after the succession is settled [Paras 73-74].